Mindanao Guerrillas Radio Communication Net

When Col WENDELL W. FERTIG assumed command of the Mindanao Guerrillas on 18 September 1942, he was confronted with the problem of setting up and perfecting a good radio communication system, both for internal and external contact. Efficient administration of the units under his command and the transmission of vital information to higher headquarters especially relating to enemy troop disposition, ship movement and plane traffic, demanded the establishment of radio net. A move in this direction was immediately started.

By 30 Sept 1942, four Filipino radio men, ALFREDO BONTUYAN, GLICERIO LIM, GERARDO and ELENO ALMENDRAS, reported to Col FERTIG. They were commissioned Third Lieutenants in the United States Army Forces in the Philippines, and subsequently established themselves in Lala, Lanao.

FLORENTINO OPENDO, former Bureau of Aeronautics Radio Operator, living at that time in Dipolog, Zamboanga and reported having a radio transmitter buried near nis home, was called – after an improvised radio set failed to function.

After OPENDO’s radio transmitter was fixed and ready for use, all the radio men transferred to Bonifacio, Misamis Occidental where the set was established. At this time, three American radio men, ROBERT V. BALL, 5th Air Base Sq., USAC, WILLIAM F. KONKO, MTB Sq 3, USN, and WILLIAM JOHNSON of the MIB So, were commissioned Second lieutenants. Another American, GEORGE HALL, USAC, having reported to Col FERTIG, was assigned to the Force Radio Section which at that time had just been activated.

Lt ROBERT F. BALL, was designated CO of the Force Radio Section (FRS).

America Suspicious of our Call Sign

In the early days of January 1943, BALL, KONKO, JOHNSCN, HALL, OPENDO and ELENO ALMENDRAS, by turns sat at the key day and night, without let-up, calling CQ, general call for any station, in the hope that some Allied station would hear them. For over a month, efforts spent in this direction proved futile. No contact was made.

Later, however, it became known that all the calls were heard by monitoring stations in Washington, but the call sign used, KZOM, having been utilized by the former Air Corps stationed at Del Monte, Mindanao, suspicion was entertained that calling station from the Philippines was a decoy. This was confirmed by Capt CHARLES SMITH who, with Capts ALBERT Y. SMITH and JOHN A. HAMNER, had gone to Australia in a sailboat on 5 Dec 1942. Capt CHARLES M. SMITH came back to Mindanao in the first submarine that landed on 5 Mar 1943.

Sometime in the second week of Jan 1943, ROX M. BELL, formerly Physics professor at the Silliman University, Dumaguete, came with a small home-made radio transmitter which right then was utilized by Col FERTIG’s headquarters in Misamis, Misamis Occidental, in contacting the big transmitter at Bonifacio which later was functioning smoothly after ROY M. BELL had done some repairs on it.

First Contact With Outside

On 6 Feb 1943, contact was made with the station of Lt-Col MACARIO PERALTA in Panay. PERALTA also had a guerrilla organization in Panay.

On 18 Feb 1943, contact was made with station KFS, San Francisco. Code words were arranged with the War Department through this station and contact was established with station KAZ, Gen MacArthur’s net control station in Australia.

On 23 Feb 1943, the first message was received from Gen MacArthur, designating Mindanao as the Tenth Military District and assigning Col FERTIG Commanding Officer. For use with KAZ, the call sign WYZB was employed.

A guerrilla unit in Pagadian, Zamboanga, under Maj NICOLAS P. LASOLA had built a small radio and contact was quickly established between FERTIG’s station WAM and LASOLA’s WPX. At this time, the call sign ZAP, previously used, was dropped and substituted with WAM for the inter-island net and WYZB for contacts with SWPA.

Through radio contact, Maj LASOLA and his unit came under the Tenth Military District command.

Couriers coming from Malaybalay, Bukidnon brought the information that SALIPADA K. PENDATUN, another guerrilla leader, was operating in Bukidnon. He was reported to have a radio, built by some Americans who were in his unit. Contact with PENDATUN was then established.

At this time, WAM at Bonifacio was designated as Net Control Station for the Tenth Military District with WPX, Pagadian, Zamboanga; WSK, station of ROY M. BELL, Negros; and WBA, PERALTA’s station on Panay as branches.

Sub Brings Needed Supplies

The submarine that landed at Pagadian on 5 Mar 1943, brought Lt-Commander “CHICK” PARSONS and five brand-new radio sets along with other vitally needed supplies. Commander PARSONS brought with him instructions from Gen MacArthur. The importance of gathering intelligence information on and about the enemy and its quick transmission to SWPA was especially stressed.

Accordingly, on 10 Mar 1943, Capt CHARLES M. SMITH with Lts JOHNSON and BALL went to Davao and established a radio station as close to the city as possible. Then they employed intelligence operatives to gather information inside the city, especially on harbor installations and ship movements. This information was sent to WAM and immediately relayed to GHQ, Australia.

JOHNSON was left in Davao while BALL and SMITH returned to District Headquarters sometime in May 1943. On his return, BALL began to plan for the installation of more Coast Watcher Stations, under instructions of Col FERTIG, which were subsequently to cover every harbor and shipping lane in the Philippine waters.

Another Radio Contact With America

In Feb 1943, two Americans, LLOYD WATERS, USAC and GLYN MITCHELL, USAC, worked under Maj CECIL WALTER in Anakan, Misamis Oriental, in putting into operation a 250-watt transmitting set which WALTER previous to the war had been using to contact Manila and the States. After some weeks of constant labor, contact between WALTER and the War Department through KFS, San Francisco, California, was established.

In May 1943, Commander PARSONS visited WALTER at Anakan, bringing with him instructions and codes from Col FERTIG. Soon thereafter, contact between WALTER’s MRS and WAM, was established. WALTER and Col FERTIG were old friends both having worked for the same company prior to the war.

Another submarine landing was made at Pagadian in May 1943, bringing back Capt JOHN HAMNER with more radio equipment and other supplies. A week later, HAMNER with JAMES CAIN, Sgt. USAC, who had recently joined the FRS, went to Tawi-Tawi and there established a watcher station to take careful watch and report of enemy movements in the Southern shipping lanes.

Lt LINCOLN H. DA PRON, 1th Bombardment Sq., USAC, arrived at FERTIG’s headquarters on 21 May 1943 from Col ROBERT V. BOWLER, then commanding the 109^th Division, operating in the Cagayan-Bukidnon area. DA PRON returned to Misamis Oriental on 26 May with radio equipment and installed a radio set at Alubijid, a few kilometers from Cagayan, having an excellent view of the Cagayan harbor. This station was in addition to BOWLER’s main Headquarters Station TAC. On 5 Jun 1943 DA PRON using call sign TAB, made the first contact with WAM. Lt JCHN WOOD, 101st Ordnance, and @LAYTON MANNERS, 19th Bombardment Group, took over operation of the station when DA PRON left early in July 1943 to join the FRS.

The Force Radio Section was gradually expanding. HENRY ROOKE, MTB Sq 3, USN, THOMAS MITSOS and HAROLD MARTIN, both previously with the 19th Bombardment Group, were commissioned Second Lieutenants and assigned to the FRS as code men.

Japs Force Withdrawal

On 26 Jun 1943, the Japanese landed a huge convoy of troops at Misamis, Misamis Occidental. One cruiser, 2 destroyers, 15 aircraft and several transports participated in the landing. The odds were too much for the guerrilla troops. They were forced to withdraw inland after putting up some resistance which proved futile. Previously, Col FERTIG foreseeing such eventuality, had engines and equipment installed in the interior.

The radio was moved to that location. At times during the enemy operations, the radio was operating within 300 yards of Jap patrols, but never missed contact with any of the net stations. Gen MacArthur, in a communication a few weeks later, highly commended the radio personnel for exemplary bravery under fire.

The presence of the enemy in the area, aggravated the food procurement difficulty. So by the end of July 1943, Col FERTIG’s headquarters transferred to Liangan, Lanao – using bancas in crossing Panguil Bay, and under the very noses of the enemy in the middle of the night – leaving Lt KONKO behind to take over the control of the net while the move was being made.

Lt KONKO’s station ERT, with the exception of traffic to SWPA, handled the entire net while the move-out was in progress. Traffic was relayed to WALTER’s MRS at Anakan which in turn relayed all the traffic direct to KAZ. All incoming messages from KAZ were routed in the same manner.

WAM was installed in the first few days of Aug 1943, three kilometers inland from Liangan.

On 12 Sept 1943, another submarine landing took place at Liangan, just a few miles across from the Japanese garrison at Misamis. Seven tons of much-needed cargo were unloaded. The first American repatriates from the Philippines to the United States were shipped out on this trip. One of them was Lt FRANCIS J. NAPILLILO, Jr. who had been working with the FRS and the former Chief Petty Officer of PT-35 which escorted Gen. Douglas MacArthur on his famous Breakout from Corregidor to Cagayan on March 11-13, 1942.

Establish Contact With US Navy

One of the most important pieces of equipment unloaded by this submarine was a large Navy transmitter. This transmitter was immediately set up at the inland radio station by Lts DA PRON and ALMA B. MILLS. On 28 Sept 1943, direct contact with the Naval net control station in Australia was made. This contact enabled the FRS to send flashes on Japanese shipping direct to the Naval Intelligence and made possible also the sending of traffic direct to KAZ without relaying any more through MRS.

In the early part of Oct, BALL then recently promoted Captain, was sent by Col FERTIG to Agusan Valley to look for a more suitable location of the Force Headquarters. The barrio of Esperanza, thirty five kilometers from the coast up the Agusan River, was picked for the new site. Engines were immediately installed and houses repaired in expectation of the move-out from Lanao. Col FERTIG accompanied by Lt LOWELL HOLDER, two weeks previously assigned with the FRS, followed Capt BALL on 15 Oct 1943.

Two more submarine landings took place in Nasipit and Cabadbaran, Agusan Province on 15 Nov and 2 Dec 1943 respectively. Approximately ninety eight tons of supplies were unloaded during those two weeks. Many radio sets were among the cargo. This enabled the FRS to establish an extensive coast watcher net all over Mindanao.

Lts MARTIN, MITSCS and DA PRON arrived Esperanza on 4 Dec 1943 from Lanao.

With these three men and many more which Capt BALL assigned from the 110^th Division, the Net Control Station was speedily set up and ready to resume control. A new call sign was assigned by BALL for use at the new location. This call sign WAT, was both for the inter-island and SWPA. Another call sign ZAV was used with the Navy. Three sets were put into operation; one for the Mindanao island net, another for SWPA and still another for the Navy.

The men assigned were Lts WILLARD MONEY, WILLIAM LASAM, LAZARO HIDALGO, VINCENTE LASAN, TOMAS LOPEZ, SIXTO FERRER and ISIDRO PALACIO, MITCHELL and WALTERS had formerly been operating WALTER’s MRS at Anakan which was moved to Butuan when they were assigned to the FRS.

WAM, during the move, continued to be operated in Lanao as Net Control Station, under the care of Lts KONKO, CHIMELEWSKI, MILLS, ALMENDRAS, OPENDO, LE COUVRE, GARLAND and FARRENS. When enough equipment was set up at Esperanza, WAM was left complete as standby station. The WAM personnel remained in Lanao with the exception of Lts KONKO, MILLS, LE COUVRE and GARLAND who were called to Esperanza where they arrived on 22 Dec 1943.

Radio Stations Expand

With various strategic sites picked out for watcher net coverage, Lt WILLARD MONEY was sent out to put the sets into operation. Leaving Esperanza on 23 Dee 1943, he installed the first set at Mambajao, Camiguin, and left it under the management of Lt RICHARD THOMMES, a former USAC soldier previously assigned in Camiguin by Lt-Col ERNEST E. McCLISH, the CO of the 110th Division, with headquarters at Butuan.

MONEY proceeded to LIANGAN where he dropped off some new equipment for WAM. Then a Coast Watcher Net was installed by MONEY in the province of Cotabato that extended along the whole of the provincial coastline. With the increase of the number of stations in Western side of Mindanao, WAM was designated Net Control Station for Western Mindanao. All stations in the Western side directed their traffic to WAM. All traffic was then sent to WAT thru a different circuit.

Other stations were then established: MBA with Lt FERRER, guarded the sea

lanes that extended into the Mindanao sea from the Surigao straits, SEVILLA at Balete, Surigao; MBN with Lt OWEN P. WILSON at Caraga, Davao; MBQ with Lt GILL at Lianga, Surigao and MBR at Nueva Campo, Surigao. The last three American officers were newly assigned to the FRS.

Approximately thirty stations then about completely covered the coastline of the entire island. Besides these stations on Mindanao, the FRS was in contact with eight stations in the Visayan islands. Ship movements were flashed to WAT from these stations and were in turn relayed direct to Navy Headquarters in Australia. In some cases, messages of this type were receipted for by the Navy within one hour of ship sighting by the watcher station.

Organize Radio Net in Samar

With the final installations of the net completed, Capt BALL was relieved by Maj JAMES L. EVANS who had arrived with Maj CHARLES SMITH, when the latter came back to Mindanao, BALL and SMITH went to Samar to organize the guerrillas and set up a radio net there. At this time, the FRS was augmented by more personnel. Lts ARTHUR HAGE, FREDERICK TAYLOR, JAMES SCHOEN, BERNARDO ADOLFO, GAUDIO PANGAN, GREGORIO SAN GILL, GREGORIO OLIVER and MELQUIADES CAROZ. The FRS personnel now consisted about twenty operators and sixteen code men with more than this number distributed in the watcher stations.

On 22 Dec 1943, the Japanese invaded the province of Lanao, forcing the radio station there to go off the air. The radio personnel managed to reach Misamis Occidental where they set up a sub-Net Control in the mountains behind the town of Misamis, after making their way through the jungles. Using the call sign CET, they again took over the control of all stations on the western half of the island.

In the later part of Jan 1944, WAT was moved further up the Agusan River to Talacogon. Reports from the watcher stations and all other intelligence information on the enemy situation were being flashed in such a volume that twenty four hour operation daily became imperative. Two stations were assigned to gather all the incoming messages from the net. Another net was utilized to flash reports to the Navy. Still another set was used to send out all the intelligence reports to GHQ, SWPA.

Radio Traffic Greatly Increased

More stations were then established. These were as near as possible to the places garrisoned by the Japs in order to flash information on the number of planes and airfield the enemy had in operation; troop movements; heavy gun emplacements, truck convoys, troop concentrations, etc. This data was of utmost importance and along with ship sightings and plane movements, given priority. To confuse the enemy monitoring stations, the call signs of the net stations were frequently changed.

On 2 Mar 1944 Lt-Commander M. M* WHEELER of the United States Naval Intelligence arrived on Mindanao by submarine. With him were Lt SATURNINO SILVA and four enlisted men of the 1st Filipino Division from the States. The four enlisted men were subsequently assigned to the FRS as operators and Lt SILVA as Ordnance Officer, Tenth Military District. Commander WHEELER was to make many trips along the coast of the island to gather important naval intelligence.

Japs Bomb Headquarters Incessantly

On 15 Mar 1944, huge Japanese contingents invaded Butuan, headquarters of the 110th Division – at the same time enemy dive bombers bombed the Agusan River Valley, bombing every barrio along the river banks in an endeavor to knock out radio installations and destroy guerrilla headquarters. These bombings and strafings continued for days. Over a two-day period, Talacogon was savagely bombed and strafed. No less than twenty bombs exploded right in the barrio. Radio houses, though not badly damaged, were riddled with bullets. One transmitter was hit but was immediately replaced. The continuous search, intense and persistent, conducted by Jap planes and ground troops to locate radio installations proved useless. No damage was inflicted in these enemy operations on the radio net. However, it was decided that in case of a shutdown by the Net Control Station at Talacogon, another should take its place at a moment’s notice. So Lts WATER and RUSSEL SMITH were sent to build a camp at Waloe, on a tributary of the Agusan River, installing engines and setting up the necessary equipment.

On 5 May 1944, at 11:35 AM, six Jap Betty bombers swept over Talacogon, bombing and strafing at a low altitude. After the enemy action, only one cow was found killed. All installations were intact.

Evacuation Prudent  to Waloe

Immediate evacuation was ordered that day. It was thought that the next aerial attacks might not be so erratic. That afternoon half of the number of operators and code men went up the river to Waloe, arriving there at 8:00 PM and immediately began operating the radio equipment established by WATERS and SMITH. The remaining radio personnel in Talacogon dismantled all installations and moved to Waloe that night. By dawn of 6 May 1944, the barrio had been completely evacuated. A major move had again been made by the FRS without missing a single contact.

In the morning of 6 May 194, the six Bettys came back and levelled Talacogon to the ground. Not a single building was left standing. This evidently led the Japs to believe that all installations force Headquarters were wiped out.

A few days later, Commander WHEELER arrived at Waloe from one of his trips to the coast. He was then designated CO, FRS, relieving Maj EVANS who was ordered by Col FERTIG to make a complete survey of the health situations of the various units stationed in Agusan, Surigao and Davao.

New Code System Introduced

Commander WHEELER introduced a new code system which was put into use with all stations of the Tenth Military District. This in time proved most valuable. An aircraft warning system was then organized with all stations, using a special type of code. This was to facilitate speedy transmittal of plane traffic so that each station could send in a short message, not exceeding ten groups, all data regarding the type, speed, direction, altitude, and position of a plane sighted.

Such facts could be reported to the NCS and in turn relayed to a Fighter Command Station almost before the planes were out of sight of the spotter. This system proved invaluable when American fighters and bombers began working over the islands in Sept 1944. Plane sightings with this code system were being reported from watcher station to Net Control to Australia on the average of five and one half minutes after sighting!

In the new location, food problem became more acute. The Agusan River Valley was flooded during most of the year, making the planting of staple crops terribly hard. The produce of the natives was barely enough for their own needs. To procure dried fish and salt required a twenty-day round trip to and from the coast. Officers and men used to scour the surrounding country for food available. The Headquarters personnel, however, took it on the chin and smiled it off.

May 27-28, another American submarine was scheduled to land near Lianga, Surigao, but did not establish contact with shore party and supplies were unloaded in Tukuran, Zamboanga on 1 Jun 1944. Three Americans were un loaded on that trip; Maj HAROLD A. ROSENQUIST, Sgts MC GRATH, and GEORGE FINNEGAN. The two enlisted men were weather men sent to report weather conditions to the Air Forces. Maj ROSENQUIST had the mission, among others, of contacting the American Prisoners at Davao Penal Colony. But the Japs had already moved the prisoners from the Colony when ROSENQUIST arrived in Davao on 6 Aug 1944. Maj ROSENQUIST was then unable to perform this part of his mission.

These three Americans had to hike all the way through from Pagadian to Waloe, arriving there on 25 July 1944. Maj ROSENQUIST was assigned Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2, for the Tenth Military District having come direct from G-2 Section, CHQ,  SWPA.

During this period, it became evident that the Japanese were intent in tracking down the headquarters, with all possible means and persistence. They were reported converging in on Talacogon. It was not hard for them to get at Waloe in three flanks.

Shipping flashes were coming in thick and fast and the security of the radio was vital to Army and Naval Intelligence. Going off the air, happen what might, would be a calamity at this time. The flow of valuable intelligence traffic must continue.

At this time, the Sub-NCS in Western Mindanao was functioning efficiently under Lt JOIN SIMMONS, USNR, who landed by submarine on 5 Jun 1944. The call sign used was now SL9 and most of the other station call signs were also changed.

SL9 Prepared For Emergency Take-Over

With the enemy closing in, Col FERTIG decided that SL9 should be prepared to take over the net control of the entire Tenth Military District, in the event the Waloe radio headquarters was forced to go off the air. Lt-Commander SAM J. WILSON, with a complete list of codes, key phrases and station records, left Waloe in July 19) for SL9 to deliver the instructions and codes he carried. With SL9 prepared to take over at a moment’s notice, 9LL, formerly WAT, could go off the air with the knowledge that the huge intelligence network of the radio stations would remain in operation.

Radio Traffic Must Continue

On 3 August 1944, Col FERTIG decided to leave Waloe and move to the interior. With the flow of intelligence reaching a peak volume and coming from strategic stations all over the island – ship movements, plane traffic, enemy troop movements and ever so much other data of essential value to the war effort, it was more important to keep radio contact than any one single factor.

Taking two diesel motors, radio equipment and a small supply of food, the first party left Waloe on the morning of 5 Avg 1944. This group consisted of Col FERTIG, Lts DA PRON, GARLAND, WATERS and HIDALGO and a number of soldiers. This group was to prepare the camp, set up motors, install other equipment and take over the net as soon as possible. After a ten-hour baroto trip, the party arrived at the prearranged site after dark, but there was no camp existing. An unfinished bamboo hut was all that stood in the midst of the virgin jungle far up the Umayon River. Plans had previously been made by Col FERTIG for the building of a camp at this site. But the laborers to whom the work was entrusted were uncivilized pagan natives about the only available denizens thereabouts and wholly unreliable.

Early the next morning, everyone set to work fast but methodically, getting radios set up and on the air. A small battery set was set up to keep contact with the headquarters at Waloe. Messages were received to the effect that the Japs were swiftly closing in on Waloe. Other messages stated that more Japs were heading for Waloe from the South. Urgency of setting up the radio patently apparent, speed on the work was accelerated.

On 10 Aug 1944, three sets were ready for operation. Near midnight of the same day, Commander WHEELER ordered the radios at Waloe off the air and the remaining Headquarters personnel started up river to join the first group.

The sets in this jungle camp were on the air that night. Again the change-over was completed without missing a single contact. During the next two days, the three sets were operated by only one operator on each net. And when: on the morning of 12 Aug 1944, the rest of the Headquarters personnel arrived, it was a great relief to Col FERTIG and all the men.

There were only two huts hacked out of the jungle. Everyone then set to work establishing a camp. When the men were not on duty at the radio station, they were out in the jungle with bolos, Gradually large clearings were made and a camp of sorts was built.

Food and Floods Real Problem

The radios were now working perfectly. However, other problems, keenly felt, began to force themselves on the group. The rainy season had begun, swelling the river twenty or more feet. The whole camp was deep in mud and water. Food in the area was impossible to get. No natives lived there and wild foods were not in sight. Everything had to be brought up the river by barotos – a twelve hour trip from Waloe. The biggest maneuverable baroto could  only haul a small amount of cargo – and there were forty men at the camp!

Waloe was bare of foodstuffs. To make matters worse, all the trails to the food areas were closed by the Japs swarming in all directions. About one hundred soldiers were busy day and night, procuring whatever could be found; corn, wild camotes, coconuts and even sago, an extract from the pulp of a certain palm tree.

As food was becoming increasingly difficult to obtain and slow process of starvation closing in on the camp, radio traffic was coming in faster and heavier. Jap shipping was out in huge force and ship flashes seemed to the group more important than food. Each might mean one Jap ship less and this was the goal towards which efforts in the past few years were directed.

Fatigued by too much work, hunger gnawing at the vitals and living conditions bitter1y unbearable, any group would have become irritable and the slightest provocation would have started a fight. But the morale of the group continued to be high for Col FERTIG proved a real and understanding leader during this trying period. There were three days when a small ear of roasted corn served the meal of one person each. Yet during those three days, at least eight enemy ships were reported sunk due to the flashes from the radio sets of that camp. That helped!

Friendly Planes Sighted

On 9 Sept 1944, a large formation of planes flew directly over the encampment. Some arguments arose as to whether they were American or Jap planes. Some claimed having caught glimpses of stars on the wings. Others were pessimistic having been schooled for three years in seeing always a red bail on the planes. But a couple of hours later, messages began pouring in from stations all over Mindanao. Friendly planes! One station reported the actual bombing practically play by play, of the town of Cagayan, capitol of Misamis Oriental. \

From then on, American planes were continually flying in large groups over the camp. This increased the work two-fold. As must have to happen, some of these planes were getting shot down. After reports on such incidents poured in, instructions by radio were flashed immediately to all stations to instigate rescue parties in search of survivors. In some instances, search parties were on the job one hour after a plane had been seen to go down.

Later in the month, the two diesels began to give trouble. Going at twenty four hour a day pace, they were just about to give out. Col FERTIG immediately ordered parties to locate other motors. One was found in an old useless river launch in the barrio of La Paz, about two days baroto trip down the river. The Japs having vacated by then the Agusan River area, Col FERTIG decided to move the Headquarters to la Paz.

Move To La Paz

On 1 Nov 1944, Lt DA PRON took one small radio set and went down river to set up radio installations in this barrio. On 4 Nov La Paz was ready with motors, power line, antennas and houses for the equipment. Leaving the river camp for La Paz on November, half of the personnel reached the new location on the 6th. Radios were installed without loss of time and the net control was taken over by the net set-up the next morning. Another move without loss of contact.

One station was working messages with the upriver location at the time of the turn-over. While this station was waiting for a receipt on a message just sent, a signal was given by the La Paz set-up to take over. The station continued sending traffic without ever knowing that a change-over had been made. A few days later, the rest of the personnel arrived at La Paz and the operation was again back to normal.

Americans Leave For Repatriation

12 Jan 1945 brought changes to the FRS, Five American officers who had been with the outfit since its activation left for Leyte to proceed to the States for a well-deserved rest. Capt MARTIN, Lts MITSOS, WATERS, HACE and LE COUVRE had all been away from home and overseas for over five years and were very anxious to be back to the homeland. Capt GARLAND was made Code Officer for the district. Capt MILLS was sent to Baculin, Davao to replace Lt WILSON who had been ordered to Leyte for hospitalization. Lt JOHN F. WOOD who had been operating a watcher station near Cagayan over a year and a half, was transferred to SL9, Western Mindanao, as Chief Radio Operator.

Radio Traffic Increased 164 Percent

Beginning with the American landings in Leyte, 20 Oct 1944, continual shifting of enemy troops was accentuated. Barges, bancas, ships, trucks and planes were being used by the Japanese in the transport of troops, aside from the usual method of hiking or using carabaos, horses and carts. So new areas heretofore without radio stations had to be covered. Good coverage of all seaports and highways was imperative, necessitating more and more mobile stations to be sent to the field.

Seven airfields have been built by the Tenth Military District, under the direction and supervision of Col FERTIG. These fields were scattered over the island and in operational use. There were other airstrips just as serviceable as the bigger airfields in other strategic locations. Planes bringing in supplies were landing on them. Planes in need of gas or repair or because the weather was bad or in any other case where they were in distress, were using these fields. The war was taking the fast tempo of augmented action and the FRS was in the thick of it. So sets were installed on each field for instant coverage of all traffic. In Nov 1944 radio traffic to the outside higher echelon had increased by 164% over that sent out in June 1944!

Fertig Goes to Leyte

In Feb 1945, Col FERTIG flew to Leyte to discuss future plans for the District. Among them was the move of the FRS to a better location at Camp Keithley, Lanao Province. Lt FREDERICK TAYLOR previously assigned to the 110th Division, was called to La Paz to take over the control of the net.

During the move out, it was decided that station SL9 would act as the NCS. 9LL would be the NCS for the stations on the eastern side of the island. They would relay all their messages to SL9 as that station had been previously doing with its traffic. After an assortment of equipment, enough was left for 9LL to continue efficient operation. The rest of the equipment was packed and moved to the east coast for transfer over a water route.

Personnel and equipment were to be picked up at Barobo, Surigao on 16 Mar 945. As the trip from La Paz to Barobo required a good three days, the first echelon left headquarters on the 10th. All equipment had to be carried on the back and so the move was no easy matter. The sets and generators were not altogether light. Then upon reaching Barobo all would have to be taken to a small island about a mile offshore. The waters at Barobo were too shallow so the island had to be utilized in that lap of the move out.

At 8:00 AM, 16 Mar 1945, the boats were sighted. Most of the men had not seen US ships in three years. The sight was very welcome. At 2:00 PM, all men and cargo had been loaded and the ships were under way. The convoy passed through Surigao Straits and into the Mindanao Sea and arrived at the port of Iligan, Lanao on the morning of the 18th.

New Headquarters at Camp Keithley

The location for the new headquarters was Camp Keithley, a former PC camp, about thirty six kilometers inland. All equipment and part of the personnel were immediately sent by trucks to the camp. By the 22nd, the entire set-up was installed, although much of the equipment suffered some damages on the way. Using a new call sign, LW2, the NCS was taken over from the SL9 on the morning of the 23rd of March 1945. Five separate circuits were installed – one to work all the traffic from Eastern Mindanao (9LL), one for Western Mindanao (SL9) and one for Cotabato (NCS) under Capt MONEY, (3PP6); one for the 8th Army and the USAFFE Headquarters and one for the Navy. For the first time there was enough space, housing and wire to facilitate the installation with remote control for transmitters. In the new set-up the entire section was considerably improved in layout and efficiency.

On 17 Apr 1945, the first American troops landed at Parang, Cotabato. The Tenth Military District was immediately attached to the Tenth Corps whose troops made the landing. Communication was established immediately between LW2 and YD44, Tenth Corps NCS.

A new phase of the Force Radio Section began with this invasion. Guerrilla troops were used with American troops to round up and cut off all Jap troops that tried to evade the advancing American element. Small portable radios were sent to all sectors, to accompany each advancing unit. From Davao to Agusan, Bukidnon, Cotabato and Zamboanga operators with these small sets hiked with the fighting troops and relayed back to headquarters the latest information on Jap movements. By these sets, Jap hideouts were located and our ground troops hounded them, ferreted them out and zooming, diving planes bombed and strafed them.

“Mission Accomplished”

With the Island of Mindanao now declared officially liberated, the Tenth Military District Force Radio Communications Net, BROUGHT into being with the PRIME PURPOSE OF RELAYING INTELLIGENCE DATA TO HIGHER HEADQUARTERS, HAD ACCOMPLISHED ITS MAIN ASSIGNMENT.

The tangible results of this flow of traffic – enemy ship sinkings, destructions of military installations by American planes and the annihilation of enemy troops – have more than justified the sacrifices, hardships and the many problems attendant to keeping constant radio contact without interruption with higher Army and Navy Headquarters.

Nothing has been said in this report concerning the other jobs handled through the Radio Communication Net but the problems concerning administration control and the tactical disposition of 33,000 Mindanao Guerrilla troops have added the burden to the Radio Communication Net.

The map preceding this section graphically illustrates the many strategically located radio stations which comprised the Tenth Military District Radio Communications Net or Force Radio Section as it was more commonly known.

Source: History of the Mindanao Guerrillas by the American Guerrillas of Mindanao (Unpublished Manuscript)

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