The History of the Mindanao Guerrillas Intelligence Network

22 February 1943

G-2 Section, 10th Military District

Three rugged years of concentrated efforts of the Intelligence Section of the Mindanao Guerrillas brought recognition in the form of commendation from the Highest Headquarters of the United States Army in the Pacific in which Major General A. C. WILLOUGHBY, Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, in communication dated 23 Jun 1945, to Colonel WENDELL W. FERTIG, said:

“It is desired to express the appreciation of the G-2 Section of this Headquarters for-most valuable intelligence service rendered by the guerrilla organization under your Command.

This service and its flow of reports and messages covered the following periods under the agencies indicated:

From 1942 to June 1943, Ge2 SWPA, through Allied Intelligence Bureau, Philippine Sub-Section;

From June 1943 to March 1945, through Philippine Regional Section, G-33

After March 1945, G-2, Eighth Army.

In the period through 192 and during. the early half of 1943, your Command was particularly helpful in laying plans for the location of radio posts and development of an intelligence net. Since the latter half of 1943, your development of these original plans has been ably carried out.

Air, ground and naval intelligence data have been efficiently correct and therefore of great value in the preparation and successful prosecution of Allied plans in the Philippine area.”

Difficulties Encountered in Early Intelligence Work

Funds, absolutely needed in the success of intelligence operations; capable, trained agents required to perform delicate missions and run the gamut of attendant risks; means of transportation and communication, essential in the facility of movement of secret operatives and transmission of information – were all deplorably lacking in the beginning. In fact, in the initial stage of the Mindanao Guerrillas, Col FERTIG, along with other manifold occupations, was his own Intelligence Officer.

The Intelligence Section of the Mindanao Guerrillas evolved from practically nothing. The Intelligence Department is something which, by its obvious importance in any Army organization, deserves foremost consideration and attention. An Army cannot become truly powerful, however heavily stacked with weapons and other vital supplies if it has not within its control an agency with which to obtain accurate knowledge on the plans, strength, location, identification and movements of the enemy.

Intelligence – For Self-Preservation

No Army, not even a guerrilla band can effectively fight, or even survive if the odds are against it, if it does not have some knowledge of the enemy – his troops, weapons and disposition.

This was especially true in the early days of the Mindanao guerrilla resistance movement where units numbered only a mere handful. They had to know  the exact location of the enemy at all time, and if possible, obtain some knowledge of his plans, his weapons and other factors which were important then to seif-preservation alone. WILLIAM TATE with his small band in early September 1942 relied on the gossip of his troops and the civilians to learn necessary facts concerning the enemy.

Development of Intelligence

To warn soldiers of the approach of the enemy, various means were availed of as signals. In Lanao, the use of “agong” or brass gongs was popular. Along the enemy approaches were strategically located “agongs” caught up the announcement and relayed the awesome message to the Headquarters in coastal places, “tambuli” was generally used. “Tambuli” (Tagalog) or “Budyong” (Visayan) are derived from Carabao or Cow horns or big sea shells. They are blown by mouth and echoing sounds that travel a long distance emanate from them.

“Tagongtong” or “bamboo telegraph” was generally am more widely used, due principally to the quick availability of bamboos. They are made by cutting, seasoned bamboo poles to pieces, usually half a meter long. Tied with a rope, they are hung in various places along possible enemy routes. Upon enemy approach, the nearest “Tagongtong” is struck with an iron piece. In this way, no movement of the enemy could be made without the knowledge of the people, especially along the barrios where they passed.

Everyone was enjoined to gather all information of the enemy, including the wildest of rumors, for transmission to headquarters for its evaluation and as basis for whatever action need be taken.

Philippines’ Strategic Importance In Pacific War

The Philippines in the theatre of the war operations in the Pacific, occupies a strategic position. The fact is inescapable that the Philippine Islands extending from Batanes to Siasi over a distance of some 900 statute miles, served as an essential link to bridge the gap between Japan and the East Indies, Malaya and even the Indian Ocean.

Control by Japan of the Islands would, in effect make China Sea a private lake of the Nippon Empire. Properly garrisoned and defended, it constitutes a no mean. bulwark to guard the approaches of East Asia against thrusts coming from the Pacific. MACARTHUR himself recognized this fact when on July 1945 he remarked, in summing up the Philippine Campaign that the naval battle off Leyte Gulf was the turning point in the Pacific War.

Enemy Routes Covered

As much as the Philippines were a barrier to the Japanese in the march for conquest at the initial stage of the Pacific War, so also did it become an obstacle to hurdle in the path of the American Liberation Forces in the return of MACARTHUR – with one great difference, however, and that was: An organized Army of determined guerrillas had long entrenched themselves in the Islands, especially in Mindanao, a veritable fifth column, with carefully coordinated intelligence nets operating without let-up twenty four hours a day, covering ail strategic locations; Overland routes as highway, roads, trails; Waterways, as sea-lanes, rivers, lakes, and vantage points everywhere for observations on aerial enemy activities. They covered surprisingly well the reporting of ship movements, enemy troop dispositions and aerial traffic. Radio sets dotted the whole Mindanao, so that in 1945, there were fifty-eight stations reporting intelligence to Headquarters for relay to higher Army and Navy sources for action.

Because of this intelligence net and radio communication system, the American Forces knew many facts about the Japs that helped the subsequent actions by the Allies in prosecuting the war on Mindanao and other islands of the Philippines.

Coast Watcher Stations – Road Spotters

Watcher’s stations, mostly coastal, were assigned the work of reporting immediately ship sightings, including – if possible – direction, tonnage, class, number, possible load, etc. Watcher’s stations were also placed in strategic places along highways to report on troop movements and other information about the enemy on land.

A report by Col FERTIG to Gen MACARTHUR, dated 7 Jul 19, showed in part the role played by the watcher’s station in the scheme of intelligence operations:

“x x x The Commander Seventh Fleet was pleased to give us a “Well Done” for having located a major enemy fleet passing through the islands and out through San Bernardino Straits.

Reports covered a period of thirty-six hours and were remarkably accurate; establishing the presence of nine aircraft, carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyers and the usual fleet train. Our reports allowed the Navy to calculate strength and speed, and undoubtedly contributed to the successful conclusion of the action, known as the “Battle of the Western Philippines”.

In addition to the spectacular nature of the above reports, our watcher station reports showed a large increase in both number of ships and total tonnage moving through the Islands. For the first time, use of escort vessels appeared to be the rule.

Another effect of the submarine campaign is noted. The Japanese merchant vessels hide each night in a selected anchorage, sailing at dawn. Thus seventy-two hours are required to move a convoy from-Davao to Zamboanga, a distance easily covered in twenty-four hours.

Mindanao Guerrillas Enjoyed People’s Backing

Intelligence operations were, after the sad debacle met by the USAFFE in early 1942, conducted by various persons, groups of persons or organized bands of guerrillas – for internal security. USAFFE officers and men who had chosen not to submit to the demands for surrender by the Invader, had to have some of intelligence work by themselves, to know the definite intentions of the enemy to escape personal capture.

Early guerrillas, operating independently of each other, had to know somehow the plans, movements and location of the enemy so they could know when and where to strike and at the same time prevent being caught unaware. Even civilians, after learning of Japanese brutalities, found it necessary to know enemy intentions and movements – to avoid contact and escape bearing the brunt of enemy atrocities. In effect, the very fondness for acts of barbarism on the part of the Japanese, forced both the civilians population and the early, loose, scattered guerrilla bands to organize into intelligence groups primarily for security.

When the Mindanao Guerrillas, going under the name Mindanao-Visayan Force was organized little by little into a unified command, it had the people’s backing and support.

Intelligence Activities Expanded

The increase in the number of FERTIG’s guerrilla bands necessitated a corresponding intensification and diversification of intelligence activities. And aside from the usual intelligence activities, it was necessary to have some knowledge of the location of hidden arms and ammunition; hidden stuffs of Japanese and pro-Japanese cohorts, Jap spies and sincere collaborators and their actual intentions.

Hidden Arms and Ammunition

After the surrender of 10 May 1942 of the Mindanao USAFFE, a great number of arms and ammunition fell into the hands of civilians by various means. These were badly needed by the ever increasing guerrilla army. To know where they were hidden and who hid them became an important undertaking for intelligence agents. Once known and confiscated, it would mean additional stock for use against the enemy.

Hidden Japanese Personal Effects, Etc.

In certain areas in Mindanao, especially in places where in peacetime, the Japs had business operations, some of their personal effects were hidden, taken care of by Jap sympathizers, such as trucks, automobiles, radio sets, gasoline, canned goods, cloth, etc. As these were useful to the guerrillas, intelligence agents ferreted them out.

Primary Missions – “Intelligence”

The radio communication of Gen MAC ARTHUR recognizing the Mindanao Guerrillas of Mindanao and incorporating them into the Tenth Military District on 22 February 1943, emphasized intensification of intelligence coverage, not only of Mindanao but also of Samar-Leyte Area. This was necessary in view of the fact that the huge American Forces in the Pacific were approaching the Philippine Theatre of operations. No one single factor was to receive any greater effort than intelligence during the entire Mindanao Guerrilla period.

Important Materials to SWPA

On 14 Jul 1943, along with three American officers, escaped POW from the Davao Penal Colony, went four postal bags filled with mail from the Tenth Military District for GHO, SWPA. These bags contained an assortment of reports and intelligence matters. The importance of this mail was summed up in a radio message from Gen MAC ARTHUR to Col FERTIG dated 18 Aug 1943:

“Intelligence Report, Tenth MD for April Won First Class Compliments from G-2, SWPA. Reports, Papers and Personal Knowledge Evacuated with Party have been a Great Value for Plans.”

Intelligence Net Covers Entire Mindanao

The Intelligence Organization of the entire Tenth Military District Command, covered the whole of Mindanao Island as the last of the Guerrilla Bands were finally absorbed into the unified control of Force Headquarters, and the Divisions organized covered the entire island territory.

District G-2 Section

In the District Headquarters, as in any Army organization, was created the G-2 Section whose main function was the collection, collation and evaluation of all intelligence information from all available sources to forward with the least possible delay to the Headquarters of Gen MAC ARTHUR then in Australia.

Division G-2 Section

In the different Divisions, G-2 Sections were also organized, similar in scope but provided with more field personnel, both Army and Civilian, mostly operatives or agents.

Regimental S-2 Section

The different regiments that composed a Division each had their own S-2 Intelligence Section with enough personnel, Army and Civilian, to scour for enemy information all over their allotted sectors. The same method of transmission of information availed of by the Division Ge2 Section was used by the Regimentals. Battalions too, had their S-2 Sections charged with the same work.

1,500 Intelligence Agents – Full Time Job

Working in the different battalions, regiments, divisions and the Force G-2 Section were about 1,500 operatives or agents – about twenty-five percent of who were soldiers. This figure represents those operatives actively dedicating their full time to intelligence work. All loyal civilians (the percentage of disloyal ones very negligible), all soldiers and officers were in effect operatives, for in the Philippines, people were naturally curious and to turn that curiosity to advantage became an easy matter not only with the Japanese does the spy system work based on “Everyone can Spy= Everyone must Spy”. Some mercenary elements sided with the Japs, yet the greatest bulk of the population covered the enemy in a network of intelligence. There could hardly be any movement on his part, unless performed in places absolutely inaccessible to foreign approach, that escaped notice and about which information was relayed through various means, reached to Army Unit Headquarters.

The Work of Special Agents

This generally refers however, to the obvious facts like the estimated number of the enemy in certain garrisoned areas or the number of Japs passing through a certain locality. But the more important facts needed by MAC ARTHUR’s Headquarters – enemy intentions; military installations; unit identification; first and last names and ranks of Commanding Officer; enemy material and equipment; locations and description of radio installations and radar; enemy documents; location, capacity and stocks of naval fuel storage; harbor installations, etc – all these needed a special kind of detective work, as well as courage, sacrifices and boundless risks.

How this Information is Gathered

To obtain accurate data on the enemy, various means were employed by those in charge of subsidiary intelligence nets. The most favorite of which and hardest to detect, is the planting of operatives right in the midst of the Japanese garrisons. Most of those employed in this manner were known to have been uncompromising Pro-Japanese elements, but were at heart for and with the Allied cause. This was a difficult role to assume, with personal complexes and great risks.

One typical instance was the case of VICENTE MENDOZA of Cagayan, Misamis Oriental, who was trusted implicitly by the Japanese but in reality was working for the guerrilla command at Bukidnon and Balingasag. Others, to a lesser degree, aided him in this dangerous work, among them POMPOSA BACCARISAS, a girl close to the Japs. Much valuable information has been furnished the Army by these intrepid agents. The Japanese, however, caught both and extracted the terrible penalty of torture and death.

Three Intelligence Operatives Inside Davao

Among the operatives planted in the midst of the enemy in Davao by Major VIRGILIO S. AGUILAR, Field Military Intelligence Officer for Davao, were SEGUNDO RUIZ, PRIMO BALATAYO and CIPRIANO MERCADO.

1) SEGUNDO RUIZ, a surveyor, was employed by the Zenetaka Gomi (Japanese concern engaged in working on the projects of the Jap Army), to take charge of the levelling of the second runway of the Licanan Airdrome. Being a trusted man of the Japs, he-had access to different military installations. He was working at Licanan for two months prior to 2 Sept 19h – on which day American planes first bombed and strafed Licanan. A considerable number of Japanese lives were lost and a number of planes destroyed on the ground, along with the destruction of military installations. Agents like RUIZ, made possible this effective bombing by furnishing accurate intelligence prior to such bombings.

2) PRIMO BALATAYO, graduate in commerce, was employed by the Japs as Assistant Manager of Maeda Gomi at Bunawan, Davao. He was respected by the Japs and was even allowed a car for his own use. On several occasions, Japanese officers brought him along and showed him different projects, constructed and under construction, by the Japs. Partly, at least, on his information furnished, the Sasa Airfield was heavily bombed on 2 Sept 1943.

Thirty planes were destroyed om the ground. Two hundred and fifty Japs, along with 150 Filipino Pro-Japs, were killed while eating their noon-day meal in the Mess Hall. Military installations were effectively blasted.

3) CIPRIANO MERCADO was employed as Foreman by the Japs in constructing camps in the Akaname Plantation. After all, the camps were constructed and occupied by the Japs, MERCADO furnished the Field Military Inte1ligence Officer with complete data on the camps; including sketches showing their exact location, bivouac areas and installations. The same information was transmitted by radio to headquarters concerned. Soon after, sometime in March 195, planes came and bombed and strafed the hidden camps, causing almost total destruction and the loss of many Japanese lives.

All three of these agents, escaped Japanese capture but in the case of CIPRIANO MERCADO, eight members of his immediate family were killed when overtaken by the Japs in Gatungan, two kilometers West of Bunawan, Davao.

By Subterfuge

Another favorite method employed by operatives was subterfuge. A person, soldier or civilian, in the guise of being a harmless individual, would be sent into a Japanese-held territory using various pretexts: selling chickens and eggs, wine, etc or pretending to visit their relatives or friends who are Jap puppet officials, or in any ways. Their jobs were to carefully observe for later reporting all Japanese installations and activities in areas traveled.

Much information had been gathered by the use of this method.

Women, too, played an important part in the intelligence nets – for they had a particular means of appealing to the vanity of the Japs and getting them to talk.

Intelligence Prior to American Landings

Another example of the efficiency in the inte1ligence work of the Mindanao Guerrillas is the information furnished just prior to the landing of the American Forces at Parang and the subsequent advance on Malabang, Cotabato.

From FERTIG to Commanding General, 8th Army, Information to 10th Corps, dated 13 April 1945:

“Evaluation of the Illana Bay situation; unopposed LANDINGS MAY BE MADE AT any point from Pagadian, Zamboanga, along coast through Malabang to the Cotabato-Lanao Boundary. Nips that were between Malabang and Parang evacuated by baroto to Cotabato on 12 April. Our forces maintaining patrols between Malabang and Parang and will contact our radio station near Parang shortly.

Latest intelligence information strongly indicate light resistance only at Parang proper although heavy bombings past few days and those to continue should eliminate targets and troops in that city. Nothing but light beach defenses (barbed wire entanglements) reported from Parang to Linek, I believe landings should be accomplished with little preparatory naval gunfire directed at beaches or inland north of Parang.

Malabang Airfield in condition to take as many planes as you desire. Extremely dry weather in the past few days will cause dust nuisance. For continued use throughout operation, steel mats should be placed at once. The main seven thousand feet runway can be cleared of grass to give eight hundred feet of actual width. Civilian Mayor of Malabang is cleaning town but no civilians allowed to enter except workmen.”

On 17 April 1945, American Forces landed, without opposition.

Propaganda, A Necessary Adjunct

The enemy, adept at cheap propaganda, found willing listeners at first among the gullible which, though constituting a negligible minority, if not made to understand the true picture of the war situation immediately, might contaminate the others into believing in the eternal “might” of “unconquerable” Japan. Most of them, in Jap garrisoned cities, due to strict censorship, did not even have any inkling of how the war was progressing. To remedy this situation, intelligence operatives not only went to Japs occupied places to gather information on the enemy, but also to apprise the Filipinos inside the real turn of events, by word of mouth or sometimes by printed war news sheets.

In the early days, when the guerrillas had no source from which to draw funds for financial support or to fill up other information needs, the civilians had to be awakened to a sense of patriotism from their lukewarm attitude. Radio news had to be broadcast to the people by speeches or typewritten leaflets and the war situation explained to them in detail.

The “cockpit” became a favorite gathering place and exchange place of information.

Days Of Darkness

The second half of 1944 sow the most intense mopping-up operations of the Japanese on the island of Mindanao. Thousands of enemy troops, withdrawing from Southwest Pacific fronts, converged in the Philippines. The victorious American troops were fast closing in on the retreating forces. The Philippines offered them a temporary haven from the terrible onslaughts dished out in the Marianas, Peleliu, etc. It was at this time that the Mindanao Guerrillas, ill-fed, ill-clothed, ill-armed and ill, gamely resisted in the face of overwhelming odds, continuously believing with almost blind faith that always “it was darkest before dawn”. Some had to strike temporarily the protection of the jungles – yet always to strike the enemy whenever and wherever opportunity presented itself.

The situation, from the standpoint of the guerrillas, was appalling under the terrific surge of enemy pressure. But they found wider scope and more fields for thorough, intensified intelligence operations. Despite unnerving difficulties encountered in one form or another, intelligence work continued in increased pace and ever-surging tempo.

The answer to the question whether or not the Mindanao Guerrillas were successful in the pursuit of the primary mission – securing of intelligence, is found in the ruins of Surigao and Cagayan cities; in the hundreds of enemy ships resting at the bottom of the surrounding seas; in the charred remains of enemy installations; and in the mangled bodies of dead Japanese.

Tragedies in Intelligence Operations

Many instances of dire happenings, in the form of tortures and death have occurred to intelligence agents. In their own way, they are as much deserving of recognition as those who fought decisive battles on the battlefields.

EXAMPLE NO. 1: – “Pvt SIMPLICIO LIBRES, “E” Co., 2nd Bn, 113th Infantry, temporarily assigned with Lt DE LOS REYES, 110th Division Special Intelligence Net, Sector No. 2, was captured by the enemy while enroute from Sector No. 3 to Lt DE LOS REYES’ Sector at Nasipit. He was tied and blindfolded when found in Bancasi, Butuan, with five bayonet wounds and cracked skull, on 15 Nov 1944. Later investigations revealed LIFRES was killed by the Japs that passed that area on the 14th of Nov 1944, from Nasipit. He was then bringing a message from the CP of the 113th Infantry Regiment, 110th Div., to Sector No. 2, at Nasipit.”

EXAMPLE NO. 2: – “On 17 Nov 1944, at 1:00 PM, a Jap patrol was able to ambush and capture one of the soldiers of the 113th Infantry Regiment, sent on an intelligence mission, Pvt LACORDA. This was near the Davao road junction, in the vicinity of Butuan. He was later discovered to have been tortured to death, one leg was skinned to the bone from ankle to knee. He was then stabbed to death right through the heart with his own bolo.”

EXAMPLE NO. 3: – “PRIMITIVO TALADUA, Intelligence Agent, G-2 Section, 10th Military District, after having arrived from Manila where he was assigned to gather some intelligence information, was caught by the Japs in Linabo, Plaridel, Misamis Occidental on 13 Feb 1944. Incriminating papers were found by the Japs in his person. He was brought to Calamba, a nearby barrio, his hands tied tight with barbed wire. While being investigated, his nails were pulled out one by one and at the same time, a hot piece of iron was applied to his breast and forehead. After two days of incessant tortures, the Japs finding he would not tell what he knew about the guerrillas, they hacked his body with bayonets until he died”.

EXAMPLE NO. 4: – “On 29 Sep 1944, at 10:00, CANDELARIA DEIMO, a girl civilian operative of the “A” Corps Ge2 Section, 10th MD, was captured by the Japs in Misamis, Misamis Occidental. Her body was battered with blows, after having been brutally abused by the Jap investigators. As she would not tell what she knew of the guerrillas, she was finally bayoneted till killed.”

EXAMPLE NO. 5: – “Hight civilian operatives, led by SABINO SABERON, proceeded to Bayabas, some twenty five kilometers Southwest of Davao City, to obtain accurate data on Jap activities, defenses, dumps and other enemy installations, on 26 Jan 1945.

Suspected by Jap civilians of being Intelligence Agents, the party was attacked in Tuli, before reaching objective, on 29 Jan, killing two of them. The rest who fled were overtaken by the enemy near the junction of the Davao and Siao Rivers the next day. Two more were killed, three fled again to report the tragedy. SABERON, wounded, was brought along by the Japs and on the way, tortured and finally killed.”

Intelligence Expenses – Less Than P 500,000

The total intelligence expenses for the Tenth Military District for the entire guerrilla period…Philippine Emergency Money, Old Philippine Treasury Notes, and American Dollars….amounted to less than one half million pesos and dollars!

This amount would hardly buy one seaworthy inter-island steamer. Yet this fund bought Intelligence information which, wholly or in part, led to the sinking of many thousands of tons of Jap shipping….to say nothing of the havoc wrecked by American forces – both ground and air, as a result of factual intelligence reporting.

8,000 Radio Messages Per Month

The various reports immediately following, serve to illustrate just how the intelligence factors were broken down, and accomplished. Radio messages to higher headquarters during 1944, averaged anywhere between 8000 to 10,000 per month and most of this was concerning intelligence.

There can be nothing but a tremendous satisfaction to all the people of Mindanao…whether soldier or civilian…who had a share, large or small, in contributing their part to this tangible war effort.

History will record the part played by the people of this Island in the progress of the war against the enemy…and the contribution of Intelligence will be included as a valuable and vital factor.

Coastwatcher Stations

In the theater of war operations in the Pacific, the Philippines occupied a strategic position, Gen MAC ARTHUR himself, recognized this fact when on h Jul 1945, he remarked in summing up the Philippine Campaigns that the Naval battle off Leyte was the turning point of the war.

Enemy Shipping Must be Observed and Reported

Realizing the importance of Mindanao, especially in its geographical relation to the Dutch East Indies, New Guinea and other Pacific Islands, the Tenth Military District established coast watcher stations in all strategic spots surrounding the island. As early as 1943, there were 17 coast watcher stations on the island…this was later increased to a total of 31. They covered all the important sea lanes and the radio stations are graphically shown on the map of Radio Stations, including in this History.

Eyes Of The U.S. Navy

In the beginning these coast watchers served as security outposts for the guerrilla forces, but when the tide of war began to turn in our favor, these stations were multiplied and became the “Eyes” of the U.S. Navy which was fast sweeping Pacific Waters, and ever-nearing the Philippines.

Report of enemy ship movements were reported by “flash” radio messages…in code and in accordance with the Navy system of identification. The actual movement of a convoy of Japanese ships could be “flashed” thru its entire movement along either the west or east coast of the Philippines…for this Headquarters not only served Higher Headquarters with ship spotting for Mindanao…but also acted as the Relay Station for the entire Philippines.

During the month of Jun 1944 a total of 214 ship sightings for the Philippines was flashed to Navy Headquarters over our key station which had direct contact with Navy Intelligence at Perth, Australia.

Beaten Paths Observed, Jap Shipping Intensified

Through the particular location of watcher stations it was possible to establish and plot “beaten paths” of enemy shipping, which proved of great assistance to the Navy, particularly submarines which would “catch their prey” in these established shipping lanes.

As the enemy situation became more acute, the Philippines came their haven or refuge, and also as a section of the Pacific for greater fortification. Ship traffic increased considerably in Jun 1944, and even as late as October a total of 405 ships were sighted in Philippine waters, especially the Visayas and Mindanao. Luzon at that time was covered by a separate relay station.

“Well Done” from The US Navy

The work that the coast watcher stations contributed to the operations in the Philippines is expressed in a radio message from the Commander, Seventh Fleet, to Commanding Officer, Tenth Military District:

“YOUR FINE WORK HAS BEEN A LARGE CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO SUCCESS OF OUR ARMS IN THE PHILIPPINES.”

***

Some “Flash” Messages From Coast Watcher Stations 1943:

15 Dec.            A CONVOY OF ENEMY SHIPS CONSISTING OF 5 FOX ABLES, 2 FOX  TARE ABLE, 1 FOX TARE CHARLIE, 2 FOX TARE DOG, 1 SUGAR BAKER WAS SIGHTED AT 0420 GMT, POSITION 10 DEGREES 17 MINUTES NORTH AND 124 DEGREES 14 MINUTES EAST, HEADING SOUTYWEST AT MEDIUM SPEED.

1944:

7 Jan.               28 FOX TARE CHARLIES WERE SIGHTED IN SURIGAO STRAITS TO EAST OF ESPERANZA AT 5:25 PM HEADING SOUTHWARD.

15 Jan.             1 FOX TARE DOG, 27 SUGAR CHARLIES AND 6 BIG UNIDENTIFIED VESSELS COMING FROM CEBU WERE SIGHTED AT 0315Z SLOWLY HEADING TO SOUTHEAST. POSITION WAS GIVEN AS 057215.

12 Feb.            20 COASTAL MOTOR VESSELS AND 1 FOX TARE CHARLIE THAT CAME FROM THE DAVAO DIRECTICN WERE LYING OFF SACOL ISLAND AT 1300.

15 Feb.            A BIG CCNVOY OF 20 UNIDENTIFIED SHIPS WAS SIGHTED AT 0900 HOW TIME READING SOUTHEAST CELEBES SEA AT REGULAR SPEED.

8 Apr.              AT 1115 ONE HEAVY CRUISER APPROACHING TICTUAN ISLAND FRCM ZAMBOANGA TAKING AN EASTERLY DIRECTION. AT 1305 SAME HEAVY CRUISER REPORTED FOLLOWED BY ANOTHER CRUISER OF SAME TYPE FROM ZAMBOANGA GOING WESTWARD TO TICTUAN ISLAND.

8 Apr.              AT 0830 ONE SHIP INSIDE LIANGA BAY WITH DESTROYER BEING TOWED. AFTER HALF AN HOUR STOP, IT PROCEEDED NORTH TO SURIGAO, IT WAS FOLLOWED BY ONE PATROL BOMBER.

19 Apr.            TWO TRANSPORTS ESCORTED BY ONE DESTROYER SIGHTED AT 1730, 10 MILES OFF LEBAK COAST, COTABATO, GOING NORTH FROM SOUTH AT MEDIUM SPEED.

1 Jun.               JAP TASK FORCE IN DAVAO GULF – ONE BIG AIRCRAFT CARRIER, 5 BATTLESHIPS, 6 DESTROYERS, 15 SUBMARINES, 9 TRANSPORTS AND ABOUT 15 SMALLER SHIPS,

7 Jun.               28 FOX TARE CHARLIES WERE SIGHTED IN SURIGAO STRAITS TO EAST OF ESPERANZA AT 5:25 HEADING SOUTH.

19 Jun.             TWO COAST GUARD CUTTERS PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED AT STA ANA. CREW OF 25, ARMED WITH TWO CANNONS, THREE AA GUNS AND SERVERAL MGS.

19 Jun.             TWO MERCHANT SHIPS ESCORTED BY THREE GUNBOATS ANCHORED AT GLAN, COTABATO.

13 Jul.             TWO BIG TRANSPORTS (HEAVILY LOADED) AND 1 GUNBOAT FROM NORTH ENTERED GLAN AND ANCHORED AT WHARF.

18 Jul.             6 SHIPS FROM ZAMBOANGA PROCEEDING EAST WITH 1 DESTROYER LEADING, FOLLOWED BY 1 SUBMARINE CHASER, 2 LARGE MERCHANT SHIPS, 1 DESTROYER AND 1 FREIGHTER*TRANSPORT

1 Aug ONE CRUISER AND ONE MERCHANT VESSEL ENTERED SARANGANT BAY HEADING FAST TOWARDS DADIANGAS.

24 Aug.           24 SHIPS BELIEVED LARGE LAUNCHES, SOME ARMED, SIGHTED ENTERING CAGAYAN, FROM WEST AT 4:00 PM.

19 Sept.           9 UNCLASSIFIED VESSELS, LARGES APPROX 500 TONS, ENTERING CAGAYAN HARBOR FROM WEST. 8 MERCHANT VESSELS REPORTED ARRIVED CAGAYAN PORT FROM NORTHEAST EARLY IN THE MORNING.

Oct.                 DURING THE MONTH OF OCTOBER 19h A TOTAL OF 05 SHIPS WERE SIGHTED BY COAST WATCHER STATIONS IN THE VISAYAS AND MINDANAO, AND REPORTED THROUGH TENTH MD HEADQUARTERS DIRECTLY TO THE NAVY.

Military Installations

If there is anything which we can call an outstanding achievement of intelligence work on Mindanao, it is the accurate location of enemy military installations, It was in this work that our civilian operatives excelled because they knew the places very well, saw these installations themselves, in fact in some cases they helped in constructing them.

Location of guns and their caliber, trenches, foxholes, dugouts supply and ammo depots, barracks and bivouac areas, all these were spotted and plotted in maps just as fast as they were made or even before they were finished. This information was especially valuable to our air forces.

What happened? – Before the enemy could use these installations they were either destroyed or neutralized by bombing. What surprised the Japanese most was the accurate bombing of installations which were hardly visible from the air like the tunnels they dug on the sides of mountains and hills. Bewildered, they suspected every Filipino as a “spy” and in the final phase of the Davao Campaign this resulted in the killing of several Filipino civilians including some of our operatives.

Enemy Defenses Known

Long before the landing of American troops on the island they were already informed of what kind of defenses they would encounter end in what places they would meet them. It is interesting to note that when the American forces marched their way along the Davao South Highway towards the city in May 1945, they found the gun emplacements intact along the coast in the same places as reported by our intelligence net in March 1945.

“20 MARCH 1945 — FIVE COASTAL ARTILLERY GUNS INSTALLED LONG SHORE 1OO METERS FROM SEA BEGINNING EAST OF KM 55 SOUTH HIGHWAY. GUNS ARE 130 METERS APART UNDER MANGROVE TREES.”

***

Other Typical messages Reporting Enemy Military Installations 1944:

13 Nov.           CONCENTRATION OF WAR MATERIAL IN RURAL HIGH SCHOOL AT KIDAPAWAN.

2h; Nov.          ENEMY AIR SPOTTER AND RADIO STATION LOCATED ON TOP OF SAAVEDRA HILL, ONE MILE WEST OF TAPUNDO PT, ON SOUTHEAST CORNER OF ISLAND.

1 Dec.             FOUR LARGE CANNONS ARE LOCATED ABOUT OO METERS NORTHWEST OF MATINA RESERVOIR. AT POINT 100 METERS WEST OF MATINA RUNWAY AND ONE KM SOUTH OF NATIONAL HIGHWAY ARE FOUR AA GUNS. FOUR MORE ARE LOCATED 300 METERS WEST OF SOUTH END OF MATINA RUNWAY.

6 Dec.              GUNS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED EMPLACED AT INTERVALS FROM LAPASAN TO TAGOLOAN. SOME FIELD FORTICIATIONS AND ENTANGLEMENTS ARE LOCATED ON SAME AREA.

23 Dec. CATEEL: JAPS HAVE PLACED ELECTRIFIED WIRE AROUND BARRIO AND ALONG COAST TO STA FELCMINA. BELIEVE THIS ALARM SYSTEM ONLY.

1945:

10 Mar.           GUN EMPLACEMENTS: PIN POINTED IN DAVAO SHEET NR 4732-II: ONE 12-INCH GUN AT 371,562. ONE AT 377-572, AND ANOTHER AT 285-570.

14 Mar.           REF DAVAO SHEET NR 4752-II. FOOD DEPOT AT 536-658.2, REVETMENT 3 METERS THICK AND 5 METERS LONG CAMOUFLAGED WITH GRASSY SOD. LOCATED AT 345.6-320. REF BUNAWAN SHEET NR 4732-I. FOOD DEPOT IN 3 BLDGS AT 318-687. GAS DRUMS SCATTERED IN PILES AROUND THESE BLDGS.

20 Mar.           TRENCHES, FOXHOLES AND AIR RAID SHELTERS UNDER HIGHSPEED CONSTRUCTION ALONG TAGUROT ROAD AND BUNAWAN RIVER.

31 Mar.           REF SHEET NR 732-II PIN POINTED TARGETS DAVAO AREA: HOUSES ON BOTH SIDES LAPANDAY RUAD OCCUPIED FRCM 325-663 TO 313-681. BARRACKS AND TUNNELS FROM 312.5621.

2 Apr.              LARGE TUNNEL WITH 16 OUTLETS LOCATED 25 METERS EAST OF DAVAO RIVER AND WEST OF KM 15-5 LAPANDAY ROAD. ELECTRIC MACHINERY IN TUNNEL WORKING DAY AND NIGHT. CONTENTS CANNOT BE GOTTEN DUE TO STRICT RESTRICTIONS. LOADED CANVAS-COVERED TRUCKS ENTER TO UNLOAD.

6 Apr.              ENEMY AT TALAKAG ENCAMPED IN MIXTURE OF TENTS AND IMPROVISED SHELTER 150 METERS SOUTHWEST BY WEST OF BRIDGE OVER KABANGLASAN CREEK NEAR TALAKAGON-TALAKAG-LINGION TRAIL. ‘THEY ARE IN OPEN TERRITORY.WILL PROBABLY TAKE SHELTER FROM RAID IN KABANGLASAN CREEK ABOUT 100 METERS SOUTH OF CAMP. FIELD GUN LOCATED NEAR DESTROYED OVEN 80 METERS NORTHWEST OF SAME BRIDGE. OTHER TENTH WEST AND NORTH OF GUN. FOXHOLES ON BOTH BANKS OF CREEK NEAR BRIDGE AROUND TALAKAG PLAZA AND IN TREES HALF KM SOUTH OF FARM 8.

15 Apr.            TROOPS ARE BIVOUACKED AT POSITION 194-221. ARTILLERY PIECES HIDDEN UNDER FRUIT AND BANANA TREES AT NURSERY. RECOMMEND BOMBING AND STRAFING WITHIN RADIUS OF 600 METERS OF POINT INCLUDING FOREST AREA SOUTH OF NURSERY. ALL THESE PLACES ARE ON KORONADAL HIGHWAY.

19 Apr.            CARMEN FERRY: REF PIKIT SHEET NR 4532-III. CULVERT ON ROAD AT 36.4-64.28 USED AS AIR RAID SHELTER. MOTOR POOL WITH 33 TRUCKS AT 38.57-65.1. 30 JAPS OCCUPY LONE HOUSE AT 38.8-62.3. GAS DUMP AT 38.52-64.19.

13 Jun.             JAPS IN ABTALEL AREA HAVE CONSTRUCTED TRENCHES. 18 TRUCKS AND MANY DRUMS OF GASOLINE, SEEN AT MOTOR POOL WHICH IS NOW LOCATED IN THE WOODED AREA SOUTHWEST OF FOOT OF NUFOL HILL.

15 Jun.             AT TAMUGAN AND GIMALANG SECTORS THE ENEMY IS BUSY LAYING MINES ALONG ROADS AND TRAILS.

Enemy Troop Disposition Most Important Phase of Intelligence

No one single phase of intelligence, except documents, was more difficult to obtain and evaluate than enemy troop dispositions – important to our own guerrilla troops who for the most part had to avoid open combat with ‘large forces’ – and important to higher headquarters which must know enemy troop disposition at all times – in every battle zone of operation.

Evaluation Difficult

To know of troop movements – whether it be small patrols, or large columns – was not difficult in itself – but to have some fairly accurate ideas as to numbers was something again. The Filipinos were decidedly weak in their reporting of anything pertaining to figures – but by process of evaluation, based on this characteristic, one could not arrive at same fairly decent estimate.

Troops Shift Frequently

Japanese troops were constantly shifting – even in the heavily garrisoned Davao area. Conditions on Mindanao were not conducive to easy travel so the spotting and reporting of troop movements was made somewhat easier.

Our radio stations were strategically located near the heavily garrisoned enemy locations to facilitate rapid reporting of movements – either overland or by water route. It was particularly important in late 1944 and early 1945 to know the number of troops being shifted to and from Mindanao – either in support of campaigns against the American forces to the north – or the Mindanao as a retreat from such campaigns.

Many Radio Messages

Daily throughout the reporting of Mindanao intelligence, troop movements represented a considerable volume of radio traffic. Just a few representative messages are reproduced below – they cover many sections of the island and are indicative of the wide range of intelligence coverage.

1944:

11 Jan.             MISAMIS ORIENTAL. 1,900 JAPS ARRIVED CAGAYAN FROM ILOILO.

11 Feb.            1,000 JAPS ARRIVED ZAMBOANGA FROM NORTH.

7 Apr.              DAVAO. 4 LARGE TRANSPORTS UNLOADED TROOPS AT DAVAO CITY     ESTIMATED AT 2000.

16 May.           SURIGAO. ELEMENTS OF JAP 30TH DIV ARRIVED SURIGAO FROM CEBU.

15 Jul.             ESTIMATED 2,000 JAPS ARRIVED DAVAO FROM PALAU FOR MONTH OF JUNE AND FIRST TWO WEEKS OF JULY.

4 Aug.             MISAMIS ORIENTAL. TRANSPORTS ARRIVING CAGAYAN BROUGHT 3,000 TROOPS. 1,000 TROOPS IMMEDIATELY WENT SOUTH THRU THE SAYRE HIGHWAY.

1944:

INDICATIONS SHOW THEY CAME FROM LUZON AND VISAYAS: CONSIST OF AIR CORPS GROUND PERSONNEL AND YOUNG INF RECRUITS.

1 Sept.             MISAMIS ORIENTAL. FROM 15 to 30 AUGUST ESTIMATED 6,000 TROOPS ARRIVED CAGAYAN FROM VISAYAS AND LUZON. THREE TROOPS APPEAR TO BE FROM SWPA BUT HAVE RESTED IN THE NORTH.

10 Sept.           BUKIDNON. 3,000 TROOPS MOVING SOUTH THRU SAYBE HIGHWAY, HIKING AT NIGHT AND RESTING IN FOREST DURING DAY.

18 Sept.           COTABATO. REPORTS INDICATE THAT APPROX 2,000 TROOPS OF THE HARADA BUTAI COMING FROM COTABATO DIRECTION ARE DISTRIBUTED TO VARIOUS SECTORS AS DIGOS, MINTAL, BAYABAS, MALAGOS, AND TUGBOK.

19 Sept.           SURIGAO. JAP TROOPS APPROX 3,000 PASSED THRU AGUSAN FROM SURIGAO. SOME TOOK SHIPS IN NASIPIT FOR GAGAYAN.

11 Oct.             AGUSAN. ESTIMATED 2,000 JAPS HIKED FROM NASIPIT TO TAGOLOAN. UNESTIMATED NR LEFT ON 6 BARGES WITH SUPPLIES.

27 Oct.            SHIPS WITH ESTIMATED 500 JAPS LEFT CAGAYAN FOR LEYTE. ADDITIONAL 600 JAPS BELIEVED FROM BUGO-TAGOLOAN AREA LEFT CAGAYAN ON SHIPS FOR SAME DESTINATION.

28 Oct.            BUKIDNON. CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF TROOPS IN TRUCKS MOVED FROM SOUTH TO NORTH ALONG THE SAYRE HIGHWAY. THEY WERE SUBSEQUENTLY SHIFTED TO LEYTE.

17 Nov.           MISAMIS ORIENTAL. ESTIMATED 2,2000 JAPS LEFT CAGAYAN FOR NORTH BELIEVE LEYTE. ALMOST NIGHTLY DEPARTURE OBSERVED SINCE NIGHT OF 6 NOV. USUALLY ABOUT 500 EACH NIGHT USING LAUNCHES AND BARGES

20 Nov.           MISAMIS ORIENTAL. 2 SUGAR CHARLIES AND 16 BARGES LOADED WITH TROOPS LEFT CAGAYAN BELIEVE BOUND FOR LEYTE.

4 Dec.              MISAMIS ORIENTAL. STRENGTH IN CAGAYAN AREA INCREASED AT END OF NOV. TROOPS CAME FROM THE SOUTH. BELIEVE WAITING TRANSPORTATION.

14 Dec.            BUKIDNON. MORE THAN 1,000 JAPS FROM BUKIDNON PASSING BUGASAN -EN-ROUTE TO BUTUAN, COTABATO.

19 Dec.            ZAMBOANGA. JAPS HAVE MOVED ALMOST ALL TROOPS FROM TETUAN, TUMAGA AND PRESAMAYOR TO PASONANCA.

27 DEC.          MISAMIS ORIENTAL. GEN MOROZUMI WITH STAFF AND A LARGE NUMBER OF TROOPS LEFT CAGAYAN FOR SOUTH.

1945:

22 Jan.             SURIGAO. APPROX 400 JAPS INCLUDING WOMEN AND CHILDREN LEFT MAGPAYANG, SURIGAO FOR BUTUAN. TROOPS ARRIVED BUTUAN ON 22 JANUARY.

30 Jan.             200 ENEMY TROOPS SHIFTED SOUTH FROM CAGAYAN AREA AND A SMALL NUMBER ALSO WENT SOUTH FROM MALUKO-DALWANGAN.

12 Feb.            ESTIMATED 1,500 JAPS MOVED FROM LASANG TIBONGCO SECTOR TO PADADA-DIGOS SECTOR, DAVAO.

18 Feb.            COTABATO. APPROX 1,000 JAPS ARRIVED PARANG FROM COTABATO CITY AREA. THEY ARE BIVOUACKED SOUTH OF WATER TOWER, IN BARRACKS AND SCHOOL BUILDING.

21 Apr.            COTABATO. OVER 1000 JAPS OF ARMY, NAVY AND ARTILLERY UNITS MOVING NORTH ON DULAWAN-KORONADAL HIGHWAY.

20 Mar.            COTABATO. OVER 700 JAPS ARRIVED BULUAN 18 MARCH, FROM SOUTH WITH 4 TRUCKS OF AMMO AND GASOLINE.

25 Mar.            BUKIDNON. ‘TROOPS ALONG SAYRE HIGHWAY ARE MOVING SOUTH. SINCE 15 MAR APPROX 2,500 JAPS HAVE GONE SOUTH FROM IMPASUGONG AREA.

24 Mar.            MISAMIS ORIENTAL. ESTIMATED 00 JAPS WITHOUT ARMS LANDED IN CAGAYAN AREA FROM BARGES. ENEMY TELLS CIVILIANS THEY ARE FROM

ILOILO.

Japanese Documents : High Priority

In a letter to Col FERTIG of 5 May 1944 from Gen WILLOUGHBY, G-2, GHW, SWPA, the primary intelligence requirements were expressed as follows:

“Location of specific enemy units. We can identify them thru documents – we know their strength and organization. The full name and rank of the commander occasionally furnished the clue to the particular tactical unit. Identification of units from a regiment up to a division is extremely important as that data gives us definite indication of the enemy’s combat ability. Enemy documents furnish the clue to the solution of enemy units and their dispositions. Such documents should receive high priority. Diaries, bulletins, orders, etc., of the enemy reveal much more than believed possible.”

This was no easy assignment for not only did the Japanese carry away their dead, almost with fanatical persistence, but we had no interpreters and therefore no way of deciding the importance to higher headquarters of documents when captured. In the earlier days, and even up to the landing in Leyte of 2O Oct 1944, transportation facilities between headquarters was most infrequent, so those documents captured, lost their timeliness due to slowness of delivery.

Through many agents, to all outward appearances, loyal to the Japs but secretly working for our cause – it was possible to obtain the names of Commanding Officers, and occasionally learn the identity of units.

Notwithstanding these drawbacks, a certain amount of captured material made its way to higher headquarters, and in a few instances, loyal Chinese friends were able to give some translations which occasionally proved of value.

Some Documents Found Highly Valuable

Documents captured from two Japanese aviators in Oct 1944 near Butuan, Agusan, and captured items obtained after the Allied air strike at Surigao in Sept, proved to be of exceptional value. The former contained late cryptographic material especially desirable. The latter contained a lot of data on the 1st Japanese Division which at the time had been unlocated but believed to be in the Philippine Islands. These items were delivered to 6th Army on Nov 1944 when their importance was discovered. In this connection the following quotation from letter received from Sixth Army Japanese Translation Section is quoted:

“Receipt is acknowledged of a number of Japanese diaries, documents, maps, equipment and manuals, as delivered to this section by Capt. H. A. Rosenquist, AC of S, Ge2, 10th M.D.

It is suggested that all such materials be immediately classified as to its source, date obtained, and other information which will be of assistance to this section in its evaluation of such material. All should be separated and labelled accordingly.

This type of Japanese captured material contributes greatly to the progress of the war effort. Our special appreciation goes to your forces for these excellent contributions. Keep up the good work.”

****

Some Radio Messages Sent Higher Headquarters

1944:

6 Nov.             20 JAP MANUALS PAYBOOKS AND PERSONAL LETTERS CAPTURED IN SURIGAO. IMMEDIATE ANALYSIS REVEALED VERY VALUABLE ORDER OF BATTLE AND ORGANIZATION INFORMATION OF THE JAP 1ST DIV.

13 Nov.           JAP AVIATOR THREW AWAY PACK CONTAINING NAVY CODE BOOK, AVIATION NAVIGATION INSTRUMENT, ENEMY IDENTIFICATION BOOK & AVIATORS REPORT. THESE FORWARDED TO SIXTH ARMY.

1944:

8 Dec.              CAPTURED DOCUMENTS REVEALED THAT ENEMY IN MALABANG HAD A STRENGTH OF 500 WITH 2 MORTARS, HEAVY AND 1 LIGHT MG: THEY LOST 46 KIA BUT THEIR MORALE HIGH AND WILL FIGHT TO HE LAST.

18 Dec.            CAPTURED DOCUMENTS REVEALED THAT 77H INF REGT STATIONED AT KIBAWE. IT REVEALED THEY HAD 1,800 ARMS & APPROX HALF A MILLION AMMO.

1945:

2 Jan.               LETTER, WRITTEN BY CO SRD CO,. 32ND BN, 54TH IND BRIGADE TO HIS COMMANDING OFFICER, CAPTURED BY GUERRILLA UNITS STATED THAT THEIR UNIT WAS SHORT ON AMMO AND MEDICINE AND REQUESTS FR EVACUATION.

28 Mar.           DOCUMENT CAPTURED FROM L JAP MESSENGER PIGEON IDENTIFIED THE 177TH INF REGT.

9 Apr.              DOCUMENT, 1 CARDBOARD BOX FULL, WILL BE PUT ON LCI FOR FORWARDING TO 8TH ARMY. SOME DOCUMENTS OF OFFICIAL NATURE APPEAR TO BE PAYROLLS. SHOULD PROVE VALUABLE.

12 Apr.            DOCUMENTS, DIARIES AND DOG TAGS PICKED UP BY AMER PT BOATS AT BALINGASAG.

15 Apr.            VARIOUS JAP TRAINING MATERIALS, PHOTOGRAPHS, REFERENCES, BOOKS AND MAPS FORWARDED TO HIGHER HQ. THESE WERE CAPTURED IN MALABANG.

18 Apr.            JAPS MAPS OF MATAMPAY AREA (BLUEPRINT) AND NUROUPI TOWNSITE (TOPOGRAPHIC) FIELD MEMORANDA, WAR DIARIES AND OTHER DOCUMENTS CAPTURED BY GUERRILLA AND FORWARDED TO HIGHER HED.

19 Apr.            11 JAP BOOKLETS, 1 PIECE OF THIN WOOD WITH JAP CHARACTERS AND LOOSE PAPERS CAPTURED BY GUERRILLA TROPPS DURING DIPOLOG OPERATIONS FORWARDED TO HIGHER HEADQUARTERS.

Enemy Airfields

The Philippines are strategically located to render convenient airstrikes against allied positions in the Pacific area. They also afford protective screening for their own lines of defenses and operation on areas bordering the China Sea.

Mindanao Air Power of Enemy Must Be Watched

For offensive reasons as well as purely defensive, it was important to the American forces that close and careful surveillance be given by intelligence agents and this Headquarters to enemy airfields construction of new fields; improvements of old; locations of revetments, military installations relating to airfield use, and last but equally important a constant report of plane traffic on fields in operation.

Agents Work Right on Fields

The Japanese needed, and needed badly, Filipino laborers, mechanics and others to work on their airfields, many hastily constructed or improved, when they began to realize the fast tempo of the American forces advances, under the shrewd tactics of Gen MACARTHUR. It was therefore possible to place many agents on jobs with the Japs. At Licanan Airfield one such agent was a surveyor. He drew all the airfield plans and always made a copy of them to smuggle out through another agent, perhaps a loyal truck driver.

Through this means, the intelligence was getting so fine that we even knew how many truckloads of gravel were needed to fill one crater hole, and how many laborers were needed to complete the job. At Matina Airfield, it took 200 laborers one full day to fill one bomb crater!

The following excerpts from a few radio messages serve to illustrate how GHQ, SWPA and the American Air Force was informed on every phase of airfield activity:

1944:

8 Jul                HANGARS AT SASA AND NAVY YARDS CAMOUFLAGED WITH COCONUT AND NIPA. ALL AIRFIELDS PROVIDED WITH AA PROTECTION. GASOLINE STORED AROUND EDGE OF FIELD.

18 Jul              MALABANG HAS 80 PLANES SHELTERS LOCATED OUTSIDE OF RUNWAYS NEAR SEA EXTENDING NORTH. BUAYAN HAS 10 RUNWAYS, ANOTHER EAST DIRECTION ARE 12 AA GUNS, 37 MM AND 8 INCH CANNON.

25 Jul              JAP SEAPLANE BASE NOW AT MALALAG IN ADDITION TO PADADA.

24 Nov            JAP PLANE ASSEMBLY AT BATUTITIK. OVER 90 PLANES ASSEMBLED THERE: HIDDEN AND DISPERSED AS FAR AS 2 KMS FROM FIELD. FIELD LOCATED 2 KMS WEST OF BATUTITIK BARRIO.

10 Dec             27 JAP PLANES HIDDEN IN TUNNELS AT MINDANAO FIELD AT ZAMBOANGA. 7 TORPEDO PLANES, ONE FIGHTER, ONE DIVE BOMBER AND 17 TWIN ENGINE BOMBERS.

23 Oct             FIVE ZEKE FIGHTERS PASSED NIGHT AT LUMBIA MISAMIS ORIENTAL FIELD, WENT SOUTH NEXT DAY CAME FROM NORTH. HABITUAL FOR NIP PLANES TO LAND AT DUSK AT LUMBIA AND TAKE OFF EARLY NEXT MORNING.

1945:

9 Feb               REMAINING 5 PURSUITS AT LUMBIA NOW LOCATED IN COCO GROVES JUST EAST OF TALAKAG-CAGAYAN ROAD AT KM 8. THIS IS ALONG EAST BOUNDARY LUMBIA FIELD.

10 Feb             NO PLANE ASSEMBLY SHOP AT LICANAN AIRFIELD. PLANES ARRIVE ALREADY IN FLYING CONDITION. SMALL PORTABLE REPAIR SHOP COMPOSED OF 3 LATHES, 6 FEET, 10 FEET AND 12 FEET. 2 SMALL HAND BLOWERS FOR BLACKSMITHING AND IRON WORK. REPAIR DONE AT HANGAR ON RUNWAY WHERE NEEDED.

17 Feb             AIRPLANE REPAIR SHOP LOCATED WEST SIDE NR 1 RUNWAY LICANAN AIRFIELD APPROX 90 METERS FROM SOUTH END RUNWAY CITED. 2ND LIKE SHOP SPOTTED APPROX 100 METERS NORTH OF 1ST CITED.

12 Feb             FOUR ENEMY PLANES WARMED UP AT LUMBIA TODAY. THEY ARE HIDDEN IN DENSE WOODS 1,500 METERS AT 15 DEGREES FROM MUNICIPAL BUILDING LUMBIA.

22 Feb             BETWEEN LIBBY FIELD AND NATIONAL ROAD ARE 28 PLANE SHELTERS BUILT OF WOOD AND STONE. 28 PLANES COUNTED BY AGENT ON 12 FEB. GAS BURIED AT ALL FUR CORNERS OR ROAD JUNCTION. GOING FROM LIBBY FIELD AND CROSSING NATIONAL ROAD.

2 Mar              27 PLANES AT LICANAN AIRFIELD DAVAO AND 82 AT MATINA AIRFIELD.

31 Mar            6 PLANES HIDDEN AT BALUAN, 100 METERS EAST OF CREEK AND 700 METERS FROM SARANGANI BEACH. BALUAN IS JUST NORTH OF BUAYAN. JAPS ARE VERY CAUTIOUS THIS AREA. FILIPINOS RESTRICTED,

Road Spotters

Only two highways on the island of Mindanao offered suitable road surface for mechanized units – the Sayre and National Highways, and even these were by no means ideal for heavy traffic or bulky vehicles. It was an easy matter then to keep a careful check on enemy vehicle traffic; also troop movement on these two highways.

Lookout At Sumilao

In August 1944 a 24-hour lookout post was established in a strategic position at Sumilao, Bukidnon, which overlooked the Sayre Highway. Traffic to and from Bugo on the Mindanao coast, through Del Monte to points south on Sayre Highway, Malaybalay, Valencia, etc., had to pass this point in the highway.

A radio station was located as near the lookout position as security would permit and radio messages were sent daily, sometimes as “flashes” when the occasion demanded. During the month of Nov 1944 alone a total of 216 Japanese trucks were observed going north; 255 counted going south. A few of the typical daily radio messages are reproduced below:

25 Oct. ‘44      18 TRUCKS WENT NORTH AND 12 WENT SOUTH. CARGO UNIDENTIFIED

25 Oct. ’44       99 TRUCKS WENT SOUTH LOADED WITH TROOPS. 31 TRUCKS WENT NORTH EMPTY.

6 Dec. ‘44       17 TRUCKS WENT SOUTH LOADED WITH TROOPS: 60 TRUCKS WENT NORTH LOADED WITH UNKNOWN CARGO.

18 Apr. ’45      64 TRUCKS WENT NORTH AND 49 SOUTH.

28 Apr. ’45      ENEMY TRUCK TRAFFIC CONTINUES. FOR PERIOD OF 3 DAYS A TOTAL OF 42 TRUCKS WENT NORTH AND 101 TRUCKS WENT SOUTH. OF THESE

68 MOVED BY DAY AND 75 BY NIGHT. TRUCKS GOING NORTH USUALLY EMPTY WHILE THOSE GOING SOUTH ALL LOADED WITH TROOPS.

LOOKOUT AT BANCUD (15 Kms. South of Malaybalay):

A lookout position in this spot, while covering the same Sayre Highway, gave the opportunity for a double check and an indication of the activity at Malaybalay proper. Apparently many of the trucks reported from Sumilao post never did go farther than Malaybalay for during the same month of November only 127 trucks were reported as going north; 57 as going south, from the Bancud lookout position.

Lookout On National Highway Davao Area

It was much more difficult to maintain lookout positions in the very heavily garrisoned Davao areas However an observer was stationed at Km 20, North of Davao City, along the National Highway. Reports were rendered daily by radio, supplemented by written report covering more details. The following traffic for period of 24 days from 13 Dec 1944 to 5 Jan 1945 as follows:

GOING NORTH:

OFFICERS – 65; TROOPS – 773; JAP CIVILIAN LABORERS – 365; FILIPINO LABORERS – 56; TRUCKLOAD OF PULVERIZED ROCK – 58; TRUCKLOAD OF BOARD – 71; TRUCKLOAD OF FOODSTUFF – 65; TRUCKLOAD OF GALVANIZED IRON – 7; TRUCKLOAD OF FUEL – 4; TRUCKLOAD OF SCRAP IRON – 1; TRUCKLOADOF FURNITURE – 2; TRUCKLOADOF UNIDENTIFIED EQUIPMENT -7; AND A TOTAL OF 415 CARGO TRUCKS AND 49 CARS.

GOING SOUTH:

OFFICERS – 65; TROOPS – 720; JAPANESE CIVILIAN LABORERS 239; FILIPINO LABORERS – 104; TRUCKLOAD OF PULVERIZED ROCK – 46; TRUCKLOAD OF BOARD – 23; TRUCKLOAD OF GALVANIZED IRON – 2; TRUCKLOAD OF FOODSTUFF -20; TRUCKLOAD OF SCRAP IRON – 2; TRUCKLOAD OF OIL DRUMS – 5; TRUCKLOAD OF FURNITURE – 2; 25 JAP CIVILIANS AND A TOTAL OF 375 CARGO TRUCKS AND 4l CARS.

Enemy Plane Traffic

In July 1944…about a month prior to the first bombing in the Philippines by American planes…instructions were received emphasizing the need for “flash” reporting of enemy air traffic. An established procedure or reporting was given…and this disseminated by radio to all divisions…all stations. This included not only Mindanao but the Visayas as well, in accordance with orders from GHO, SWPA.

FLASHES IN AUSTRALIA…5 MINUTES AFTER PLANE SIGHTINGS

With the net control station of the Tenth Military District on a “24-hour stand-by” and with a separate circuit direct to American Air Force Headquarters, enemy plane traffic could be flashed from original spotter, through intermediate net, then from net control to the Air Force…in an average of 5 minutes, Messages were in code, but in clear text…short but complete…and followed the following procedure:

“20 JULY 44 = YOU WILL REPORT TO FTAW IMMEDIATELY UPON DETECTION INFO CONCERNING AIRCRAFT FLIGHTS IN THE FOLLOWING SEQUENCE:

AIRCRAFT WARNING INDICATOR, YOUR CALL SIGN, MESSAGE LETTER TIME OF OBSERVATION, HOW DETECTED, DISTANCE, DIRECTION, COURSE, NUMBER OF PLANES, TYPE, IDENTITY, ALTITUDE. AIRCRAFT WARNING INDICATOR IS AW REPEATED TWICE TO INDICATE FLIGHT REPORT FOLLOWS.

YOUR NORMAL STATION CALL SIGN. MESSAGE LETTERS START WITH A FOR FIRST REPORT THEN B AND SO THRU ALPHABET TO Z WHEN A IS USED AGAIN. TIME IS REPORT BY 2 NUMBERS INDICATING MINUTES PAST HOUR WHEN FLIGHT DETECTED, HE HOUR IS SHOWN BY THE DATE TIME GROUP OF THE MESSAGE HEADING CONSEQUENTLY HOUR USED IN HEADING MUST BE SAME HOUR AS THAT WHICH FLIGHT DETECTED. METHOD OF DETECTION INDICATED BY IV FOR FLIGHT SEEN AND IA FOR FLIGHT HEARD. DISTANCE IN MILES SHOWN BY 2 NUMBERS OO BEING OVERHEAD AND 99 UNKNOWN. DIRECTION FROM YOUR STATION INDICATED BY SINGLE NUMBER, 7 FOR NORTHEAST, 2 FOR WEST, 7 FOR NORTHWEST, 4 FOR SOUTH, 5 FOR SOUTHWEST, 6 FOR WEST, 3 FOR SOUTHEAST AND 8 FOR NORTH. ZERO MEANS FLIGHT OVERHEAD AND 99 INDICATING TAKING OFF OR LANDING, DISTINCTION BEING MADE BY PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF SUBSEQUENT NORMAL REPORTS. COURSE IN INDICATED BY SINGLE NUMBER AS FOR DIRECTION, ZERO INDICATING FLIGHT CIRCLING. NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT EXPRESSED BY 2 NUMBERS, ZERO ZERO INDICATES NUMBER UNKNOWN.

TYPE AIRCRAFT EXPRESSED BY SINGLE LETTER. P FOR FIGHTER, B IS BOMBER, C FOR TRANSPORT AND X MEANS TYPE UNKNOWN. F FOR FRIENDLY, H FOR HOSTILE AND X FOR UNKNOWN. ALTITUDE IN THOUSANDS OF FEET EXPRESSED BY 2 NUMBERS, 00 MEANS HEIGHT UNKNOWN. FOLLOWING IS A SAMPLE REPORT:

‘AWAW WOO ABLE ZERO THREE ITEM VICTOR ZERO SEVEN THREE FOUR ZERO NINE BAKER HOW ZERO FIVE’

AWAW IS WARNING INDICATOR, WOO IS STATION CALL SIGN, ABLE IS MESSAGE LETTER, ZERO THREE SHOWS THAT FLIGHT DETECTED 3 MINUTES PAST HOUR USED IN MESSAGE HEADING, ITEM VICTOR MEANS FLIGHT SEEN, ZERO SEVEN THAT FLIGHT 7 MILES FROM YOUR STATION, FOUR INDICATES PLANES PROCEEDING SOUTH, ZERO NINE SHOWS PLANES IN FLIGHT, BAKER MEANS TWO ENGINER BOMBER, FIVE INDICATES 5000 FOOT ALTITUDE.”

A Few Of The Radio Flashes

Translated from code to understandable English, there follows a few of the many hundreds of plane flashes sent thru the 10th MD radio net:

1943:

19 Dec.            5 ENEMY BOMBERS ESCORTED BY 19 PURSUITS PASSED OVER MISAMIS ORIENTAL. IN THE AFTERNOON 17 FIGHTERS PASSED SAME AREA FLYING FROM NORTH TO SOUTH.

1944:

20 Jan.             50 PURSUITS PASSED OVER SULU SEA GOING NORTH.

23 Mar.           FLIGHTS OF 6 TO 9 BOMBERS FROM PATAG AIRFIELD PATROLLING MACAJALAR BAY FOR LAST 3 DAYS.

1944:

1 Apr.              FLIGHT OF 11 HEAVY BOMBERS, ALL TWIN ENGINED, AND 4 SINGLE MOTORED FIGHTERS, PASSED MALITA HEADING TOWARDS DAVAO.

6 Apr.             ONE JAP BOMBER WAS OBSERVED FLYING AT ABOUT 200 FT GOING NORTHEAST OVER CABADBARAN AT 8:00 AM SIGHTED FROM MAGALLANES, AGUSAN.

18 Apr.            11 RED PURSUIT PLANES PASSED CAGAYAN. INSIGNIA: WHITE SKULL AND CROSS BONES BOTH SIDES OF FUSELAGE AND ON WINGS. APPEARED TO BE NAKAJIMA PURSUIT. ONE BOMBER ESCORTED BY FIGHTERS PASSED OVER PANGUIL BAY AT 9:30 AM.

11 Jun.             9 PATROL PLANES, SINGLE ENGINED, APPARENTLY WITH FIXED LANDING GEAR OBSERVED PASSING OVER TALAKAG, BUDIDNON, GOING NORTH.

14 Jun.             ONE BOMBER ESCORTED BY 6 PURSUITS PASSED EAST TO SOUTHEAST OVER OPOL, MISAMIS ORIENTAL.

22 Jun.             16 PLANES, BOMBERS AND FIGHTERS, PASSED NORTHWEST TO SOUTHEAST OVER CAMIGUIN ISLAND.

27 Jun.             8 PLANES, ZEKE TYPE, PASSED OVER LAS NIEVES, AGUSAN.

.2 Jul.              LARGE NUMBERS OF JAP PLANES, BOMBERS AND FIGHTERS PASSED OVER BALINGASAG, ORIENTAL MISAMIS.

14 Jul.             1000 – 1 MEDIUM BOMBER FLEW OVER OPOL TO NORTHWEST. 1430 – 1 MEDIUM BOMBER FLEW OVER OPOL TO WEST.

16 Jul.             1230 – 5 FIGHTERS PASSED OVER CAGAYAN, MISAMIS ORIENTAL TO NORTH.

17 Jul.             1100 – 3 MEDIUM BOMBERS ESCORTED BY 7 PURSUITS ARRIVED DAVAO FROM NORTH.

Bombing Results Reported

FIRST BOMBING – 6 AUGUST 1944: The very first bombing of a target in the Philippines by American planes, occurred 6 August 1944, when two bombs were dropped in Davao area = one near Santa Ana wharf, killing three Jap navy men; the other in the water nearby. This however, was no criterion of the bombing and strafing effectiveness to follow – and the months of September and October 19); in particular, saw many American planes in action on Mindanao, insistently pinpointing enemy military installations, ships, airfield, planes, troops and many other targets which this Headquarters had reported by radio to Ge2, GHW, SWPA, over a period of months.

The need for factual reporting on bombing and strafing results was equally as important as sending data on new targets. Ail intelligence agents were instructed to give high priority to this new phase of intelligence reporting.

Many hundreds of radio messages on bombing results were received from the many strategically located radio stations on Mindanao. A few, taken at random from our Intelligence Summaries are quoted below; along with an interesting report of the bombing effectiveness in the Hinatuan Bay, East:

Coast area on 9 Sept 19h.

1944:

10 Sept:           AMERICAN BOMBERS BOMBED AND STRAFED LANDING FIELD AND TRUCKS ALONG NATL HIWAY SURIGAO X RESULTS DASH 9 VESSELS SUNK, INCLUDING 6 TRANSPORTS, 30 MOTORBOATS, 1 LANDING BARGE, 1 QUEEN BOAT X TRANSPORTS LOADED WITH SOLDIERS, KNOWN TO BE ABOUT 1,500 WITH BUT FEW SURVIVORS WHO WERE KILLED IN WATER BY LOYAL CIVILIANS IN BAROTOS HITTING THEM OVERHEAD WITH PADDLES X 50 MULES DESTROYED AND 12 SALVAGED X 19 TRUCKS DISABLED ON HIWAY X BOXES OF AMMO, FOODSTUFF, GASOLINE DRUMS AND SOME FIELD GUNS DESTROYED AT WHARF.

14-15 Sept.      PILOTS QUARTERS, MOTOR POOL, TWO LARGE WAREHOUSES, TWO SHIPS FUEL TANKS UNDER ACACIA TREES, ALL ZAMBOANGA, DESTROYED BY AMERICAN PLANE BOMBINGS.

1944:

24 Sep.            SURVIVORS OF MUNKEIN MARU, NOW CONFINED, STATE THAT THEIR SHIP WAS DAMAGED BY PLANES AND SUNK BY SUBMARINES ON 9 SEPT. THEY CLAIMED 400 WERE ON SHIP WITH BUT FEW SURVIVORS.

27 Sep.            3 TRANSPORTS SUNK BETWEEN BONGO ISLAND AND COTABATO CITY. 600 NIPS DEAD AND 200 NIPS SURVIVED X 22 CAPTURED BY OUR TROOPS AT ONE SPOT X.

18 Oct.            11 PLANES DESTROYED SUPPLY DUMPS AT TAMONTAKA, COTABATO AND 1 LAUNCH AND 2 BARGES NEARBY. 2 LAUNCHES BURNED AND MANY JAPS.

2 Dec.              16 TRUCKS AND 2 BOMBERS BURNED, 50 NABY TROOPS KILLED AT MATINA AIRFIELD.

1945:

13 Apr.            TWO SUBMARINES SUNK AT PANAKAN WHARF THESE WERE TIED UP AT WHARF EFFECTIVELY CAMOUFLAGED, REPORTED BY OUR AGENTS AND AIR PHOTOS SUBSEQUENTLY PINPOINTED X PERISCOPE WAS CAMOUFLAGED AND HIDDEN BETWEEN GASOLINE DRUMS.

14 May            6 JAP TORPEDO BOATS WERE SUNK OFF PISO PT BEACH THIS SAME AREA STRAFED RESULTING IN DESTRUCTION OF 2 FUEL DUMPS AND 2 AMMO DUMPS. THESE TARGETS WERE CONSTANTLY REPORTED FROM DEC ’44 UNTIL DATE THEY WERE DESTROYED.

NOTE            DURING THE MONTHS OF AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER, 19hh, MILITARY TARGETS IN DAVAO CITY ONLY WERE BOMBED YET DUE TO ACCURATE REPORTING OF TARGETS OVER ONE HALF OF CITY IS STILL INTACT, YET ALL MILITARY TARGETS WERE DESTROYED.

“Jap Convoy Annihilated In Hinatuan Bay, Surigao”

“At about 5 o’clock in the morning of 9 Sept 1944, planes were heard from the town on Bislig. From the eyewitness view point, three groups of planes approx. fifty in number were seen over the bay. A few minutes later, explosions were heard and the planes were seen diving by twos. Smoke then rose up from behind the point of Maribojoc. ‘The whole bay of Bislig can be viewed clearly on top of a mountain in sitio Papay. The eyewitness, together with other people went to this favorable position and from there saw big ships, steel vessels with two funnels, some in flames and some covered with thick and black smoke.

There were twenty-six of these vessels including two that looked like destroyers and approx. fifty small vessels. The planes continued bombing and strafing for three or four hours which returned the fire. One plane was shot down.

During this attack, the large steel ships remained out in deep water and the smaller vessels which were 200 to 250 ton wooden ships, powered with diesel engines, scattered for shelter behind Macaburom and Mawis Islands. At about 9:00 or 10:00 AM, six US warships were noticed on the horizon, heading towards Hinatuan Bay. A few minutes later, the ships moved to the warships – two big ones and four smaller ones. When they were opposite Maribojoc Pt, they opened fire on the Japs vessels, some of which were already burning. All were hit, and subsequently sunk. The warships withdrew and headed south. Only fifty survivors managed to reach Mawis Island. They were picked up by a Jap launch. Not a single Jap ship escaped the bombing and shelling.”

ROADS AND TRAILS

Japs Attempt To Keep New Trails Secret:

Among the varied activities undertaken by the enemy in an all-out effort to strengthen their defenses, especially in the Davao area, was the construction of roads and trails to the interior and in the interior sectors.

These were calculated to hasten the movement of troops and equipment in the event of American Landings and subsequent withdrawals. These new trails and roads were so linked together in the Davao area, that they provided an orderly withdrawal of troops and equipment to alternate interior defense positions.

Construction of these trails were naturally meant to be secret…but to construct a road, build a bridge, or erect a building in the Philippines without the knowledge of the native people would be something next to impossible.

Trails were made rather narrow, and advantage taken of overhead foliage, to prevent spotting by reconnaissance planes. However, in spite of all precautions, there was not a new Japanese trail that was not subsequently reported by loyal civilians and our agents.

Maps Valuable To American Ground Forces:

Very few accurate maps were available for use by American tactical forces and none of them indicated the trails and roads built since the days of Pearl Harbor. Consequently guerilla maps furnished by the Intelligence Section were of great value…and actually reproduced for distribution to all units concerned.

Such a map is the one of the “DAVAO INTERIOR SECTOR” included with this report. This shows a maze of roads and trails non-existent on any map in the hands of the American forces. Neither did reconnaissance photos bring out all these trails…but this map obviously became important in the Davao…Kibawe-Talomo Trail encounters.

In other sectors on Mindanao, the enemy attempted to construct similar trails of withdrawal and secondary positions. The Malungon Trail, connecting Sarangani Bay area with that of Padada or southern Davao is a good example. However, this trail was never used effectively, due to the enemy being cut off from Digos due to rapid advance of American forces.

Following are a few radio messages released to higher Headquarters concerning new trails, roads and important. changes:

1944:

26 Oct.            FROM LIBONA, BUKIDNON, NIPS HAVE BACK TRAILS TO SOUTH.

31 Oct.            ROAD UNDER CONSTRUCTION NORTHWESTERN DAVAO AREA PASSES THRU GUMALANG, UPPER BIAO, MONGON KULAPU AND UPIAN TO BALATUKAN WHERE IT CONNECTS WITH THE PROVINCIAL ROAD THAT WAS CONSTRUCTED BEFORE THE WAR. PACK ANIMALS ARE USED FOR CARRYING EQUIPMENT FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION PURPOSES.

Oct.                 NIPS IN CAGAYAN IMPROVING BACK TRAILS THRU LIBONA, MAMPAYAG, DALWANGAN, AS POSSIBLE MEANS OF RETREAT.

Oct.                 NIPS HAVE ESTABLISHED ESCAPE ROUTE THRU PASONANGA RIVER TOWARDS WEST COAST. THEY ARE ALSO MOVING SUPPLIES TO CAPISAN.

1945:

10 Feb.            ALL BRIDGES BETWEEN SANTIAGO AND MAGPAYANG BEING REBUILT.

18 Feb.            ENEMY FINISHED ROAD CONNECTING SASA AIRFIELD WITH KM 8 CABANTIAN BUHANGIN ROAD

26 Feb.            NEW ROUTES OF WITHDRAWAL ENEMY TROOPS SOUTH DAVAO AREA INFORMED OF WIDENED TRAILS ABOUT 6 METERS WIDE, 1 FROM MATINA SECTOR (KM 2.6) GOING NORTH TO CATALUNAN GRANDE THEN TO MINTAL COMPLETED ABOUT 31 JANUARY. 2ND FROM SIBULAN (KM 30 SOUTH HIGHWAY) PASSING EAST OF INAWAYAN, EAST OF CATIGAN DIRECT TO BAYABAS THEN TO MANUEL PLANTATION (ABOUT KMS WEST OF NAMING).

28 Mar.  BRIDGES FROM KM 6h to 66 (AGUSAN-SURIGAO BOUNDARY) UNDER REPAIR.

16 Jun. A NEW 17 KM TRAIL HAS BEEN COMPLETED FROM TULI TO SALAYSAY ALONG NORTH SIDE OF KIBAWE-CALINAN ROAD AND ANOTHER 11 KM TRAIL FROM JUNCTION OF TULI AND SUWAWAN RIVER TO UPIAN MOUNTAINS.

COMPOSITE INTELLIGENCE REPORT

When the Americans landed at Leyte, 20 Oct 1944, they considered sending a force to Surigao, to protect that flank. However, the 6th Army called for a representative of the Tenth Military District, to present facts on that forward and the rear areas as well.

Maj HAROLD A. ROSENQUIST, AC of S, G-2, who had just spent some time in the Surigao area obtaining marine and land mine information before the landing of American forces in Leyte, was dispatched by Col FERTIG to Leyte by PT boat.

A complete report was prepared and submitted to G-2, 6th Army. It is reproduced herewith for it graphically illustrates the intelligence reporting all over the island which made this report possible. On the basis of this report, and the ability of FERTIG’s guerrillas to hold the enemy in check, it was decided not to make a landing in Surigao.

UNITED STATES FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES

Headquarters Tenth Military District

In the Field

7 November 1944

l. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION:

a. MINDANAO as a Whole: The Island of MINDANAO is being divided into a forward and a rear area for purposes of discussion, and forward area comprising all territory N of a line running E and W from LIANGA (SURIGAO) to, but not including, CAGAYAN (MISAMIS ORIENTAL), and the rear area comprising the remainder of the Island. As of 30 Oct 1944 enemy strength in MINDANAO was estimated as follows:

AGUSAN                                           350

BUKIDNON                                      4,400

COTABATO                                      16,000

DAVAO                                             25,000

LANAO                                              500

MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL                100

MISAMIS ORIENTAL                     3,500

SURIGAO                                          1,800

ZAMBOANGA                                 5,700

                                                            _______

Total                                                    57, 350

b. Enemy Activity in Forward Area: Enemy garrisons as of 30 Oct. were located as follows:

AGUSAN                                           150

NASIPIT                                 150

BUTUAN                               60

MISAMIS ORIENTAL

TALISAYAN                         100

ANAKAN                              50

SURIGAO

SURIGAO TOWN                 200

MABUHUAY                        500

ANAMAR                              250

BADAS                                  100

MADRID                               400

TANDAG                               100

                                                            _____

 Total                                                   1,910

Garrisons at NASIPIT, BUTUAN, TANDAG and MADRID are at. present confined or being attacked by guerrilla troops of the 119th and ll4th Regt, of the 110th Division. The enemy garrison at ANAKAN was reported as having moved to CAGAYAN by barge. At present those garrisons are on the defensive as a result of the orders from the Headquarters of the Tenth Military District to confine and eliminate them. These guerrillas can contain the enemy by land, but the sea approaches remain open to him; by the use of barges and motor launches the Japs can, therefore, freely move their troops. The enemy garrisons are limited in their function to very short patrols. ‘There are four airfields in the forward area: At SURIGAO, BADAS, MALPOK (near BUTUAN) and ANAKAN (near GINGOOG). These are fighter strips, but they are not in use.

c. Enemy Activity in Rear Area: Since the first of September the Japs have been concentrating on a strong defense of the BUKIDNON VALLEY area, including the SAYRE HIGHWAY leading to DAVAO, COTABATO and CAGAYAN seaports.

Indications were that the Japs moved many troops S (7,000 from SURIGAO during the months of August and September) to establish a highly mobile island reserve straddling the N, S and W approaches to the above named ports. Enemy troops are therefore in a position rapidly to reinforce strategic points as these are threatened except in AGUSAN and SURIGAO. The most recent troop movement was that to the city of KABAKAN (COTABATO) pf approximately 8,000 troops. This movement may account for the sudden drop of 8,000 troops in the strength estimates for BUKIDNON. Besides the movement of 120 truckloads of troops to the N along the SAYRE HIGHWAY, the enemy continues to move troops to the S. According to a PW from the hist Regt, 30th Div., captured at CARAGARA (LEYTE) 31 October, the hist Regt arrived at CAGAYAN 2h October from the S and left CAGAYAN on three unidentified destroyers 26 October, arriving at ORMOC (LEYTE) on 27 October. In DAVAO PROVINCE the tendency has been to bivouac away from the city, from military installations and other bombing targets; such troops are concentrated in areas to the W of DAVAO CITY near MT APO. No explanation can now be given for the increase in troop strength (an increase of 3,600 during the month of October) in ZAMBOANGA, all concentrated in the vicinity of ZAMBOANGA CITY. Guerrillas occupy or control over three-fourths of this province.

d. Installations, Fortifications, Supplies:

(1) Roads and Trails: When still in control of the AGUSAN and SURIGAO areas, the enemy improved the MAYGATASAN TRAIL, thus providing an outlet from BUTUAN via the AGUSAN RIVER to LIANGA, and at the same time providing an outlet from DAVAO by means-of the National Highway via the AGUSAN RIVER to the MAYGATASAN TRAIL.

(2) Bridges: In the forward area the greater number of the bridges, most covering culverts and small rivers, are either usable or can be replaced.

The enemy recently destroyed the bridge between SURIGAO and IPIL (SURIGAO). The large bridge at MAGPAYOS, south of BADAS (AGUSAN), was destroyed by the flood of 20 October. ‘The bridge at SANTIAGO (AGUSAN) is out, one bridge between MADRID and LANUZA. These bridges can be repaired where necessary through the cooperation of the local inhabitants. The small bridges would require little time, the larger much more, for repair, depending upon the available materials.

(3) Fortifications: The usual practice of the enemy is to install barbed wire entanglements, foxholes, and trenches around the garrisoned area. Each garrison has one or more .30 cal MGs covering the main approaches. The recent reports state that there are barbed wire entanglements along the shore from the wharf to the river’s mouth in SURIGAO CITY. There was also an unconfirmed report that land mines are planted on the beach at the mouth of the SURIGAO RIVER. Defensive areas have recently been strengthened from Km 1 to Km 3 (immediately S of the city proper).

(4) Artillery: It has been reported that two 75 mm guns are located within SURIGAO CITY and three at PT BILAA. However, the Japs have recently evacuated PT BILAA and the whereabouts of these guns is not known.

A report stated that they had been removed to MADRID but it was not verified.

The Japs make constant and effective use of knee mortars and 8l-mm mortars in keeping guerrilla units at a distance. There are no known AA guns in the forward area

(5) Armor: Reports indicate that three tanks are located at BUGO near CAGAYAN.

(6) Underwater Obstacles: A marine mine field was reported extending from PT BILAA in a northerly direction to a point 100 yards off shore.

Boats beyond this point proceeded without escort. Local inhabitants found some floating mines on the E coast shores of SURIGAO. These mines were 1 yard in diameter, with eight acid detonators, were painted black, loaded with citric acid powder, and laid at a depth of from two to three years. Some mines had red flags to indicate position; they are reported by these inhabitants to break away from their moorings easily.

(7) Supplies: In SURIGAO PROVINCE only 80% of the Japs are armed, the rest having Lost their equipment during large scale bombings of 9 September or being survivors from ships sunk during recent naval battles. In this province the enemy is better equipped with food supplies than in AGUSAN where it had become necessary to rely on local sources, especially on fish from native fishermen.

2. GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES: During the month of October, following approval of GHQ, SWPA, aggressive action was taken to contain and where possible, to eliminate enemy garrisons. In the forward area at present, as suggested above, the garrisons at NASIPIT and BUTUAN AGUSAN) are, except for the sea approaches, definitely surrounded. In SURIGAO PROVINCE enemy is being engaged at MADRID, but reinforcements have been received here, and consequently guerrilla activity is limited to harassing attacks only. No large scale offensive action has been taken against the Headquarters garrison at MABUHAY, principally because of a lack of sufficient mortars and mortar ammunition.

During the first nine months of 1944, a total of 3,916 Japanese were killed by guerrilla forces of the Tenth Military District.

From the time of the original organization of guerrilla units in the Tenth Military District, special emphasis has been placed on the following activities:

a. The establishment of coast watcher systems.

b. The building of intelligence nets for the obtaining of data including facts about troop concentrations and movements, air and water-borne traffic, and airfield installations. Radio communications were installed for the dissemination of such intelligence whenever the equipment was available.

Moreover, the guerrilla units established food projects, and so contributed substantially to the solution of the food problem in a number of areas.

3. ENEMY CAPABILITIES: The enemy is capable of:

a. Maintaining a static defense of MINDANAO: Although there does not seem to be any Logical reason for the Japs to maintain a static defense of MINDANAO, there have been some indications of recent enemy movement to the S. This would seem to indicate that the Japs intend to continue their policy of keeping a mobile inland reserve for the defense of the Island.

b. Defending the N and the NE coasts There have been no indications that the enemy intends to defend the N and the NE coast. Troops have been moved N to CAGAYAN but none has been moved to the E from there. Some enemy troops have been landed along the E coast of SURIGAO PROVINCE at TANDAG and MADRID but these were small in number and some may have been survivors from ships that were sunk.

c. Evacuating troops to BORNEO via ZAMBOANGA: It is possible for the enemy to evacuate his troops to BORNEO via COTABATO and ZAMBOANGA. The constantly fluctuating enemy strength in ZAMBOANGA would suggest that this province has been used as a staging area for troops. Then enemy has been known to stage troops through ZAMBOANGA to COTABATO, and thence to BUKIDNON or DAVAO. Obviously this route could also be used in reverse. During the months of September and October enemy strength in COTABATO PROVINCE increased by approximately 10,000 troops. These probably were scheduled to reinforce the mobile inland reserve in BUKIDNON. It may be that since the American landing on LEYTE they are being held until the enemy can decide which course of action to follow.

d. Moving troops N to CAGAYAN and attempting to reinforce LEYTE: The enemy has already moved the bulk of the 1st Regt. 30th Div., N to CAGAYAN and by boat to LEYTE. During the last week in October a total of 120 truckloads of Japs were seen moving N to CAGAYAN; these probably were the 1st Regt and an additional 600 troops that left CAGAYAN by boat for an unknown destination (probably LEYTE). However, there have been no further indications of any attempts to strengthen CAGAYAN or to send troops there from the S.

e. The evacuation of troops by the enemy from CAGAYAN to the WESTERN VISAYAS remains a capability of the enemy, but no reports have been received that would indicate such a maneuver.

/s/ Harold A. Rosenquist

/t/ HAROLD A. ROSENQUIST,

Captain, FA.,

AC of S, G-2

Historic Jasaan Church finally gets a historical marker

Previously Recognized as a National Cultural Treasure by the National Museum

JASAAN, MISAMIS ORIENTAL-The historic Immaculate Conception Parish Church of this elder municipality of Misamis Oriental finally got a historical marker from the National Historical Commission of the Philippines recognizing its historical significance.

The NHCP Historical Marker (photo courtesy of Arellano J. Galdo III)

On April 23, 2025, the NHCP marker was unveiled and turned over by NHCP Chair Regalado Trota Jose, Jr.,  to Most. Rev. Jose A. Cabantan, DD., Archbishop of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Cagayan de Oro.

Aside from the signing of the Memorandum of Agreement for the historical marker, the occasion also marked the unveiling of the church’s newly restored Retro-Tabula (Retablo).

The Restored Retablo (photo courtesy of Arellano J. Galdo III)

Retablo (Latin for Retro-Tabula meaning “behind the Altar”) is equivalent to reredos or the retable in French, a vertical multi-tiered structure behind the altar with an elaborate frame enclosing revered objects, which may include religious paintings, sculptures, or both.

The Jasaan Parish Restoration & Development Committee with NHCP Chair Regalado Trota Jose, Jr., Cagayan de Oro Archbishop Jose Cabantan, Jasaan Municipal Mayor Redentor Jardin, and other dignitaries. (photo courtesy of Vinny N. Veleso)

The event was witnessed by Mr. Alvin R. Alcid, NHCP Deputy Executive Director for Programs and Projects; Rev. Fr. Demli Redeemer C. Valmores, SSJV, Parish Priest of the Immaculate Conception Parish Church; and Mayor Redentor S. Jardin of the Municipality of Jasaan.

According to Vinny N. Veloso, secretary and founding member of the Jasaan Parish Restoration & Development Committee (JPRDCI) which led the restoration of the retablo, it was established by and composed of Jasaan Parishioners, dedicated to the restoration and development of the religious, spiritual and cultural heritage of the Jasaan Parish Church and its environs for the benefit of the residents of the parish today and in the future, and for the old and the new generations to reconnect with their spiritual and religious heritage and culture.

Currently, the JPRDCI officials include Chair Lorraine V Gagno; Vice chair Joey J Cabañas; Treasurer Efleda J Geralde; Auditor Bella P Pagapular; PRO Lucila S Valledor; Cultural and Heritage & Education- Segundo H Sabijon.

“The Committee is focused on the restoration of the Immaculate Conception Parish Church and related buildings and on the establishment of other projects like a parish museum to safeguard and showcase the historical and cultural artifacts of the parish,” Veloso said.

History of Jasaan Church

Immaculate Conception Parish Church, better known as the Jasaan Church, is a Baroque Roman Catholic Church  located in Poblacion, Upper Jasaan, Misamis Oriental, Philippines.  It falls within the jurisdiction of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Cagayan de Oro. It was declared a National Cultural Treasure by the National Museum due to its artistic design and cultural values.

The Immaculate Conception Parish Church of Jasaan, Misamis Oriental (photo courtesy of Arellano J. Galdo III)

In 1830, the mission of Jasaan was established separately from Cagayan de Oro,  where its authority and evangelization reached as far as the towns of Sumilao, Libona, and Malitbog in the province of Bukidnon. 

Inspired by the San Ignacio Church in Intramuros, Manila, the Jesuit brothers Francisco Rivera and Juan Cuesta are credited with the construction of the original church.

The center of civilization of the new parish and its first church was at “Daanglungsod,” which is now Aplaya, Jasaan. The first church was built out of lime from 1723 to 1830 under the supervision of Fr. Ramos Cabas, parish priest of Sitio Kabitiaugan, Barrio AplayaThe ruins of the first church and a ‘cotta’ (fortified watchtower) is visible on the low hill near the highway.

In 1859, Jasaan became the base for evangelical activities among the Manobos in Bukidnon.  From Jasaan, missionaries fanned out to areas in Bukidnon now known as Malitbog, Siloo, Linabo, and Sumilao.  In 1887, Jesuit Father Juan Herras, began the construction of the present Immaculate Conception Church. Father Gregorio Parache, S.J., was the parish priest of Jasaan at that time.

The original facade of the church has been modified after a series of renovations. The original altar of the church has been moved backward to allow a larger area for the faithful inside the church building. The original sacristy has been moved to the side.

The church is registered as a National Cultural Treasure by the National Commission for Culture and the Arts  (NCCA) after the National Museum declared the Immaculate Conception Parish Church a National Cultural Treasure on July 31, 2001 due to its cultural and historical value. The NCCA serves as the umbrella organization for the National Museum, coordinating with it and other cultural agencies to implement cultural policies and programs.

The church has two bell towers  with four bells in total. The oldest of the four bells is dated 1807 while the largest is cast “Nuestra Señora de la Inmaculada Concepcion de Jasaan Año 1854”, while the others have these inscriptions around its outer rim: “Para El Pueblo de Jasaan 1860”.

The NHCP is the national government agency mandated to promote Philippine history through its museums, research, and publications, and to preserve historical heritage through conservation and the marking of historic sites and structures.

The Jasaan Church also has a church museum in an annex building which houses its extensive collection of artifacts dating back to its beginning during the 1800s.

-30-

Mindanao Guerrillas Radio Communication Net

When Col WENDELL W. FERTIG assumed command of the Mindanao Guerrillas on 18 September 1942, he was confronted with the problem of setting up and perfecting a good radio communication system, both for internal and external contact. Efficient administration of the units under his command and the transmission of vital information to higher headquarters especially relating to enemy troop disposition, ship movement and plane traffic, demanded the establishment of radio net. A move in this direction was immediately started.

By 30 Sept 1942, four Filipino radio men, ALFREDO BONTUYAN, GLICERIO LIM, GERARDO and ELENO ALMENDRAS, reported to Col FERTIG. They were commissioned Third Lieutenants in the United States Army Forces in the Philippines, and subsequently established themselves in Lala, Lanao.

FLORENTINO OPENDO, former Bureau of Aeronautics Radio Operator, living at that time in Dipolog, Zamboanga and reported having a radio transmitter buried near nis home, was called – after an improvised radio set failed to function.

After OPENDO’s radio transmitter was fixed and ready for use, all the radio men transferred to Bonifacio, Misamis Occidental where the set was established. At this time, three American radio men, ROBERT V. BALL, 5th Air Base Sq., USAC, WILLIAM F. KONKO, MTB Sq 3, USN, and WILLIAM JOHNSON of the MIB So, were commissioned Second lieutenants. Another American, GEORGE HALL, USAC, having reported to Col FERTIG, was assigned to the Force Radio Section which at that time had just been activated.

Lt ROBERT F. BALL, was designated CO of the Force Radio Section (FRS).

America Suspicious of our Call Sign

In the early days of January 1943, BALL, KONKO, JOHNSCN, HALL, OPENDO and ELENO ALMENDRAS, by turns sat at the key day and night, without let-up, calling CQ, general call for any station, in the hope that some Allied station would hear them. For over a month, efforts spent in this direction proved futile. No contact was made.

Later, however, it became known that all the calls were heard by monitoring stations in Washington, but the call sign used, KZOM, having been utilized by the former Air Corps stationed at Del Monte, Mindanao, suspicion was entertained that calling station from the Philippines was a decoy. This was confirmed by Capt CHARLES SMITH who, with Capts ALBERT Y. SMITH and JOHN A. HAMNER, had gone to Australia in a sailboat on 5 Dec 1942. Capt CHARLES M. SMITH came back to Mindanao in the first submarine that landed on 5 Mar 1943.

Visiting General MacArthur in his office in Brisbane at 6:05pm on Friday 30 July 1943 were
L to R:- Major William E. Dyess (Air Corps), Commander Melvyn H. McCoy (USN), General
Douglas  MacArthur and Major S.M. Mellnik (Coast Artillery Corps). These three men had recently escaped
a Japanese POW camp on Davao
 and returned to Australia by submarine with Commander “Chick” Parsons.
Present but not in the photograph were Colonel Whitney, Commander Parsons and Captain Charles Smith.
(Ozatwar.com)

Sometime in the second week of Jan 1943, ROX M. BELL, formerly Physics professor at the Silliman University, Dumaguete, came with a small home-made radio transmitter which right then was utilized by Col FERTIG’s headquarters in Misamis, Misamis Occidental, in contacting the big transmitter at Bonifacio which later was functioning smoothly after ROY M. BELL had done some repairs on it.

First Contact With Outside

On 6 Feb 1943, contact was made with the station of Lt-Col MACARIO PERALTA in Panay. PERALTA also had a guerrilla organization in Panay.

On 18 Feb 1943, contact was made with station KFS, San Francisco. Code words were arranged with the War Department through this station and contact was established with station KAZ, Gen MacArthur’s net control station in Australia.

On 23 Feb 1943, the first message was received from Gen MacArthur, designating Mindanao as the Tenth Military District and assigning Col FERTIG Commanding Officer. For use with KAZ, the call sign WYZB was employed.

A guerrilla unit in Pagadian, Zamboanga, under Maj NICOLAS P. LASOLA had built a small radio and contact was quickly established between FERTIG’s station WAM and LASOLA’s WPX. At this time, the call sign ZAP, previously used, was dropped and substituted with WAM for the inter-island net and WYZB for contacts with SWPA.

Through radio contact, Maj LASOLA and his unit came under the Tenth Military District command.

Couriers coming from Malaybalay, Bukidnon brought the information that SALIPADA K. PENDATUN, another guerrilla leader, was operating in Bukidnon. He was reported to have a radio, built by some Americans who were in his unit. Contact with PENDATUN was then established.

At this time, WAM at Bonifacio was designated as Net Control Station for the Tenth Military District with WPX, Pagadian, Zamboanga; WSK, station of ROY M. BELL, Negros; and WBA, PERALTA’s station on Panay as branches.

Sub Brings Needed Supplies

The submarine that landed at Pagadian on 5 Mar 1943, brought Lt-Commander “CHICK” PARSONS and five brand-new radio sets along with other vitally needed supplies. Commander PARSONS brought with him instructions from Gen MacArthur. The importance of gathering intelligence information on and about the enemy and its quick transmission to SWPA was especially stressed.

Accordingly, on 10 Mar 1943, Capt CHARLES M. SMITH with Lts JOHNSON and BALL went to Davao and established a radio station as close to the city as possible. Then they employed intelligence operatives to gather information inside the city, especially on harbor installations and ship movements. This information was sent to WAM and immediately relayed to GHQ, Australia.

JOHNSON was left in Davao while BALL and SMITH returned to District Headquarters sometime in May 1943. On his return, BALL began to plan for the installation of more Coast Watcher Stations, under instructions of Col FERTIG, which were subsequently to cover every harbor and shipping lane in the Philippine waters.

Another Radio Contact With America

Major Cecil Walter.

In Feb 1943, two Americans, LLOYD WATERS, USAC and GLYN MITCHELL, USAC, worked under Maj CECIL WALTER in Anakan, Misamis Oriental, in putting into operation a 250-watt transmitting set which WALTER previous to the war had been using to contact Manila and the States. After some weeks of constant labor, contact between WALTER and the War Department through KFS, San Francisco, California, was established.

In May 1943, Commander PARSONS visited WALTER at Anakan, bringing with him instructions and codes from Col FERTIG. Soon thereafter, contact between WALTER’s MRS and WAM, was established. WALTER and Col FERTIG were old friends both having worked for the same company prior to the war.

Another submarine landing was made at Pagadian in May 1943, bringing back Capt JOHN HAMNER with more radio equipment and other supplies. A week later, HAMNER with JAMES CAIN, Sgt. USAC, who had recently joined the FRS, went to Tawi-Tawi and there established a watcher station to take careful watch and report of enemy movements in the Southern shipping lanes.

Lt LINCOLN H. DA PRON, 1th Bombardment Sq., USAC, arrived at FERTIG’s headquarters on 21 May 1943 from Col ROBERT V. BOWLER, then commanding the 109th Division, operating in the Cagayan-Bukidnon area. DA PRON returned to Misamis Oriental on 26 May with radio equipment and installed a radio set at Alubijid, a few kilometers from Cagayan, having an excellent view of the Cagayan harbor. This station was in addition to BOWLER’s main Headquarters Station TAC. On 5 Jun 1943 DA PRON using call sign TAB, made the first contact with WAM. Lt JCHN WOOD, 101st Ordnance, and @LAYTON MANNERS, 19th Bombardment Group, took over operation of the station when DA PRON left early in July 1943 to join the FRS.

The Force Radio Section was gradually expanding. HENRY ROOKE, MTB Sq 3, USN, THOMAS MITSOS and HAROLD MARTIN, both previously with the 19th Bombardment Group, were commissioned Second Lieutenants and assigned to the FRS as code men.

Japs Force Withdrawal

On 26 Jun 1943, the Japanese landed a huge convoy of troops at Misamis, Misamis Occidental. One cruiser, 2 destroyers, 15 aircraft and several transports participated in the landing. The odds were too much for the guerrilla troops. They were forced to withdraw inland after putting up some resistance which proved futile. Previously, Col FERTIG foreseeing such eventuality, had engines and equipment installed in the interior.

The radio was moved to that location. At times during the enemy operations, the radio was operating within 300 yards of Jap patrols, but never missed contact with any of the net stations. Gen MacArthur, in a communication a few weeks later, highly commended the radio personnel for exemplary bravery under fire.

The presence of the enemy in the area, aggravated the food procurement difficulty. So by the end of July 1943, Col FERTIG’s headquarters transferred to Liangan, Lanao – using bancas in crossing Panguil Bay, and under the very noses of the enemy in the middle of the night – leaving Lt KONKO behind to take over the control of the net while the move was being made.

Lt KONKO’s station ERT, with the exception of traffic to SWPA, handled the entire net while the move-out was in progress. Traffic was relayed to WALTER’s MRS at Anakan which in turn relayed all the traffic direct to KAZ. All incoming messages from KAZ were routed in the same manner.

WAM was installed in the first few days of Aug 1943, three kilometers inland from Liangan.

Francis J. Napolillo, Jr. (courtesy of Frank Andruss)

On 12 Sept 1943, another submarine landing took place at Liangan, just a few miles across from the Japanese garrison at Misamis. Seven tons of much-needed cargo were unloaded. The first American repatriates from the Philippines to the United States were shipped out on this trip. One of them was Lt FRANCIS J. NAPILLILO, Jr. who had been working with the FRS and the former Chief Petty Officer of PT-35 which escorted Gen. Douglas MacArthur on his famous Breakout from Corregidor to Cagayan on March 11-13, 1942.

Establish Contact With US Navy

One of the most important pieces of equipment unloaded by this submarine was a large Navy transmitter. This transmitter was immediately set up at the inland radio station by Lts DA PRON and ALMA B. MILLS. On 28 Sept 1943, direct contact with the Naval net control station in Australia was made. This contact enabled the FRS to send flashes on Japanese shipping direct to the Naval Intelligence and made possible also the sending of traffic direct to KAZ without relaying any more through MRS.

In the early part of Oct, BALL then recently promoted Captain, was sent by Col FERTIG to Agusan Valley to look for a more suitable location of the Force Headquarters. The barrio of Esperanza, thirty five kilometers from the coast up the Agusan River, was picked for the new site. Engines were immediately installed and houses repaired in expectation of the move-out from Lanao. Col FERTIG accompanied by Lt LOWELL HOLDER, two weeks previously assigned with the FRS, followed Capt BALL on 15 Oct 1943.

USS Narwhal (SS-167) was the busiest Spyron sub with nine missions to her credit. (USN Phot0)

Two more submarine landings took place in Nasipit and Cabadbaran, Agusan Province on 15 Nov and 2 Dec 1943 respectively. Approximately ninety eight tons of supplies were unloaded during those two weeks. Many radio sets were among the cargo. This enabled the FRS to establish an extensive coast watcher net all over Mindanao.

Lts MARTIN, MITSCS and DA PRON arrived Esperanza on 4 Dec 1943 from Lanao.

With these three men and many more which Capt BALL assigned from the 110th Division, the Net Control Station was speedily set up and ready to resume control. A new call sign was assigned by BALL for use at the new location. This call sign WAT, was both for the inter-island and SWPA. Another call sign ZAV was used with the Navy. Three sets were put into operation; one for the Mindanao island net, another for SWPA and still another for the Navy.

The men assigned were Lts WILLARD MONEY, WILLIAM LASAM, LAZARO HIDALGO, VINCENTE LASAN, TOMAS LOPEZ, SIXTO FERRER and ISIDRO PALACIO, MITCHELL and WALTERS had formerly been operating WALTER’s MRS at Anakan which was moved to Butuan when they were assigned to the FRS.

WAM, during the move, continued to be operated in Lanao as Net Control Station, under the care of Lts KONKO, CHIMELEWSKI, MILLS, ALMENDRAS, OPENDO, LE COUVRE, GARLAND and FARRENS. When enough equipment was set up at Esperanza, WAM was left complete as standby station. The WAM personnel remained in Lanao with the exception of Lts KONKO, MILLS, LE COUVRE and GARLAND who were called to Esperanza where they arrived on 22 Dec 1943.

Radio Stations Expand

Lt Col Ernest E McClish, CO, 110th Division, 10th Military District, USFIP

With various strategic sites picked out for watcher net coverage, Lt WILLARD MONEY was sent out to put the sets into operation. Leaving Esperanza on 23 Dee 1943, he installed the first set at Mambajao, Camiguin, and left it under the management of Lt RICHARD THOMMES, a former USAC soldier previously assigned in Camiguin by Lt-Col ERNEST E. McCLISH, the CO of the 110th Division, with headquarters at Butuan.

MONEY proceeded to LIANGAN where he dropped off some new equipment for WAM. Then a Coast Watcher Net was installed by MONEY in the province of Cotabato that extended along the whole of the provincial coastline. With the increase of the number of stations in Western side of Mindanao, WAM was designated Net Control Station for Western Mindanao. All stations in the Western side directed their traffic to WAM. All traffic was then sent to WAT thru a different circuit.

Other stations were then established: MBA with Lt FERRER, guarded the sea

lanes that extended into the Mindanao sea from the Surigao straits, SEVILLA at Balete, Surigao; MBN with Lt OWEN P. WILSON at Caraga, Davao; MBQ with Lt GILL at Lianga, Surigao and MBR at Nueva Campo, Surigao. The last three American officers were newly assigned to the FRS.

Approximately thirty stations then about completely covered the coastline of the entire island. Besides these stations on Mindanao, the FRS was in contact with eight stations in the Visayan islands. Ship movements were flashed to WAT from these stations and were in turn relayed direct to Navy Headquarters in Australia. In some cases, messages of this type were receipted for by the Navy within one hour of ship sighting by the watcher station.

Organize Radio Net in Samar

With the final installations of the net completed, Capt BALL was relieved by Maj JAMES L. EVANS who had arrived with Maj CHARLES SMITH, when the latter came back to Mindanao, BALL and SMITH went to Samar to organize the guerrillas and set up a radio net there. At this time, the FRS was augmented by more personnel. Lts ARTHUR HAGE, FREDERICK TAYLOR, JAMES SCHOEN, BERNARDO ADOLFO, GAUDIO PANGAN, GREGORIO SAN GILL, GREGORIO OLIVER and MELQUIADES CAROZ. The FRS personnel now consisted about twenty operators and sixteen code men with more than this number distributed in the watcher stations.

On 22 Dec 1943, the Japanese invaded the province of Lanao, forcing the radio station there to go off the air. The radio personnel managed to reach Misamis Occidental where they set up a sub-Net Control in the mountains behind the town of Misamis, after making their way through the jungles. Using the call sign CET, they again took over the control of all stations on the western half of the island.

In the later part of Jan 1944, WAT was moved further up the Agusan River to Talacogon. Reports from the watcher stations and all other intelligence information on the enemy situation were being flashed in such a volume that twenty four hour operation daily became imperative. Two stations were assigned to gather all the incoming messages from the net. Another net was utilized to flash reports to the Navy. Still another set was used to send out all the intelligence reports to GHQ, SWPA.

Radio Traffic Greatly Increased

More stations were then established. These were as near as possible to the places garrisoned by the Japs in order to flash information on the number of planes and airfield the enemy had in operation; troop movements; heavy gun emplacements, truck convoys, troop concentrations, etc. This data was of utmost importance and along with ship sightings and plane movements, given priority. To confuse the enemy monitoring stations, the call signs of the net stations were frequently changed.

On 2 Mar 1944 Lt-Commander M. M* WHEELER of the United States Naval Intelligence arrived on Mindanao by submarine. With him were Lt SATURNINO SILVA and four enlisted men of the 1st Filipino Division from the States. The four enlisted men were subsequently assigned to the FRS as operators and Lt SILVA as Ordnance Officer, Tenth Military District. Commander WHEELER was to make many trips along the coast of the island to gather important naval intelligence.

Japs Bomb Headquarters Incessantly

On 15 Mar 1944, huge Japanese contingents invaded Butuan, headquarters of the 110th Division – at the same time enemy dive bombers bombed the Agusan River Valley, bombing every barrio along the river banks in an endeavor to knock out radio installations and destroy guerrilla headquarters. These bombings and strafings continued for days. Over a two-day period, Talacogon was savagely bombed and strafed. No less than twenty bombs exploded right in the barrio. Radio houses, though not badly damaged, were riddled with bullets. One transmitter was hit but was immediately replaced. The continuous search, intense and persistent, conducted by Jap planes and ground troops to locate radio installations proved useless. No damage was inflicted in these enemy operations on the radio net. However, it was decided that in case of a shutdown by the Net Control Station at Talacogon, another should take its place at a moment’s notice. So Lts WATER and RUSSEL SMITH were sent to build a camp at Waloe, on a tributary of the Agusan River, installing engines and setting up the necessary equipment.

On 5 May 1944, at 11:35 AM, six Jap Betty bombers swept over Talacogon, bombing and strafing at a low altitude. After the enemy action, only one cow was found killed. All installations were intact.

Evacuation Prudent  to Waloe

Immediate evacuation was ordered that day. It was thought that the next aerial attacks might not be so erratic. That afternoon half of the number of operators and code men went up the river to Waloe, arriving there at 8:00 PM and immediately began operating the radio equipment established by WATERS and SMITH. The remaining radio personnel in Talacogon dismantled all installations and moved to Waloe that night. By dawn of 6 May 1944, the barrio had been completely evacuated. A major move had again been made by the FRS without missing a single contact.

In the morning of 6 May 194, the six Bettys came back and levelled Talacogon to the ground. Not a single building was left standing. This evidently led the Japs to believe that all installations force Headquarters were wiped out.

A few days later, Commander WHEELER arrived at Waloe from one of his trips to the coast. He was then designated CO, FRS, relieving Maj EVANS who was ordered by Col FERTIG to make a complete survey of the health situations of the various units stationed in Agusan, Surigao and Davao.

New Code System Introduced

Commander WHEELER introduced a new code system which was put into use with all stations of the Tenth Military District. This in time proved most valuable. An aircraft warning system was then organized with all stations, using a special type of code. This was to facilitate speedy transmittal of plane traffic so that each station could send in a short message, not exceeding ten groups, all data regarding the type, speed, direction, altitude, and position of a plane sighted.

Such facts could be reported to the NCS and in turn relayed to a Fighter Command Station almost before the planes were out of sight of the spotter. This system proved invaluable when American fighters and bombers began working over the islands in Sept 1944. Plane sightings with this code system were being reported from watcher station to Net Control to Australia on the average of five and one half minutes after sighting!

In the new location, food problem became more acute. The Agusan River Valley was flooded during most of the year, making the planting of staple crops terribly hard. The produce of the natives was barely enough for their own needs. To procure dried fish and salt required a twenty-day round trip to and from the coast. Officers and men used to scour the surrounding country for food available. The Headquarters personnel, however, took it on the chin and smiled it off.

May 27-28, another American submarine was scheduled to land near Lianga, Surigao, but did not establish contact with shore party and supplies were unloaded in Tukuran, Zamboanga on 1 Jun 1944. Three Americans were un loaded on that trip; Maj HAROLD A. ROSENQUIST, Sgts MC GRATH, and GEORGE FINNEGAN. The two enlisted men were weather men sent to report weather conditions to the Air Forces. Maj ROSENQUIST had the mission, among others, of contacting the American Prisoners at Davao Penal Colony. But the Japs had already moved the prisoners from the Colony when ROSENQUIST arrived in Davao on 6 Aug 1944. Maj ROSENQUIST was then unable to perform this part of his mission.

These three Americans had to hike all the way through from Pagadian to Waloe, arriving there on 25 July 1944. Maj ROSENQUIST was assigned Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2, for the Tenth Military District having come direct from G-2 Section, CHQ,  SWPA.

During this period, it became evident that the Japanese were intent in tracking down the headquarters, with all possible means and persistence. They were reported converging in on Talacogon. It was not hard for them to get at Waloe in three flanks.

Shipping flashes were coming in thick and fast and the security of the radio was vital to Army and Naval Intelligence. Going off the air, happen what might, would be a calamity at this time. The flow of valuable intelligence traffic must continue.

At this time, the Sub-NCS in Western Mindanao was functioning efficiently under Lt JOIN SIMMONS, USNR, who landed by submarine on 5 Jun 1944. The call sign used was now SL9 and most of the other station call signs were also changed.

SL9 Prepared For Emergency Take-Over

With the enemy closing in, Col FERTIG decided that SL9 should be prepared to take over the net control of the entire Tenth Military District, in the event the Waloe radio headquarters was forced to go off the air. Lt-Commander SAM J. WILSON, with a complete list of codes, key phrases and station records, left Waloe in July 19) for SL9 to deliver the instructions and codes he carried. With SL9 prepared to take over at a moment’s notice, 9LL, formerly WAT, could go off the air with the knowledge that the huge intelligence network of the radio stations would remain in operation.

Radio Traffic Must Continue

On 3 August 1944, Col FERTIG decided to leave Waloe and move to the interior. With the flow of intelligence reaching a peak volume and coming from strategic stations all over the island – ship movements, plane traffic, enemy troop movements and ever so much other data of essential value to the war effort, it was more important to keep radio contact than any one single factor.

Taking two diesel motors, radio equipment and a small supply of food, the first party left Waloe on the morning of 5 Avg 1944. This group consisted of Col FERTIG, Lts DA PRON, GARLAND, WATERS and HIDALGO and a number of soldiers. This group was to prepare the camp, set up motors, install other equipment and take over the net as soon as possible. After a ten-hour baroto trip, the party arrived at the prearranged site after dark, but there was no camp existing. An unfinished bamboo hut was all that stood in the midst of the virgin jungle far up the Umayon River. Plans had previously been made by Col FERTIG for the building of a camp at this site. But the laborers to whom the work was entrusted were uncivilized pagan natives about the only available denizens thereabouts and wholly unreliable.

Early the next morning, everyone set to work fast but methodically, getting radios set up and on the air. A small battery set was set up to keep contact with the headquarters at Waloe. Messages were received to the effect that the Japs were swiftly closing in on Waloe. Other messages stated that more Japs were heading for Waloe from the South. Urgency of setting up the radio patently apparent, speed on the work was accelerated.

On 10 Aug 1944, three sets were ready for operation. Near midnight of the same day, Commander WHEELER ordered the radios at Waloe off the air and the remaining Headquarters personnel started up river to join the first group.

The sets in this jungle camp were on the air that night. Again the change-over was completed without missing a single contact. During the next two days, the three sets were operated by only one operator on each net. And when: on the morning of 12 Aug 1944, the rest of the Headquarters personnel arrived, it was a great relief to Col FERTIG and all the men.

There were only two huts hacked out of the jungle. Everyone then set to work establishing a camp. When the men were not on duty at the radio station, they were out in the jungle with bolos, Gradually large clearings were made and a camp of sorts was built.

Food and Floods Real Problem

The radios were now working perfectly. However, other problems, keenly felt, began to force themselves on the group. The rainy season had begun, swelling the river twenty or more feet. The whole camp was deep in mud and water. Food in the area was impossible to get. No natives lived there and wild foods were not in sight. Everything had to be brought up the river by barotos – a twelve hour trip from Waloe. The biggest maneuverable baroto could  only haul a small amount of cargo – and there were forty men at the camp!

Waloe was bare of foodstuffs. To make matters worse, all the trails to the food areas were closed by the Japs swarming in all directions. About one hundred soldiers were busy day and night, procuring whatever could be found; corn, wild camotes, coconuts and even sago, an extract from the pulp of a certain palm tree.

As food was becoming increasingly difficult to obtain and slow process of starvation closing in on the camp, radio traffic was coming in faster and heavier. Jap shipping was out in huge force and ship flashes seemed to the group more important than food. Each might mean one Jap ship less and this was the goal towards which efforts in the past few years were directed.

Fatigued by too much work, hunger gnawing at the vitals and living conditions bitter1y unbearable, any group would have become irritable and the slightest provocation would have started a fight. But the morale of the group continued to be high for Col FERTIG proved a real and understanding leader during this trying period. There were three days when a small ear of roasted corn served the meal of one person each. Yet during those three days, at least eight enemy ships were reported sunk due to the flashes from the radio sets of that camp. That helped!

Friendly Planes Sighted

On 9 Sept 1944, a large formation of planes flew directly over the encampment. Some arguments arose as to whether they were American or Jap planes. Some claimed having caught glimpses of stars on the wings. Others were pessimistic having been schooled for three years in seeing always a red bail on the planes. But a couple of hours later, messages began pouring in from stations all over Mindanao. Friendly planes! One station reported the actual bombing practically play by play, of the town of Cagayan, capitol of Misamis Oriental. \

From then on, American planes were continually flying in large groups over the camp. This increased the work two-fold. As must have to happen, some of these planes were getting shot down. After reports on such incidents poured in, instructions by radio were flashed immediately to all stations to instigate rescue parties in search of survivors. In some instances, search parties were on the job one hour after a plane had been seen to go down.

Later in the month, the two diesels began to give trouble. Going at twenty four hour a day pace, they were just about to give out. Col FERTIG immediately ordered parties to locate other motors. One was found in an old useless river launch in the barrio of La Paz, about two days baroto trip down the river. The Japs having vacated by then the Agusan River area, Col FERTIG decided to move the Headquarters to la Paz.

Move To La Paz

On 1 Nov 1944, Lt DA PRON took one small radio set and went down river to set up radio installations in this barrio. On 4 Nov La Paz was ready with motors, power line, antennas and houses for the equipment. Leaving the river camp for La Paz on November, half of the personnel reached the new location on the 6th. Radios were installed without loss of time and the net control was taken over by the net set-up the next morning. Another move without loss of contact.

One station was working messages with the upriver location at the time of the turn-over. While this station was waiting for a receipt on a message just sent, a signal was given by the La Paz set-up to take over. The station continued sending traffic without ever knowing that a change-over had been made. A few days later, the rest of the personnel arrived at La Paz and the operation was again back to normal.

Americans Leave For Repatriation

12 Jan 1945 brought changes to the FRS, Five American officers who had been with the outfit since its activation left for Leyte to proceed to the States for a well-deserved rest. Capt MARTIN, Lts MITSOS, WATERS, HACE and LE COUVRE had all been away from home and overseas for over five years and were very anxious to be back to the homeland. Capt GARLAND was made Code Officer for the district. Capt MILLS was sent to Baculin, Davao to replace Lt WILSON who had been ordered to Leyte for hospitalization. Lt JOHN F. WOOD who had been operating a watcher station near Cagayan over a year and a half, was transferred to SL9, Western Mindanao, as Chief Radio Operator.

Radio Traffic Increased 164 Percent

Beginning with the American landings in Leyte, 20 Oct 1944, continual shifting of enemy troops was accentuated. Barges, bancas, ships, trucks and planes were being used by the Japanese in the transport of troops, aside from the usual method of hiking or using carabaos, horses and carts. So new areas heretofore without radio stations had to be covered. Good coverage of all seaports and highways was imperative, necessitating more and more mobile stations to be sent to the field.

Seven airfields have been built by the Tenth Military District, under the direction and supervision of Col FERTIG. These fields were scattered over the island and in operational use. There were other airstrips just as serviceable as the bigger airfields in other strategic locations. Planes bringing in supplies were landing on them. Planes in need of gas or repair or because the weather was bad or in any other case where they were in distress, were using these fields. The war was taking the fast tempo of augmented action and the FRS was in the thick of it. So sets were installed on each field for instant coverage of all traffic. In Nov 1944 radio traffic to the outside higher echelon had increased by 164% over that sent out in June 1944!

Fertig Goes to Leyte

In Feb 1945, Col FERTIG flew to Leyte to discuss future plans for the District. Among them was the move of the FRS to a better location at Camp Keithley, Lanao Province. Lt FREDERICK TAYLOR previously assigned to the 110th Division, was called to La Paz to take over the control of the net.

During the move out, it was decided that station SL9 would act as the NCS. 9LL would be the NCS for the stations on the eastern side of the island. They would relay all their messages to SL9 as that station had been previously doing with its traffic. After an assortment of equipment, enough was left for 9LL to continue efficient operation. The rest of the equipment was packed and moved to the east coast for transfer over a water route.

Personnel and equipment were to be picked up at Barobo, Surigao on 16 Mar 945. As the trip from La Paz to Barobo required a good three days, the first echelon left headquarters on the 10th. All equipment had to be carried on the back and so the move was no easy matter. The sets and generators were not altogether light. Then upon reaching Barobo all would have to be taken to a small island about a mile offshore. The waters at Barobo were too shallow so the island had to be utilized in that lap of the move out.

At 8:00 AM, 16 Mar 1945, the boats were sighted. Most of the men had not seen US ships in three years. The sight was very welcome. At 2:00 PM, all men and cargo had been loaded and the ships were under way. The convoy passed through Surigao Straits and into the Mindanao Sea and arrived at the port of Iligan, Lanao on the morning of the 18th.

New Headquarters at Camp Keithley

The location for the new headquarters was Camp Keithley, a former PC camp, about thirty six kilometers inland. All equipment and part of the personnel were immediately sent by trucks to the camp. By the 22nd, the entire set-up was installed, although much of the equipment suffered some damages on the way. Using a new call sign, LW2, the NCS was taken over from the SL9 on the morning of the 23rd of March 1945. Five separate circuits were installed – one to work all the traffic from Eastern Mindanao (9LL), one for Western Mindanao (SL9) and one for Cotabato (NCS) under Capt MONEY, (3PP6); one for the 8th Army and the USAFFE Headquarters and one for the Navy. For the first time there was enough space, housing and wire to facilitate the installation with remote control for transmitters. In the new set-up the entire section was considerably improved in layout and efficiency.

Col. Wendell W. Fertig (center) and his general staff at Camp Keithley, Dansalan City.

On 17 Apr 1945, the first American troops landed at Parang, Cotabato. The Tenth Military District was immediately attached to the Tenth Corps whose troops made the landing. Communication was established immediately between LW2 and YD44, Tenth Corps NCS.

24th Infantryh Division amtracs landing in Parang, Cotabato, Mindanao (World War Photo)

A new phase of the Force Radio Section began with this invasion. Guerrilla troops were used with American troops to round up and cut off all Jap troops that tried to evade the advancing American element. Small portable radios were sent to all sectors, to accompany each advancing unit. From Davao to Agusan, Bukidnon, Cotabato and Zamboanga operators with these small sets hiked with the fighting troops and relayed back to headquarters the latest information on Jap movements. By these sets, Jap hideouts were located and our ground troops hounded them, ferreted them out and zooming, diving planes bombed and strafed them.

“Mission Accomplished”

With the Island of Mindanao now declared officially liberated, the Tenth Military District Force Radio Communications Net, BROUGHT into being with the PRIME PURPOSE OF RELAYING INTELLIGENCE DATA TO HIGHER HEADQUARTERS, HAD ACCOMPLISHED ITS MAIN ASSIGNMENT.

The tangible results of this flow of traffic – enemy ship sinkings, destructions of military installations by American planes and the annihilation of enemy troops – have more than justified the sacrifices, hardships and the many problems attendant to keeping constant radio contact without interruption with higher Army and Navy Headquarters.

Nothing has been said in this report concerning the other jobs handled through the Radio Communication Net but the problems concerning administration control and the tactical disposition of 33,000 Mindanao Guerrilla troops have added the burden to the Radio Communication Net.

The map preceding this section graphically illustrates the many strategically located radio stations which comprised the Tenth Military District Radio Communications Net or Force Radio Section as it was more commonly known.

Source: History of the Mindanao Guerrillas by the American Guerrillas of Mindanao (Unpublished Manuscript)

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TESDA, PDO eye expanded partnership to boost emerging metro

Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines – The burgeoning Northern Mindanao region may soon get a timely boost as it metamorphoses into the Philippines fourth metropolitan area.

Barely five months after signing an agreement to join forces in building up a globally competitive workforce in the Metro Cagayan de Misamis growth area, the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority(TESDA) and Pueblo de Oro Development Corporation (PDO), are in talks to have the government agency construct its Region 10 office, Misamis Oriental Provincial Office, and  Cagayan de Oro Training Center in the Pueblo de Oro Township in Uptown Cagayan de Oro.

In a meeting hosted by the Cagayan de Oro Chamber of Commerce and Industry Foundation, Inc., (Oro Chamber), PDO General Manager & Vice President for Mindanao Engr. Chrysler B. Acebu, who is also concurrently the  Vice President for Manufacturing and Industry of Oro Chamber, stressed  the strategic importance of its partnership with TESDA, especially with regard to PDO’s Masterson Mile North, a five-tower luxury condominium complex; the 31-hectare Southridge Silicon Valley-inspired mixed-use development, and a World Trade Center.

TESDA Sec. Jose Francisco “Kiko” Benitez addresses the joint meeing of TESDA, PDO and Oro Chamber. (RMB)

“We would really need TESDA to help us upgrade the skills of our workforce since PDO is known for its high-end products, therefore we need workers who are able to keep up in terms of delivering quality work that align with the premium standards we envision for these upcoming projects,” Acebu noted.

Industry 4.0, (also known as the Fourth Industrial Revolution or 4IR) is the current phase of the industrial revolution characterized by digital transformation and a shift towards automation and data exchange in the manufacturing and business processes. 

ICCP manages six industrial parks around the Philippines where the skillsets of the workers of its locators have to be competitive at a global level to be able to adequately address the needs of their markets and clients.

Pueblo de Oro Development Corporation (PDO), through its corporate social responsibility arm ICCP Group Foundation, Inc. (IGFI), and the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) signed a Memorandum of Agreement on November 29, 2024, which aims to address the growing demand for skilled workers particularly in the construction sector, promote sustainable livelihoods, and advance the region’s economic growth. Left to Right – Ronnie Tapnio, IGFI; Chrysler-Acebu, PDO; Rafael Abrogar II, TESDA-X; and, Marigold Cherie Garrido. TESDA MisOr.

TESDA Sec Kiko Benitez with Oro Chamber President Al Brito. (RMB)

“To network with TESDA and other stakeholders is part and parcel of our  journey and we are looking forward that the initiative of Pueblo de Oro will come into reality,” said Oro Chamber President Almarco C. Brito.

“It’s time to build our own regional building that will become the face of TechVoc to improve things, the way we do things, the way we deliver our services to our clients,” responded TESDA-10 Regional Director Rafael “Rafi” Y. Abrogar II. “Our partnership is a testament to the development of Cagayan de Oro, Misamis Oriental and Region X, and we are honored to be your partners (PDO and Oro Chamber).”

Abrogar revealed that TESDA Regional Offices are now empowered to delve into curriculum development in partnership with industry and the academe, especially for hard-to-fill skills, trainings, or qualifications which still lack competency standards, and apply these directly to address the specific needs of particular industries and companies.

TESDA Director General Secretary Jose Francisco “Kiko” B. Benitez for his part stressed the advantage of having the TESDA regional and provincial offices in close proximity to the Oro Chamber office, considering the member firms of the chamber is the primary market for its graduates and services.

“This jibes perfectly with TESDA’s BEST (Better Employability through Skills Training) priority program which focuses on demand and data driven TVET that’s agile and responsive to the demands of industry,” Sec. Benitez stressed. “This involves modernizing programs, integrating digital skills, and fostering partnerships with industries, to ensure graduates are future proofed for the evolving workforce, and ever ready to meet the demands of local and global economies. 

Joined by TESDA Deputy Directors General for TESDA Deputy Director Generals Vidal Villanueva III (Operations) and Felizardo Colambo (Special Concerns), Secretary Benitez kicked off his official visit to Region 10 with a meeting at Pueblo de Oro to discuss the proposed donation of a lot intended for the establishment of a new TESDA Regional Office Building in the city’s uptown area, signifying a new chapter in service accessibility and infrastructure development for the region. Click on this link for a first look at TESDA’s concept for the planned edifice.

“Inherent to TESDA’s mandate is to provide relevant, accessible, high quality techvoc, hence the need to have a demand driven skills training through a strengthened partnership with industry as indicated in our priority program for Demand Drive and Data Driven TVET,” said  TESDA Misamis Oriental Provincial Dir. Marigold Cherie R. Garrido. “The partnership with PDO will also lead towards realizing TESDA’s priority program 5.0 on Employment Outcomes.”

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Formation of Regiments and Divisions

A. The Need For Unity

The diverse guerrilla bands springing into existence and taking shape and form during the last quarter of 1942, were loosely organized, clearly wanting in discipline and manifestly in dire need of many necessary attributes that make up the requirements for fighting units.

Filipino Guerrillas in Mindanao, 1945

The guerrillas had no definite source from which to draw disbursements for the expenses entailed in their maintenance and operations or the various supplies or the payment of salaries and allowances. In fact, this deficiency was the root cause of a number of abuses committed by the guerrillas in some areas.

Enemy Had All The Advantages

Ill-fed, clothed in rags, sick and without sufficient weapons and ammunition to use in resisting the gigantic war machine of an empire, the guerrillas had practically nothing to hold on to except the smoldering fire of hatred for the brutal conqueror that terrorized and subjugated their people.

Most sadly lacking in education and training of any sort, and led for the most part by men whose visions were fenced within the narrow confines of limited understanding, could not be expected to look far ahead. Added to all this, was the sudden disruption of communication and transportation lines which made extremely difficult the transmission of plans and tactics of one group to another.

To cap it all, the enemy occupied almost all the strategic places, aggravating the hardship of contact between guerrilla bands. The result was that one guerrilla unit, isolated in its own chosen sector, constituted the law.

It took advantage of its new-found power, and invariably was tempted to prey upon the already suffering civilians for the support and maintenance of the organization. Some of these guerrillas, found a welcome opportunity to square old accounts with persons who, in the normal times of the past, had somehow the upper hand in the run of affairs. This gave rise to unnecessary and uncalled-for retaliations.

The need for unity of action was clearer than ever. At no other time was the truism, “IN UNION THERE IS STRENGTH”, made truer.

Fertig Unified Command

Col WENDELL W. FERTIG, from his headquarters in Misamis, Misamis Occidental, knew all these facts and more. He knew, that if no strong move was made to unify the many guerrilla groups strung all over the island of Mindanao; internal and bloody friction among them would result over which the enemy would gloat with glee. His objective then settled down to the problem of unification.

Col. Wendell W. Fertig

The very first move he made was to arm himself with the powers, assumed or not, needed to clothe a recognized leader. The rank of “Brigadier-General” which was first applied by MORGAN to a fictitious character, was actually assumed by Col FERTIG when he accepted the leadership. The rank, though just an adopted one, lent more color to the Leader and enhanced the authority he exercised in those early guerrilla days.

“WENDELL W. FERTIG, BRIGADIER-GENERAL, ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES, COMMANDING,”  placed at the end of written communications from Col. FERTIG’s headquarters was somehow enough to make small guerrilla leaders forget their dreams of power and glory and rally to the colors borne by the “American General”.

Leadership, however, does not end in ranks, genuine or assumed. And Col FERTIG was one who did not dawdle on half-way measure. The next stop was a move toward capturing the attention of Gen MacArthur in the great potentialities of the unified Mindanao Guerrillas, for the attainment of the final goal – total defeat of the Empire of Japan in a war of attrition. This of course, eventually would lead to recognition and recognition would mean conferring upon the Mindanao guerrillas the status of being a part of a great Army of the United States, with the manifold advantages attendant thereto.

Establishes Contact With Macarthur

Accordingly, efforts were made in establishing radio contact with the US War Department or Southwest Pacific Area. Also three intrepid Americans, CHARLES SMITH, ALBERT SMITH and JOHN HAMNER, set out for Australia in a small sailboat, reinforced with an old motor placed in the hull which served more as ballast than as a driving force. Their mission was to contact Gen MacArthur and bring full data on the Mindanao Guerrilla possibilities and problems.

Both the radio and the sailboat trip ventures were successful, after harrowing experiences and anxious expectancy.

On 20 Feb 1943, Col FERTIG sent Gen MacArthur this radio message:

“The unification of scattered guerrilla forces so far into nine regiments is made with the end in view of eliminating dangerous friction between them and coordinating their efforts against the enemy. The present total strength of these units consists of 650 officers and 10,300 men. Regiments can quickly be expanded if arms are available. At present we have seventeen MG’s, eighty-four BARs, twenty-three Colt MRs, 4,000 rifles and twenty-one Garands, exclusive of those in the Philippine Corps. The shortage of ammunition is becoming acute. What we have cannot sustain the present harassing guerrilla activities.”

Two days later, on 22 Feb 1943, Gen MacArthur sent Col FERTIG the following:

“Command areas will be progressively established based on existing military districts. Commanders of districts will operate under the control of this Headquarters (Southwest Pacific) and assignments will be made on the basis of performance. Lt-Col FERTIG (CE) is designated to command the Tenth Military District (island of Mindanao) x x x He will perfect intelligence not covering the Ninth Military District (Samar-Leyte) x x x No officer of rank of General will be designated at present”.

As a tangible manifestation of Gen MacArthur’s recognition of the Mindanao Guerrillas under Col FERTIG, on 5 March 1943, a submarine arrived and unloaded supplies for the Tenth Military District off Tukuran beach, Pagadian, Zamboanga. Aboard was Lt-Commander “Chick” PARSONS, MacArthur’s representative charged with the mission of observing conditions in the Philippines, especially Mindanao, making report and recommendation on his findings and of helping Col FERTIG in the unification of the Mindanao Guerrilla. Also with him was Lt-Col CHARLES SMITH, one of the three Americans who led successfully and braved the uncertain voyage to Australia from Mindanao on 5 Dec 1942 in a small sailboat.

Authority To Print Money

On the heels of this recognition, there came the authorization from President MANUEL L. QUEZON for the appointment of a new Currency Board to print money for the financing of the organization and its corollary entities, including that for civilian relief. This was on 10 April 1943, and the authority follows:

“Following forwarded to you from QUEZON (for FERTIG from MacArthur): I hereby appoint new Currency Board with same authority as previous board as to military requirements and also unlimited amount for civilian relief. New Board Judge FLORENTINO SAGUIN, Provincial Treasurer, FELOMENO PACANA and Provincial Auditor ISIDORO BARBASA.”

In a radio message dated 16 April 1943, correction was made on the foregoing instructions. The word “unlimited” between “also” and “Amount” was changed to “limited”.

The recognition of the FERTIG Command by Gen MacArthur, and the authorization by President QUEZON to print money for the support of the Mindanao Guerrillas, including the maintenance of the civil government and for civilian relief, and the steady flow of supplies from Southwest Pacific Area, did not come as a gift on a platter of gold. This recognition was the result of incessant labors and sacrifices of untold risks undergone by Col FERTIG and those who stood by him, in the welding into an effective fighting machine of what in the beginning were loose, irresponsible, roving, undisciplined men.

Adopt Philippine Army Table of Organization

It was originally planned by FERTIG to follow the! Philippine Constabulary set-up of Districts, Sectors and Sub-Sectors. This, however had to be discarded in favor of the Philippine Army Table of Organization (Reserve Division), for the reason that the latter pattern admitted more room for expansion. Hence, Divisions following the PATO (Reserve Division) were evolved, composed of Regiments. The Regiments were evolved from Guerrilla units which were formed into battalions.

To effect the efficient administration, control and supervision of the different guerrilla units; enhance the unification program am hasten the formation of regiments and divisions, it was essential that a well-established, strong General Headquarters be maintained. Permanency of station was, however, out of the question in enemy occupied Mindanao and mobility of GHQ was compulsory. In fact, on several occasions, the Japanese attacked or bombed FERTIG’s Headquarters, being especially active in the Agusan area. But wherever the location of the General Headquarters, Col FERTIG and his Staff, managed to administer the affairs of the organization smoothly. Headquarters was variously denominated; GHQ, CPG, CPZ, Cpz-W, CPZ-U and CPZ-L.

District Headquarters was first established in Misamis, Misamis Occidental. The site was not centrally located but did allow the maintenance of Communication by sea with all divisional areas. After the enemy invasion of Misamis Occidental on 26 June 1943, the headquarters was moved to Liangan, Lanao. This was in early July 1943.

As the Japanese efforts to stamp out the guerrillas became more and more intensified, Col FERTIG considered splitting the District Headquarters for security purposes. If one met disaster, the other could carry on. Lives were expendable but somehow the contingency of disruption due to enemy action had to be considered and met in advance, to forestall the possibility of complete annihilation. For this reason, Col. FERTIG and a portion of his staff, transferred to Esperanza, Agusan Province some thirty five kilometers up the Agusan River from Butuan, on 15 Oct 1943.

The move from Liangan to Esperanza was mostly by sailboat through enemy infested waters. At that time, the Japs were garrisoning Iligan, Cagayan and Gingoog Bays. The sailboat was open to enemy attack from air and sea. The importance of that trip was augmented by the presence in the frail sailboat of the Commanding Officer, Col FERTIG himself, and the important records of the District Headquarters.

“A” Corps Formed

Col ROBERT BOWLER, Chief of Staff, headed the portion of the Headquarters left in Liangan, Lanao. Eventually on 1 Jan 1944, Col FERTIG created the “A” Corps for the supervision, administrations and control of the 105th,  106th, 108th and 109th Divisions, all garrisoning Western Mindanao, with Col BOWLER, after having been relieved as Chief of Staff, made Commanding Officer.

This arrangement enabled Col FERTIG to dedicate most of his time in setting things right in the forces at Misamis Oriental (Eastern side), Agusan, Surigao and Davao – all then under 110th Division. Also followed his plan of having a second headquarters which would take over direction and communications if the other was jeopardized.

With the series of American landings in the Philippines which began in Leyte on 20 Oct 1944, easing enemy pressure on the Mindanao guerrillas, and the fact that the District Headquarters was transferred to Camp Keithley, Dansalan City, Lanao on 31 March 1945, the “A” Corps was dissolved on 1 April 1945, the reason for its existence having already grown effete.

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Beginning and Growth of the Tenth Military District in Mindanao

1. Factors Favorable For Guerrilla Growth:

a) Natural Barriers: Mindanao turned out to be a fertile field for originating, nurturing, maturing and welding into a compact organization, guerrilla units. The island abounds in jungles, irregular land surface, rivers, mountains, steep cliffs, swamps and two big lakes (Lanao and Mainit), all offering obstacles in the way of travel.

Meranaw public market in Dansalan on the shore of Lake Lanao.

b) Absence of Highway, Good Roads: Battles fought on Mindanao, can hardly be engaged in by mechanized units, except on the Sayre and National Highways. Good roads, passable by bulky vehicles, are very rare. In place of roads are trails, most of them so small that when abandoned for a short time, they become untraceable. These trails cross and crisscross each other through a most irregular terrain covered with thick forests and rocky ledges, forbidding cliffs and other natural barriers. Such natural difficulties were to become a strong ally for the successful movement of guerrilla forces.

c) Food Plentiful: Mindanao lands are essentially agricultural that even in the middle of well-nigh impenetrable jungles, a ‘small clearing planted with corn, rice, bananas, camotes or other food-yielding plants, can support families. Even forest food products like sago, rattan shoots, edible wild tree’s fruits as durian, lanzones and pulps of certain forest trees, were plentiful. The jungles too offer plenty of game such as wild hogs, deer, monkeys, wild chickens and various birds. To cap it all, Mindanao is one of the most sparsely populated islands in the Philippines, taking into consideration its size. It has, by the census of 1900 less inhabitants than the province of Cebu. There was no scramble for food in the early days of the guerrilla movement!

d)  USAFFE Officers and Men add their experience

American prisoners of war celebrate the Fourth of July at risk of discovery and death at the hands of their captors. The Visayan-Mindanao Force under US Army Brigadier General William F. Sharp was composed of the 61st, 81st, and 101st Infantry Divisions of the Philippine Army. Major General Jonathan M. Wainwright, in nominal command of all the Allied Forces in the Philippines, ordered Sharp to surrender on May 9. Sharp complied and most of his men entered captivity at Camp Casisang, Malaybalay, on May 10. Camp Casisang had been a training ground for the Philippine Constabulary. The barracks were of crude construction, some with corrugated steel roofs but most were made of either thatched wood or nipa palm fronds. Water was a scarce commodity and the prisoners were limited to one canteen of water per day for all purposes. One pump was the sole source of water for about 1,000 Americans and 11,000 Filipinos. On August 15, 1942, All Generals, Full Colonels and their orderlies left Camp Casisang. There had been a large number of full Colonels plus five Generals at the camp. One of them was Philippine General Manuel Roxas, who after the war became the President of the Philippines in 1946. The Japanese gathered 268 men and marched them to Bugo where they boarded the Tamahoko Maru on October 3, 1942 for a 3-day voyage to Manila. At Manila they were marched to Bilibid Prison to wait for transportation to Japan. Many did not survive the war. On October 15, 1942 Camp Casisang was closed. All remaining prisoners were moved on the Japanese frieghter Maru 760 to Davao.

A considerable number of USAFFE officers and men did not surrender or if they had surrendered, many escaped or were released from the concentration camps. Outside of Japanese control, they became potent material for the guerrilla movement. It should also be said here with regret, that many USAFFE personnel made no effort to contribute in any way to the guerrilla resistance movement and reported to military authorities only after the landing of American troops in Leyte. Of the 33,000 guerrilla forces on Mindanao, all but thirty per cent comprised USAFFE men. Seventy per cent were civilian volunteers!

e) Americans were leaders: A total of 187 American officers and men, in various branches of Army service, but mostly from the Air Corps, plus a few American civilians, managed to elude the clutches of the enemy and were mainly responsible in solidifying into a strong organization the different and diverse guerrilla groups on Mindanao, assisted by Filipino guerrilla leaders. Mindanao guerrilla units, some springing into action immediately after the surrender, were whipped into line and in mid-1943, there were approximately thirty-thousand enlisted men and three-thousand officers in the solidified Mindanao Guerrilla Command.

This was known and officially recognized by Gen. MacArthur as the Tenth Military District, United States Forces in the Philippines (USFIP), under the strong leadership of a non-pareil “Guerrilla Chieftain”. All of these units were activated in accordance with the Tables of Organization of the Philippine Army (Reserve Division).

Colonel Wendell Fertig, was the highest ranked guerrilla leader of Mindanao’s 10th Miltiary District

How this organization came into being and succeeded in pushing its missions to a successful conclusion, is a story of so many stories, linked and interlinked to become an interlaced whole, one and indivisible. It is in great part, the story of Colonel WENDELL W. FERTIG.

2. NUCLEUS OF THE TENTH MILITARY DISTRICT:

WILLIAM A. TATE, American-Negro-Filipino mestizo, who before the war was an employee of the Mindanao Autobus Co., and late Chief of Police of Momungan, Lanao (present day Balo-i, Lanao del Norte) under the Japanese, decided to revolt. Past midnight of 16 September 1942, TATE, in compliance with a prior arrangement made with Capt. LUIS MORGAN, an American mestizo PC officer, crossed Panguil Bay in a sailboat with thirty-four men from Baroy, Kolambugan, Lanao to Tangub, Misamis Occidental. They were poorly armed but determined in their mission.

The intention was to surprise the puppet Japanese-sponsored officials in that and other municipalities and take away the arms and ammunition scheduled to be ready for delivery to the enemy authorities. These were kept in the municipal halls. TATE met no opposition, and the move was highly successful. He arrested several puppet officials, ordered them jailed and confiscated eighty-seven firearms which were waiting collection by the Japanese military.

Fertig Takes Command – 4 October 1942

MORGAN followed two days later. The two guerrilla leaders moved from town to town in the Northern portion of Zamboanga, attempting to consolidate guerrilla units already in existence and creating new militia groups in places where there were none.

MORGAN and TATE, lacking in the fundamental essentials of strong leadership and knowing their own limitations, sought Col. WENDELL W. FERTIG through Capt. CHARLES W. HEDGES, later promoted Colonel, asking FERTIG to head the planned organization of the Visayas-Mindanao Force.

COLONEL CHARLES W HEDGES, AUS, COLONEL WENDELL FERTIG, 10TH MILITARY DISTRICT (2nd to the right and rightmost) at Malabang Airfield with unidentified GSAP Air Controller and Australian Rex Blow (2nd from left)

Before the outbreak of the war, Col. HEDGES was the Logging Superintendent of the Findlay Millar Timber Co at Kolambugan, Lanao with a commission as Captain in the Reserve, United States Army. He was a very close friend of Col. FERTIG. He also knew personally MORGAN and TATE and, in fact, met them at the Baroy beach when they came to request Col. FERTIG to command the proposed Visayas-Mindanao Guerrilla Force. Lending the weight of his friendship and influence, he aided in convincing Col. FERTIG to accede to the request of

MORGAN and TATE

Col. FERTIG recognized the immediate need for united and concerted action in the attainment of a common purpose and agreed to assume command of the Mindanao Guerrillas, then going by the name “Mindanao-Visayan Force”. This was on October 1942. In his own words, quoted from a radio message to Gen. MacArthur:

“The unification of the scattered guerrilla forces is made with the end in view of eliminating dangerous friction ‘between them and coordinating their efforts against the enemy x x x.”

Thereafter he concentrated his efforts, time and energy in the reorganization, organization and administration of different guerrilla units in Mindanao, beginning with Misamis Occidental and Zamboanga. All guerrilla groups, one by one, fell in line under the new leader, Col. FERTIG, who was soon to initiate similar plans to unify all scattered guerrilla units on the island under one unified command.

On 12 Nov 1942, the guerrilla units in Misamis Occidental and Zamboanga were formed into the 106th Infantry Regiment, the first regiment to be activated under the command of Col. FERTIG.

WENDELL W. FERTIG, an American mining engineer in the Philippines, was called to active duty with the Corps of Engineers early in 1941; served on Bataan and in March 1942, was flown to Mindanao to continue the construction of airstrips. When the order of general surrender came, he refused to surrender but stayed in Kolambugan, Lanao where, when TATE and MORGAN started the guerrilla resistance movement, he accepted the offer to take command of the organization. A man of vision, Col. FERTIG saw in the movement tremendous possibilities ahead though attendant with multiple hardships, deficiencies and heartaches, but the coming events justified his hopes.

FERTIG’s immediate goal resolved into:

a) Smoothing out rivalry among loose, roving bands of scattered guerrillas to prevent the development into serious, internal conflicts resulting from petty misunderstandings and feelings of distrust among themselves;

b) The unification of all guerrilla groups into one compact command to be more effective in the prosecution of plans against the enemy; and

c) Making definite provisions for the security, protection and maintenance of the fast-expanding troops. The last included the organization of an essential intelligence to know the strength, movements and plans of the enemy.

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The Rise of the Guerrillas in Mindanao

May 1942

TAMPARAN DISTRICT: During the last week of May 1942, the Japs sent a strong patrol to Bacolod Grande on the Northwest shore area of Lake Lanao. The Patrol burned all houses in the settlement, killed some Maranaos. This was retaliatory to the strong opposition offered by the Maranaos in that sector during the first week of May 1942 when the Japs were advancing on Dansalan. The enraged Maranaos fled to the mountains to have more freedom in planning for revenge, for the Moros have the memory of an elephant in remembering crimes committed upon them. They do not forget.

These Moros completely ignored the order of the Japs in Dansalan to return to their homes and resume their normal pursuit of living. To show that the Japs were taking their own orders seriously, punitive Jap patrols were sent out from time to time. These Japanese patrols killed Moros whom they met on the way. There were also glaring instances of brutal abuses perpetrated on the Moro women. The Moros became obsessed in their determination to revenge these insults.

In early August 1942, a strong Japanese patrol went to Uya-an by way of Gadongan. The patrol killed several people in Gadongan and burned all the houses. Upon arriving at Uya-an, they immediately set fire to the large houses, including the market place. Here, for the first time, the Japs met resistance. Two Japs were killed and the rest retreated in time to avoid being surrounded, cut-off and massacred.

Moros Formally Challenge Japs

Two Tamparan Datus, patriotic and influential, LASUB and DIMALAANG by names, constructed a strong, well-situated cotta at Lalaboan in the Basak area. When the cotta was finished and provisions for battle ready, the two Datus sent a joint letter to the Jap Commander in Dansalan, challenging the Japs to a show-down of armed might.

126 Japs Killed

On 12 September 1942, the Japanese, not to let such a challenge go unanswered, promptly sent one full company of soldiers, under Captain TAKIUCHI all loaded in one launch. They landed at the mouth of the Laiaboan District and proceeded along the National Highway in the direction of the Moro cotta.

Here however, the Japs soon found themselves surrounded with all means of escape barred. Of the 126 Japs who took part, not a single person escaped – all were killed.

Ground encounters proving too costly for the Nips, they resorted to safer tactics. The succeeding three months saw Tamparan District bombed and strafed heavily by Japanese planes but long before the bombs fell, the Moros had moved to safer areas.

Kolambugan Area

A Jap patrol consisting of 200 officers and men, landed at Kolambugan at 4:00 AM, 25 August 1942. The purpose of the patrol was to secure the surrender of Captain LUIS MORGAN, and other USAFFE officers who had refused to surrender and who continued to hide from

the Nips.

The Japs failed to find MORGAN, who was the CO of the PC Detachment at Kolambugan prior to the surrender and despite the order of surrender, he managed to keep his command intact and evade the enemy.

Many attempts were made by the Japs to capture or convince MORGAN and his men to surrender, but all failed. Incidentally, during this patrol, four Americans who too had not seen fit to surrender, barely escaped capture.

They were WENDELL W. FERTIG, CHARLES W. HEDGES, CHARLES SMITH and JOHN A. HAMNER. All of them later played important roles in the organization of the Mindanao Guerrillas.

ILIGAN AREA

On 16 Sept 1942, an estimated 250 Jap troops left Iligan passing the National Highway towards Kauswagan. On the way they were ambushed by Lt. FELIPE FETALVERO (PC) and his men who knew of the Japanese movement beforehand.

Two men, Lt. LAZARO SILVA, PA, (now a Major and CO, 108th Division) and FELIPE MORALITA, a PC Sergeant, with their own guerrilla troops, assisted Lt. Fetalvero, (now Major and at one time CO, 105th Division) in this encounter. Taken by surprise, the Japs lost a number of lives.

The following day, Japanese launches landed Jap troops behind the position occupied by Lt. SILVA. This caused him to withdraw his troops; the Moros under JOSEPH SANGUILA, and another unit composed of Christians under Corp. MIPANGCAT GALAWAN. However, the Japs thought best not to proceed to Kauswagan and returned to Iligan.

In the latter part of Oct 1942, a Jap convoy of a considerable number of trucks moving from Dansalan to Malabang were ambushed by a swarm of Moros under Datu Aguam. The entire convoy was wiped out in the vicinity of Lake Dapao.

Another attempt to open for traffic the Iligan-Cagayan part of the National Highway was made on 27 Oct 1942 when forty Jap trucks loaded with men and material left Iligan in the direction of Cagayan. Guerrillas on the way systematically attacked the convoy, in almost all hours of the day and night. Only twenty-three trucks reached Cagayan on 5 Nov 1942, seventeen having been wrecked in transit and many Jap personnel killed and supplies destroyed.

Daway District

Pedro Andres (Pedring Timonera)

The moving spirit behind the early guerrilla unit in Daway was Lt. PEDRO ANDRES, with headquarters at Daway, Sta Filomena. He was assisted by Lt. FELEXBERTO CASTRO, Sgt. ENGRACIO C. ALCANTARA, Mr. DAMASO P. MOLDES, Mr. AURELIO CUIDLAT and Mr. MANUEL VILLAMONTE.

Early in October 1942, a company was organized composed of civilians and former USAFFE men who reported for duty to Lt. PEDRO A. ANDRES at Daway. This unit was later designated “I” Co, and the Japs were soon to learn of this organization.

On 19 October 1942, a Jap patrol was sent to go after Lt. ANDRES and bring him back dead or alive. This patrol met no encounter for ANDRES’ unit was not yet fully prepared and so chose not to give battle.

On 24 October 1942, two cargo trucks, one confiscated bus and a passenger car, all loaded with Japs, arrived at Sta Filomena where they were ambushed by ANDRES and his men. One Jap officer and fifteen of his men were killed. Thus began the offensive section of another guerrilla unit against the common enemy.

Hinaplanon, Pugaan, Panul-Iran, Pendugangan

In the first week of Oct 1942, ABRAHAM WABE, a resident of Tuburan, Iligan, succeeded in gathering some arms and ammunition and started to form an organization at Hinaplanon. Realizing his limitations in military matters, WABE turned over his small guerrilla group to Lt. PEDRO ANDRES.

Further organization of this unit, later designated “K” Co, was made by Lieut. GRACITANO JAYLO. Sgt. FABIAN CABRERA and Corp. PABLO S. PACANA, all PC, were assigned by ANDRES to the unit.

In the early part of November, a guerrilla organization was born in the valley of Pugaan, headed by Lt. GIL D. SUMPIO, PA, with the assistance of Lt. HONORIO AQUINO. This unit was later designated “L” Co.

In the sitios of Panul-Iran and Pendugangan, a civilian, JOVENCLO YU, assisted by’ another civilian, ROMEO ALCANTARA, started the guerrilla movement in those adjacent localities. Later this unit was designated “M” Co.

All these guerrilla units had no actual contact with the enemy at the early stages of organization though organized for just that contingency. Companies, “K”, “L”, “M”, were later organized into the 3rd Battalion of the 108th Infantry Regiment. Lt. PEDRO ANDRES became the CO of the battalion while Capt FETALVERO became CO of the Regiment. Still later, this battalion was lifted bodily and made the 3rd Bn of the 120th Inf Regt. This was made possible with the expansion of the 106th Inf Regt, so that one battalion taken from it did not affect its strength materially and would still meet the requirements of the Philippine Army Table of Organization.

Cotabato Province

M’ Lang

Edward Kuder (seated) with the young Salipada Pendatun, 1927. Courtesy of Phillipines Free Press

The “Philippine Revolutionary Army” was created in M’Lang sometime in the middle of October 1942, by Lieut. SALIPADA K. PENDATUN (later Lt-Colonel) from unsurrendered USAFFE officers and men. The nucleus forming the “Philippine Revolutionary Army” started operation against the enemy as early as 29 Sept 192, by attacking the Japs in Ladtingan, Pikit, and killing some forty of them without any casualty on the guerrilla side.

Datu ALIMAN MAMASALAKEG and PEDRO SINGAYAO of the “Philippine Revolution-

ary Army” both commissioned officers later, with some men, ambushed three truckloads of Japs in Upian along the Sayre Highway on 5 Oct 1942, resulting in the death of seventy-five enemy soldiers and one officer, the destruction of one truck and capture of a Jap saber and flag. The guerrillas, entrenched in an invulnerable position, suffered no casualty.

These two guerrilla groups, the “People’s Revolutionary Army” and the “Philippine Revolutionary Army” continued to give plenty of trouble to the enemy. The former continuously engaged the enemy at Bulanan, Lumopig, Salunayan and Libungan. The latter unceasingly harassed the Japs in Pikit, Kidapawan and Kabacan.

As time went on, these guerrilla bands grew in power and strength, with the result that more arms were turned into them and mere men hastened to join their ranks.

Midsayap

Datu MANTIL DILANGALEN and FROILAN MATAS, each with a guerrilla following, fused their forces sometime in the latter part of Sept 1942, into what they called the “People’s

Revolutionary Army”.

On 2 Oct 1942, this joint command occupied Midsayap which had just been vacated by the Japs. On 6 Oct 192, they formally took over Midsayap by observing the raising of the American and Filipino flags in the town right on the spot where the Jap emblem had previously

flown.

On 8 Oct 1942, while Datu MANTIL DILANGALEN was inducting officers and men in the market place into the “People’s Revolutionary Army”, two truckloads of Japs arrived and attacked the guerrillas at two points near the Midsayap junction. In the ensuing battle, twenty-one enemy soldiers were killed and some wounded, Lt. NICOLAS ABEJO and Sgt. ANTONIO VIRAN of the guerrillas, were wounded.

Glan And Sarangani Area

A band of guerrillas, somewhere in Malungon, Buayan, under the leadership of Capt. NICOLAS VILLAMOR, was organized with a few rifles and shotguns, as early as Oct.

1942. In and around Glan proper were some sixty USAFFE soldiers with rifles and shotguns, under the leadership of Capt. ROMAN R. AQUINO, FA, USAFFE.

A union of VELLAMOR and AQUINO guerrilla bands was highly desirable. Through the efforts of Maj. HERBERT C. PAGE and a Dr. GIL B. PABILLO, the merger was effected on 14 Dec 1942 when VILLAMOR with his men and PABLLLO came to Glan upon the invitation of Maj. PAGE and Capt. AQUINO. The combined guerrilla groups established their headquarters at Glan with Capt. V. BILBAO, commanding.

Lebak-Salaman Area

In November 1942 on one dark night, eighteen prominent citizens in the Lebak-Salaman District gathered in a certain house at Puricay; MARCELINO A. CONCHA, prominent businessman, Justice of the Peace RICARDO A. CABALUNA, Manager of American Land and Commercial Co., FORTUNATO P. MENDOZA, JUAN CELESTE and others. They decided to form a guerrilla unit to fight the enemy, due to the abusive powers of the Japanese overseers, most of whom were civilians. All they required was a military leader and they persisted in their search for one.

Leader With Good Reasons

Capt. FELICIANO MAGSAKAY, former CO of the PC detachment stationed at Lebak was then hiding in the mountains. He not only had military training and experience but he entertained a deep personal hatred of the Japs.

When on 27 July 1942, the Japanese came to Lebak, MAGSAKAY was summoned to attend a conference. At the time a patrol of sixteen Japanese went to Barurao where the wife of MAGSAKAY and three children were staying. They demanded to know where her husband hid the arms and ammunition of the USAFFE. Upon her refusal, the Jap officer struck her several times on the legs with his sheathed saber. Further questioning resulting in failure, the officer again struck Mrs. MAGSAKAY on the head with the same weapon. Then kicking the woman and her children, they left as unceremoniously as they came.

MAGSAKAY, upon his return from the conference, reacted as would any normal human being. He swore revenge and took his family to the mountains. It was there that four months later, the request of the eighteen prominent men reached him. He gladly accepted leadership. Other than strictly patriotic reasons, it offered a welcome change to square accounts with the enemy.

On November 1942, MAGSAKAY with seven regular PC and PA soldiers armed with rifles and ten civilian volunteers handling shotguns, struck! At 3:00 PM, that day, a Japanese patrol car came to Barurao from Kalamansi. When the vehicle passed through a coconut grove of the American Land and Commercial Co., a concentrated fusillade of enfilading fire met it. The automobile was immediately wrecked. A Jap Captain, said to have been a Bataan “Hero”, four other Japanese and two Filipino Civilians with them were killed. The two civilians peculiarly died as a result of the explosion of a Jap grenade thrown by the dying Jap Captain. It landed but a few feet from the Capt. and killed the two Filipinos.

Another Guerrilla Unit Formed

On 16 Nov 1942, a public meeting was held in Barurao to acquaint the people with the new movement and the motives behind it. The now Lt-Col JAMES R. GRINSTEAD was one of the more than three-hundred men, Moros and Christian alike, who attended the meeting.

The command was offered to the American officer but he graciously declined the position yielding in favor of MAGSAKAY and satisfying himself with being second in command. MARCELINO A. CONCHA was elected Director of Internal Affairs. FORTUNATO G. MENDOZA, Food and Supply Administrator and RICARDO A. CABALUNA, Staff Adviser.

That very day, the guerrilla band, now augmented by some two hundred civilian volunteers, marched to Kalamansig, the seat of the puppet Jap government, arriving there at midnight. Then early in the morning the guerrilla troops closed in from all directions. But the enemy garrison was no longer there, having moved secretly to Sta Clara two days previously, leaving a lone Filipino guard who surrendered without resistance and delivered to the guerrilla band three rifles.

That marked the end of the Japanese administration in the Lebak-Salaman area, three and one half months after its establishment. The guerrillas took possession of the town and began garrisoning it.

Again Takes Offensive Action

On 23 Nov 1942, Capt MAGSAKAY, Lts BALONCGAY and ABAS GUIABAR with twenty-

five soldiers and civilian volunteers, marched to Sta Clara at 2:00 AM, intent on capturing that Jap garrison. At 7:00 AM, they attacked the garrison from three points. The exchange of fire lasted for three hours.

At 10:00 AM, the garrison surrendered, Two Filipino civilians were killed and four Japanese civilians, former overseers of the Japanese-sponsored civil government in Lebak-Salaman area, were captured along with Capt JESUS SONGALIA, Lt JUAN DE CASTRO and twenty Filipino soldiers. About four hundred Filipino civilians, previously herded inside the garrison by the Japs, were released. No Jap soldiers were in sight.

Without MAGSAKAY’s knowledge, the Jap garrison had evacuated Sta Clara for Cotabato on the night of 21 Nov 1942, leaving SONGALIA, DE CASTRO and the twenty Filipino soldiers to defend the camp in case of a guerrilla attack. These Filipino officers and men, were Prisoners of War brought by the Japs from Cotabato to Sta Clara. Captured in this action by the guerrilla were twenty rifles, including a BAR; three shotguns, five revolvers, and five-hundred rounds of ammunition.

On 21 Dec 1942, the Headquarters of the MAGSAKAY guerrillas was moved to Barurao from Kalamansig.

The Kiamba Area

During the first week of March 1943, a guerrilla band, headed by Cap NICO VILLAMOR, attacked Kiamba. VILLAMOR ransacked the entire town, after placing under arrest seven Jap civilians. These had been left by the enemy to administer, along with the puppet town officials the government of Kiamba. VILLAMOR brought the Jap civilians to Glan.

Dulawan

Tun Sri GUMBAY PIANG

Capt GUMBAY PIANG, USAFFE, paroled due to ill-health from the Concentration Camp at Malaybalay in Sept 1942, went to Dulawan, the seat of the Japanese-sponsored civil government in the Dulawan sector and stayed there, still a virtual Prisoner of War. During his one-year stay at Dulawan proper, he secretly organized a guerrilla unit out of former USAFFE officers and men and civilians whom he selected to be in his confidence for their bravery, discretion and patriotism.

In June 1943, having heard that Col WENDELL W. FERTIG was the recognized Commander of all Mindanao Guerrillas, PIANG sent two envoys, Lieuts MANDANG MAMALANGKAS and ABDUL GUIANI, to contact him in Liangan, Lanao and secure authority for the organization of a guerrilla unit in Cotabato.

The envoys returned early in August 1943, bringing the information that pending personal interview with PIANG himself, the issuance of the desired authority was to be held in abeyance. In the meantime, sometime before the arrival of his emissaries, PIANG with his family and followers evacuated to Kabinge, a hinterland sitio, twenty two kilometers from Dulawan, where he organized his temporary headquarters. He left, however, a letter addressed to Cols JIMBO and YAMASHITA at Dulawan informing them of his move. This was a challenge flaunted in the face of the Japanese Commanders and henceforth, PIANG rose high in the black list of the enemy.

In the middle of August 1943, he with twenty-three followers in an arduous and dangerous trip went to Misamis, Misamis Occidental, to contact person-ally the Commanding Officer of the Tenth Military District. The result of this conference was the authority for PIANG to organize a separate guerrilla unit, which was the nucleus of the 119th Infantry Regimentt, 106th Division. Capt PIANG returned to Kabinge on 10 October 1943 and set himself fully to the task of organization.

Bukidnon-Province

Imbatug-Sta-Fe-Libona 

Sometime in June 1942, Lieut LEOPOLDO BLANCO, Lieut ELEAZAR ANDUQUE and some enlisted men, who had refused to surrender to the enemy, started collecting arms and ammunition in Imbatug, Sta Fe and Libona, preparatory to the organization of a respectable guerrilla unit.

The then Major ERNEST E. McCLISH with some American  companions came to Imbatug. BLANCO sought the advice of McCLISH and was told to continue collecting more arms and ammunition. A guerrilla unit was then organized with McCLISH in command and BLANCO assisting him.

Kalabong-Dalirig

In the later part of July 1942, Pfc MARCITANO PUNTAIN AREA DERROTA and Pvt RCMEO JAGA organized guerrilla units in Kalabong and Dalirig.

On 14 Oct 1942, DERROTA with forty-eight men ambushed enemy trucks at Mangima, killed some Japs and captured foodstuffs and other supplies. DERROTA, being fast on the go and very active, was nick-named by his men “The Mystery Shadow”.

On 17 Nov 1942, DERROTA and JACA with nineteen men took Puntian without encountering resistance. Puntian, though not garrisoned by the enemy, was frequented by Japanese police patrols.

In the vicinity of Puntian, a certain Cpl LUDOVICO LOPEZ had about forty men under him with a few arms. He promptly merged his group with that of DERROTA and worked under the latter in a subordinate capacity.

The Activity Of Avanceña

On 15 December 1942, MARINO AVANCEÑA, arrived at a sitio near Sumilao. Claiming to be a Captain and a direct representative of Major BOWLER, he called all the guerrilla leaders, instructed them to place their units under the command of Maj BOWLER. The different guerilla entities were then and there organized by AVANCEÑA into a battalion with himself as

Battalion Commander. Telling his men to stand by, he proceeded to Sumilao.

On 26 December 1942, AVANCEÑA came back and ordered an all-attack on Impasugong and Maluko. The attack was carried out but the objectives were not taken.

It later developed that AVANCEÑA was a suave pretender, that he represented nobody but himself. Credit must be given him, however, for the fact that in his planned attacks some forty Japs were killed with only one wounded on the side of the guerrillas. AVANCEÑA was reported to be also responsible, with his daring at impersonation in recovering thousands of rounds of ammunition from Dalirig.

Tankulan, Sumilao and Maluko

In the early part of Sept 1942, USAFFE officers who did not surrender, found themselves in Tankulan, Sumilao and Maluko and environs. They too began collecting arms and ammunition, and organizing independent guerrilla units in these areas. Among them were Lts. PATRICIANO A. DESTAJO, JOSE P. LABARO, ISAIAS ARBOLEDA, DOMINADOR IPANAG, and RAMON ONAHON.

Captain Ramon M. Onahon (photo from Onahon Family Collection)

RAMON ONAHON deserves special mention. In those uncertain days, he unmindful of the risks he was running, displayed extraordinary courage in harassing the enemy along the Sayre Highway, inflicting considerable casualties in lightning raids with his small unit.

Kitao-Tao, Kibawe

In Bukidnon, sometime in the later part of 1942, ALANIB, MALAYBALAY four distinct, strong guerrilla units were merged into one command. No squabbles were encountered

in the fusion. Each group had only one mission; that of dealing the heaviest possible blows to the enemy. Each knew without being told of the fundamental applicability of the axion: In union there is strength.

These guerrilla units were 1) under the leadership of Pfc VICENTE LEUTERIO of Kibawe; 2) under the leadership of SALIPADA PENDATUN of Kalungan, Cotabato; 3) under Capt ALIPIO JUNTILLA of Alanib and 4) under Maj F. McGee at Kanaan and Silae.

After the surrender, Pfc VICENTE LEUTERIO went straight to his farm at Palma. Peace, in his farm, was denied him, however. Somebody reported to the Jap authorities that LEUTERIO was hiding arms and ammunition. LEUTERIO escaped before the Japs arrived. On 5 Oct 1942, he organized some twenty five reservists and civilians.

Attack on the Seventh Anniversary

He was able to arm seven of the strongest and most capable men. LEUTERIO then divided among them some 1,000 rounds of .20 cal ammunition. This band, including LEUTERIO, inaugurated the Seventh Anniversary of the Philippine Commonwealth by attacking the Japanese outpost in Kitao-tao at dawn of 15 Nov 1942. This sudden attack netted seven Japs and one Filipino Jap police man KIA and a few Japs wounded. LEUTERIO’s group suffered no casualties!

On 17 Nov 1942, LEUTERIO and his men ambushed the last of the three Jap trucks at Pinamaloy, all bound for Malaybalay. Eight Japs were killed and some wounded.

On 19 Nov 1942, Capt AMADO CRUZ, Senior Inspector Jap BC, with a squad of soldiers went to Kibawe to get LEUTERIO dead or alive. Having been informed of this, LEUTERIO made a jump ahead of Capt CRUZ. At 10:00 PM, that same day, LEUTERIO and his men attacked the house where CRUZ and his soldiers were sleeping, killing the inspector and three of his men.

Leuterio Inspires the People

This whirlwind activity of LEUTERIO was inclined to be magnified, especially by the poor people, who had always feared the Japs as invincible and invulnerable. Overnight he became a legend. More men joined his command and more arms and ammunitions were gathered in.

Datu Udtog Matalam

The Japanese set a price on LEUTERIO’s head. It was at this time that he asked assistance from Datu UGTUG of Eastern Cotabato, on 20 Nov 1942. On 27 Nov 1942, SALIPADA PENDATUN, brother-in-law of DATU UGTUG, arrived at Kibawe with some one hundred men, fully armed. After a short conference between LEUTERIO and PENDATUN on 1 Dec at Kibawe, it was agreed that the two units would be fused and PENDATUN was to lead. They also agreed to contact and invite officers and men who did not surrender and were at that time in Bukidnon, hiding from the Japs. Among these officers contacted were TEODORO GARCIA, NICOLAS GABUTINA, TOMAS CABILI, MELENCIO ORBASE and many others. Several Americans were also contacted. Among them were VINCENT DOUGLAS (later Capt), JACK CLARKE (later commissioned Lieut), FORREST HOWARD (later Lieut), TRACY TUCKER (later Lieut), and ANTHONY BENAC (later Lieut).

A delegation was sent to Congressman MANUEL FORTICH, the Grand Old Man of Bukidnon, for his opinion of the movement. Without reservation, FORTICH pledged full support and cooperation and encouraged the resistance movement. This attitude heartened and encouraged the guerrillas no end.

On 4 December 1942, PENDATUN assigned LEUTERIO to the Pinamaloy sector and LEUTERIO promptly cut down the telephone line to Malaybalay. The Kitaotao garrison immediately sent several men to repair the line. LEUTERIO ambushed the group and killed three of them; the rest ran back to take refuge in the schoolhouse at Kitao-tao.

PENDATUN sent LEUTERIO reinforcements which reached LEUTERIO on 5 Dec 1942 including Lieuts ALBERTO CRUZ and MELENCIO ORBASE. That same evening, Jap reinforcement came from Malaybalay. The enemy was then contacted and the battle lasted for three days. On Dec 8th, the Japs left Kitao-tao for Malaybalay having suffered no less than forty dead and five wounded. On the guerrilla side only one was killed, a Pvt LAMAK-LAMAK.

The guerrillas then occupied Kitao-tao and Pinamaloy and as far as Do logon.

Fortich’s Support Helpful

Congressman Manuel Fortich

At this juncture, another meeting took place in the house of Congressman FORTICH at Dalirig. The Old Man reiterated his pledge of support and co-operation and gave the guerrillas, now very much united, thirty rifles and 10,000 rounds of ammunition. When the people of Bukidnon heard of the open and full adherence of Congressman FORTICH to the movement, they also came out openly in support of the guerrilla. Army men left their hiding places with whatever arms and ammunition they had, and offered their services.

Even civilians elements demanded admission into the fold. In less than ten days, the equivalent of two skeleton regiments were formed with nine hundred armed with rifles, and a few machine guns. No less than 20,000 rounds of cal .30 ammunition were in the hands of the unit at that time.

Alanib

Sometime in October 1942, at Alanib, a group of about fifty men, consisting of reservists, PC men and civilians, banded themselves together to form a guerrilla unit. They were armed with rifles, some automatic, and each man carried no less than seventy rounds of ammunition. Sgt LEOPOLDO ALBERTO and JOEPE NOBLEZA headed this guerrilla band.

About the first week of December 1942, a certain Capt ALIPIO JUNTILLA left his hiding place at the Kaatoan Quinine plantation and went to see Major BOWLER to ask for authority to organize a guerrilla unit in Alanib andvicinity.

On 12 Dec 1942, JUNTILLA returned with HIDALGO and WALDO McVICKERS with a platoon detachment and, absorbing the unit of ALBERTO and NOBLEZA, organized the Alanib sector. Other officers in hiding in the Kitanglad mountains volunteered. By 14 Dec 1942, this group numbered around two hundred fully armed men with .30 cal rifles, three of which were automatic. It also developed a medical unit, labor pool, and an Ordinance section. This unit, a short time later, was absorbed into PENDATUN’s ever growing guerrilla.

Talakag

Up to 29 Oct 1942, Talakag was governed by Japanese puppet Filipino officials and was frequently visited by Japanese officers and soldiers as well as Japanese civilians. The

Cagayan-Talakag road was at that time still passable by motor vehicles.

On 29 Oct 1942, Lieut WALDO McVICKERS with a few armed men took Talakag by surprise and forced the surrender of the Japanese police and eleven puppet officials. This action was sanctioned previously by the then Maj ROBERT V. BOWLER, an American officer who chose not to surrender to the enemy but instead stayed in Wanguilan, a sitio near Talakag.

Immediately thereafter, a conference was held in Talakag, presided over by Maj BOWLER, McVICKERS, BENITO T. HIDALGO, WILLIAM L. F. MC LAUGHLIN, NICOLAS DENOSTA, ALBINO NOBLE, CIRILO RIVERA, AMADO SANTIAGO, and RICARIDO RODRIGUEZ all made Captains later attended the meeting. Plans for effective campaigns against the enemy; mustering of men into the guerrilla fold; collection of more arms and ammunition; feeding of the troops; and establishment of the civil government were among the matters discussed.

On 30 Oct 1942, the American and Filipino flags were raised over Talakag. A patrol, under    McVICKERS, was immediately sent to destroy the ferry-boat at Ugiaban, Talakag which heretofore had been used by the Japanese. All along the highway from Talakag to Lumbia, outposts were established.

Kanayan and Silae

At Kanayan and Silae, some fifty armed men were under Maj FRANK D. McGEE. On 20 Dec 1942, Lieut VICENTE VILLANUEVA, personal representative of PENDATUN who at this time, by resolution of all his officers, assumed the rank of “Brig-General”, contacted Maj McGEE at Kabangahan. A little later, Maj McGEE proceeded with his men to Mailag and turned over his command to PENDATUN.

By 20 Dec 1942, PENDATUN’s force had swelled into a total of 1,117 officers and men, and was functioning as a Division, It became known as the “Bukid non-Cotabato Force”.

The Malaybalay Siege

Smacking of medieval warfare and looming unique in the history of the Bukidnon guerrillas, was the protracted siege of Malaybalay undertaken by the PENDATUN forces which lasted for some fifty-three days from 12 Jan to 6 March 1943. It was a tale of sheer courage, determination and devotion to duty.

Salipada Pendatun (center) with Robert Bowler ((left) and Chick Parsons (right) (MacArthur Memorial)

Pendatun fought against the Japanese during the Second World War, forming a group called the Bolo Battalion, which evolved into the larger group, Muslim-Christian Guerrilla Movement and later, the Cotabato-Bukidnon Force.

As a USAFFE officer during World War II, Pendatun organized and commanded the 102nd Regiment under the 101st Division of the Philippine Army/Constabulary from 1942 to 1943. He prevented the total destruction of the regiment during the Japanese invasion of Mindanao in early 1942. As part of the guerrilla movement, he launched an assault on Japanese garrison in Pikit in September 1942, and led a raid on the Japanese garrison at Kabacan on October 25, 1942.

He also eliminated the Japanese garrison at Kitaotao, Bukidnon on December 4, 1942 and rescued Filipino prisoners of war at Casisang, Bukidnon on December 24, 1942 and led the two-month siege on a Japanese garrison at Malaybalay, Bukidnon. For his accomplishments, Pendatun was promoted to Brigadier General and was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Star, the second highest military decoration given to AFP Personnel.

Major McGEE’s forces occupied strategic places between Dalwangan and Malaybalay. Almost simultaneously, Lieut ARLINDO F. ANGELES’ Engineering Group undertook the destruction of all bridges North of Kalasungay. In the dead of the night of 11 Jan 1943, Kabacan Bridge was blasted. with dynamite, with the deafening detonations of the explosion heard far and wide. It was an announcement to the Japs in Malaybalay that something serious was afoot.

Previous to this, however, the Japs sensing trouble, had begun transferring Prisoners of War from Casisang to Malaybalay and thence to Cagayan.

Note: Had the PENDATUN forces succeeded in gaining full control of the National Highway from Dalwangan to Kalasungay, the Japs in Malaybalay would have been entirely cut off from contact with their garrisons in the North.

By this time, there was absolutely no more Jap garrison South of Malaybalay, except possibly that in Kabacan, Cotabato, 160 kilometers away. Datu UGTUG’s forces occupied positions in Upian, Afroman, Cotabato, to cut off any enemy reinforcements from Cotabato – which act of the enemy which was then considered a remote possibility.

The Japs in Malaybalay were determined, however, to keep the Dalwangan-Malaybalay Road open. At 5:00 AM, 12 Jan 1943, Japanese patrols sent to investigate the condition of Kabacan bridge, encountered a platoon under Lt ROSALES JUNI. That day, another platoon under Lt LORENZO DEFUNTORUM encountered a light Japanese patrol in the vicinity of Kalasungay. In both encounters, the enemy employed heavy weapons but without effect – there were no casualties on the guerrilla side. That same day, a strong Japanese outpost with heavy weapons, guarded the immediate vicinity of Kabacan while the Kabacan bridge, dynamited by the guerillas the day previous, was being repaired by the Japs.

On 14 Jan 1943, Major McGEE and a few men occupied Dalwangan and captured four Filipino Jap Policemen who first resisted but later gave up, having been convinced that their position was untenable.

Guerrillas Enter Malaybalay

At 4:00 AM, 15 Jan 1943, LEUTERIO and twenty-six enlisted men attacked the Central School Building, Alhambra Cine and Governor ANTONIO RUBIN’s residence.

Simultaneously, Lt SALVADOR GA and nineteen men of McGEE’s troops attacked the Japs in the Forestry Building. In both attacks the Japs replied with heavy weapons, mortars and machine guns but to no avail. None of the guerrillas were hurt.

At 9:30 on the same day, Lt FELICIANO CASTELO and his men crossed the Sawaga River and marched towards the PC Barracks occupied by Filipino BC’s under Lt JUAN LAGRAMA, Prisoner of War. LAGRAMA offered to surrender all arms and ammunition in the possession of the BC’s under him. But while the negotiations were going on, ROQUE ASENERO, BC, unnoticed slipped away and informed Cap ALVIAR who in turn informed Capt YOSIOKA, the Jap Commander. Immediately, Lt. CASTELO’s position was shelled and machine gunned.

In that exchange of fire, the BCF’s (Bukidnon-Cotabato Forces) lost five men and seven wounded. Casualty of the enemy was believed high. That act of treachery on the part of a Filipino engendered deep rancor in the hearts of the guerrillas.

Action on the Northern outskirts of Malaybalay was fast and furious. This was the sector alloted to the McGEE forces. While Lt. JUNI and his men were fighting the Japs in Kalasungay, Lt GA and his men with a commanding position in Sumpong Hill ambushed Jap foot soldiers going to the Forestry Building from the Normal School Building. Two rifles were taken from the enemy. Eighteen Japs dead, twelve of which were killed by Corp PAJO. No casualties on the guerrilla side.

Japs Capture A Guerrilla Officer

On 28 Jan 1943, in the vicinity of the Sumpong Hill, JUNI and his company, another platoon led by Lt. FRANCISCO AZOONA and a third group under Lt. CONRADO TADEO, locked horns with a considerable number of Japs. In this encounter a Jap Captain MIRAT was killed. Capt GIL ALTAMIRANO, Executive Officer of McGEE, was captured by the enemy and subsequently tortured to death.

By then Malaybalay was a town of foxholes. Even the Filipinos insiders were in foxholes.

One skeleton battalion under Capt ORBASE succeeded in driving the Japs from the PC Barracks and occupied it as well as the Bukidnon High School Grounds and the area West of the road near Governor RUBIN’s mansion.

Japanese planes bombed and strafed continuously guerrilla positions in Kalasungay, Casisang and Impalambong. Some eighty bombs were dropped by the enemy without any casualties. Based on their proximity, these planes most probably originated from the small auxiliary/dispersal airfields at Malaybalay, Valencia, Maramag, Impasug-ong, Dalwangan, and Kibawe, and the Del Monte Airfield Complex in Tankulan, Maluko (present day Dicklum, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon).

In various assaults made by BCF men, the guerrillas suffered four casualties.

Catapult Captured Bombs

In the later part of February, action was intense. The guerrillas were using bombs retrieved from the Maramag Landing Field. These were thrown to the enemy positions by means of catapults. The depletion of the Japanese forces began to show. This was confirmed by prisoners escaping from the town to the protection of the guerrillas. They revealed that the beleaguered Japs were thinking of surrendering if the expected aid from the North did not come on time.

On 23 Feb the biggest number of prisoners escaped from Malaybalay and included Lt Col LUIS M. DELGADO, Capt GRISPINO DE CASTRO, Lt ALFREDO BUSTAMANTE, ALFREDO BAKING, MALACAS MEDINA, FRANKLIN LABAON, F. ABUNDA, SAYUSAY and many enlisted men. Most of the officers and enlisted men were ill. Some of these were later to join the guerrillas and play an important part in future history.

An answer to the frantic call for help of the Malaybalay garrison came in the form of about thirty-five Japs from the North, who were engaged incessantly by the guerrillas while enroute. More followed and three hundred of them finally entered Malaybalay at 5:00 PM, 6 March.

Due to shortage of ammunition, the guerrilla forces withdrew eight kilometers south of Malaybalay and maintained a front line extending from Bugcaon to Linabo.

The original strength of Japs in Malaybalay was more than 250. They were well entrenched, employing heavy and automatic weapons with a great amount of shells and other ammunition. They were aided by BC’s loyal to Japs.

Malaybalay was not taken. But the very audacity of the attack and the protracted siege the guerrillas undertook struck a new note of fear into the heart of the enemy. Moreover, the action strengthened the confidence of’ the troops in their capabilities and opened the eyes of the Filipino defeatists. The possibilities for future moves were astounding and definitely encouraging.

The now Lt-Col FRANK D. McGEE, a West Point graduate, and unsurrendered USAFFE officer, was the strategist of the guerrillas in the Malaybalay operations. To him was largely due the credit of planning and putting into effect almost all the important strategy employed by the BCF in the Malaybalay siege.

Misamis Occidental

The guerrilla units in Misamis Occidental came into being not in the heat of actual battle but in preparation for the coming clash with the enemy. These guerrillas had made no operations against the Japs in the early days although later they, like the rest, have had their share of fighting.

As the Misamis Occidental was the first province to form the nucleus of the Tenth Military District, it was essential that guerrilla groups be organized fully in the shole provinces. Added to this was the fact that Col FERTIG had chosen Misamis Occidental to be the seat of his Headquarters and hence it must of necessity need to be properly garrisoned.

Guba, Misamis

On 16 Sept 1942, just before MORGAN joined TATE in the town of Misamis, Lt ANACLETO C. DINO, MORGAN’s Junior Officer in 8th Lanao Co, PC, was directed by MORGAN to assist Lts PATROCINIO GARCIA and JOAQUIN DIAMAL, both PA, to organize the Militia in Misamis to apprise MORGAN of the organization.

On the same day, 18 Sept 1942, MORGAN sent for DIAMAL and the men to proceed to Misamis immediately. MORGAN, however, did not wait for the men. That day he proceeded to Dipolog, leaving DINO, GARCIA and DIAMAL to organize the militia at Misamis, with the men from Guba forming the nucleus.

DIAMAL arrived at Misamis on the 19th with about forty men. Preparation for the defense of the town was immediately undertaken. Plans were set to discuss important matters relating to the organization. In the conference were present Lts PATROCINIO GARCIA, PEDRO S. AQUINO, SEGISMUNDO HULIGANGA, OSIAS MACAMAY and a prominent civilian, FELICISIMO BACULIO.

Clarin

Lieuts JOSE MABOLO, VICENTE LUGTU and PEDRO YLAGAN undertook the organization of the Clarin Militia in mid-Sept 1942.

Tudela

Lieuts JESUS AGUILAR, MEXIMO LAO, FELECISIMO GABULE and FRANCISCO OBUT organized the Tudela Militia, in mid-Sept 1942.

Jimenez

Lieuts PANCHO and AGUILAR organized in the middle of Sept 1942 the Jimenez Militia, joined later by Lieuts CELSO VALMORES, VIDAL AMOJELAR, ANDRE ANCHETA, BENJAMIN CAJITA, FELICISIMO CAYLO, LORENZO EVIOTA and HAMABAR BONDOC.

Oroquieta

The Oroquieta Militia, organized in mid-Sept 1942, was composed of two companies, “A” and “B”, “A” Co was commanded by Lt SIMPLICIO APAO with Lt FELIMON LAGMAN as Executive Officer and Lts ANTONIO G. GOZAR, EUFRONIO LLANTO and HIGINIO REBOSURA as Staff Members. Its Headquarters building was the Provincial Hospital, “5” Co was commanded by Lt LUCAS NARANGO. Staff: TEODORO SULAY, EUGENIO NERI, DEMETRIO U. SY and ESPIRITU TAN. Headquarter building, the Central School.

Lopez Jaena

The Lopez Jaena Militia was organized by Lt NARCISO DIGAMON, assisted by Lts SIMEON LEDESMA, ORLANDO CARREON and BERTY EDMILAO in Sept. 1942.

Tangub

Mayor EPIFANIO FLORES was instrumental in the organization of the Tangub Militia assisted by Lt SEGISMUNDO HULIGANGA. A meeting was held at Pulao, Tangub with FLORES presiding and attended by Lt HULIGANGA and two other officers. The militia started with ninety men. On 31 Sept 1942, Lt DINO in the absence of MORGAN, designated Lt PEDRO S. AQUINO to command the Tangub Militia.

BONIFACIO: The Bonifacio Militia was organized about the middle of Sept 1942 by ZOILO RUAYA, assisted by Atty ERNESTO CASTANEDA and Lt DANIEL LUMAPAS.

BALI ANGAO

Lts ABELARDO NERIDA, ANGEL RUPERTO, PATRICIO ATAY and one CORPUS were the organizers of the Baliangao Militia in mid-Sept 1942.

PLARIDEL

The militia at Plaridel was organized by Lt CALIXTO DE LEON in 22 Sept 1942.

ZAMBOANGA PROVINCE

DIPOLOG-KATIPUNAN-DAPITAN: MANIWAY (DAPITAN), SINDANGAN

The MORGAN Expeditionary Force arrived at Dipolog the afternoon of 18 Sept 1942. The militias were immediately organized in Dipolog and other barrios subsequently visited by the expedition. Most of these were nameless and unknown, but were absorbed by MORGAN into the Organization under “General” FERTIG.

A Brigadier General Will Command

The explanation to the people by MORGAN was brief: An American Brigadier General has arrived from Australia to organize a new Army, fight the Japs and at the same time prepare the ground for the coming of the American Liberation Forces. Cooperation was expected of everybody. Those who did not cooperate with the new movement were classed with the enemy and would be considered as such when the American Forces arrived.

L-R UNIDENTIFIED UNITED STATES ARMY AIR FORCE PILOT, REX BLOW; COL CHARLES W HEDGES, UNITED STATES ARMY, COL WENDELL FERTIG, COMMANDER, 10TH MILITARY DISTRICT, USFIP

However pressure was unnecessary. The sight of an American at that time was viewed with the greatest elation by the people. The knowledge that an American General was around to lead the fight, gave the people new hope out of the ashes of defeat, despondency and dejection. There were, of course, some who were skeptical: “Who is FERTIG?” “Never heard of him before”

“Is it really true that he came from Australia?” “How does he look?” “Is he not only a mythical character of MORGAN’s imagination?” These questions and more were asked, But the majority, quickly and eagerly, volunteered their services.

UNITS ARE FORMED EVERYWHERE – SEPT 1942

In Dipolog District, Lieut PATERNO LUBATON, was appointed by MORGAN to head the militias, assisted by Lieuts EUFEMIO SALERA, DEOGRACIAS HAMAC, JEREMIAS BARINGA and MEROPE FRANCO. The officers and their men concerned themselves at the outset with the collection of arms and ammunition.

In Katipunan District, Lieut ESTEBAN ABIAD was appointed leader of militia, assisted by Lieuts NARCISO ENGLIS, CRISOSTCMO EGUIA, PEDRO ALO and ROBERTO PEÑARANDA.

In Dapitan District, Lieut FRANCISCO HAMOY was appointed to command, assisted by Lieuts VICENTE DALMAN, HERMINIAHON ZAPANTA, JOSE ADRAINCEM and RODOLFO GALLEPOSO.

In Mainway District (this is a big barrio of Dapitan), Lieut RAFAEL T. CLASO was left in command, assisted by Lieuts RENORIO NATIVIDAD, EPIFANIO BOO, ABELARDO BARRIOS, FELIPE ALVIOLA and VICTOR MANIGSACA.

On 20 Sept 1942, at 4:30 PM, MORGAN arrived at Sindangan, and because he wanted to cover as much territory as possible, he left Maj JUSTINO TEANO, an old PC officer, to head the organization of the militia in Sindangan. The Sindangan Militia Force was organized on 21 Sept, with the reorganized 2nd Company of the former PC stationed in Sindangan during the war, composing the greater bulk. It became the Sindangan Militia District.

Fertig Goes To Dipolog

On 6 Oct 1942, FERTIG arrived at Dipolog with MORGAN and Maj FABIAN MEJIA, a PC officer who was elected to head the guerrillas in Misamis Occidental. From Dipolog, the party continued on inspection of other guerrilla units in Northern Zamboanga.

Dipolog, Dapitan, Katipunan and Maniway Militia Districts were made into Sub-Sector 5A with Capt PETRONELO RUIZ as the Commander. Dipolog District became “A” Co; Dapitan, “B” Co; Katipunan, “C” Co; and Maniway, “D” Co.

Sindangan Militia District was made into Sub-Sector Noe 5-B and designated “E” Co led by Capt FELIPE QUEJADA, an old PC officer, assisted by Lieuts JOSE SOL BALORIA, GALILEO ACOSTA, GAUDENCIO DUHAYLUNGSOD, LUCIO ALBOS and FILEMON PARTOSA.

On 11 Nov 1942, Sub-Sectors 5-A and 5-B were organized into the 107th Inf Regt which covered the towns of Plaridel and Baliangao (Misamis Occidental) and Dapitan, Dipolog, Katipunan and Sindangan (northern portion of Zamboanga).

On 17 Nov 1942, Maj JUSTINO TEANO assumed command of the newly organized 107th Infantry Regiment.

PAGADIAN

On 12 Sept 1942, the puppet government in Pagadian ended. A certain Jap, YANO by name, sent by the Dansalan Jap Government to act as overseer in Pagadian, was killed in that evening. The killing was engineered by PC and PA men who as early as July 1942, had arrived at Pagadian and bidded their time.

The following day, 13 September 1942, the Motor Launch “Chingkang”, owned by some Chinese businessmen, arrived at Pagadian from Margosatubig brining a lone Jap, ITO, overseer of the puppet government of Margosatubig. Not having any inkling as to what happened to YANO, ITO landed in Pagadian. He was immediately put under arrest by PC and PA men and in the evening promptly beheaded. This was after his early activities during June, July, August and early September 1942.

Consternation gripped the puppet officials. Some of them were unceremoniously thrown to jail. Others were allowed freedom but given stern warning. Anxiety tugged at the heart of the town. The people expected the Japs to send plenty of soldiers and conduct a punitive expedition. However, this misgiving was unfounded. The Japs did not return until much later.

The leaders of the new movement included Lieuts FERNANDO PAGADIAN, NEMECIO BUYCO and FEDERICO PADAYHAG. Most of the men were those belonging to the former 3rd Zamboanga PC Co stationed at Pagadian before the surrender. This guerrilla unit decided to garrison Pagadian and establish their headquarters there instead of going into the hills.

All the PC men formed a company and selected Lt PADAYHAG as their Commanding Officer; the PA’s formed another and elected Lt. PAGADUAN to head them.

On 14 October, at 9:30 in the morning, MORGAN at the head of his rolling force arrived at Pagadian, by way of Aurora and Labangon. WILLIAM TATE was with the party. Organization immediately followed.

On 17 Oct 1942, the Pagadian Sector was formally organized with Capt NICOLAS P. LASOLA as Sector Commander.

Margosatubig, Kabasalan and Malangas

Shortly after the surrender, Moro bandits started raiding and looting the sitios in and around Malangas, a barrio belonging to the municipality of Margosatubig.

During all this time FRANK McCARTHY, a contractor in the Malangas Coal Mines, together with other public-spirited men, handed themselves together in their evacuation place some nineteen kilometers inland. They had with them some of the old laborers of the mines who continued to live with and work for them. McCARTHY had them promise to stick by him which they did.

Little by little they gathered quite a number of arms and ammunition. Some they bought outright from retreating soldiers who badly needed money to return to their homes. Other soldiers with arms and ammunition were prevailed upon to join the guerrilla unit instigated by McCARTHY.

Moro Bandits Cause Trouble

In the meantime, the Moro bandits became stronger and richer by their constant pillaging forays. They controlled Malangas, making this their headquarters and store-house for their looted goods. To make it worse, news reached McCARTHY that Moros in Siay, Kabasalan, had started to pillage nearby villages. McCARTHY decided to take action. With Moro bandits in Malangas and Moro bandits in Kabasalan – he felt bottled up, and his people in immediate danger.

LIBIO CRUZ, a member of the McCARTHY group, volunteered to go to the Moros in Malangas, pretending that he was dissatisfied with his lot in the McCARTHY outfit and wanted to join the bandits. This plan worked satisfactorily. The Moros believed the story of CRUZ, Then the told CRUZ that they were about to loot two wealthy Subanons living not far from Malangas. CRUZ immediately sent a secret message to McCARTHY, arranging for an ambush. McCARTHY planned accordingly.

Moro Bandits Ambushed

On 20 June 1942, the Moro bandits and CRUZ proceeded to put into action their plans of robbing the wealthy Subanons, but the McCARTHY ambush was successful. Three Moros were killed outright and two died later after having been badly wounded in the encounter. McCARTHY’s group suffered not a scratch.

More encounters with the Moro bad men followed. The Moros were driven from Malangas and McCARTHY moved in on 26 June 1942. A meeting was called in the Malangas market attended by some 200 Christians, Subanons and some peaceful Moros. A volunteer guard organization was created. The following month saw the organization of VG’s in Siay, Kabasalan and Kulasian, Margosatubig. The primary mission was to maintain peace and order. This mission included fighting the Moro bad elements and the Japs too, if need be.

Early in July 1942, the three Jap overseers, YAMASITA in Kabasalan; and JOVEN in Naga-Naga, heard of the activities of the McCARTHY group.

On 13 July 1942, a Jap vessel docked at Malangas pier with some three hundred Jap soldiers aboard, under the command of Capt MAIDA. The Japs called a meeting of the town people. The theme was the same – not to disturb the peace and order and not to fight against the mighty, invulnerable, invincible Japanese empire.

At this time, McCARTHY and his volunteer guards had to lie low a distance to the interior. It was suicidal to risk open encounter with that number of the enemy.

On 14 August 1942, the Jap-controlled motor launch “Chingkang” again arrived at Malangas led by SHIROTA, reported to be from Dansalan. He sent word to McCARTHY to surrender with his men and their arms, He also left a warning to the Malangas civilians that if they insisted in foolishly indulging in guerrilla activity, the Japs would burn the town. SHIROTA then proceeded to Margosatubig.

McCarthy Asks For Support

On 15 August 1942, McCARTHY appealed to the people of Malangas at the marketplace in a public meeting to back his guerrillas. The civilians, hating both the Japs and the Moro bandits and liking the leadership of McCARTHY, pledged McCARTHY then planned to send out in a vinta thirty of the strongest and most dependable men, well-armed and carrying explosives to Margosatubig in the dead of the night. ‘Their mission being to sink the Chingkang. This plan failed, however, as the vinta was overtaken by low tide at the mouth of Talanusa channel not far away from Margosatubig.

SHIROTA was angered when later he know of this. On 21 August, he arrived in Malangas aboard the same vessel with two Japanese soldiers and forty BC soldiers – all well-armed. They failed to locate McCARTHY and his men. Three times, until 25 August 1942, the boat of the Japs went to Malangas during the day to capture McCARTHY or at least discourage his organization and the town people against the Japs. Each night, however, the Jap vessel would return to Margosatubig, to avoid running into an ambush.

Kabasalan

A MELCHOR ALDE struck at the Japs at Kabasalan on 13 Sept 1942. The Japs managed to

escape but were later captured and killed by a member of the Siay guerrillas to which ALDE belonged. On that same day, McCARTHY and his men were on their way to Kabasalan to help the Siay group in their coup de etat against the Jap rule.

After the incident, the Siay guerrilla increased their strength. From 12-19 Sept 1942, the Siay guerrilla under the leadership of two brave brothers, CESAR and BENJAMIN BERENGUER, collected many firearms and rounds of ammunition from Naga-Naga and outlying barrios – both from Moros and Christians alike. JOVEN, the Jap overseer of Naga-Naga, having been informed of the overthrow of his government in Kabasalan fled to Margosatubig. When the men of BERENGUER and MC CARTHY reached Naga-Naga, the Japs were no longer there.

On 20 Sept 1942, the BERENGUER brothers and Kabasalan soldiers arrived in Malangas in the launch “Oboza” which they put into running condition after having captured it in Kabasalan. This trip was in response to McCARTHY’s request for help in attacking Margosatubig, and in capturing the Motor Launch “Chingkang”.

Before they reached Margosatubig, however, the “Chingkang” had already left on 12 Sept 1942 for Pagadian with ITO, the Jap overseer. Had ITO delayed he would have been caught in Margosatubig by the McCARTHY and BERENGUER guerrillas. However, on 13 Sept 1942, the fate that he ran away from Margosatubig awaited him at Pagadian where he was beheaded.

The combined MC CARTHY-BERENGUER guerrillas were met by a wildly cheering crowd upon landing in Margosatubig. Filipino and American flags were in evidence everywhere.

JOVEN, the Jap overseer of Naga-Naga who went to Margosatubig, and was left by ITO there with another Jap TACHINA, fled to the mountains. A certain L. BARBA who had been previously taken prisoner by the Japs – maltreated and robbed of his property, pursued the two Japs, found them in the interior, and killed them.

The last days of September and the first three weeks of October 192 ware used by the Siay and Malangas guerrillas to strengthen their positions, including that of Margosatubig.

On 22 October 1942, MORGAN and his Expeditionary Force arrived at Margosatubig. McCARTHY’s and the Kabasalan group under the BERENGUERS, were formed into the Malangas Sector, with Captain FRANK W. McCARTHY, commanding.

Curuan

PC, PS, PA and VG’s in Curuan, about forty six kilometers from the city of Zamboanga, formed themselves into the Curuan Cooperative Government which was ratified by the members and supporters on 21 Oct 1942. The activities of this government extended and branched out to the surrounding places, including Basilan and Sacol Islands.

Curuan,. Zamboanga (Danilo Paragas)

MORGAN’s Expeditionary Force arrived at Curuan on 15 Nov 1942. The Curuan Cooperative Government was then abolished and became the Curuan Sector under Lieut VIRGILIO C. ALARCON.

MISAMIS ORIENTAL

Himaya, El Salvador

In the early days of October 1942, Major MANUEL JALDON with a few officers and men having collected some arms and ammunition, formed a guerrilla unit at Himaya, a sitio in El Salvador, Cagayan. He issued a call to reservists and civilians to join in the renewal of hostilities against the enemy.

Malanang, Barra, Iponan

While JALDON was thus occupied, another unit was organized in the nearby sitios of Malanang, Barra and Iponan by Lieuts MARCELINO MAAGAD and MARCELO GEBE. The energetic push which these young men gave their work brought into their fold some thirty five men and thirteen rifles, one shotgun, two revolvers and some ammunition.

In the beginning these two officers were working independently but when they learned of each other’s existence and intentions, they decided to join forces. Having also heard of the activities of Major JALDON, these two young men reported to him on 15 November 1942, at Bolisong, Headquarters of the former’s unit, and placed their guerrilla bands at his disposal. JALDON assigned their unit to cover the Malanang-Barra-Iponan Sector. MAAGAD was designated as Commanding Officer.

On 26 November 1942, MAAGAD’s unit assisted by the now Maj FIDENCIO LAPLAP, attacked the enemy at Patag, killing seventeen Japs and suffering no casualty on their part. Maj LAPLAP was one of the USAFFE officers who hid in Talacogon and later, because of his good showing in combat, was made a Staff Officer by JALDON. This successful encounter at Patag encouraged other officers and men of the USAFFE in hiding, to join with JALDON’s outfit.

Nasagpian

Lieuts ARTURO CAMPO, NORBERTO JACALAN and OTONTEL COTEJO who were organizing a guerrilla unit at Nasagpian, also reported to Maj JALDON and thereafter fused with the Malanang-Barra-Iponan Sector, increasing the strength of this sector to about eighty eight officers and men.

On 28 Dec 1942, the Japs in a vengeful mood, attacked this sector. The attack was repulsed and the enemy withdrew with a number of casualties.

Pagatpat

In November 1942, another guerrilla unit was being organized at Pagatpat by Lieuts ANDRES BACAL and MARCELINO BARILLO. This began with only a handful of men but later expanded to about one hundred men and officers.

On 16-17 Nov 1942, the Japs attacked this sector intending to smash its defenders. They failed to push through and returned to Cagayan.

Taytay

At the time JALDON was organizing his units at Himaya, a small guerrilla band in Taytay was being created under the leadership of Lt ARACID HAMID. Later HAMID, like the others, reported to JALDON for duty, placing his small guerrilla units at JALDON’s disposal.

Initao

Maj ANGELES LIMENA was also organizing a unit of his own called the West Misamis Oriental Sector which occupied the area lying West of the Alubijid River. This in turn was sub-divided into Lugait Sector under Lt CONSTANTINO MEDADO, Naawan Sector under Lt CARLITO SUBANO, Initao Sector under Lt ANTONIO OGNIR. The Alubijid Sector was designated for command of Major FIDENCIO LAPLAP.

Balingasag

On 16 Sept 1942, twenty nine guerrillas of Balingasag, who had organized a week before, attacked a Jap officer, Capt OKAMORA, and two Jap soldiers who were living in the church tower. The Japs expected no trouble in Balingasag as a puppet government was already in existence. The guerrilla band was led by Lieut PEDRO D. COLLADO and Pfc CLYDE M. ABBOTT, USAC. Other leading members of the organization were EUTIQUIO CAPRIO, VICENTE MERCADO, PEDRO VALENCIA and AMBROSLO CASTINO.

Abbott Inspires Guerrillas

In this fight, SANTIAGO UBALDE, a guerrilla member, was killed. The exchange of fire between the Japs in the tower and the guerrillas below was continuous. The town priest was sent to the tower to negotiate for the surrender of the Japs, but they refused. CLYDE ABBOTT, in complete disregard of his own safety advanced and threw a lighted dynamite, but the explosive fell short of the tower. Then the guerrilla band decided to burn the church. This was done with dried coconut leaves and the burning led by ABBOTT himself.

When the church was on fire, the Japs jumped out, firing at the guerrillas as they attempted to escape. VICENTE MERCADO killed the Jap Captain and other members of the band killed the other two Japs.

The next day, two Jap launches, “Mambejona” and “Tito” approached the beach to land troops. They were repulsed by rifle fire from the guerrillas lining the beach. An estimated seventeen. Japs were killed in the launch “Mambajona”. “Tito” was too far off for effective firing.

Japanese attempts to retake Balingasag failed and day by day the guerrillas increased their strength in number, arms and ammunition. The town of Salay was included in the Balingasag Sector when CIPRIANO BEREGAY with some men went to that municipality on the 18th Sept to end the Jap puppet government there.

In Oct 1942, Lieut PEDRO D. COLLADO made a trip to Misamis, Misamis Occidental to report to Col FERTIG. Through COLLADO, the Balingasag Sector was then incorporated into the ever increasing Mindanao guerrilla organization. The spirit of unity which prompted these bands to join together for a common cause, without regard to personal glory, is one of the encouraging highlights of the early guerrilla organization.

Talisayan

Led by Pfc FAUSTO ORONDANG, PC, nineteen guerrillas took over the government of the Talisayan town the night of 19 Sept 1942. The puppet Mayor, FELICISIMO AGUILAR, was taken captive and the Jap overseer of the town was beheaded. The next day more men joined. The guerrilla band, leaving a few men in Talisayan, then proceeded to Gingoog and took that town on 20 Sept. Puppet officials were jailed. Then followed the taking of Kinoguitan. Camiguin Island consisting of the municipalities of Catarman, Sagay and Mambajao under Lieut MANUEL CORRALES and FELINO DONESA whom OMONDANG commissioned as Captain. OMONDANG’s headquarters was at Talisayan.

The OMONDANG unit however, showed a defiant attitude to the guerilla forces headed by Col FERTIG. Upon order of Lt-Col ERNEST E. McCLISH, then designated CO of the 110th Division which included a part of Bukidnon, all of Misamis Oriental, Surigao, Agusan and Davao Provinces, OMONDANG was disarmed and his men taken into the 110th Division. This was on 1 Dec 1942.

AGUSAN PROVINCE

Buenavista

The first guerrilla shot in the entire province of Agusan was fired in Buenavista.

2nd Lieut HILARION ANIASCO, PC and TIRSO GERONA, civilian volunteer, after organizing a small guerrilla unit, struck on 26 Sept 1942. A Japanese car on its way to Buenavista from Butuan to get fish and vegetables was ambushed near the road junction. Two Japs and one Filipino civilian guide were killed. The guerillas then took command of Buenavista, killing an additional five Filipino spy suspects in the interim. They then set up a guerrilla government.

The Jap garrison at Butuan, some fifteen kilometers away to the East, repeatedly attempted to retake Buenavista but were repulsed in a series of encounters. This guerrilla organization like many others grew in strength rapidly.

The Japs, a few days later bombed the town, destroying the Municipal Building.

Cabadbaran

Cabadbaran, under the leadership of Atty JOSE R. VILLANUEVA and 2nd Lieut BENJAMIN FAMADOR, escaped POW, also revolted. Early in Oct 1942, SINDAK, a Japanese hireling who had been terrorizing Cabadbaran for some time, was sent by the Jap High Command of

Butuan to Cabadbaran with two Filipino policemen to arrest the escaped USAFFE Filipino officers and the Cabadbaran Chief of Police. The guerrilla group under Sergeant GREGORIO VENCE, later Lieut, arrested SINDAK and his two policemen, confiscating their truck. The following day, SINDAK was killed.

Some days later, this guerrilla band swelled by the presence of Lt THOMAS R. BAXTER, later Capt; LT ROSAURO P. DONGALLO, later Major; Lt ALFREDO CAYTON, Lt PLENIO ATEGA and Sgt GREGORIO VENCE, fought a Jap patrol of undetermined number at kilometer four, Cabadbaran-Butuan road, inflicting some casualties on the enemy.

After this encounter, the DONGALLO brothers, THOMAS BAXTER and VICENTE ZAPANTA, who joined after the encounter, proceeded to Misamis Oriental on Zapanta’s banca and jointed Lt-Col McCLISH at Balingasag, then busy organizing the 110th Division. VICENTE ZAPANTA, later Major and his wife actively participated in the organization of the ll0th Division. ZAPANTA’s banca “Athena” was a great help in the water traffic of the command.

Two other early guerrilla leaders actively participating in the Cabadbaran guerrillas were CRUZ RANARIO, later Captain, and Atty TERESA CORVERA, intelligence agent.

Ampayon

Another group was formed in Ampayon by LOPE DESIATA, ex-policeman and joined Sgt LEON EBALLA, PC, now Lieut. This group later joined the Cabadbaran guerrilla command under the leadership of Lieut BENJAMIN FAMADOR, LT. PLENIO ATEGA, and Sgt GREGORIO VENCE.

Libertad

In Libertad was also another group under Sgt SALVADOR CIENCIA, now Lieut; Sgt DEMAFELIS, now Lieut; Lt. VICENTE CEMBRANO, now Capt. This group was led by Pvt GEORGE ABAPO, PS, 3rd Lt BENJAMIN PIA, TIRSO GERONA, civilian volunteer and 3rd Lt ARTURO LEONARDO.

Sometime in Jan 1943, KHALIL KHODR, Syrian miner, was chosen by the small guerrilla units which included that of Buenavista and Cabadbaran and the vicinity of Butuan, to head the movement. KHODR proved a good leader and organized a fairly large guerrilla unit. This unit later absorbed the guerrilla band in the Agusan River area headed by Lt LOU ROBERTON, Lieut ALFREDO CAYTON and that around Butuan led by Lieut CIENCIA. KHODR was subsequently made Captain.

Jagupit

A small band of USAFFE soldiers and officers organized a guerrilla group in Jagupit under the leadership of Lt CAYETANO SERRANO, Lieut ERNESTO RIVER (escaped POW) and Lt EDUARDO CURATO (escaped POW). This band later joined the forces in Cabadbaran.

Before the activation of the Agusan. guerrillas into the fold of the 110th Division under Lt-Col ERNEST E. McCLISH, there had been an attempt of various guerrillas to unify their command. One of these attempts was made in the conference’ held at Amparo. The guerrilla leaders present elected the following:

KHALIL KHODR was placed 2nd in command because it was intended that Colonel KANGLEON then confined in Butuan but definitely planning to escape was to head the united guerrillas in Agusan Section.

Chief of Staff             : 2nd Lt HILARION ANIASCO

G-1                              : 2nd Lt VICENTE CEMBRANO

G-2                              : Atty JOSE VILLANUEVA

G-3                              : Sgt (now Lt) SALVADOR CIENCIA

G-4                              : 1st Lt CELESTINO UDARBE (now Capt)

Fin Officer                  : Lt PLENIO M. ATEGA

Commanding Officer in the field  : Lt BENJAMIN FAMADOR

No Table of Organization was followed. The offices were simply created in the conference. But this plan was not carried out on account of the arrival of Capt WILLIAM KNORTZ, representative of Lt-Col McCLISH, on 30 Dec 1942. Capt KNORTZ immediately recognized the Agusan guerrillas and on 14 Jan 1943, the 112th Inf Regt (later changed to 113th Inf) was incorporated into the 110th Division.

THE BUTUAN SIEGE

From 3-10 March 1943, forces in the 110th Division composed of the Misamis Oriental guerrillas (110th Inf) and the Agusan units (113th Inf), a total of some 2,000 men, stormed the Jap garrison at Butuan and laid a siege for eight days.
McCLISH was assisted by Lt-Col CLYDE C. CHILDRESS; LUIS MORGAN and his expeditionary force; ROSAURO DONGALLO, CO, Division Special Troops; KHALIL KHODR, CO, 113th Inf; Capt CRUZ RANARIO, Division “M; Atty TERESA CORVERA, Woman guerrilla leader of Agusan; Lt CLYDE ABBOTT leading the 110th Inf troops.

More than half of the town was burned in the battle. The Jap remnants were finally driven to the Elementary School Building where they entrenched themselves and were about to surrender when Jap planes arrived and bombed and strafed the guerrilla attackers. This was followed by Jap reinforcements of some two hundred well-armed men from Cagayan. Jap casualties in this battle were estimated to be close to a hundred. Twenty men were lost on the side of the guerrillas.

Butuan was not taken but the attack demoralized the Japs who, sensing that their stay in Butuan was precarious, moved to Cagayan, Misamis Oriental on 28 August 1943.

This Butuan siege like that of Malaybalay was among the few determined attempts in the early guerrilla days to dislodge the enemy, however poorly equipped were the attacking forces.

SURIGAO PROVINCE

Masgad

A guerrilla force was organized here by MACARIO DIAZ,— Municipal Mayor of Surigao City who did not surrender to the Japs. DIAZ however, had only a few arms and a few rounds of ammunition. Some minor encounters between the DIAZ band and the Japanese took place around the area of Lake Mainit, particularly the Siana Mines. Some Japanese patrols from Surigao were encountered in hit-and-run attacks by the DIAZ guerrilla band.

OTHER GUERRILLAS

In Gigaguit and environs, Maj CEFERINO GARCIA, PC, organized another guerrilla band; SAMMY GOODE with a small following in Tago; JOSE McCARTHY at Tandays; Capt TOMANING at Lianga and other small guerrilla units were organized almost simultaneously in mid-Sept 1942.

These bands were loose and attempts to unite them failed. It was only when Capt WILLIAM KNORTZ was sent over to Surigao by Lt-Col McCLISH to organize a regiment that all the guerrilla bands were fused and united in June 1943.

Such Americans as Capts THOMAS BAXTER and ANTON HARATIK did a great job in initiating the organization of small guerrilla bands in Surigao and Agusan before KNORTZ arrived.

PAUL H. MARSHALL

This was to be the nucleus of the 114th Inf Regt of the 110th Division, – later strengthened and made a potent, powerful striking force under Maj PAUL H. MARSHALL, (later Lt-Col), former Sgt in the Army of the United States who escaped from Davao Penal Colony in the early part of 1943. He was assisted by Capt (later Major) ROBERT SPIELMAN who had escaped with Lt-Col MARSHALL from Davao, the latter’s Executive Officer. Lt-Col MARSHALL relieved McCLISH as CO of the 110th Division on 22 Jan 1945. His unit was instrumental in driving the Japs from the Surigao-Agusan North area previous to the landing of American Forces on Mindanao.

DAVAO PROVINCE

Laureta’s Guerrilla Band

Lt-Col CLARO LAURETA, then Captain, USAFFE, did not surrender to the Japs in Davao, but instead moved to the interior and organized a guerrilla band of his own and firmly resisted the Japs. He was formerly CO of the Camp Victa Co, PC, Davao.

Lt COL CLARO LAURETA (MacArthur Memorial)

His original group consisted of about forty soldiers of his former command. He maintained his guerrilla unit along the Lubuganon River and enforced law and order in the settlement of some 4,000 civilian evacuees from Davao City. This was in the very early days after the surrender. The guerrilla band soon drew other soldiers.

Later minor guerrilla chieftains like Lt PEPITO in Saug; Lieut NAVARRO with some thirty men in Compostela, joined LAURETA.

Seventy Five Japs Killed

Even before the surrender and as early as 1 May 1942, LAURETA’s unit intact after the disintegration of the Fil-American Forces in the Davao Sector, waged guerrilla warfare against patrols and small enemy garrisons. At 5:00 PM on 1 May 1942, Lieut NAPOLI, one of LAURETA’s officers, with some soldiers surprised the Japanese garrison at Pagsabangan. The enemy suffered a loss of seventy three men killed including eleven Moros, and many wounded. The guerrillas had one man wounded.

On 15 May 1942, an enemy patrol of forty men under Lieut MORI was encountered at Barrio Mabaud, near Pagsabangan. MORI and a Jap soldier were killed. The guerrillas suffered no loss.

On 1 June 1942, at 10:00 AM, an advance guard of a unit of 250 Japs was encountered by the guerrillas in Barrio Magatos, Kapalong. Ten Japs were killed. No guerrilla casualties.

Simultaneously, the guerrilla outpost at barrio Talomo encountered a Jap contingent, part of a unit of 250, and after a brief exchange of fire, five Japs were counted dead with no casualties on the guerrilla side.

On 18 Sept 1942, a Japanese patrol of seven men searching for a Jap crashed plane in barrio Camoning, two kilometers from the guerrilla camp, was completely wiped out and their arms and ammunition were appropriated by the guerrilla attackers.

Cambanogoy Encounter-Two Japs Killed

On 10 December 1942, an enemy patrol of forty men clashed with a guerrilla patrol of an inferior number at barrio Cambanogoy. The Japs retreated, leaving behind two of their dead.

The LAURETA guerrilla band, in the face of overwhelming enemy superiority ~Japs in Davao calculated to be no less than fifty thousand men during that time – remained intact throughout the guerrilla period and continued to harass the enemy and to keep the civilian population united except in the heavily garrisoned Jap areas.

Mati-Manay  

JOVITA PEDRAYA, Sgt, USAFFE, took command of about 200 men formerly under Capt ASIS, his former Commanding Officer who was killed after he tried to force his men to surrender to the Japs. This was in June 1942. The territory occupied by the PEDRAYA group

lay in the east coast of Davao and included Mati and Manay. This group was later made into the 111th Provisional Battalion under the 110th Division with Lt OWEN P. WILSON commanding and PEDRAYA, Executive Officer.

Cateel-Lingig

Small guerrilla units were formed in Cateel and Lingig under Lt TEODULFO VILLARIN. These also were later absorbed in the 110th Division but did no active fighting until Capt ANTON HARATIK took command in the latter part of 1943. Then small encounters were

initiated with the enemy. This unit formed the nucleus of the 112th Provisional Battalion.

SULU AREA

On 24 Dec 1941, the Japs invaded Jolo and easily overcame the PC forces garrisoned there. The remnants of the dispersed PC forces formed the nucleus of subsequent guerrilla groups. There is very little to record on their activities.

Tawi-Tawi  

When the war broke out, the PC Commander in the Tawi-Tawi area was 1st Lt ALEJANDRO PRESPECES. After the surrender, he was forced to move with his force of thirty armed men to Bato-Bato, due to inadequate supply of food and supplies.

Lt ANTON TAN, a school teacher and Reserve officer in Jolo, was with the Jolo USAFFE Force in December 1941. When the surrender came and the troops dispersed, he went to Sibutu to join the guerrillas.

Another guerrilla unit in the Tawi-Tawi area was led by “Colonel” TOME BITENG. Very little is known of this organization but it is believed that BITENG is an ex-USAFFE officer from Panay whose outfit is concerned mostly with shipping rice to North Borneo and profiteering on sugar trade between Negros and the Sulu islands. He kept his connections with the Panay guerrillas and was encouraged by them to seek an independent command, He never did cooperate in effecting the unification of guerrilla units in the area. He expressed willingness to take instructions from FERTIG’s Headquarters but did not report when requested to do so.

SIASI-JOLO AREA

Capt LUIS. P. MORGAN and his Expeditionary Force arrived in the environs of the City of Zamboanga sometime in mid-November 1942. He desired to organize the Sulu guerrillas

so he sent for Lt ABDUL-RAHIM IMAO, a Jolo Moro, who at the time was at Zamboanga. A guerrilla unit was organized at Siasi in December 1942, under Lt IMAO.

On 25 Dec 1942, the newly formed unit attacked the Siasi Jap garrison, capturing thirty rifles. In ear1y January 1943, the Jap garrison attacked the Siasi guerrillas but failed to disrupt them.

In the meantime, contacts were made with other guerrilla leaders all over the Siasi-Jolo area and in time the following sectors were organized:

Siasi Sector                             – Lt Komgldm Tio

Tawi-Tawi Sector                   – Lt Alejandro Prespeces

Silangkan (Jolo) Sector           – Lt Abdulrahim Imao

Maimbung (Jolo) Sector         – Lt A. Ali

Karunglang (Jolo) Sector        – Lt E. Agga

Lusuk (Jolo) Sector                 – Lt A. Datiles

Taglibi (Jolo) Sector               – Lt Ballesteros

Bilaan (Jolo) Sector                – Capt Arolas Tulawie

Since the surrender, the Japs stationed only a small garrison in Jolo. The guerrilla activities in the sector confined the Japs to Jolo town until mid-1943. At that time, the Jap garrison was reinforced and temporarily disrupted the guerrillas.

LTC. ALEJANDRO SUAREZ

In January 1943, Lieut-Col ALEJANDRO SUAREZ who escaped from the Japanese custody in the Mindanao mainland, returned to Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, and unified the various guerrilla units operating independently in the province. He later commanded the 125th Infantry Regt assigned to cover that sector.

Source: History of the Mindanao Guerrillas by the American Guerrillas of Mindanao (AGOM) Unpublished Manuscript

PAGHANDOM: Immortalizing the Legacies of Kagay-anon Media Pioneers

“One of the most fundamental freedoms accorded to citizens like us who live in a democratic country is the freedom of speech and of the press.” (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr.)

For the first time ever, the pioneers of Cagayan de Oro’s Press and Broadcast media were honored in a ceremony held fittingly enough, on the 83rd Araw ng Kagitingan (April 9, 2025).

Rep. Rufus B. Rodriguez (2nd District, Cagayan de Oro) delivers his keynote address. (RMB)

“We sought to recognize and honor the pioneers and trailblazers in the Cagayan de Oro press, emulate their dedication, and inculcate the values of objectivity and fairness to the present Cagayan de Oro media,” said Rep. Rufus B. Rodriguez (2nd District, Cagayan de Oro) who created the multi-sectoral committee composed of veteran journalists, academe, and prominent civic leaders which selected the posthumous recognition for the selected nominees honored during the program dubbed PAGHANDOM: Immortalizing the Legacies of Kagay-anon Media Pioneers which was also the title of a book launched on the same occasion.

“As a son of Cagayan de Oro and its duly elected Representative in Congress, I am honored to finally launch of PAGHANDOM, a project that is close to my heart—a tribute to the pioneering journalists of our beloved city,” Rep. Rodriguez remarked during his Keynote Address.

“When I first formed the Congressional Committee on the Cagayan de Oro City Pioneer Media Awards, our mission was clear: to give long overdue recognition to the men and women of media who shaped the social and cultural fabric of our city through their courage, conviction, and commitment to the truth.”

The Congressional Media Pioneer Awards Organizing Committee gives a thumbs up with Rep. Rufus B. Rodriguez
(photo by Kyla Marie Ibarra, CDO 2nd Congressional District Office)

“Our journalists have been storytellers, watchdogs, educators, and historians. Their voices have echoed through decades of trials and triumphs in Cagayan de Oro-through war, dictatorship, disaster, and recovery. Yet, sadly, many of them have not been properly remembered.”

“This is why we worked hard to document and publish a book that tells their stories-stories of sacrifice and perseverance, of triumphs and advocacies, of the pursuit of truth despite the odds. This book honors the contributions of our media pioneers, etching their legacies into the very fabric of our city’s history.”

“It contains not just names and achievements, but stories of courage, inspiration, and resilience that deserve to be told and remembered. In this journey, we honor the early torchbearers of our city’s press-to name a few, pioneers like Ramon, Felino, and Vicente Neri, who laid the foundations of local journalism; Bienvenido Cruz, Henry and Reuben Canoy, whose voices helped shape public discourse; Serafin Benaldo and Ben Emata, who pushed the boundaries of storytelling through broadcast media; Proculo Maslog, a pillar in media education; and of course, the late Senator Aquilino “Nene” Pimentel Jr., whose journalism intertwined with public service stood hand in hand in defense of democracy. Their legacies serve not only as inspirations but also as a call to carry the torch of the freedom of expression forward.”

After a thorough field work bannered by Xavier Ateneo through English Dept Head Dr Ferdinand Cantular, and Pilgrim Christian College through Dean Annabel Nambatac, Mr Jeff Baconga, Mr. Ardizon Arsua, and Mr. Ryan B. Sanchez, 18 candidates for radio, 2 for TV, 7 for publishers and 13 for writers and columnists were classified with the assistance of the Cagayan de Oro Press Club Board of Trustees headed by President Froilan Gallardo.

Also cited with a special recognition were the ten pioneer/charter members of the Cagayan de Oro  Press Club, considering the seminal role this organization played in the formation of a vibrant and working press in the then infant city of Cagayan de Oro on November 11, 1951.

Not the least, special recognitions were also  for  Outstanding Performers by media category with two for broadcast TV, four for broadcast radio, four for print publishers, three for print columnists, and two for print writers.

Robert de la Serna, son of Lorenzo de la Serna. (RMB)

“I thank Congressman Rufus Rodriguez and the Congressional Committee on Cagayan de Oro Pioneer Media Awards for initiating this recognition. Known for championing local pride—from our rich history to the people whose quiet stories have shaped our communities—this gesture from his office honors not just my father, but all those who believe in the power of public service through words–in print, radio, and tv. This morning, I accept this award in behalf of Lorenzo de la Serna and all honorees—with deep pride, and the echo of my father’s typewriter still guiding me,” said Robert dela Serna, son of Lorenzo de la Serna in his message of acceptance.

“On July 1, 1903, my great-grandfather, then Governor of Cagayan de Misamis, established a printing press and newspaper firm called Ang Katarungan on what is now Tiano Bros. Street—still known today as the printing press lane of the city. It became the pioneering Spanish and English weekly newspaper in Mindanao. It survived war and dictatorship printing 4000 copies during its height in the 1930s,” reflected Lawyer Ernesto Neri, great grandson of Vicente Neri San Jose.

Atty. Ernesto B. Neri receives his great grandfather’s Plaque of Recognition from Rep. Rufus B. Rodriguez. (RMB)

“Reflecting on this event, I realize that although I never had the chance to meet them, my grandfather and great-grandfather somehow spoke to me through the bulky, oily, and often dangerous printing machines in the basement of our house, where I used to play as a child.”

“Today, those memories have surfaced a new meaning. Those aren’t just phased out remnants of a past. It serves as an object that reminds me of the power of the written word—how it can shape minds, spark change, and, in doing so, ensure that a society remains free. As long as it is wielded on behalf of the truth.”

Cover photo: The families of the awardees take a memento for posterity with Rep. Rufus Rodriguez and Family, City Vice Mayor Bebot Rodriguez, Atty Dionel Albina, Mr Alfonso Alamban, and members of the Media Pioneers Awards Committee. (photo courtesy of the 2nd District Congressional Office, Cagayan de Oro City).

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New PHIVIDEC IA Investor to boost exports, employment, agri output for Region X

Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental, Philippines — The recent signing of a lease agreement by a Thai-owned, Hong Kong based with the PHIVIDEC Industrial Authority (PHIVIDEC IA) is expected to significantly transform the country’s largest industrial estate and Region X.

PhilCo Food Processing, Inc. (PhilCo), an affiliate of the Thai World Group of companies, signed a 20-year agreement with PHIVDEC IA on April 11, 2025 at the PHIVIDEC-IA Complex to lease a 39,596 square meter greenfield lot within the PHVIDEC Industrial Estate-Misamis Oriental (PIE-MO) in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental. With an initial rental of PHP 6.335 million per year, escalating 5% annually, this investment underscores the Philippines’ growing appeal as an industrial hub.

“This signing is a game-changer for PHIVIDEC and Northern Mindanao,” said Atty. Joseph Donato J. Bernedo, Administrator and CEO. “PhilCo, as part of the Thai World Group, brings world-class expertise that will create over 1,000 direct and 1,500 indirect jobs, uplifting local communities and coconut farmers.”

Pending its Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) registration, PhilCo is wholly-owned by Lucky Force International Limited, a Hong Kong entity under the Thai World Group, led by Thai executives Sakaoduan Amornpura (President) and Buncha Punyatanakorn (Business Development Manager).

“As an affiliate of the Thai World Group, PhilCo is proud to partner with PHIVIDEC and PEZA to launch this sustainable, export-focused venture. This investment reflects our confidence in the Philippines as a strategic base, leveraging Thai World Group’s legacy in agricultural innovation,” PhilCo’s principals shared.

PHIVIDEC IA Administrator & CEO Atty. Jose Donato Bernado with PhilCo Director & Business Development Manager Buncha Punyatanakorn

The agreement includes Lucky Force as a co-lessee and guarantor until PhilCo secures its SEC registration, ensuring financial continuity. “This collaboration showcases the power of international investment to drive local prosperity,” Atty. Bernedo noted. “It’s a testament to the synergy between Thai enterprise and Philippines potential.”

The company aims to establish a cutting-edge facility to produce 78,000 tons of ultra-high temperature (UHT) coconut milk annually for export. PhilCo plans to source 500,000 mature coconuts daily from Northern Mindanao farmers, bolstering the region’s agricultural economy. Construction is slated to begin by October 2025, with commercial operations targeted between December 2025 and January 2026.

The project aligns with the Philippine Economic Zone Authority’s (PEZA) approval on March 28, 2025, granting PhilCo six years of Income Tax Holiday (ITH) and other tax incentives under the CREATE MORE Act.

Since assuming office as PHIVIDEC IA as its Administrator and CEO, Atty. Bernedo and the PHIVIDEC IA team have rolled out essential utilities, support services, and key infrastructure needed to ensure the smooth and efficient operations of their various enterprises.

Mindanao Container Terminal yard. (Photo from Mindanao International Container Terminal Services, Inc).

Foremost among these is PHIVIDEC IA’s flagship Mindanao Container Terminal (MCT) MCT Phase II expansion project which will double MCT’s berth length from 300 to 600 meters that will expand MCT’s container volume handling capacity or utilization rate from its current 350,000 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) which was already exceeded in 2020, to over 2 million TEUs annually, with the expanded 900 meter quay, and at least eight ship-to-shore gantry cranes. 

Another key initiative is the Bulk Water facility which is now undergoing construction. The initial phase will benefit 30-40 % of  the 59 locators and 200 service providers within the 3,000 hectare PHIVIDEC Industrial Estate-Misamis Oriental. Once its dams are completed, it can extend its services beyond the estate to nearby municipalities, to as far as Cagayan de Oro City.

A key social service is the Pambansang Pabahay para sa Pilipino (4PH) Housing project within the estate at Zone 3, GK, Brgy. Sta Ana, Tagoloan, a joint project with the Department of Human Settlement and Urban Development (DHSUD) that aims to make 3,000 to 4,000 affordable housing units for qualified beneficiaries including Informal Settler Families, PHIVIDEC-IA employees, retired AFP Veterans, PHIVIDEC-IA locators, local communities, and interested individuals who wish to avail themselves of the housing program. The first of its 18 residential buildings is now under construction will have 20 residential units in each of its 12 floors.

Not the least, PHIVIDEC-IA is ramping up road expansions and maintenance this year to provide smooth transport and operations for its locators, and would also soon install a waste management facility to provide an environmentally friendly solution to the estate’s waste disposal concerns.

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With Metropolization, SM Investments Exec lauds CDO economy as ascendant gateway to Mindanao

CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY- The Chief Executive of a top Philippine company in the Forbes Global 2000 and the country’s largest in terms of market capitalization, recently lauded Cagayan de Oro’s economy and location as it  grows into the fourth metropolitan center based on its projected population growth and functional role as a major gateway and transshipment hub in Northern Mindanao.

Frederick C. DyBuncio, President & CEO, SM Investments Corporation (Pio Baconga)

In his keynote speech during the March 28, 2025 1st Quarter General Membership Meeting of the Cagayan de Oro Chamber of Commerce & Industry Foundation, Inc. (Oro Chamber), Mr. Frederick C. DyBuncio, President & CEO of SM Investments Corporation and the 2GO Group, Inc., cited how “Cagayan de Oro is at a critical juncture in its development, and remains an ideal foothold for many companies, including those within the SM group.”

SM Investments Corporation (SMIC) a.k.a. SM Group, is a Filipino conglomerate with interests in various sectors, mostly in shopping mall development and management, retailreal estate development, banking, and tourism.

Publicly listed in 2005, it has become one of the largest conglomerates in the Philippines, being the country’s dominant player in retail with 4,470 retail stores nationwide, consisting of department stores under the SM Store; specialty stores; SM Supermarkets; SM Hypermarkets; SaveMore, Alfamart and Waltermart stores..

Chinabank SM City CDO Uptown Branch

The Company is engaged in property development SM Prime Holdings, Inc. and financial services through BDO Unibank, Inc. and China Banking Corporation.

Mr. DyBuncio is also  the Chairman, President/Chief Executive Officer of 2GO Group, Inc., and Chairman of Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation.

“Furthermore, according to the National Economic Development Authority, geography will play a key role in accelerating development in this area. This is a very exciting time for the region, and it highlights the pivotal role that Cagayan de Oro will continue to play as a thriving business and investment hub in the coming years,” he stressed.

Logistics Hub

As demand for cold chain and ISO tank solutions continues to rise, he said Cagayan de Oro remains integral to 2GO’s operations, with shipments from CDO accounting for nearly 30% of 2GOs total ISO tank and flexibag cargo, consisting of food ingredients, additives, industrial chemicals, and compounds.

Additionally, hatching eggs and poultry meat from CDO made up another 15% of the group’s  northbound cargo—figures that reflect the city’s growing importance in their expanding network, he added.

Cagayan de Oro presents an ideal atmosphere for businesses to flourish in Mindanao due to an assertive retail trade, growing manufacturing sector, robust motor vehicle industry, and an expanding service and hospitality sector.

“Your growing economy is considered as 2GO’s biggest shipping hub in Mindanao. SM’s one stop shop logistics solutions provider currently operates 4 times weekly voyages between Cagayan de Oro and Manila, as well as twice weekly service to and from Cebu, and is the only passenger-cargo operator plying the Cagayan de Oro-Manila route with one of the most modern and fastest vessels in the Philippines.

“With the challenges of being an archipelago, a reliable supply chain is very important for traders and consumers in order to optimize product shelf life. Moreover, a strong transportation and logistics partner empowers local businesses and industries to move goods and people efficiently and conveniently,” he said.

Mindanao Railway

On top of the Cagayan de Oro Baseport and the Mindanao Container Terminal (MCT) in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental being Mindanao’s premier platforms, Cagayan de Oro is also undergoing greater connectivity especially with the railway system in the pipeline that is designed to link the industrial and commercial centers in northern Mindanao and provide connection to the two ports, the Laguindingan International Airport (now undergoing expansion under a Public-Private Partnership with Aboitiz InfraCapital), and the 3,000 hectare PHIVIDEC Industrial Estate, the Philippines largest.

Currently, the Tagum-Davao-Digos segment (Phase 1) has already secured government funding, while the Laguindingan-Cagayan de Oro-Villanueva, Misamis Oriental segment (Phase 3) has received approval for a feasibility study.

The Villanueva-Cagayan de Oro-Laguindingan-Iligan Airport Railway System has been a long-standing advocacy of Rep. Rufus B. Rodriguez (2nd District, Cagayan de Oro) since the 14th Congress in 2007. In 2009, he secured P60M for a Feasibility Study which was completed in 2010. In Sept. 2023, DOTr Secretary Jimmy Bautista approved P100 million from the Public-Private Partnership Center Project Development and Monitoring Facility (PDMF) Committee for the pre-feasibility study completed last July 2024. The final FS is now underway and once finished, construction of the project will start. A pre-FS for Phase III-A from Laguindingan Airport to Iligan City will then be funded and likewise pursued.

“There are high hopes pinned on this project as it entails the construction of passenger railway stations, cargo terminals, maintenance depots, operations control centers, and connections to seaports and commercial areas”.

Consumption Growth and Social Good

The rising population and degree of economic activity in Cagayan de Oro is also spurring growth in consumption. Local purchasing power has been evident in the growth in car sales, home ownership, urban development and education-related developments.

 Providing access to modern retail, SM has two malls in Cagayan de Oro—SM City CDO Uptown and SM CDO Downtown which has a BPO Tower, an event hall and a water catchment underneath as part of disaster resilience efforts. 

Mr. DyBuncio also revealed how there is growing demand from Filipino home-seekers in Cagayan de Oro as shown by the performance of Vail Residences, developed by SMDC, its residential property arm.

“SMDC is looking at another phase of Vail Residences which reflects the vibrancy in economic activity in the metropolis,” he added.

Digital Learning Hubs 

Not the least, Mr. DyBuncio disclosed how Macasandig Elementary School, which was the 85th school building of the Foundation, has been equipped with 20 computer desktop sets and LCD monitors to provide students with the opportunity to develop their digital skills through hands-on experience with various computer programs and tools through  SM Foundation, SM Retail, and Mastercard.

 SM For All

In closing, Mr. DyBuncio said SM Investments recently marked their 20th  anniversary as a publicly-listed firm, and he continues to take part in SM’s journey towards inclusive growth.

“Coming from humble beginnings, our founder, Henry Sy sought a better life for his family and the community he became part of. This is the same vision that drives SM today.” 

“Through our foundation, we collaborate with the communities we operate in to uplift lives of underprivilege individuals, championing education, healthcare, agriculture and contributing to disaster relief efforts when needed.  Our core business in retail, banking and integrated property developments, together with our portfolio investments continue to support job creation and MSMEs across the country.”

“Our brand promise, “WE’VE GOT IT ALL FOR YOU,” has served us well for years. But as we move forward, we aim to build an SM FOR ALL—one that reaches and benefits every Filipino, ensuring that our growth is shared by all across many generations.”

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