Metro Cagayan de Oro

12 January 1943

Smacking of medieval warfare and looming unique in the history of the Bukidnon guerrillas, was the protracted siege of Malaybalay undertaken by the Cotabato Bukidnon Force of SALIPADA K. PENDATUN which lasted for some fifty-three days from 12 Jan to 6 March 1943. It was a tale of sheer courage, determination and devotion to duty.

Pendatun fought against the Japanese during the Second World War, forming a group called the Bolo Battalion, which evolved into the larger group, Muslim-Christian Guerrilla Movement and later, the Cotabato-Bukidnon Force.

As a USAFFE officer during World War II, Pendatun organized and commanded the 102nd Regiment under the 101st Division of the Philippine Army/Constabulary from 1942 to 1943. He prevented the total destruction of the regiment during the Japanese invasion of Mindanao in early 1942. As part of the guerrille movement, he launched an assault on Japanese garrison in Pikit in September 1942, and led a raid on the Japanese garrison at Kabacan on October 25, 1942.

He also eliminated the Japanese garrison at Kitaotao, Bukidnon on December 4, 1942 and rescued Filipino prisoners of war at Casisang, Bukidnon on December 24, 1942 and led the two-month siege on a Japanese garrison at Malaybalay, Bukidnon. For his accomplishments, Pendatun was promoted to Brigadier General and was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Star, the second highest military decoration given to AFP Personnel.

Major Frank McGEE’s forces occupied strategic places between Dalwangan and Malaybalay. Almost simultaneously, Lieut ARLINDO F. ANGELES’ Engineering Group undertook the destruction of all bridges North of Kalasungay. In the dead of the night of 11 Jan 1943, Kabakan Bridge was blasted. with dynamite, with the deafening detonations of the explosion heard far and wide. It was an announcement to the Japs in Malaybalay that something serious was afoot.

Previous to this, however, the Japs sensing trouble, had begun transferring Prisoners of War from Casisang to Malaybalay and thence to Cagayan.

Note: Had the PENDATUN forces succeeded in gaining full control of the National Highway from Dalwangan to Kalasungay, the Japs in Malaybalay would have been entirely cut off from contact with their garrisons in the North.

By this time, there was absolutely no more Jap garrison South of Malaybalay, except possibly that in Kabacan, Cotabato, 160 kilometers away. Datu UGTOG MATALAM’s forces occupied positions in Upian, Aroman, Cotabato, to cut off any enemy reinforcements from Cotabato – which act of the enemy which was then considered a remote possibility.

The Japs in Malaybalay were determined, however, to keep the Dalwangan-Malaybalay Road open. At 5:00 AM, 12 Jan 1943, Japanese patrols sent to investigate the condition of Kabacan bridge, encountered a platoon underLt ROSALES JUNI. That day, another platoon under Lt LORENZO DEFUNTORUM encountered a light Japanese patrol in the vicinity of Kalasungay. In both encounters, the enemy employed heavy weapons but without effect – there were no casualties on the guerrilla side. That same day, a strong Japanese outpost with heavy weapons, guarded the immediate vicinity of Kabacan while the Kabacan bridge, dynamited by the guerillas the day previous, was being repaired by the Japs.

On 14 Jan 1943, Major McGEE and a few men occupied Dalwangan and captured four Filipino Jap Policemen who first resisted but later gave up, having been convinced that their position was untenable.

Guerrillas Enter Malaybalay

At 4:00 AM, 15 Jan 1943, LEUTERIO and twenty-six enlisted men attacked the Central School Building, Alhambra Cine and Governor ANTONIO RUBIN’s residence.

Simultaneously, Lt SALVADOR GA and nineteen men of MC GEE’s troops attacked the Japs in the Forestry Building. In both attacks the Japs replied with heavy weapons, mortars and machine guns but to no avail. None of the guerrillas were hurt.

At 9:30 on the same day, Lt FELICIANO CASTELO and his men crossed the Sawaga

River and marched towards the PC Barracks occupied by Filipino BC’s under Lt JUAN LAGRAMA, Prisoner of War. LAGRAMA offered to surrender all arms and ammunition in the possession of the BC’s under him. But while the negotiations were going on, ROQUE ASENERO, BC, unnoticed slipped away and informed Cap ALVIAR who in turn informed Capt YOSIOKA, the Jap Commander. Immediately, Lt. CASTELO’s position was shelled and machine gunned.

In that exchange of fire, the BCF’s (Bukidnon-Cotabato Forces) lost five men and seven wounded. Casualty of the enemy was believed high. That act of treachery on the part of a Filipino engendered deep rancor in the hearts of the guerrillas.

Action on the Northern outskirts of Malaybalay was fast and furious. This was the sector alloted to the McGEE forces. While Lt. JUNI and his men were fighting the Japs in Kalasungay, Lt GA and his men with a commanding position in Sumpong Hill ambushed Jap foot soldiers going to the Forestry Building from the Normal School Building. Two rifles were taken from the enemy. Eighteen Japs dead, twelve of which were killed by Corp PAJO. No casualties on the guerrilla side.

Japs Capture A Guerrilla Officer

On 28 Jan 1943, in the vicinity of the Sumpong Hill, JUNI and his company, another platoon led by Lt. FRANCISCO AZOONA and a third group under Lt. CONRADO TADEO, locked horns with a considerable number of Japs. In this encounter a Jap Captain MIRAT was killed. Capt GIL ALTAMIRANO, Executive Officer of McGEE, was captured by the enemy and subsequently tortured to death.

By then Malaybalay was a town of foxholes. Even the Filipinos insiders were in foxholes.

One skeleton battalion under Capt ORBASE succeeded in driving the Japs from the PC Barracks and occupied it as well as the Bukidnon High School Grounds and the area West of the road near Governor RUBIN’s mansion.

Japanese planes bombed and strafed continuously guerrilla positions in Kalasungay, Casisang and Impalambong. Some eighty bombs were dropped by the enemy without any casualties. Based on their proximity, these planes most probably originated from the small auxiliary/dispersal airfields at Malaybalay, Valencia, Maramag, Impasug-ong, Dalwangan, and Kibawe, and the Del Monte Airfield Complex in Tankulan, Maluko (present day Dicklum, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon).

In various assaults made by BCF men, the guerrillas suffered four casualties.

Catapult Captured Bombs

In the later part of February, action was intense. The guerrillas were using bombs retrieved from the Maramag Landing Field. These were thrown to the enemy positions by means of catapults. The depletion of the Japanese forces began to show. This was confirmed by prisoners escaping from the town to the protection of the guerrillas. They revealed that the beleaguer-

ed Japs were thinking of surrendering if the expected aid from the North did not come on time.

On 23 Feb the biggest number of prisoners escaped from Malaybalay and included Lt Col LUIS M. DELGADO, Capt GRISPINO DE CASTRO, Lt ALFREDO BUSTAMANTE, ALFREDO BAKING, MALACAS MEDINA, FRANKLIN LABAON, F. ABUNDA, SAYUSAY and many enlisted men. Most of the officers and EM were ill. Some of these were later to join the guerrillas and play an important part in future history.

An answer to the frantic call for help of the Malaybalay garrison came in the form of about thirty-five Japs from the North, who were engaged incessantly by the guerrillas while enroute. More followed and three hundred of them finally entered Malaybalay at 5:00 PM, 6 March.

Due to shortage of ammunition, the guerrilla forces withdrew eight kilometers south of Malaybalay and maintained a front line extending from Bugcaon to Linabo.

The original strength of Japs in Malaybalay was more than 250. They were well entrenched, employing heavy and automatic weapons with a great amount of shells and other ammunition. They were aided by BC’s loyal to Japs.

Malabalay was not taken. But the very audacity of the attack and the protracted siege the guerrillas undertook struck a new note of fear into the heart of the enemy. Moreover, the action strengthened the confidence of’ the troops in their capabilities and opened the eyes of the Filipino defeatists. The possibilities for future moves were astounding and definitely encouraging.

The now Lt-Col FRANK D. McGEE, a West Point graduate, and unsurrendered USAFFE officer, was the strategist of the guerrillas in the Malaybalay operations. To him was largely due the credit of planning and putting into effect almost all the important strategy employed by the BCF in the Malaybalay siege.

Source: History of the Mindanao Guerrillas by the American Guerrillas of Mindanao (AGOM). Unpublished Manuscript.

12 November 1942

Why The Early Guerrillas In Mindanao
Factors Favorable For Guerrilla Growth:

a) Natural Barriers: Mindanao turned out to be a fertile field for originating, nurturing, maturing and welding into a compact organization, guerrilla units. The island abounds in jungles, irregular land surface, rivers, mountains, steep cliffs, swamps and two big lakes (Lanao and Mainit), all offering obstacles in the way of travel.

b) Absence of Highway, Good Roads: Battles fought on Mindanao, can hardly be engaged in by mechanized units, except on the Sayre and National Highways. Good roads, passable by bulky vehicles, are very rare. In place of roads are trails, most of them so small that when abandoned for a short time, they become untraceable. These trails cross and crisscross each other through a most irregular terrain covered with thick forests and rocky ledges, forbidding cliffs and other natural barriers. Such natural difficulties were to become a strong ally for the successful movement of guerrilla forces.

c) Food Plentiful: Mindanao lands are essentially agricultural that even in the middle of well-nigh impenetrable jungles, a ‘small clearing planted with corn, rice, bananas, camotes or other food-yielding plants, can support families. Even forest food products like sago, rattan shoots, edible wild tree’s fruits as durian, lanzones and pulps of certain forest trees, were plentiful. The jungles too offer plenty of game such as wild hogs, deer, monkeys, wild chickens and various birds. To cap it all, Mindanao is one of the most sparsely populated islands in the Philippines, taking into consideration its size. It has, by the census of 1900 less inhabitants than the province of Cebu. There was no scramble for food in the early days of the guerrilla movement!

(Photographs courtesy of the MacArthur Memorial Museum and Library, Norfolk, Va.)

d)  USAFFE Officers and Men add their experience: A considerable number of USAFFE officers and men did not surrender or if they had surrendered, many escaped or were released from the concentration camps. Outside of Japanese control, they became potent material for the guerrilla movement. It should also be said here with regret, that many USAFFE personnel made no effort to contribute in any way to the guerrilla resistance movement and reported to military authorities only after the landing of American troops in Leyte. Of the 33,000 guerrilla forces on Mindanao, all but thirty per cent comprised USAFFE men. Seventy per cent were civilian volunteers!

e) Americans were leaders: A total of 187 American officers and men, in various branches of Army service, but mostly from the Air Corps, plus a few American civilians, managed to elude the clutches of the enemy and were mainly responsible in solidifying into a strong organization the different and diverse guerrilla groups on Mindanao, assisted by Filipino guerrilla leaders. Mindanao guerrilla units, some springing into action immediately after the surrender, were whipped into line and in mid-1943, there were approximately thirty-thousand enlisted men and three-thousand officers in the solidified Mindanao Guerrilla Command. This was known and officially recognized by Gen. MacArthur as the Tenth Military District, United States Forces in the Philippines (USFIP), under the strong leadership of a non-pareil “Guerrilla Chieftain”. All of these units were activated in accordance with the Tables of Organization of the Philippine Army (Reserve Division).

How this organization came into being and succeeded in pushing its missions to a successful conclusion, is a story of so many stories, linked and interlinked to become an interlaced whole, one and indivisible. It is in great part, the story of Colonel WENDELL W. FERTIG.

Nucleus Of The Tenth Military District:

WILLIAM A. TATE, American-Negro-Filipino mestizo, who before the war was an employee of the Mindanao Autobos Co., and late Chief of Police of Momungan, Lanao (present day Balo-i, Lanao del Norte) under the Japanese, decided to revolt. Past midnight of 16 September 1942, TATE, in compliance with a prior arrangement made with Capt. LUIS MORGAN. American mestizo PC officer, crossed Panguil Bay in a sailboat with thirty-four men from Baroy, Kolambugan, Lanao to Tangub, Misamis Occidental. They were poorly armed but determined in their mission.

The intention was to surprise the puppet Japanese-sponsored officials in that and other municipalities and take away the arms and ammunition scheduled to be ready for delivery to the enemy authorities. These were kept in the municipal halls. TATE met no opposition, and the move was highly successful. He arrested several puppet officials, ordered them jailed and confiscated eighty-seven firearms which were waiting collection by the Japanese military.

Fertig Assumes Command – 4 October 1942

MORGAN followed two days later. The two guerrilla leaders moved from town to town in the Northern portion of Zamboanga, attempting to consolidate guerrilla units already in existence and creating new militia groups in places where there were none.

MORGAN and TATE, lacking in the fundamental essentials of strong leadership and knowing their own limitations, sought Col. WENDELL W. FERTIG through Capt. CHARLES W. HEDGES (later promoted Colonel), asking FERTIG to head the planned organization of the Visayas-Mindanao Force. Before the outbreak of the war, Col. HEDGES was the Logging Superintendent of the Findlay-Millar Timber Co at Kolambugan, Lanao with a commission as Captain in the Reserve, United States Army. He was a very close friend of Col. FERTIG. He also knew personally MORGAN and TATE and, in fact, met them at the Baroy beach when they came to request Col. FERTIG to command the proposed Visayas-Mindanao Guerrilla Force. Lending the weight of his friendship and influence, he aided in convincing Col. FERTIG to accede to the request of MORGAN and TATE. Col. FERTIG recognized the immediate need for united and concerted action in the attainment of a common purpose and agreed to assume command of the Mindanao Guerrillas, then going by the name “Mindanao-Visayan Force”. This was on October 1942. In his own words, quoted from a radio message to Gen. MacArthur:

“The unification of the scattered guerrilla forces is made with the end in view of eliminating dangerous friction ‘between them and coordinating their efforts against the enemy x x x.”

Thereafter he concentrated his efforts, time and energy in the reorganization, organization and administration of different guerrilla units in Mindanao, beginning with Misamis Occidental and Zamboanga. All guerrilla groups, one by one, fell in line under the new leader, Col. FERTIG, who was soon to initiate similar plans to unify all scattered guerrilla units on the island under one unified command.

On 12 Nov 1942, the guerrilla units in Misamis Occidental and Zamboanga were formed into the 106th Infantry Regiment, the first regiment to be activated under the command of Col. FERTIG.

WENDELL W. FERTIG, an American mining engineer in the Philippines, was called to active duty with the Corps of Engineers early in 1941; served on Bataan and in March 1942, was flown to Mindanao to continue the construction of airstrips. When the order of general surrender came, he refused to surrender but stayed in Kolambugan, Lanao where, when TATE and MORGAN started the guerrilla resistance movement, he accepted the offer to take command of the organization. A man of vision, Col. FERTIG saw in the movement tremendous possibilities ahead though attendant with multiple hardships, deficiencies and heartaches, but the coming events justified his hopes.

FERTIG’s immediate goal resolved into:

a) Smoothing out rivalry among loose, roving bands of scatter-ed guerrillas to prevent the development into serious, internal conflicts resulting from petty misunderstandings and feelings of distrust between themselves;

b) The unification of all guerrilla groups into one compact command to be more effective in the prosecution of plans against the enemy; and

c) Making definite provisions for the security, protection and maintenance of the fast-expanding troops. The last included the organization of an essential intelligence net to know the strength, movements and plans of the enemy.

Source: History of the Mindanao Guerrillas by the American Guerrillas of Mindanao (AGOM) Unpublished Manuscript

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10 November 1944

On 10 November 1944, about 3:00 AM, no less than 400 Jap regulars and marines riding in Q-boats, launches and boats, landed at Madaum under cover of darkness.

The men of Cos “G” and “H” deployed along the beach of Madaum discovered the presence and immediately fired at them, inflicting some casualties. The Cal .50 machinegun (MG) sunk one launch and damaged others in the early part of the encounter. The fight along the beach continued until daylight with the enemy still unable to gain a foothold.

The guerrillas centered their fire on the Japs alighting from the boats and those wading the waist-deep water, while the machinegun fired at the launches and Q-boats which were mounted with mor tars and cal .50 MGs.

ENEMY ESTABLISH BEACHHEAD

The stiff and stubborn resistance offered by the guerrillas, prevented the enemy from establishing a beachhead until 7:00 AM when fresh reinforcements from Davao City arrived and the assault was shifted to Galinan beach, two kilometers away penetrating through the sitio of Gogon at Madaum.

The Japs then occupied Madaum up to Hijo River; after a hotly contested battle. The enemy despite heavy losses in men, continued to advance, and the guerrillas, in danger of being encircled due to numerical inferiority, withdrew from the beach and from Madaum.

While the fight was in progress at Madaum, another Japanese force of about 200 effected a landing at Busaoan, after receiving resistance from the OP of the Combat Co of twelve men under a non-commissioned officer.

GUERRILLA TROOPS RE-POSITIONED

As a result of the occupation of Madaum up to Hijo River, the companies of the 2nd Battalion with the Combat Co were withdrawn in an orderly manner and disposed of as follows: Cos “G” and “H” maintained a line of defense along the Utley-Apokon Road; a portion of the Ha & Ha & Service Co of Co “E” and of Combat Co were deployed at Canukutan bridge; Combat Co and Co “E” from Km 48 junction to Km 50, Bincungan-Magugpo Road; Co “K” at Apokon Road up to Magugpo crossing, while Co “M” was at Bucana.

Late in the afternoon, these companies were withdrawn and disposed of as follows: Cos “HE” and “G” at Magugop crossing; Co “E” deployed along Apokon Road; Co “F” at Magugpo-Pagsabangan Roads; Co “I” from Magugpo crossing to Km 56, Davao-Agusan Road; Combat Co at Km 60 to Km 62, Davao-Agusan Road, Co “K” at Km 57 to Km 60 of the same road, with outguards deployed along possible routes of enemy approach.

11 NOVEMBER 1944

On 11 Nov 1944, the enemy with fresh reinforcements from Davao, was discovered moving along the Bincungan-Magugpo Road to the National Highway. Our men immediately opened fire and killed two Japs. From 1:00 PM until dawn the next day, the fight continued with the guerrillas tenaciously holding their positions.

Early in the morning of the following day, however, the Japs used trench mortars and pushed back the guerrillas who withdrew to Km 59, Davao-Agusan Road. Again the Japs pursued the guerrillas at Km 58, Davao-Agusan Road, and another hot encounter took place in this area.

The guerrillas withdrew to Km 60, and from here.to Km 62; established a strong defensive position which the enemy failed to penetrate. The enemy withdrew and did not advance any further.

During the whole operation for the period from 10 to 13 November 1944, the total number of Jap casualties were undetermined but, definitely over 100, with many wounded, especially at the time of the initial attempts to take beachhead when our troops were in an enviable and excellent firing position. On the guerrilla side, one was missing or killed and three wounded.

Source: History of the Mindanao Guerrillas by the American Guerrillas of Mindanao (AGOM) Unpublished Manuscript

5 November 1944

The attack on Pagadian was undertaken to disperse the eighty to one hundred Japs entrenched in the heart of the town, who were heavily armed with one 50 cal machinegun, BARs, rifles, cal 25, and one stock mortar.

The attacking guerrilla mobile units had an average strength of fifty men and four officers in the nearest line of approach, and another fifty men as reserve appropriately distributed in the cordon of outposts covering the east, north and west of the town.

These mobile units occupied different houses in strategic places at varying distances from 150 to 500 meters away from the municipal plaza in such a manner that a semi-circle was formed with the enemy literally imprisoned within. Directly south of the town is the Illana Bay.

The mobile unit groups stationed in the different outposts alternated with each other in occupying the organized ground from 100 to 150 meters away around the enemy positions. The tour of duty of each mobile unit was twenty-four hours so that the Japs were kept under continuous watch by the guerrillas.

6 JAPS KILLED

On 5 Nov 1944, at 5:00 AM, “D” Co mobile unit under Capt C.I. CANTOY, Lt L. ASUELO and Lt M. CAMPO rushed unobserved to the concrete municipal building situated at the plaza. Here, the guerrillas entrenched themselves and fired on the radio station building, twenty five to thirty meters away. Three Japs standing at the doorway were easy targets.

About 6:30 AM of the same day, a Jap was observed looking out of the house of

a certain CABRALES by name of “BM” Co, He was a direct hit. A few minutes

later, two Japs bringing boards were seen at another nearby house belonging to

FLORENDO. They were fired at, one being hit.

At 8:30 of the same day, two Japs bringing a kettle were seen creeping from the radio station. They were fired at simultaneously by Corp D. RAMOS, Pfc A. ARMADA, and Pvt A MEDINA with 1 BAR and TSMGs killing them outright.

At 9:00 AM, operative BUARON detected a moving object among the bushes, apparently a Jap, but before he could fire, the Jap rushed to the radio station. A Jap peering through a small opening at the window of the station retaliated just missing BUARON’s head.

JAPS COUNTERATTACK

At 8:30 AM, the Jap counterattack began. Their .50 cal MG emplaced at DATOC’s residence about a hundred meters from the radio station riddled the municipal building with bullets, and shelled it three times.

Two were direct hits, splinters of which wounded Pvt ARTEMIO MERIDA. An order of retreat was issued to withdraw to a nearby coconut grove.

GOOD FIRE SUPPORT IN RETREAT

In the meantime, Jap riflemen had advanced to the east side of the municipal building, opened fire on the guerrillas rushing out the back door of the municipal building. But the guerrilla combat men posted north of the plaza, returned the Jap fire, thus supporting the withdrawal of their comrades.

7 November 1944: – Lt MORO LAO, Battalion Executive Officer with S-2 operatives with rifle grenades shelled the various Jap positions as did the combat men with six mortar shells.

8 November 1944: – At 4:30, Lt LAO with S-2 operatives shelled the radio station from behind hitting the roof at the western side destroying it.

About 8:00 PM, same night, Pfc ROLLEN, Pvts BUSTIDA and ACAIN, all of “D” Co approached the radio station and threw three grenades. Damage undetermined.

11 November 1944 – Early morning, rifle grenadiers led by Lt LAO, shelled the Japs sheltered in the houses of HOFILENA, DATOC and the Southern Mindanao Institute School building. The balcony of the school was hit, while the fire directed at DATOC’s hit the trench mortar.

The Combat Co also shelled the Jap garrison at 8:00 AM, 10:00 AM, and 12:00 noon with stock mortar.

12 November 1944 – In the morning, the Jap positions at CABRALES, FLORENDO and ECUIPADO were shelled by rifle grenades. At night, the guerrillas dug foxholes very close to the radio station. At the same time, the Special Mobile Unit and some enlisted men of Cos “C” and “D” under Capt CANTOY and Lt LAO, shelled the municipal building to attempt to

dislodge the Japs sheltered thereat.

13 November 1944 – By 6:00 AM, the municipal building was abandoned by the Japs and the guerrillas occupied it.

JAPS STUBBORNLY RESIST

At 7:30 AM, the Special Mobile Unit under Lt LAO, launched another attack on the radio station from newly gained positions. The building was badly battered but the Japs held to their position.

14 November 1944: – Again, Lt LAO’s men machinegunned the radio station. Grenadiers likewise did their part but the Japs resisted stubbornly.

15 November 1944: – An all-night operation was launched by Lt LAO’s Special Mobile Unit assisted by Co “A” under Lt N. BUYCO. But the Japs resisted with their stoke mortar and BARs.

16 November 19h: – The guerrillas continued the offensive with more determination. The radio station and DATOC’s house where the enemy was well-entrenched, received the brunt of concentrated fire. But no amount of firing could dislodge them.

JAPS BURN RADIO STATION

At 6:30 PM, the Japs appeared to have withdrawn from the radio station earlier in the afternoon and concentrated their own firing at the municipal building where the guerrillas had garrisoned. Then firing ceased, followed by shouts and suddenly the radio station was aflame. The house west of the Southern Mindanao Institute Building was also aflame. It was strongly believed that the Japs were cremating their dead.

17 November 1944: – At 7:30 AM, guerrillas of “BY” Co near AMOROSO’s house, killed a Jap carrying a piece of board. The rest of his companions who were inside the house scattered for cover to return fire.

18 November 1944: – At 10:00 AM, the Jap position in the town was shelled four times by the mortar squad. In the afternoon, the Japs launched a counterattack on “B” Co sector at Lumbia. The guerrillas resisted but at first with their ammunitions running low, a withdrawal seemed wise. The Japs succeeded in occupying the nearest approach of the guerrillas to the former’s position.

In the evening, “D” Co combat mobile unit and the left flank of “A” Co, advanced to about thirty yards from the Southern Mindanao Institute Building and entrenched themselves in foxholes.

19 November 1944: – The following morning, their newly entrenched positions, the guerrillas continued the attack.

From 7 to 8 AM, the Japs shelled the positions of the Combat Units of “A” and “D” Cos eight times, and that of Cos “C” and “B” three times. Pvt ATILANO CAPOL who went out of his foxhole to get drinking water was hit with shrapnel.

The men of “B” Co taking advantage of the counter offensive, launched by the Japs, re-occupied the line of nearest approach on the Lumbia side.

At 2:30 PM, the Japs taking advantage of the heavy rain crawled from their shelters at CABRALES, EQUIPADO and BALLESTEROS towards the area of Co “C” mobile unit.

SPEEDBOATS AID GUERRILLAS

25 November 1944: – At 5:30 AM, two speedboats which had been unloaded sometime before by US submarines at Tukuran Bay, armed with 20mm cannons, strafed the eastern side of the town. The maneuver was handled by Lt SINCLAIR (NOIC) assigned on duty with the “A” Corps, Western Mindanao, 10th Military District, expending a total of 180 rounds in three

drums with some incendiary and tracer bullets. The Japs retaliated with a few bursts of their .50 caliber machine gun but all their firing was overhead. The guerrillas sought in ground positions, fired also. It was a sight to see the Japs being fired at from all directions.

JAPS DISPERSE – 6 KILLED

At 7:30 AM, soon after the strafing, eight Japs were seen heading towards the east from the town. The guerrillas fired at them killing four.

About the same time, another group of Japs proceeded to FLORENDO’s neighborhood. One went up to a house while the others busied themselves cutting banana fruits. The guerrillas killed both.

The Japs burned the house of SERGIO ANGON, ANTONIO FLORENDO, VENANCIO GEMINTANO, FELIX BALLESTEROS, GREGORIO ABARRA, and CONRAD UBAS.

28 November 1944: – At 5:30 PM, a stocky Jap was seen coming from CABRERA’s

house by Corp BUANAELOR of “A” Co. He fired, felling him.

In this twenty-five day attack, the Japs suffered a total of sixteen dead, and an undetermined number of wounded. None were killed on the guerilla side with one wounded.

Source: History of the Mindanao Guerrillas by the American Guerrillas of Mindanao (AGOM) Unpublished Manuscript

30 October 1944

Misamis was considered the most strongly fortified garrison of the enemy in the province of Misamis Occidental. Since their wide-scale invasion on Northern Misamis Occidental and Zamboanga on 26 June 1943, they had entrenched themselves and found security in a four hundred year old moss covered Spanish fort situated on a promontory by the sea, appearing like an impregnable landmark that guards the gateway of the town from the Panguil Bay.

Historically known es the COTTA this fort is about five meters thick and five meters high of solid brick and encloses a ground area of one hundred meters square. Records of old say that the Spanish conquerors constructed this stronghold with the use of slave labor, and when finished served as an effective structure of resistance against frequent and daring Moro attacks and depredations.

For two and a half years, the Japanese invaders held this fort until on 10 December 1944 they were attacked by seven US planes in coordination with guerrilla ground troops.

43 DAY SIEGE

Before the arrival of the planes, the siege on Misamis by the guerrilla forces started on 30 October 1944 and continued for a period of forty-three days.

The entire command of the 106th Infantry Regiment participated except the lst Battalion. The following officers coordinated in their respective assignments, namely: Maj MARCELO BONILLA, CO, 106th Infantry Regiment, Capt DONALD WILLS, personal representative of the CO, “A” Corps, Lt T. SINCLAIR, USNR, Capt S. JULIGANGA, Acting CO, 2nd Bn, 106th Inf, and lst Lt PEDRO YLAGAN, CO, 3^rd Bn, 106th Infantry Regiment.

The strength of the enemy which garrisoned Misamis town proper on the initial day of the attack was estimated to be ninety Japs, all a part of the MoriButai and Takayama Chutai, and armed with two stock mortars, two .30 caliber machine guns, grenades, automatic rifles, and rifles.

On 30 October, the following guerrilla units were disposed according to plans before the attack, as follows: The Combat Co of the Ha Bn on the West; four companies of the 2nd Battalion at the Northwest; and three companies of the 3rd Battalion at the Southwest, in such a manner that the entire town block was covered at the East direction is the sea.

Initial contact with the enemy was made at exactly 5:30 AM with the use of two new US mortars emplaced at Bucagan Hill which had been easily captured by the guerrilla that morning. The attacking force moved slowly forward towards Misamis and by nightfall dug in rather than run unnecessary risk of advancing through open terrain.

PLATOONS WELL PLACED

The next day 30 October, the slow moving but well-planned advance resumed. “F” Co made initial contact with Jap outpost No. 2 stationed at the Misamis Institute Building; “E” Co reached a group of banana plants just two hundred yards from Jap outpost No. 1, with its first platoon some five hundred yards northeast of Jap outpost No. 1, and the second platoon occupying both sides of the Clarin-Misamis Road with Jap outpost No. 1 only a few yards away, and the third platoon about seven hundred yards away from Jap-held Misamis Institute. The soldiers of “H” Co, 2nd Bn Reserve were deployed at the swamp area North of the Cotta.

At 3:30 PM, “I” Co, of the 3rd Bn, watching the southwestern sector, assaulted the enemy guarding Bueszon Hill driving them to town. “L” Co reached Jap outpost No. near a chapel by the road to Tangub town. “K” Co occupied a line on the left of “L” Co and was only a few yards away from the Jap-held Misamis Institute Building.

The guerrilla troops crept slowly through the marshes for it faced direct fire that varied from moderate to intense, as well as fire from enemy snipers.

At dawn of 1 November, the attack raged in earnest. The Combat Co and “G” Co stormed the Misamis Institute Building; “K” and “L” Cos moved in towards Jap outpost No. 4. The Combat outfit of the 3rd Bn and “L” Co dislodged Jap outpost No. 5, while Jap outpost No. 3 was silenced. Along the road to Clarin, Jap outpost No. 1 was set on fire by men of “E” and “F” Cos.

The guerrillas in perfect order pressed the retreating enemy taking quantities of valuable supplies left behind. The attacking force advanced to the premises of the convent, right inside the town, with the Cotta only about half a kilometer away.

At 11:00 AM, an officers’ conference was hurriedly called by Maj BONILLA who was authorized to take the necessary measures in demanding surrender of the enemy who by that time were all inside the Cotta.

OFFER SURRENDER TERMS TO JAPS

Terms of surrender were sent to the Japanese Commander but were denied. So, the besiegers built up a line two hundred meters from the Cotta in the form of an arc extending from the concrete wharf to Catadman beach, thus making the Japs inside virtual prisoners. During lulls, the device of scaling the slippery walls of the Cotta with bamboo ladders was tried but was finally given up as futile.

When the planes left, the ground troops intensified the siege. The enemy answered with their machine guns and automatic rifles. Lt DOMINGO ABUAN was wounded and two soldiers of “I” Co instantly killed. Dusk came and with it heavier mortar shell fire and rifle fire from the enemy as if making one final desperate effort to fight back. The guerrillas held their front line. Exchange firing lasted until 11:00 PM.

JAPS ESCAPE

Shortly after daybreak, 11 December 1944, the guerrillas fired several times at the Cotta and receiving no reply, rushed inside only to discover that the Japs who withstood the grueling fire succeeded in escaping somehow out of the Cotta under cover of darkness. Only eight dead bodies, one dying soldier, eighty-six burnt rifles, six boxes of ammunition, and ten cavans of corn were all that remained.

Investigations showed that after the enemy had fired their last mortar shell they escaped through the ladders left by the guerrilla themselves when they attempted to scale the wails.

In their flight, they followed the shoreline back of the Cotta passing Maningeol, Clarin, Sinacaban and on towards Sinonoc, twenty-two kilometers away from Misamis and nearer Jimenez.

SEVEN JAPS SURRENDER

Lt SCFRONIO AVANCENA, CO “E’ Coy upon learning that the escaping Japs had passed his sector (Clarin), led a patrol of fifteen men in pursuit. They overtook the enemy at Sinonoc beach who were pulling off in three bancas.

AVANCENA’S men and those of “I” Co, 107th Inf Regt under Lt Re PENARANDA fired at them. One banca was badly hit and sinking. The Japs in it tried to swim towards the other bancas only to serve as targets to the men on the beach. The second banca, with a load of about twenty seven men, next received the brunt of concentrated fire. In the meantime, Capt HAMID ARACID with ten men grabbed another banca and hurried in pursuit of the fleeing bancas. The third banca with fifteen men was well under way and could not be caught. Seven Japs who could not get into the two fleeing bancas waved a white piece of cloth and were captured by the HAMID group.

Total number of Jap casualties were ten killed and seven captured. On the guerrilla side, two killed, and one wounded.

-30-

18 June 1945

Combined American and guerrilla operations in the area of the 106th Division forced the remains of the enemy, as elsewhere, to flee to the mountains. 300 to 400 Jap troops sought refuge in the Mt Blik area, Cotabato (present day Talayan, Maguindanao), but hot on their trail were the combined American and guerrilla forces.

STRATEGY PLANNED

On the night of 17 Jun 1945, Capt DEMPSTER D. DROWLEY of the American Troops of “B” Battery, 222-AAA, S/L Battalion, presided over a conference of officers at the Sibutu Schoolhouse where the disposition of troops, plans of attack and enemy positions were studied, planned and decided upon.

Accordingly, lst Lt MORTON with thirty American troops together with 2nd Lt FORTUNATO CABALES, Inf (PA), 3rd Lt PRIMETIVO TORRES, Inf (PA) and the “F” Co, were assigned

Southeast of Mt Blik to attack the enemy on the right flank.

They started out for their position at 2:00 AM on 1§ Jun 1945, 2nd Lt VICENTE VALDEZ, Inf (PC) with twenty-five enlisted men of “G” Co and ten American troops left Sibutu soon after the conference to occupy their position about 200 yards east of the Mt Blik base from where they were to attack the enemy’s left flank.

Sgt VENANCIO DIMLA, Inf (PC) with ten guerrillas of “C” Co together with Sgt SINGLETON and four other American troops were assigned to the back trails south of the enemy’s positions in the afternoon of 17 Jun 1945, their mission being to pick up enemy stragglers retreating that way. The Combat Co remained in its previous post guarding the Corporan~Litengan-Ranao Pilayan trails to prevent the enemy from going to Ranao Pilayan where food stuffs were plentiful.

Lastly, Capt DEMPSTER with Capt MACARIO CUBALIA, Inf (PC) and 2nd Lt BENJAMIN ENERIO, Inf (PA) together with fifty Americans and ten guerrillas of “G” Co were to carry on the frontal attack. They left Sibuto at h:00 AM on 18 Jun 1945.

Action started at 9:00 AM, 18 Jun 1945, and lasted till 2:00 PM.

The group of Lt VALDEZ attacked the enemy’s left flank and Sgt DIMLA with Sgt SINGLETON ambushed and killed eleven retreating Japs.

But there was a hitch in the plans. Lt MORTON’s group and Lt CABALES’ “F” Co lost their trail which caused them much delay. The enemy occupied three strategic positions of vantage on high ground and they easily gained fire superiority from their entrenchment over our troops.

TWO AMERICANS KILLED – THREE GUERRILLAS WOUNDED

Tao American soldiers were killed, namely: Sgt ALBERT G. MOSIER and Sgt. ROBERT L. MILLER.

The President of the United States of America, authorized by Act of Congress July 9, 1918, presented with pride the Distinguished Service Cross (Posthumously) to Sergeant Robert L. Miller (ASN: 17068190), United States Army, for extraordinary heroism in action while serving with Battery B, 222d Anti-Aircraft Battalion (Searchlight Battalion) in the Southwest Pacific Area, on 18 June 1945.

During military operations which culminated in the clearing of Japanese forces from Mindanao, Philippine Islands, friendly troops were advancing on an enemy-held objective when devastating fire emanating from a machine gun nest located on a hill dominating the approach halted the attack. Sergeant Miller volunteered to lead a squad in a diversionary action on the flank of the enemy position in order to facilitate the withdrawal of forces which were pinned to the ground by hostile resistance. He had maneuvered his squad to a position within 50 yards of the stronghold when the enemy opened fire with such intensity that further progress became impossible.

Armed with only a carbine, Sergeant Miller, completely disregarding his own safety, crept through the brush and cogon grass to within 20 yards of the emplacement. Leaping to his feet in full view of the enemy, he charged the position, deliberately exposing himself to draw the enemy’s fire so that his squad could assault the objective. He was struck immediately and mortally wounded, but, still attempting to advance, he fell to the ground within a few yards of the stronghold. His heroic action distracted the enemy long enough for his squad to eliminate the machine gun nest, thus relieving hostile pressure and enabling a withdrawal to a more favorable location from which to resume the attack.

Through his indomitable fighting spirit and unremitting determination in the face of overwhelming odds, Sergeant Miller made possible the successful completion of an important mission and his brilliant performance of duty was in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service.

Two others were missing for a number of days, namely: Corp CARROL F. JONES and T/ METRO A SCHURESKO. These two showed up during the last week of June 1945 at Dalican, haggard, ragged and hungry after wandering in the jungles of Mt. Blik. A native Tiruray found and guided them home and they were hospitalized in Cotabato.

Of the 119th Inf unit, three enlisted men from “C” Co, 2nd Bn, were casualties, namely: Pvts MELCHOR SALVADOR and CARLOS MODOC, wounded; while Corp ALFREDO CAOILI sustained a right knee dislocation from a bad jump during the confused retreat. There were also four civilian bearers (native Tiruray cargadors) wounded who were given medical treatment at Cotabato, while six were missing.

On the enemy’s side, twenty one were verified killed and an undetermined number of wounded.

The enemy’s arms consisted of one 90mm mortar, machine guns, BARs, 25 cal rifles and hand grenades. The American and guerrilla weapons consisted of two 60 mm mortar, six bazookas, BARs, TSMCs, carbines and a good number of  old Enfield rifles.

Source: History of the Mindanao Guerrillas by the American Guerrillas of Mindanao (AGOM) Unpublished Manuscript

25 October 1942

Kabacan, in the heart of Cotabato, was garrisoned by the Japanese in 1942, and the government run by puppet officials. When the Rio Grande Rubber Estate was sold by the Filipino Incorporators to the Japanese Imperial Government, it became the site for the provisional municipal government with Cenon Doctolero as the appointed mayor.

The guerrilla movement all over Cotabato was at fever pitch and the enemy garrison at Kabacan must be taken at all cost.

The siege started on 25 October 1942. Ali the puppet policemen including the Chief of Police and puppet Mayor surrendered en masse after due warning. They gave up all of their arms and ammunition, and they then volunteered to support with the guerrillas.

68 JAPS KILLED OUT OF 76

Early in the morning, the Japs coming out of the Kabacan garrison were ambushed. Twelve of them were killed including one Jap officer and one Filipino BC officer – Lt BALANAG by name.

The siege continued for fourteen days, carried on night and day. On 7 Nov 1942, another twelve Jap soldiers and one Filipino BC were killed. Maj BUYAO, Lt RAYMONDO F. FLORES, and Sgt MENEDSEN KAMBANG on the guerrilla side were wounded slightly by hand grenades.

The guerrilla force, a strength of one company, was commanded by Maj UDTOG MATALAM and Maj BUYAO.

Out of the seventy-six Japanese soldiers in the garrison, sixty-eight were verified definitely killed. The garrison was about to fall when a reinforcement of 250 Japanese troops arrived. Our troops were forced to retreat due to diminishing supply of ammunition, the constant complaint of all guerrilla units due to lack of means of getting ample supplies into enemy-occupied territory.

The guerilla force, a strength of one company, was commanded by Maj UDTOG MATALAM and Maj BUYAO.

Source: History of the Mindanao Guerrillas by the American Guerrillas of Mindanao (AGOM) (Unpublished Manuscript)

18 APRIL 1945

The Combat Battalion (Bn), 113th Infantry Regiment, 110th Division, stationed at Butuan, Agusan, with a total strength of 363 officers and men, aided by the 3rd Battalion (Bn), 113^th Inf Regt and supported by Navy Task Group No. 70.4, two LCIs Nos. 363 and 249 escorted by two LC’s Nos. 9 and 10, conducted an amphibious operation in Nasipit as per authority from Col. Wendell W. Fertig, CO, Tenth Military District, on a mission to eliminate the Japanese garrison at Nasipit, Agusan (now Agusan del Norte).

ENEMY POSITIONS SHELLED

On 18 April 1945 at 0300 hours, the Combat Battalion, a special unit organized to operate against Nasipit from the sea, left its embarkation point, Tinigbasan, just across Butuan Bay, for its objective. Two LCIs, Nos 363 and 249, escorted by two US gunboats Nos. 9 and 10 were utilized to bring the unit to its destination.

According to the account of this action by the of Commander Task Group 70.4 Lt. Albert C. Eldridge included in the summary report of thirteen missions to supply guerrilla forces on various enemy held islands in the Philippine area by units of task group 70.4 with participating vessels LCI(L) 361, LCI(L) 363, LCS 9, LCS 10, LCI 429 (temporary), the Nasipit Operation was part of its Mission No. 10 which started from the port of destination at Iligan, Lanao.

The LCI 361 split her shaft off the tip of Leyte island and had to be towed back to port by LCS 9, but before returning transferred part of her cargo to the LCI 363. The LCS 10 and LCI 363 then proceeded to Iligan and discharged part of her cargo and proceeded to Gingoog where the remainder of her cargo was discharged.

At Gingoog the LCS 10 and LCI 363 rendezvoused with the LCS 9 returning with the LCI 429 discharged part of her cargo at Gingoog in order to take on 220 of guerrilla Division Special Troops. The LCS 9 and LCI 429 then left and disembarked the troops at Diwata Point, Mindanao, to move southward and prevent Jap movements to the west from Nasipit.

The LCS 9 and LCI 429 took on 200 troops at Tinigbasan and waited for the LCS 10 and LCI 363 which were bringing the division chief of staff to command the landing guerrillas. The LCI 363 upon arriving at Tinigbasan, embarked 100 guerrillas and the four ships proceeded to Nasipit, arriving before dawn.

On the pre-dawn darkness of 18 April 1945, when the targets were visible, the gunboats No. 9 and 10 shelled Nasipit, particularly Punta and Talisay areas, the designated place of debarkation. The shelling was terrific. Shells and rockets were hurled into the enemy positions, with intense machinegun (MG) fire.

The task group bombarded the town from within and without the harbor for approximately one hour after which the LCIs bearing the troops then headed for the beaches with barking guns. Finally at 0730 hours, 18 April 1945, the troops landed, wading through sea water to the beach.

RESISTANCE LIGHT

“A” Co supported by “C” Co, landed at Punta. A beachhead was immediately established and “A” Co under the command of 1st Lieut JUAN CALO, swept the whole area to Kinabjangan bridge on the National Highway from the beach killing fourteen Nips on the way. At 0900 hours, Kinabjangan bridge and vicinity were in the hands of the invading forces.

The bombardment killed eight Japs and the guerrillas killed 54 Japs between the town and Buenavista, five miles east of Nasipit. The holding force previously put ashore at Diwata Point prevented the Japs from retreating westward. Only three Japs retreated in this direction and all were killed.

While “A” Co and “C” were establishing a beachhead at Punta on the North side of Nasipit, “B” Co under the command of 2nd Lieut ALEJANDRO MONTILLA effected a landing at Talisay of Nasipit proper from CCI No. 363. Immediately upon gaining the beachhead, “B” Co operated towards the junction of Nasipit-Carmen road, portion of the National Highway.

The 1st and 2nd platoons operating West of Nasipit proper met slight resistance which was immediately crushed. The 3rd platoon followed the National Highway to Nasipit proper. At O800 hours, Nasipit proper fell and the 3^rd platoon continued its movement towards the road junction to the rest of the company at 0830 hours when the road junction fell, after clearing the place of Jap snipers. “A” and “B” Cos made junction at Kinabjangan bridge.

“C” Co immediately took over and occupied Punta, Nasipit proper and Talisay areas and mopped up the area for stragglers and supplies. The objective was gained and taken, and ground was organized from Kinabjangan area to road junction Nasipit-Carmen on the National Highway for any counter-attack.

From the 19th until the morning of the 20th, the Japanese launched a heavy counter attack which was repulsed. The remnants of the Nips garrison at Nasipit were killed in the mopping up operation although a few succeeded in reaching Kiagta, another Jap garrison in Buenavista. Guerrilla forces killed twenty-four Japs in this operation.

Considerable Jap equipment and supplies were captured at Nasipit, including 3 machine guns, 20 rifles, 2 class A barges, ammunition, 20 drums of gasoline, food and fuel oil. The ammunition loot amounted to the largest yet found on the north coast and consisted of 105 mm and 70 mm howitzer shells, 60 mm projectiles and fuses, 37 mm anti-tank shells and .25 and .30 caliber rifle rounds. Also captured were one truck and one sedan in fair condition. The Navy machinist mates attached to the group had them repaired and transporting captured ammunition in the afternoon.

The LCS 9 and LCI 363 then stayed behind to furnish fire power if needed to prevent the Japs from returning to the town. The LCS 10 and LCI 429 discharged cargo at lligan the following morning and returned to Leyte. The LCS 9 and LCI 363 proceeded to Gingoog on the following day where the LCI 363 became stranded on the beach and had to wait until high tide to depart and return to Leyte.

Source: History of the Mindanao Guerrillas by the American Guerrillas of Mindanao (AGOM) Unpublished Manuscript, and Summary report of thirteen missions to supply guerrilla forces on various enemy held islands in the Philippine area by units of Task Group 70.4 under command of Lt. Albert C. Eldridge, Commander Task Group 70.4.

3 March 1945

The “Private Road” encounter came to be so called because it happened on a “Private Road” leading to a hacienda occupied by a Japanese enterprise before the outbreak of the war.

At 6:00 AM, 3 Mar 1945, a group of thirty to forty Japanese were encountered by the outpost of the Combat Co of the 110th Division Special Troops at the Taguibo steel bridge between kilometers 9 to 10 along the Butuan-Cabadbaran Road (Agusan Province).

The outpost fought for one and a half hours, then withdrew to join its company in a prepared line of defense. The Japs pursued the guerrillas but did not reach their main line of defense. They later deployed in the vicinity of the Taguibo steel bridge until 6:00 PM.

MORE JAPS ARRIVE

Just after dusk, a Jap column of ninety to one hundred men with four cartloads of supplies and an artillery gun dragged by a white horse appeared into view along the national highway from Cabadbaran proceeding to Butuan. There was tension all over the guerrilla line as every man waited for the order to commence firing.

When the column reached the left-most sector of “A” Co which was the center flank of the DST defense, every gun, BARs, TSMGs, carbines and Enfields simultaneously fired. A bloody fight followed. The Japs who were deployed in the vicinity of Taguibo steel bridge opened fire at the Combat Co entrenched in the left frank of the DST defense and tried to locate its left-most flank but failed.

The Japs from Cabadbaran tried to encircle “B” Co which was at the right flank of the DST defense but were driven back with heavy fire.

From 6:30 PM, 3 March to 2:00 AM, 4 March, the Japs desperately fought to save their supplies left in the road. They were able to drag the carts only a few yards. They dared not approach the artillery gun which was in the field of fire of “A” Co.

CAPTURED JAP FLAG AND GUN

At 2:30 AM, 4 March, a message was sent to the CO of the 2nd Battalion, 113th Inf Regiment at Antongalon (adjacent unit of the DST) for reinforcement but none arrived. However, at 3:30 AM, the enemy fire markedly weakened. The .30 cal MG emplaced on the right flank of “B” Co and the bazookas which were reserved, were moved to the defense positions of “A” Co and brought into action. Later a group of picked guerrillas rushed to the road and captured the artillery gun and the Japanese flag.

At 6:00 AM, 4 Mar 1945, a carbine platoon under 3rd Lt PLACIDO ABELLANA, CO

of “D” Co, DST, was organized to scout the area. At 7:30 AM, the 81mm gun opened up followed by bazooka rockets. The carbine platoon then advanced.

One squad of the Combat Co under Sgt MACARIO JUMAYA, captured a cartload of Japanese supplies, while Lt ABELLANA with his carbine platoon captured two others.

Total number of enemy casualties could not be determined, but were believed heavy. Two dead Japs were found in the battle ground after the Japs retreated. The guerrilla units which numbered 151 men were intact, unscathed.

Captured materials in the “Private Road” encounter were as follows: One artillery mountain gun, one Jap rifle, cal.25, one Enfield rifle cal .30 (No. 58015), five mortar shells (for Jap knee mortar), one Japanese flag, two cases of ammunition, twelve sacks of Saigon rice, twenty cans of canned beef, one Jap pack, one sack of salt, eight meat cans, three carabaos, one horse, two woolen blankets, one Jap cap, one fork, one spoon, four bayonets, two pairs of shoes, five aluminum cooking pots, three Jap grenades with pouches, one leather pouch, one Jap saber, three bolos, one pair of Khaki trousers, three carts, three boxes of toyo powder, one Jap shirt, two Jap bags, five hundred pesos Japanese money, one pocket book with Japanese writing, and several materials with Japanese inscriptions.

Source: History of the Mindanao Guerrillas by the American Guerrillas of Mindanao (AGOM) Unpublished Manuscript