After the Japanese invaded the Philippines in 1941, Mindanao was the last to surrender.
On May 27, 1942, forty eight days after the surrender of Bataan, Brig. Gen. Guy O. Fort, Commanding Officer of 81st Division of the Philippine Army, together with some of his men, marched out from their bivouac in the forest at Tamparan, Lanao, to present themselves to the Japanese commanderin Dansalan, now Marawi City. They were the last USAFFE troops to surrender to Japanese troops in Mindanao.
A month before the surrender of Mindanao and Visayas forces, the Battle for the Philippines was already lost. Bataan surrendered on April 9, 1942. Corregidor was under siege. MacArthur had escaped to Australia on orders of US President Franklin D. Roosevelt to regroup and lead the counter offensive from there.
Actually, the Japanese invasion of Mindanao had already started as early as December 20, 1941 when a small force landed in Davao. The Sakaguchi Detachment, soon left for Jolo Island and the Netherlands Indies, while another led by Lt. Col. Toshio Miura consisting of the 1st Battalion, 33d Infantry, plus miscellaneous troops, remained on Mindanao. Colonel Miura failed to extend his control into the interior even with air, artillery support and automatic weapons.
Taking Mindanao
The Japanese plan finally adopted provided for a coordinated attack from three directions by separate forces toward a common center, followed by a quick mop-up of the troops in the outlying portions of the island.
The Miura Detachment, already on garrison duty at Davao and Digos, was to be relieved by a battalion of the 10th Independent Garrison, and then strike out from Digos toward the Sayre Highway. Its route of advance would be northwest along Route 1, which intersected the Sayre Highway about midway across the island.0
The other two forces committed to the Mindanao operation, the Kawaguchi and Kawamura Detachments, would have to make amphibious assaults. General Kawaguchi was to take his men ashore at Cotabato midway along the west coast, at the mouth of the Mindanao River. From Cotabato, which was joined to Route 1 by a five-mile stretch of highway, he would send part of his force east toward the Sayre Highway to meet Colonel Miura’s troops marching west. The rest of the detachment was to land at Parang, about twelve miles north of Cotabato, and push north along Route 1, past Lake Lanao, then east along the island’s north shore to join with the Kawamura Detachment.
Kawamura was to come ashore in northern Mindanao at the head of Macajalar Bay, the starting point of the Sayre Highway. While a small portion of his force struck out to the west to meet Kawaguchi’s men, the bulk of the detachment would march south through central Mindanao, along the Sayre Highway. Ultimately, elements of the three detachments–one marching east, another west, and the third south–would join along the Digos-Cotabato stretch of Route 1 across the narrow waist of the island.
Late in April three battalions of the 10th Independent Garrison took over garrison duty on Mindanao, Cebu, and Panay. Colonel Miura immediately moved south from Davao to Digos to prepare for his advance along Route 1, while Kawamura and Kawaguchi began to embark their troops for the coming invasion.
First to sail was the Kawaguchi Detachment which left Cebu on 26 April in six transports escorted by two destroyers. Kawamura’s departure from Panay came five days later and brought him to Macajalar Bay as Kawaguchi’s troops were fighting their way northward to link up with him. Wainwright’s order to Sharp on 30 April, to hold all or as much of Mindanao as possible with the forces he had, found that commander already engaged with the enemy on two fronts.
On April 29, 1942 the Kawaguchi Detachment from Cebu landed in the town of Cotabato in two groups. One group sailed up the Rio Grande of Mindanao in Cotabato and the other in Parang. Filipino and American Forces fell back.
From April 30, 1942, the 61st Infantry Regiment defending the Matling River Bridge in Malabang fought a valiant see-saw battle against the Kawaguchi Detachment bolstered by air support, artillery and reinforced by five Type 97 te-ke light tanks. They first fell back to Km 65, then to Lake Dapao where the 61st Infantry Commander Col. Eugene Mitchell, and Constabulary Capt. Pastrana where captured by the enemy’s second column near Pualas, Lanao.
By May 3, the 73rd Infantry Regiment defending Bacolod Grande had to fall back to Kapai in the face of the relentless Japanese attacks again bolstered by overwhelming air support and four Type 97 te-ke light tanks.
On May 3, 1942, the Japanese Kawamura Detachment landed at Macajalar Bay, Cagayan, Misamis Oriental, the northern terminus of the Sayre highway. The Filipino and American defenders unsuccessfully defended the Macajalar Bay coastline and fell back inland to the Mangima line in Tankulan, Bukidnon. On the same date, additional Japanese troops landed in Malabang and Cotabato and proceeded northward with no opposition, forcing Col. Duque to order the 2nd Infantry Regiment to retreat to Oring Pass to avoid being encircled.
The last battles before the surrender were actually for control of the Sayre highway, north in Bukidnon and Cotabato in the south, and the Del Monte Airfields.
Prelude to Surrender
Major Max Weil (Hq. Comdt. and P.M.) describes the chaotic situation leading to the collapse and surrender of the Visayas-Mindanao Force (VMF) in his narrative report of the Headquarters (Hq.) and Headquarters Detachment, VMF, on May 3-10, 1942:
On May 4, 5, 6 and the daylight hours of May 7 were spent in Dalirig. The constant artillery and activity of hostile aircraft pointed to an attack imminent upon the Dalirig position. The General staff made its decision to move the headquarters to Impasug-ong during the night of May 7. This was affected in an orderly manner without loss of men or materiel.
May 8, May 9, and May 10 were spent in Impasug-ong. Due to enemy shell fire and air activity, our front lines withdrew from Dalirig to Maluko, and when our forces were routed from Maluko, the Commanding General, VMF made his decision to surrender to the enemy at daybreak, May 10, 1942.
On the night of May 9-10, it must be mentioned that fully 95% of the PA Officers and Enlisted Men of Hq. & Hq. Detachment misbehaved in the face of the enemy by fleeing from their posts and assigned duties.
Members of the Staff spent May 10, in negotiation with Japanese emissaries discussing surrender terms. On the evening of May 10, VMF Headquarters was moved to Malaybalay Divisional Area to await the concentration and internment of the North and South Forces of our Army.
When the order to surrender from General Wainwright to Gen. Sharp was received, the USAFFE’s Mindanao Force’s battlefield situation was perilous. The troops north of Sayre highway were reeling against the strong and relentless Japanese offensive. Behind their lines, Dalirig and Talakag were already taken. The remaining units were ordered to disperse into the mountains and continue guerrilla operations against the Japanese.
Thus, the northern portion of the Sayre highway was left open to the Japanese Forces. By May 10, 1942, the day of the surrender, the Filipino and American Forces in the northern portion of Sayre highway were already surrounded by the enemy. The Japanese forces under Major General Saburo Kawamura could have delivered the death blow had Gen. Sharp refused to surrender.
However, the southern end of the Sayre Highway was still in the hands of USAFFE. After organized retreats. Brig. Gen. Joseph Vachon established a defensive position along kilometer 88 at Kabacan, Cotabato. However, the successful defense of Gen. Vachon was a clever ploy by the Japanese to keep his troops tied up and prevent him from reinforcing the troops at the northern section of the Sayre highway.
The Lanao sector was commanded by Brig. Gen. Guy O. Fort who planned to defend Route 1 along Malabang to lligan, but his forces proved no match for the Japanese.
After the defeat of 61st Infantry at Malabang, he ordered a withdrawal to a prepared position at Kilometer 64 at Malabang Ganassi road. They were joined by 84th Provisional Infantry Regiment, 73rd Infantry, and the 81st Engineering Battalion.
However, before they could execute their defense plan, a Japanese motorized column broke into the line and captured the 61st Command Post. Unable to organize further resistance, the badly battered 73rd Infantry retreated to the wooded area east of Dansalan, allowing the Japanese forces to enter Dansalan unopposed.
These were the battlefield scenarios of the fast collapsing fronts just before the order of surrender was received by Maj. Gen. William F. Sharp, the commanding general of USAFFE Mindanao Force.
Surrender Orders
The order to surrender from General Wainwright was hand carried by Col Jesse T. Traywick, Wainwright’s Assistant Chief of Staff. Together with Lt. Col. Hikaru Haba, personal representative of IJA 14th Army Commander Lt. Gen Masaharu Homma, Traywick arrived in Cagayan, Misamis Oriental, in a Japanese plane.
After the two were driven to Cagayan, the headquarters of Major General Saburo Kawamura, commander of the detachment attacking south down the Sayre Highway, Traywick suggested he simply be driven along this highway to Sharp’s headquarters.
Kawamura had a different plan. Hundreds of letters were written by hand, signed by Traywick, and dropped by plane on the afternoon of May 9.
To COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE FRONT LINE:
I, having a very important message from Lieutenant General J. M. Wainwright, must deliver it personally to Major General William F. Sharp.
When anyone who receives this letter, he should raise a white flag visible to the Japanese Army and stop firing and the Japanese Army will do the same.
When both sides stop firing, you send a U.S.A. officer to the front line with a white flag. I will meet him.
In order to deliver my message to General SHARP as soon as possible you should be prepared to furnish a guide and a car for me.
May 9, 1942
Traywick protested in vain that this procedure was unrealistic and had little chance of success. At dusk, a Japanese officer drove him south toward Del Monte on the Sayre Highway. Traywick was given a small map, a canteen of water and pointed southeast. The Japanese officer told him American trucks were 60 kilometers ahead.
Traywick insisted it was a ridiculous mission, but the argument was useless. The American headed down a jungle trail in the pitch dark. He forded a river and climbed a steep ravine. Within an hour the trail ended and he pushed into dense undergrowth. He waded and swam across several small rivers and climbed more steep ravines, until at 2:00 a.m., May 10, he came to a nipa hut. He shouted. There was no answer. He walked into an empty house, lay down on a cot and tried to sleep. Just as he was dozing off, a kitten jumped on the bed, curling by his neck.
The two slept until dawn. When Traywick awoke he discovered he was in hilly, jungle country with mountains to the west. He started south and soon saw a Japanese machine-gun nest. He shouted. Five Japanese soldiers turned, looked at him in astonishment as he advanced with a piece of white sheet on a stick.
The weary, tattered colonel was driven back to Cagayan. This time he insisted on going up the Sayre Highway. “You can’t go far,” said Kawamura through an interpreter. “The bridges are blown.”
“I’ll go as far as I can, then walk.”
Accompanied by Colonel Haba, Traywick was again driven toward Del Monte. When they came to a blown bridge, the two men crossed on foot and continued down the Sayre Highway. It was a hot trip. Once they rested near three Japanese bodies. After they rose to leave, Tray-wick faced the dead soldiers and saluted. Colonel Haba bowed and patted the American approvingly on the shoulder.
Finally, that afternoon, they reached the American lines and were driven to Malaybalay. As he approached the building housing Sharp’s headquarters, Traywick rehearsed what he would say. If none of his arguments worked he would have to arrest the general.
He walked up to the tall, thin Sharp, handing him the letter of instructions.
Wainwright’s letter to Sharp read as follows:
Subject: SURRENDER
To : Major General William F. Sharp Jr Commanding, Visayas-Mindanao Force
To put a stop to further useless sacrifice of human life on the fortified islands, yesterday I tendered to Lt. General Homma, the Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines, the surrender of four harbor ports in Manila Bay.
General Homma declined to accept my surrender unless it included the forces under your command. It became apparent that the garrison of these said forts would be eventually destroyed by aerial and artillery bombardment and big infantry supported by tanks, which overwhelmed Corregidor.
After having met General Homma with no agreement between us, I decided to accept in the name of humanity his proposal and tendered at midnight 6-7 May 1942 to the senior Japanese officer in Corregidor the formal surrender of all American and Philippine Army troops in the Philippine islands. You will therefore be guided accordingly and will repeat, will surrender all your troops under your command both in the Visayas islands and Mindanao to the proper Japanese Officer. This decision on my part, you will realize was forced upon me by means beyond my control.
Colonel Jesse T. Traywick Jr., HSC, my Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, who will deliver this letter to you is fully empowered to act for me. You are hereby ordered by me as the senior officer in the Philippines Islands to scrupulously carry out the additional instructions as this staff officer may give you in my name.
You will repeat the complete text of this letter and of such other instructions as Col Traywick may give you by radio to General MacArthur. However, let me emphasize that there must be on your part no thought of disregarding these instructions. Failure to fully and honestly carry them can have only the most disastrous results.”
JONATHAN WAINWRIGHT
Lieutenant General, US Army
Col Traywick explained to Sharp the “disastrous result” probably meant the fate of the officers and men held prisoners or hostage in Corregidor should the other forces refuse to surrender.
Upon learning of this alternative to his encircled troops, Sharp decided to order the cessation of hostilities.
To Traywick’s surprise, Sharp made no protests but readily agreed to go forward and surrender to Kawamura. First he sent radiograms to his island commanders:
AS I HAVE NOT YET SURRENDERED, THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN YOU YESTERDAY RELEASING YOU FROM MY COMMAND ARE WITHDRAWN. I RESUME COMMAND AND DIRECT YOU TO CEASE ALL OPERATIONS AGAINST THE JAPANESE ARMY AT ONCE. YOU WILL RAISE A WHITE FLAG AND AWAIT THE ARRIVAL OF MY STAFF OFFICER WHO WILL MAKE THE TERMS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR SURRENDER OF THE FORCES UNDER YOU. THIS IS IMPERATIVE AND MUST BE CARRIED OUT IN ORDER TO SAVE FURTHER BLOODSHED. ACKNOWLEDGE.
SHARP COMMANDING
At 7:15 P.M he sent another message, this one to MacArthur: I HAVE SEEN WAINWRIGHT’S STAFF OFFICER AND HAVE WITHDRAWN MY ORDER RELEASING COMMANDERS ON OTHER ISLANDS AND DIRECTED SURRENDER. DIRE NECESSITY ALONE HAS PROMPTED THIS ACTION.
Men all over Mindanao began to surrender. Others were heading for the hills. Corporal Durward Brooks, former radio combat operator of the 28th Bombardment Squadron, was with a group of nine escapees They had tried to get their lieutenant to join them but his answer was, “I couldn’t live in the mountains. I’m from Boston.”
In Washington, General Marshall was reading a message from MacArthur:
I HAVE JUST RECEIVED WORD FROM MAJOR GENERAL SHARP THAT GENERAL WAINWRIGHT IN TWO BROADCASTS ON THE NIGHT OF THE 7/8 ANNOUNCED HE WAS REASSUMING COMMAND OF ALL FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES AND DIRECTED THEIR SURRENDER GIVING IN DETAIL THE METHOD OF ACCOMPLISHMENT. I BELIEVE WAINWRIGHT HAS TEMPORARILY BECOME UNBALANCED AND HIS CONDITION RENDERS HIM SUSCEPTIBLE OF ENEMY USE.
The Back Story
Here’s a closer look at what transpired between Wainwright, Sharp and MacArthur moments before the actual surrender of Sharp to the Japanese.
In the morning of May 6, his radio operator handed him a message from Wainwright
“TO SHARP SCFW 20X
ALL FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES EXCEPT FORCE ON THE FORTIFIED ISLANDS AT THE ENTRANCE TO MANILA BAY ARE RELEASED TO YOUR COMMAND INFORM ALL CORCERNED REPORT AT ONCE TO MACARTHUR FOR ORDERS I BELIEVE YOU WILL UNDERSTAND THE MOTIVE BEHIND THIS ORDER.”
However, before Sharp could wire MacArthur for orders the following message came through from MacArthur headquarters in Australia:
“WAINWRIGHT HAS SURRENDERED. FROM NOW ON COMMUNICATE ON ALL MATTERS DIRECT WITH ME. HAVE YOUR COMMUNICATIONS WITH CHYNOWETH?
MACARTHUR”
On May 7 Sharp received a confusing message from Wainwright informing him that he was taking back the command of all Visayas and Mindanao forces.
However, this was cleared up when Col. Traywick arrived at his headquarters and gave him the letter from Wainwright. Knowing what the “Disastrous result” meant for the fate of the surrendered troops at Corregidor, Sharp decided to obey the order to surrender.
On May 10 Sharp sent off the following order to forces in the Visayas.
“AS I HAVE NOT YET SURRENDERED, THE INSTRUCTION GIVEN TO YOU YESTERDAY RELEASING YOU FROM MY COMMAND ARE WITHDRAWN STOP I RESUME COMMAND AND DIRECT THAT YOU CEASE ALL OPERATION AGAINST THE JAPANESE ARMY ALL AT ONCE STOP YOU WILL RAISE THE WHITE FLAG AND WAIT THE ARRIVAL OF MY STAFF OFFICER WHO WILL MAKE THE TERM OF THE NEGOTIATION FOR THE SURRENDER OF THE FORCES UNDER YOU STOP THIS IS IMPERATIVE AND MUST BE CARRIED OUT IN ORDER TO SAVE FURTHER BLOODSHED STOP.
That same morning Sharp wired MacArthur the following:
“FOR MACARTHUR STOP I HAVE SEEN WAINWRIGHT STAFF OFFICER AND HAVE WITHDRAWN MY ORDERS RELEASING COMMANDERS ON OTHER ISLANDS AND DIRECTED COMPLETE SURRENDER DIRE NECESSITY ALONE PROMPTED THIS ACTION. “
MacArthur shot back a message while the forces in Visayas and Mindanao were busy implementing the plans for surrender as follows:
“ORDERS EMANATING FROM GENERAL WAINWRIGHT HAVE NO VALIDITY. IF POSSIBLE SEPARATE YOUR FORCE INTO SMALL ELEMENTS AND INITIATE GUERRILLA OPERATIONS. YOU OF COURSE HAVE FULL AUTHORITY TO MAKE ANY DECISION THAT IMMEDIATE EMERGENCY MAY DEMAND. KEEPING COMMUNICATION WITH ME AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. YOU ARE A GALLANT AND RESOURCEFUL COMMANDER AND I AM PROUD OF WHAT YOU HAVE DONE.
MACARTHUR”
Sharp’s decision to surrender could no longer be undone. He implemented instructions from the Japanese High Command, ordered all Filipino and American troops in Bukidnon, Cotabato, Surigao and Agusan to assemble in Malaybalay. Those in Lanao and Zamboanga were instructed to assemble in lligan. Those who survived the death marched from Dansalan to lligan were transported on a ship to Cagayan and thence to Camp Casisang in Malaybalay. Orders were also issued against destroying arms, equipment, and comply with all the given instructions by the Japanese commander. Camp Casisang in Malaybalay, Bukidnon, was the main concentration camp with 6,500 surrendered soldiers including General Manuel Roxas.
When Sharp was asked by the Japanese commander, “Why so few?” “That’s all I have,” he replied.
In reality many chose not to surrender had hid in the mountains to fight another day. Out of 36, 000 Filipinos and American troops in Mindanao, only 6, 500 entered concentration camps. Some surrendered only out of loyalty to their American officers, but the percentages of Filipino enlisted personnel who surrendered was negligible. About 200 Americans took to the hills.
Father James Haggerty S.J., a Jesuit priest who witnessed the surrender of 1,500 Filipino soldiers at Sumilao, Bukidnon said, “Tomorrow, if I’ve correctly judged the temper of those boys, you’ll have about seven hundred left,” he told Col. Tarkington, an American officer who participated in the surrender rites to the Japanese.
“The Japanese gave us the side towards the mountain,” he continued, referring to Mt. Kitanglad, not far from the convent of Sumilao church, the site of their surrender.
In the morning, only four hundred of the 1,500 soldiers remained. The rest disappeared into the vast mountain range of Mt. Kitanglad during the night.
Haggerty described how it was days after the surrender.
“Fr. Kirch and I remained in the convento and church for about a week while there were about 150 Japs who guarded the surrendered equipment. During these days, each night some of the boys would sneak into the convento and haul some valuable things including ammunition and some packs thrown away by our soldiers for hiding near the farm at Bontongon. The boys buried rifles and two machine guns under the ground floor of the convento. “
Roxas did not want to surrender. He stayed behind when Pres Quezon left for Australia. However, the living conditions in the mountains of Bukidnon were too harsh for his age. He decided to slip inside Camp Casisang as the camp security was not too strict. He was later discovered and ordered to be executed by the Japanese Military Administration. Col. Nobuhiko Jimbo, the interrogation officer, recognizing Roxas value to the Philippines, defied the order. Roxas was sent to Manila and placed under house arrest.
The surrender drew mixed reactions. American officers pleaded with Filipino soldiers but to no avail. Very few surrendered and only because of their loyalty to their American officers.
Raring to go to action were men from Agusan and Surigao who had not yet seen actual combat. Reserve troops in Malaybalay headquarters were waiting for their chance to fight what was expected to be a glorious defense like Bataan. Troops in coastal Lanao and Misamis Occidental who had not tasted actual combat were also itching for a fight.
Col. Ben-Hur Chastain, commander of Agusan-Surigao sector, complied with the order to surrender even if he was more inclined to fight further with the Japanese.
As a result of the order to surrender, a good number of defiant Filipino troops in Mindanao took the order to surrender to leave their units bringing their weapons and went home to their families. Those who could not go home, hid in the hills hoping to continue the fight and praying for reinforcement from America to arrive.
In an interview with this author, the late 2Lt Sotico L. Calejesan said that together with some fellow Kagay-anon soldiers assigned in Davao, they left their units and went home to their families in Cagayan, Misamis Oriental. They avoided the highway for fear of being caught by Japanese patrols. They took great risks by trekking through the jungles. They stayed close to Mt Kitanglad and navigated its uncharted foot hills until they reached Libona, the boundary town between Bukidnon and Cagayan, Misamis Oriental. They hacked their way through the thick jungle and gambled with their lives. They bravely faced death rather than live on a bended knee.
In Lanao, when the order to surrender reached General Fort, he said “as a soldier, I have no other alternative to follow but to obey orders. I expect you to do the same. No desertion will be tolerated.”
Following the reorganization of the Lanao Force and the relocation of the headquarters to different locations, General Fort was contacted by Lt. Colonel Mitchell, Colonel Dalton, and Major Prichard. They brought an order from General Sharp instructing him to surrender. Initially hesitant due to conflicting instructions, General Fort eventually made the difficult decision to surrender his division in the early morning of May 27, 1942, at Dansalan, now known as Marawi City.
As commander of Filipino and American Forces in Lanao including the Moro Bolo Battalion, he was the last to surrender.
However, the officers and men of the Moro Bolo Battalion who took their oath before the Holy Koran to fight to death could not be compelled to surrender. Fort, familiar with the ways of the Moro people, allowed them to go home with their rifles.
Fort recalled an order given to one of his officers, Capt Bayers, whom he sent out to organize a guerrilla band but it was not known if Gen Fort strictly implemented his order and forced the surrender of his men.
Datu Busran Kalaw, one of the leaders of The Maranao Militia Force, following the culture and tradition of a true Moro warrior, also refused to surrender and continued to harass the Japanese forces in Tamparan.
One of the unsurrendered American officers in Lanao was Col Wendell Fertig. He was an army reservist and a mining engineer before being called to active duty. When asked what his options were, he reportedly replied “Anything but surrender.” He later successfully organized the guerrilla movement in Mindanao under one unified command.
In his Memoirs, Fertig wrote, “Truly Mindanao was a land of milk and honey, but here was planted the first thought that I should not be able to go to Australia as planned, these hills (around Dansalan) were free, food was plentiful,, and I had no intention of spending my years as a prisoner of the Japanese.”
Fertig was plowing the field of a homestead in Momungan, Lanao (present day Balo-i, Lanao del Norte), belonging to an American veteran of the PhilippineAmerican War when Capt. Luis Morgan, former Philippine Constabulary Commander, and William Tate (Japanese appointed Chief of Police) handed him the command of about 500 fully armed guerrillas they organized in Lanao and Misamis Occidental.
Under his leadership and organizational skills, the strength of the Mindanao guerrilla front eventually grew to 36,000 fighting men under one unified command as the 10th Military District, United State Forces in the Philippines.
In Cotabato, there was one exceptional Filipino officer who did not surrender. Lt Salipada Pendatun, a Maguindanao Moro whose lineage could be traced to the Prophet Mohammed, argued with his commanding officer to let him and his troops continue fighting a guerrilla war against the enemy. Pendatun was a lawyer and an army reservist before the war. He was a budding politician of his native province of Cotabato. He survived the war and became a senator of the Philippines.
Apparently, using as argument the order of MacArthur to disperse into small elements and continue fighting a guerrilla war, his commanding officer relented.
Together with troops under his command and other men and officers who also refused to surrender, they hid in the mountains of Cotabato with arms, ammunition, and logistics.
Organizing the Resistance
After a short hiatus to consolidate their forces, Lt Pendatun, Datu Udtog Matalam, and Datu Dilangalen, started an organized resistance. The band of guerrillas was successful in harassing Japanese troops and attacking Japanese detachments and garrisons all over Cotabato. He laid siege to Japanese garrisons in Malaybalay, Bukidnon and Butuan. His reputation as a fearless warrior grew far and wide. The unsurrendered came out from hiding and joined his force.
He was like a beacon of light, a symbol of hope for the defeated people. He was able to organize a formidable guerrilla force that effectively challenged the Japanese garrison forces. He was the acknowledged leader of the unsurrendered. Officers with several ranks higher than Pendatun submitted to his authority.
War in the Philippines entered into the second phase. Those unsurrendered soldiers came out from their hiding place and helped build the guerrilla movement against the Japanese occupation force. With their weapons, dug out from hidden caches, and their wartime experience, they became the backbone of the guerrilla movement that sprouted all over the island. The guerrillas under one unified command eventually controlled 80 percent of Mindanao, leaving only the urban centers to the Japanese occupation
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REFERENCES:
Baclagon, Uldarico S., Colonel, “Christian-Moslem guerrillas of Mindanao / [Colonel Uldarico S. Baclagon].,” Lord Avenue Printing Press, 1988
Calejesan, Sotico 2Lt USAFFE Veteran, saw action in Davao (Personal Interview, Mr Calejesan’s residence, 1990)
Fort, Guy O. BGen, History of the 1st Division Report of the Operations of USAFFE & USFIP in the Philippines (Annex XI- Historical Report- Visayan, Mindanao Force-Defense of the Philippines) 1 September 1941-May 10, 1942. Volume X-2. 269. Philippine Archives Collection.
Haggerty, Edward James, “Guerrilla Padre in Mindanao”, 1946, Longmans, Green & Co.. 257 pages
Holmes, Kent, “Wendell Fertig and His Guerrilla Forces in the Philippines: Fighting the Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945, McFarland, Jefferson, North Carolina, 2015, 244 pages
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Keats, John C., “They Fought Alone: Wendell Fertig and the World War II Guerrilla Campaign in the Philippines,” 1963, J.B. Lippincott
Mitchell, Eugene H. Col, History of the 61st Infantry, pp. 185-197
Morton, Louis, US Army in World War II–War in the Pacific: ‘The Fall of the Philippines‘, (Washington: GPO, 1953,1989; 626 pages, 11 tables, 26 maps
Pimentel, Solomon B., “War in my Eyes: A True Story of World War II in Mindanao”, FB Malubay Mini Enterprises, 2002. ISBN 9717290040, 9789717290041
Pobre, Cesar C./Jose, Ricardo Trota, “Guerrilla Days in the Philippine South, 1942-1945”, Department of National Defense, Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, ISBN 6219575407, 9786219575409, 679 Pages
The Organization and Operations of the 81st Division (Reserve) Philippine Army, USAFFE from 1 g August 1941 to May 1942. Historical Data 81st Div, PA. Philippine National Archives Digitization Project Phase II, 4.
Toland, John, “But not in shame : the six months after Pearl Harbor / by John Toland. — New York : Random House, c1961.
US National Archives & Records Administration. United States Forces in the Philippines Tenth Military District, “A” CORPS WM HQ 109TH DIV. CPQ.Well, Major Max, Visayas-Mindanao Force (VMF) Narrative Report, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, VMF, May 3-10, 1942.
Well, Major Max, Visayas-Mindanao Force (VMF) Narrative Report, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, VMF, May 3-10, 1942.
Cover photo:
MGen, William F. Sharp & Staff at Malaybalay, May 1942
Back row standing left to right: Major Paul D. Phillips (ADC) and Captain W. F. O’Brien (ADC).
Front row, sitting left to right: Lieutenant Colonel W. L. Robinson (G-3), Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Johnston (G-4), Colonel John W. Thompson (C of S), General Sharp (CG), Colonel Archibald M. Mixson (DC of S), Lieutenant Colonel Howard R. Perry, Jr. (G-1), Lieutenant Colonel Charles I. Humber, Jr. (G-2), and Major Max Weil (Hq. Comdt. and P.M.).
