Organizing the Civil Government

16 February 1943

Before the normal processes of government could be established over Mindanao, Col WENDELL W. FERTIG believed, and rightly so, that military governments must be set up, to prepare a firm ground upon which civil authority could stand and steadily function.

On 16 Feb 1943, Col FERTIG issued a proclamation establishing, in behalf of the United States of America, the Commonwealth of the Philippines in those areas under military control.

Civil government has been progressively established in those places where the guerrillas were organized.

Directors Of Civil Affairs

The Commanding Officer, 10th Military District, directly administered the civil affairs of all the different provinces, seeking advice from his Judge Advocate General and Staff on legal matters, and from the Director of Civil Affairs whose office was created later on the different provinces and who also served, in addition to other duties, as Liaison officer between the Army and the civil government. The following were the Directors of Civil Affairs for:

Davao              )
Agusan            ) — Mr. P. A. PELAYO
Surigao            )

Misamis Oriental — Mr. JOSE VALDEHUEZA

Misamis Occidental    )
Zamboanga                 )– Mr. FLORENTINO SAGUIN

Bukidnon —     Mr. CARLOS FORTICH

Cotabato —      Mr. M. A. CONCHA

On 10 Oct 1944, however, Col FERTIG ordered the abolition of the office of the Director of Civil Affairs in the province of Zamboanga, Misamis Oriental, Misamis Occidental, Surigao, Agusan and Davao, with the exception of Lanao, Cotabato and Bukidnon, which were abolished at a much later time when conditions obtaining therein justified the action.

Governors

Agusan was placed under the military control of the 110th Division since its activation on or about 20 Nov 1942. Senior Board Member JOSE AZOTE was designated as Acting Governor of this province by the Guerrilla Command. The other officials subsequently chosen were:

Board Member ———–         JOSE P. SATORRE

Provincial Treasurer —–        QUIRICO BATTAD

Provincial Auditor ——-        FERNANDO ORONDEZ

District Engineer ——–         PASTOR LOZADA

Acting District Health
Officer —-                               Dr. GALO FRANCO

Acting Division Superin-
tendent of Schools —–           BERNARDINO CARINO

Acting Provincial Fiscal —    GABRIEL BANAAG

Provincial Agronomist —-     PEDRO ROSALES

During the incumbency of JOSE AZOTE as Acting Governor, the seat of the government was in the interior of Buenavista. In the later part of 1943, Mr. JOSE ROSALES was installed as Governor of the province in place of JOSE AZOTE.

The Japs left Agusan on 28 Aug 1943, but came back in large numbers onin 15 Mar 1944, occupying one after another, Nasipit, Buenavista, Butuan, Cabadbaran and environs. The civil government officials, in the intense enemy mopping-up operations that followed, surrendered one by one. The guerrillas arrested the erring officials sometime in the later part of 1944. They, however, were released and reinstated due to the lack of men to take their places, but this action was without prejudice to the subsequent filing of charges against their when the Commonwealth Government shall have been restored.
In Surigao, on 1 August 1943, the Commanding Officer: l0th Military District, appointed Mr. PHOTCLICO EGAY as Acting Provincial Governor. The following were the other civil officials of the province:

Secretary to the Governor —–           Mr. T. J. GERALDINO

Acting Provincial Treasurer —–        Mr. FELIX ALA-AN

Acting Asst Prov Treasurer ——-      Mr. T. APARICIO

Acting Provincial —–                        Mr. G. LAURENTE

Acting Cashier & Deputy —–           Mr. G. GALEON

Acting District Engineer —–                         Mr. V. TIZON

Acting Asst District Engineer —–     Mr. JOSE EGAY

Acting District Health Officer —–     Mr. N. BUENDIA

The following were the Mayors of the different municipalities as appointed by the Commanding Officer, 10th Military District:

Mayor of Bacuag —–                         Mr. JUAN ALVARES

Mayor of Bislig —–                           Mr. SEMON MONTERO

Mayor of Cantilan —–                       Mr. JOSE ARREZA

Mayor of Carascal —–                       Mr. PATRICIO CASTRO

Mayor of Dinagat —–                        Mr. LORENZO BAURA

Mayor of General Luna —–               Mr. JOSE GONZAGA          

Mayor of Gigaquit —–                      Mr. TIMOTEO OMAY

Mayor of Hinatuan —–                      Mr. CANDIDO VIOLA

Mayor of Lanuza —–                         Mr. SERIO VETE

Mayor of Lianga —–                         Mr. SATURNINO PATERNO

Mayor of Lingig —–                          Mr. G. SILVOSA

Mayor of Loreto —–                          Mr. ANDRES OLACO

Mayor of Mainit —–                          Mr. ROSALEO MONGADO

Mayor of Numancia —–                    Mr. RICARDO PLATIL

Mayor of Placer —–                           Mr. MARCELO PATAGAN

Mayor of Surigao —–                        Mr. JUAN ALOYON

Mayor of Tago —–                             Mr. TOMAS PAREJA

Mayor of Tandag —–                        Mr. JAIME SERNA

In the province of Misamis Oriental, a civil government was also established. Due to the presence of the enemy along the Bukidnon-Misamis Oriental National Highway and capital town of Cagayan, the province of Misamis Oriental was divided into Eastern and Western portions.

Reynaldo Y. Abejo with some Japanese Officers, taken at Pacana St. Puntod, Cagayan de Oro during the Japanese Occupation.- (Photo shared by his son-in law Francisco Acero Daclag Jr).

The civil government of Western Misamis Oriental which covered the sector from West of Tagoloan River to the boundary of Misamis Oriental and Occidental was organized by virtue of the instructions issued by Col FERTIG on 11 Dec 1942.

Pedro Sa. Baculio.

PEDRO Sa. BACULIO was proclaimed the Military Provincial Governor. The Deputy Provincial Governors for the Eastern and Western Misamis Oriental were VICENTE B. DE LARA and FRANCISCO G. YSALINA, respectively.

In Misamis Occidental, ANGEL MEDINA, former Board Member, was appointed as Acting Governor in place of PORFIRIO VILLARIN, pre-war Governor, who had served under the Japanese government and at that time in Manila. Most of the provincial officials, whether elective or appointive, were restored to their respective positions by the Commanding Officer, 10th Military District.

In Lanao, the civil government started with the appointment on 18 Nov 1942 of Mr. MARCELO T. PAISO as Military Governor by Col FERTIG. This designation was changed to Provincial Governor on 1 Mar 1943. The temporary seat of the provincial capital was located at Kauswagan, Iligan. Pre-war Mayor LEO GARCIA of Iligan, having surrendered to the enemy, was replaced by JORGE RAMIRO on 13 Nov 1942. Seat of the government was at Dalipuga. RAMIRO was later relieved by PEDRO FORTUNADO. When about to assume office on 28 Nov 1943, FORTUNADO was captured by the Japs at Tuminobo. NARCISO ADEVA, the Provincial Secretary succeeded him temporarily on 1 Dec 1943. ADEVA later asked for relief, so he was succeeded by AQUILINO GONZAGA.

On 1 Dec 1942, DATU SAMPIANO was appointed Mayor of Free Malabang, pre-war Mayor NAGUIB JUANDAY having surrendered to the enemy. DATU SAMPIANO later also surrendered to the enemy and so PANANSARNA COMMANDER was appointed to succeed him on 24 Feb 1944. Unfortunately, PANANSARNA was killed during  the enemy action in the encounter at Wawlan, Calibao, on 8 Mar 1944.

On 1 Dec 1942, Pre-war Mayor RIGA MAMBUAY who did not surrender to the enemy assumed his post. The rest of the civil officials appointed were:

Chief, Lanao Public Hospital —–                  Dr. ALIPIO VILLACORTA

District Land Officer —–                               ALEJANDRO ORDONA

Chief, Malaria Control Unit #4, —–

Bureau of Health —–                                     Dr. GAUDENCIO R. VILLANUEVA

District Forester —–                                       ANGEL C. LALLONGA

Edward Kuder (seated) with the young Salipada Pendatun, 1927. Courtesy of Phillipines Free Press

Division Superintendent of

Schools —–                                        EDWARD M. KUDER

In Zamboanga, the civil government continued to function even after the  surrender on 10 May 1942 with the seat of the government transferred to  Dipolog from Zamboanga City. The Japanese installed Acting Governor FELIPE AZCUNA as Chief Executive of the province. However, on 18 Sept 1942, the guerrillas seized the local government in Dipolog and reestablished the Commonwealth Government therein.

On 7 Oct 1942, Judge FLORENTINO SAGUIN was appointed by the guerrilla high command as Military Governor. Judge SAGUIN, however, was relieved at the end of the year 1942 to become DCA for Zamboanga and Misamis Occidental and congressman-elect MATIAS RANILLO was appointed Provincial Governor. The other officials appointed by the military authorities were:

Board Member —–                             GUADALUPE ADAZA

Provincial Treasurer —–                    LAZARO ALFABETO

Provincial Fiscal —–                          LEONCIO S. HAMOY

Acting District Health Officer —–     DR. PABLO S. HAMOY

Acting Provincial Auditor —–           IRINEO BARBASA

Acting District Engineer —–             J. PULIDO (Asst Civil

Engineer)

Acting Provincial Agricultural

Supervisor —–                        SIMEON ESTOCAPIO        

Secretary to the Governor —–           FLORENTINO A. CAD

Major Waldo McVickers

In Bukidnon, Lieut WALDO MCVICKERS (now Major), with a handful of men, seized the local puppet government of Talakag on 29 Oct 1942, and re-established the local Commonwealth Government. Dr. CARLOS A. FORTICH was then appointed Governor of Free Bukidnon with the seat of government at Mailag.

The other officials appointed for Free Bukidnon were:

Board Member —–                                         LOPE DAMASCO, Acting Governor for
sometime; TITO MACAYABAS, later
replaced by AMANDO NOBLE

Acting Provincial Treasurer —–                    Dr. FELIPE O. CEBALLOS, later
replaced by GUILLERMO TABICS

Provincial Auditor —–                                   SANTIAGO MACEREN, surrendered
                                                                        to enemy and later replaced by
                                                                        RAMON FERNANDEZ

Acting District Health Officer —–                 DR. CORAZON A. CID

District Engineer —–                                     ANTOLIN F. DIAZ

Acting District Engineer —–                         ENRIQUE GUERRERO

Provincial Secretary —–                                CIRIACO ALVAREZ, replaced by
FELIPE CEBALLOS, JR.

Provincial Agricultural

Supervisor —–                                    FERNANDO TORRES

Deputy Governors —–                                   CENON PAULICAN for Maramag,
Kibawe and Pantukan, later surr-
endered and served the puppet
government; MELECIO ALQUITELA for
Tankulan, Libona, Talakag, Imbatug
and Malitbog

Special Deputy Governors —–                      CECILIO LUMINARIAS,
ALIPIO URBINA, CATALINO DAMASCO

Asst Prov. Treasurer —–                                ALFREDO R. ESPLANDADA

Justices of the Peace —–                                JESUS MURILLO for Talakag and
Acting for Imbatug, Maluko,
Libona and Sumilao.
Judge DELFIN ROFILENA (Davao
City). Acting for Malaybalay

Local governments established in ail municipalities and municipal districts were placed under the 109th Division, except the municipal district of Malitbog which was placed under the 110th Division. However, due to enemy offensive on the last days of Oct 1943, in the area garrisoned by the 117th Infantry Regiment, where the seat of the free government was located, the civil government was disrupted. On account of the difficulty in getting a civil government function, the CO, 109th Division on 15 February 1944, issued a proclamation declaring that part of the province under a state of martial law.

Major TEOGENES VELEZ, Staff Judge Advocate, was designated as Military Lieutenant-Governor, in addition to his duties as SJA, 109th Division. A sub-provincial board was made of the Lieutenant-Governor as presiding officer and the sub-provincial Treasurer and Deputy Governor as members thereof.

The following were the officers of the sub-province:

Sub-Provincial Treasurer———– CECILIO ESCALERA

Sub-Provincial Auditor————- RAMON FERNANDEZ

Secretary to Governor————– ENGRACIO MELENDEZ

These sub-provinces however, were abolished on 6 Dec 1944. The civil government, after this was reorganized with the seat at Talakag and later due to Japanese attack of that place, the seat was moved to Taglimao, municipal district of Lumbia, Misamis Oriental, to which the Division Headquarters was transferred.

In the province of Cotabato, the provisional civil government was organized with the following officials appointed by the Headquarters, 10th Military District:

Governor —–                                     M. A. GENCHA, also designat-
ed as Director of Civil Affairs.

Board Members —–                           TOMAS MANAWIS
JOSE L. GUERRERO

Acting Treasurer —–                         TOMAS FALGUI

Acting District Engineer —–             CAYETANO MACARAIG

Acting Provincial Fiscal ——            FRANCISCO ALTEA

Acting Provincial Auditor —–           LEONCIO ALDAWA

Division Superintendent of

Schools ——                          JOSE HOMBREBUENO

District Health Officer ——               DR. JUANITO NATIVDAD

The local governments were reestablished in guerrilla areas as fast as conditions permitted.

The unsurrendered USAFFE men who settled in some of the municipalities of districts restored the local government officials. In the municipal district of Manay for example, (north of Davao City) the old Mayor surrendered to the enemy and had been killed, so Mr. E. MAPAYO, a resident of this district, was elected as Mayor.

Major Claro L. Laureta (MacArthur Memorial Archives)

It is worthy to mention that Atty. BONIFACIO JAMIRO, Deputy Governor-at large of that sector, did his best to restore local officials of his districts. This was made possible with the help of Major (now Lt-Col) CLARO L. LAURETA, then the Regimental Commander of the 130th Infantry occupying the Davao Sector.

In the later part of 1943, the two made possible the organization of the local government of the following districts, with Mayors appointed who were then temporarily appointed, later concurred in and approved. by the Commanding Officer of the 10th Military District:

Monkayo ——     

Mr. FELICIANO CERVANTES – Mayor
Mr. RAMON CABALUNA – Deputy
Governor for both Monkayo
and Compostela

Compostela —–                                  Mr. JUANITO REGANIA – Mayor

Cateel —–                                           Mr. GREGORIO DACUYCUY

Caraga —–                                          Mr. LORENZO CALIBARA

Manay —–                                          E. MAPAYO – Mayor

Baganga —–                                       Mr. RICARDO REYES – Mayor

Mati —–                                             Mr. PRIMITIVO GABONG

Camansa —–                                      Mr. BARTOLOME PACLAING – Mayor

The Provincial Government Officials composed the following:

Provincial Governor —–                    Mr. PANTALEON PELAYO

Deputy Governor-at-large —–           Mr. BONIFACIO JAMIRO

Deputy Governor of West Coast —-  Mr. RAFAEL SANTOS

Acting Provincial Fiscal —–              Mr. MARCELO BOLANDRES

Acting Provincial Auditor —–           Mr. MIGUEL BORDEOS

District Engineer —–                         Mr. MARCELINO PAYOMO

District Health Officer —–                 Dr. BENITO ENRIQUES

AGRICULTURE:                                The war brought about keen struggle forexistence. Agriculture was

given more attention.

In Agusan, rice, corn, vegetables, camote, etc., were planted in the cultivated forest areas. Even sago flour, which very few people used to take and only in time of famine, became a much sought-for food.

But unlike other provinces of Mindanao, Surigao never suffered the shortage of food supply. Under the supervision of Mr. PANTALEON DE LOS REYES, who was appointed as Provincial Agriculture Supervisor, land cultivated for rice and corn, increased by three thousand hectares, making the total 35,000 hectares.

In Misamis Oriental and almost all provinces occupied by the guerrillas, Army Communal Farms were under cultivation. These were cultivated by civilians in the so-called “pagina system”. All the produce were for the Army.

Evacuees were permitted to cultivate abandoned parcels of land and to them went the produce. Short-season crops were produced intensively, in spite of unfavorable weather conditions during the period from Feb 1943 to Nov 1944, food shortage occurred due to heavy flood in free Cagayan which cost the lives of forty-seven persons and the loss of approximately 200 to 300 cavans of rice and corn in 1943. Locust infestation in Jun 1943 in Free Cagayan and the municipal district of Lumbia, destroyed approximately sixty percent of the standing crops.

In Zamboanga, farming suffered a great set-back during the period from June to November 1942 due to the heaviest and most destructive locust infestation. Almost all the palay and crops were destroyed by the pests. Intensive locust campaign was undertaken. After that calamity, came plague of rats, crop eating birds, insects and worms, as damaging as the locust infestation. The rice situation was very alarming; that of corn was less terrible. Not until the year 1944 was the situation very much improved.

In Misamis Occidental, agriculture suffered the same fate as that of Zamboanga – crops destroyed by locusts and rats. Small portions of lands were cultivated in this province.

In Lanao, most of the arable lands along the northern coast of the province and along the Illana Bay were abandoned. Most of the Christian inhabitants in these places sought refuge in Misamis Occidental and other safe places to escape Moro banditry, and because of Jap invasion, food problems became more acute. Farmers stopped farming and way to get food from the outside was barred by the pressure of the enemy. When flood occurred in the Mandulog District and Eastern Free Iligan farms were laid waste and several human lives lost.

In Bukidnon, before the war, cattle industry was flourishing, but this was virtually wiped out. People, like the other provinces above mentioned, sorted to agriculture going to the limit of cultivating forest areas. Same thing was with Cotabato except that there was shortage of food, mostly because of little harvest in view of the fact that the enemy was able to get hold and cart away a big part of what was harvested, coupled with the destruction occasioned by the existing emergency.

In Davao, food was the problem of each and every one, Army and civilians alike. The people who evacuated in the virgin forests, just as the people of other provinces, began clearing the forest for camotes, bananas, taro, etc. Rice and corn were planted, later. Later the food production campaign was started, extended and intensified.

Commerce and Industries

In the provinces of Agusan, Surigao, Oriental Misamis, Occidental Misamis and Zamboanga, merchants frequented the market place to sell their goods and commodities.

Business was retail. Articles sold were rice, corn, soap, salt, fish, sugar, vegetables and other foodstuffs. Slow-moving bancas were used by them in plying between Agusan and the Visayas. Productive industries consisted in the manufacture of tuba, nipa wine and nipa shingles. Weaving industry was lucrative.

In Lanao, periodic trips were undertaken by trades from Bohol, Negros, Siquijor, Cebu and Camiguin, bringing in sugar, clothing, dried and salted fish, some medicine, and other stuff. On their return, they brought with them, rice, corn and other foodstuffs, lacking in their places. Normal trade relations existed between Lanao and Misamis Occidental. This trades relation, however, between these two provinces and from other islands in the Visayas, were at times paralyzed due to active enemy patrols, both by land and sea. The Japs had the practice of hooking away the sailboats encountered at sea, confiscating the cargo, and making prisoners of the crew. Because of this, business declined and later, markets and retail stores were closed. Then sudden rise of the prices of commodities inevitably followed.

Unlike the other provinces above mentioned, Cotabato and Davao whose coastal areas had always been occupied by the enemy, and Bukidnon which is very far away from the coasts, could not fully well survive in inter-island commerce.

Salt and fish for example, are hard to obtain. Native cloth “pinocpos” and “saguran” derived from buri palm, which were brought in by some bancas from other provinces, were hard to secure. Some inhabitants however, were depending on selling the rice and corn or tobacco which they planted, although most of the time, could hardly be the basis of their commerce due to the fact that the Japanese at times, find time to lay their hands on the produce.

Price Fixing & Anti-  Profiteering Committee

Due to the enemy occupation of the Philippines, importation and exportation were at standstill. Profiteering became rampant in Mindanao especially in Agusan, Surigao, Misamis Oriental and Misamis Occidental, Zamboanga, Lanao, Bukidnon, Cotabato and Davao.

For the benefit of the civilians especially and the army as well, Col FERTIG ordered the creation of the Provincial Emergency Control Board or the so-called Price Fixing and Anti-Profiteering Committee, for each province occupied by the Army and which was empowered to fix, control and determine the retail and wholesale prices of all goods, including foodstuffs within the province.

This Board consisted of the Provincial Governor as Chairman; the Provincial Treasurer, Division Superintendent of Schools, Provincial

Auditor and District Engineer as members. In every province, severe penalties were imposed on violators. However, due to absence of policemen at the time this body was created, Unit Commanders of the Tenth Military District were given authority to enforce the orders promulgated and adopted by the Board. Considerable benefits were derived in its activities by the suffering public.

However, due to the lack of supplies which actually existed that time, and basing on the hardships, sacrifices and risks in obtaining them, control of prices could hardly be made effective. In view of this and to solve this problem, the Food and Supply Administration was created.

This body was given P250,000 with which to operate and was charged with the intensification of food production and diversification of crops; dealing in rice and corn and other prime commodities during the emergency; controlling the supply to prevent profiteering; maintaining warehouses and rationing stock according to local demands; exercising a legal personality in the making of and entering into contracts and the promulgating of such regulations as to effectuate its authority. This, at least ameliorated the condition of supply and at least helped in the control of prices.

The Trading Post Administration (TPA)

The Trading Post Administration was created to meet the economic and social needs of the civilian population during the emergency; to stabilize the prices of commodities of prime necessity: to promote the development of local industries; to serve as a market for the produce of the people; to extend help to the needy; to serve as rehabilitation centers during and even after, the emergency. This Post, however, deals in buying the produce of the farmers and selling the same with no more than tea percent profit on every sale for overhead expenses and handing, and at ration basis.

In the province of Agusan, were two branches in Butuan, two in Buenavista, four in Cabadbaran, one in Nasipit and one in Jabonga. The manager of which was Governor JOSE ROSALES. In this province, The Trading Post Administration was started with an initial capital of P10,000.00. The province of Misamis Oriental started with an initial capital of P5,000.00 and managed by Mr. PRIMO SANTIAGO with its central office opened on 13 Oct 1944 at El Salvador, Tagnipa. Branch was in Cagayan-Alubijid-Initao area. Misamis Occidental had its central office at Calamba, Plaridel. This was managed by Mr. ROXAS.

Just like the three aforementioned provinces, Lanao Province had its own TPA with stores established et Baroy, Kolambugan, Bacolod, Kauswagan, Tangub and Dalipuga with Central Office at Kauswagan. This was managed by Congressman SALVADOR T. LLUCH.

Unlike the above named provinces, Surigao, Zamboanga, Bukidnon, Cotabato and Davao, did not have this TPA established. However,

stores similar to the TPA and the aim of which is the same – to ameliorate the living conditions of the people – were established. Some had the Trading Center and others had the so-called Communal Stores established which actually helped the public a lot.

Peace and Order

Peace and order, locally, during the guerrilla movements in the above-named provinces, was not a serious problem. Peace and order was maintained by the Sector Commanders with the organization of the regular guerrilla units, until later aided by the municipal police when the latter assumed their duties.

Justice of the Peace Courts were later appointed in some of these provinces by the Commanding Officer of the 10th Military District, although most of the offenses committed being between Army personnel and civilians. Prison compounds were maintained by Army authorities.

However, none of these provinces had been exempted from the state of confusion and disorder when frequented by enemy patrols or mopping-up operations.

Public Health and Sanitation

In all these provinces of Mindanao occupied by the Guerrilla Forces, many people suffered from malaria, which ranks first among all other sickness, and tropical ulcers due to lack of medicine, clothing, proper nutrition and scarcity of food supply.

In the province of Agusan, sixty percent of the people were either actually sick with malaria or had the disease in its latent stare, and many succumbed to the disease due to utter lack of medicine.

In the Province of Surigao, death rates were very high in almost all the municipalities and its surrounding areas. The government and Army, seeing the death rate very high, resorted to the establishment of the District Health Office on 1 Oct 1943. This greatly extended help to the civilian populace.

The same disease and sufferings were then prevailing in the provinces of Misamis Oriental, Misamis Occidental, Lanao, Bukidnon, Zamboanga, Cotabato, and Davao.

All efforts and necessary measures, however, were exerted in all these provinces to fight the disease – surroundings and houses were kept clean and sanitary.

It was not until the early part of 1943, when medicine began reaching this island from Australia, that a semblance of a rising barometer was noted in – the health condition in these provinces. Health conditions became ameliorated, some of the medicines that arrived having been given to the provinces mentioned above.

Education

Education during the guerrilla days were practically abandoned. The enemy was busy patrolling in many areas so that opening the schools was risky. An attempt however, to open schools in the provinces of Agusan, Surigao, Misamis Oriental, Misamis Occidental, Lanao, Zamboanga and Bukidnon, was made. The services of teachers was purely voluntary. These schools did not function fer a long time because of enemy action.

Civilian Relief Administration

To carry into effect the spirit of the telegraphic instructions of Gen MANUEL ROXAS, dated 8 Apr 1942, concerning relief work, The Civilian Retief Administration was created. The continuation of the relief was considered absolutely necessary to aid the needy who were unable to gain their own economic support. Congressman EUGENIO S. DEL ROSARIO of Misamis Occidental, was made the Director of Civilian Relief Administration by Col WENDELL W. FERTIG.

Later the position of the Director of Civilian Relief Administration was abolished. However, the Provincial Retief Committees provided for in the instructions of General ROXAS dated 8 Apr 192 continued to function as relief agencies. It had the sole power to authorize the disbursements of relief funds. In each province the Provincial Relief Committee, was composed of the Provincial Governor, as Chairman; the Provincial Treasurer, Provincial Auditor, Division Superintendent of Schools and District Engineer, as members.

In the province of Agusan, for lack of funds, application for relief filed in 1943 were acted upon only in March 1944.

Fr Edward James Haggerty SJ was known to the Mindanao Resistance during World War II as the Guerrilla Padre. (Jesuit Archives through Ramoncito Ocampo Cruz)

In the province of Misamis Oriental, Father HAGGERTY, Civilian Relief Administration Representative, distributed cash benefits which were extended to wives and children of soldiers killed or missing in line of duty, and to all others entitled thereto.

In the province of Lanao, there were 182 beneficiaries, sixteen were civilian indigents, and ‘the rest were families of soldiers. Fifty-nine of the 293 dependents were children of the civilian indigents. Due to lack of funds, many beneficiaries have not been paid regularly since November 1943. In the rest of the provinces, beneficiaries had not also been paid due to the same reason — lack of funds.

Source: History of the Mindanao Guerrillas by the American Guerrillas of Mindanao (AGOM), Unpublished Manuscript

Financing The Mindanao Guerrillas

16 September 1942

For a period of five months immediately before 16 Sept ivk2 when the movement of rearmed resistance began and rapidly gained momentum all over Mindanao, the provincial and municipal coffers were practically empty.

The financial problem, however, could not be side-tracked. The issue had to be met squarely. In the beginning, this problem solved itself in the form of voluntary contributions in cash or in kind, in the extensive and intensive food-production program; in the commandeering of equipment, foodstuffs and other supplies backed up with the official announcement that every item taken by the Army would be paid for and, finally, the printing of Emergency Currency Notes which paved the way for the stabilization of the economic life of the people.

Immediately after the surrender of the USAFFE in Mindanao on 10 May 192, the retreating unsurrendered USAFFE officers and men who found their way into Misamis Occidental, were taken for rations in a temporary camp at Barrio Guba, Clarin, where the provisions for soldiers were stored. When the supply was almost exhausted, instructions were issued to the men to return to their respective homes. Excepted were the personnel of the lst Company, PC, Misamis Occidental,

These movements were made upon orders of Maj FABIAN B. MEJIA, PC, Provincial Inspector for Misamis Occidental at the outbreak of the war. Major MEJIA did his best to alleviate the deplorable condition into which the unsurrendered officers and men were thrown.

Men Without Funds

Many of the soldiers and officers came from Luzon, Visayas and some from Mindanao. How were they to reach their homes in the absence of necessary transportation facilities? Most of them did not have any clothes except the tattered ones on their bodies. Most of them were not paid just before the surrender. Consequently, they had no money to spend.

They asked Maj MEJIA that they be paid their salaries for a month’s period at least, that of April 1942. The Provincial Inspector did not object to making payments provided proper vouchers were accomplished. The amount available was, however, inadequate, The situation of the men was so tight that they even went to the extent of going from house to house in order to get something to eat.

And then, a new turn of events developed – robberies and thieveries. The Provincial Civilian Retief Administration (CRA), a pre-war government entity, helped to remedy this deplorable state of affairs. Part of its funds was then allotted for the chartering of sailboats to return the officers and men residing of the Visayas and Mindanao to their respective home areas.

Then came 16 Sept 1942. Unsurrendered officers and men who had been laying low in the mountains and civilian volunteers from all walks of life including the men from the professions, flocked to the recruitment stations. The number of recruits increased to unexpected proportions and then, came the big question: How should the organization be maintained, especially in the matters of feeding the troops?

No Immediate Pay Assured

The militia Organization in the provinces of Misamis Occidental and Zamboanga were organized in the latter part of September 1942 into the Occidental Misamis-Zamboanga Sector with Maj MEJIA as Sector Commander. His greatest problem was the garrisoning of the different places under his sector and furnishing the men the necessary needs. These men were made to understand that there were no available funds as yet to pay them, and no steady supply of food with which to feed them. That the services they were performing were voluntary, at least for the present – although they could have plenty to expect in the future.

Major MEJIA, under instructions from FERTIG, disapproved the Commandeering of foodstuffs and other supplies. But despite the precaution taken, commandeering took its course and with it all the attendant evils.

Civilian Cooperation Sought

MEJIA called into conferences all the prominent people of the province of Misamis Occidental and caused the holding of community assemblies. Through these media, the people were informed of the sad state of the local treasuries and the imperative necessity of resorting to voluntary contributions in the form of cash or in kind. They were made to understand that the Army must be fed, if it must be expected to succeed at all. In clear, unequivocal terms the purposes and aims of the organization were stressed, the fight against the Japs and the suppression of lawlessness emphasized.

The point was well driven home; the people responded favorably. Committees were created in all towns composed of municipal mayors, municipal treasurers, secretaries, councilors and other influential persons. Voluntary contributions were properly receipted for by local persons and turned over to the municipal treasurer who in turn delivered the receipts to the corresponding army authorities. As the guerrilla movement grew, the same methods of appeal to the masses and manner of collection were adapted.

Emergency Notes Printed

In some municipalities in Mindanao, local governments printed very crude emergency notes in small denominations as medium of exchange the circulation of which was valid only within confines of the municipalities printing and issuing them. The purpose was served all right. The notes were in due time collected and put out of circulation.

One of Col FERTIG’s first acts when he assumed command of the Mindanao guerrillas was the activation of a section that was to take charge of the finances of the organization. He asked Capt CALIXTO DE LEON, an unsurrendered PA officer, later made Lt-Col, to organize it. Capt DE LEON set himself to the task.

Pay Scale Adopted

Capt. DE LEON organized a Finance Section but at that time, in the beginning, the only disbursement of funds authorized by the Commanding Officer was the payment of cash advance allowances to the officers and men effective as of 1 Oct 192, per GO #1-3, par 3, dated 14 Nov 1942:

Officers

Majors & Field Grades           – $150.00 per month

Captains                                  – 100.00 per month

lst Lieuts                                 – 80.00 per month

2nd Lieuts                               – 70.00 per month

3rd Lieuts                                – 60.00 per month

Enlisted Men

Master Sergeant                      – 20.00 per month

First Sergeant                          – 18.00 per month

Technical Sergeant                 – 18.00 per month

Staff Sergeant                         – 15.00 per month

Corporal                                  – 12.00 per month

Private 1st Class                     – 11.00 per month

Private                                     – 10.00 per month

Later the Commanding Officer authorized the payment of $ .20 to each man per day for the purchase of viands and $ .25 for the purchase of rice or corn, Total for viands and rice or corn was later increased to $ .70 per man a day.

Voluntary contributions from the civilian population was finally stopped on 11 May 1943 by virtue of Circular #70, issued by Col FERTIG on which occasion he publicly thanked the loyal citizens who voluntarily and generously gave what they could for the maintenance of the soldiers.

Funds Allotted For Projects

Besides paying the cash allowances and cash rations for the officers and men, the Finance Officer disbursed funds, as specifically authorized by the Commanding Officer. Among these were the expenses entailed in the construction of an airfield, commonly known for security reasons as farm projects, the maintenance and operation of distilleries for the manufacture of oil and alcohol; and the operation of land and water transportation.

By 1943 the guerrilla movement in Mindanao had assumed an impressive magnitude in organization. Col FERTIG felt the time had come to make it imperative that money should by 211 means be printed. The growing undertaking, already attaining astonishing headway must be sufficiently and soundly financed.

The imminence of defeat before the time of surrender to the Japanese led the Philippine authorities to burn a great many of Philippine Treasury

Notes. Hence the USAFFE forces, especially those in the Visayas and Mindanao, were unable to receive monetary assistance from the outside. So it was necessary that President QUEZON issue an order to print Emergency Currency Notes for the various Visayan and Mindanao provinces. Consequently, President QUEZON authorized the printing of Emergency Currency Notes sometime in January 1942.

Money Printing Problems

Several provinces therefore were ordered to print currency notes usually in small denominations to relieve the situation they were confronted with. In the provinces there was very little equipment for printing. The principal center of the printing industry was Cebu and Mindanao. The supply of paper, printing ink and types were limited. There was no instructions for a uniform design and the only available photoengraving equipment outside of Manila was in the City of Cebu where the cuts for the Cebu Emergency Currency Board were made.

It was the plan to furnish Visayas and Mindanao with the currency notes issued by these Emergency Currency Boards.

A uniform water-marked paper was made by the Bais Paper Mills, Negroes Oriental, especially for the work. This paper was used by the Cebu Emergency Currency Board and the Mindanao Emergency Currency Board during the short time these boards functioned – that is, before Cebu was taken by the Japs in April and Mindanao in May 1942.

Jap Military Notes Circulated

Before the guerrilla forces occupied various areas in the Visayas and Mindanao, the Japanese Military Notes were being circulated along with the old Philippine Treasury Notes. This was the policy which was enforced by the Japanese Military Authorities.

The Japenese Military Notes were derisively called “Mickey Mouse Money” by Filipinos since they looked like play money.

All Philippine Emergency Currency was confiscated whenever possible by the Japs and those found with the Emergency Currency Notes were severely punished.

The guerrilla forces issued orders prohibiting the circulation of the Japanese Military Notes. It was therefore necessary in some localities that civil authorities issue emergency currency. This was done in some cases by means of amateurishly-made rubberstamps, wood engravings and printer’s type.

Philippine Emergecy Notes from a private collection. (RMB)

The emergency notes printed were small denominations such as ®.05, P.10 and R.20, They were printed by means of small printing press, typewriter or were mimeographed or with the simple use of hand stamp. In some provinces like Misamis Occidental, the balance of the unprinted and unspent money authorized to be printed by President QUEZON, were printed and circulated.

Emergency Note Printing Restricted

On 27 Mar 1943, Lt-Col FERTIG, by virtue of the authority vested in him as Commanding Officer of the Tenth Military District, by the Commanding General of the US forces in SWPA, issued a proclamation whereby he revoked the authority granted by the Provincial Boards of all provinces in Mindanao embraced in the Tenth Military District, to print Emergency Circulating Notes. And by the same authority, he revived the Mindanao Emergency Currency Board.

As the former members served the enemy or could not be located, it was necessary to appoint new members and these appointments were confirmed by the President of the Philippines on 10 Apr 1913, The members were composed of Judge FLORENTINO SAGUIN, Chairman; F.D. PACANA, Provincial Treasurer of Misamis Occidental and I. BARBASA, Auditor of the same province.

Currency printed by this board was legal tender and hence accepted in circulation throughout the guerrilla-occupied areas in Mindanao and in certain areas in some of the Visayan provinces. This relieved the tight financial situation. The emergency notes were circulated at par with the old Philippine Treasury Notes. Counterfeiting existed but in very negligible scale. Every effort was made by the Tenth Military District to curtail this evil.

Quezon Authorizes Twenty Million Pesos

President QUEZON authorized the printing of emergency notes in the amount of twenty million pesos and this amount was about covered in the subsequently printed emergency notes. Metal coins were practically out of circulation. The owners either hid them or if not, the Japs confiscated them.

MGen Romeo Alamillo (Ret) now the National President of the Veterans Federation of the Philippines (VFP) discusses with Philippine Veterans Affairs Office Usec. Reynaldo Mapagu how the guerrillas of the 109th Infantry Regiment based in Lapad, Alubijid (present day Laguindingan) were financed by Chief Food Administrator Pastor Ilogon. (RMB)

The money needed by the Army and the existing provincial and municipal governments of Mindanao and Sulu for their expenses were advanced by the Mindanao Emergency Currency Board with the prior approval of the Commanding Officer of the Tenth Military District.

To lessen and minimize the expenses in running the local governments, municipal and provincial positions which were not absolutely necessary and could very well be dispensed with, were simply not filled in. Aside from this, only one-half of the salaries were paid, with the understanding that claims for the unpaid balance may be collected later under proper claims.

This arrangement was later modified and the paying of salaries was based on a table of graduated scale. No kick was registered as even the Tenth Military District personnel were receiving comparatively much less than the government employees.

Finance Officers Appointed

 As sufficient funds became available, Division Finance Officers were designated in the different divisions then created whose duty it was to handle the finances of their respective divisions, and much later, each regiment designated its own finance agent officer.

In January 1944, the “A” Corps, Western Mindanao, was established consisting of the 105th, 106th, 108th and 109th Divisions. Lt-Col DE LEON remained as the Force Finance Officer while Maj BENJAMIN B. MERCA was designated Corps Finance Officer. In October 1944, a Force Auditing Section was organized headed by Lt SCHMEIKES and later by Lt S. S. SALVACION. This section was abolished in April 1945.

On 31 Mar 1945, the “A” Corps was abolished. Lt-Col CALIXTO DE LEGON was relieved as Force Finance Officer and assigned as Liaison Officer between the Headquarters Tenth Military District and the province of Sulu.

Before the President QUEZON left the Philippines in March 192, he created two central emergency currency boards – one in Cebu for the Visayan provinces and another in Dansalan, Lanao, under the name of Mindanao Emergency Currency Board or MECB.

First members of the MECB were Commissioner TEOPISTO GUINGONA, as Chairman; Mr. UBALDO D. LAYA, Provincial Treasurer for Misamis Oriental, and Mr. T. ALAGABAN, Auditor for the province of Lanao. This board functioned in Dansalan, Lanao, for about a month only, due to enemy invasion of Mindanao during the latter part of April 1942.

LAYA, under orders of General ROXAS, left Dansalan for Misamis Oriental on 1 May, 192. His place in the board was temporarily taken over by the Municipal Treasurer of Dansalan, JULIAN ABERILLA.

MECB has difficulties

Events happened after 1 May 1942. On 2 May 1942, the Japs occupied Dansalan. Information received by LAYA from SAM J. WILSON when they met in Talakag, follows:

WILSON from the Headquarters of Gen FORT at Bubong, Lanao, was to contact General ROXAS at Cagayan, but could not do so due to the blasting of the Cagayan bridge just when WILSON was about to cross it. The latter said that the MECB records, supplies and a few pieces of its equipment including a hand cutting machine, as well as some printed and numbered but uncut notes of RP 2,00 denomination had to be hurriedly evacuated from Dansalan in the dead of the night on 1 May 192 by truck toward Tamparan, Lanao, under the charge of DONATO DACUSIN, Treasurer of Sulu, who acted as Executive Officer and Secretary of the MECB. DAGUSIN was murdered by the Moros while on the way to Tamparan on or about 5 May 1942. WILSON who furnished this information did not make any mention as to what happened to the funds in the hands of DACUSIN. It was presumed however, that the money was taken by the Moro criminals.

The MECB resumed functioning for the first time at barrio Matugas, Misamis Occidental from 5 April 1943 to 26 June 1943 where a total of   P 3,021,520.00 were printed.

The MECB encountered many hardships during its existence. The intense enemy patrols to locate the mint – and so the transfer from one place to another of the press and other printing paraphernalia – the dismantling, setting up and dismantling again – lack of food – sickness suffered by the personnel.

Yet somehow, the MECB acquitted itself more than creditably, doing wonderfully we1l in turning out the much-needed currency notes to finance the gigantic undertaking of running an Army of some 33,000 officers and men and of alleviating the conditions of the people of Mindanao as a whole.

Total economic collapse and disintegration of the guerrilla forces was definitely avoided.

Invasion by the enemy on 26 Jun 1943 of the province of Misamis Occidental caused the transfer of the printing outfit to Liangan, Lanao, where it began to function from 5 Sept 1943 to 1 Nov 1943; turning out a total of P2,689,00.00. At this time, Mr. UBALDO D. LAYA, former member of the MECB was requested by Col FERTIG to join. He reported on 5 Sept 1943 and immediately took charge of the work and supervised the printing.

Press Called “Rice Mill”

The printing press was called the “rice mill” to maintain secrecy. It was located at the edge of a forest. About it, Col FERTIG, in a personal note to Commander JOSEPH WILLINGHAM, USN, dated 18 Sept 1943, wrote:

“Our mint consisted of a small nipa shack in a cornfield, md I believe that it is probably the most unique mint now functioning under the supervision of the government of the United States.”

The Liangan site considered insecure, another transfer was effected, to Upper Agusan, this time up the Agusan River. In Esperanza, Agusan, printing started 13 Dec 1943 to 25 Jan 1944, where a total of P4,970,630.00 was turned out.

Enemy Seeks Mint Destruction

Enemy pressure caused transfer again to Loreto, Upper Agusan River, where work was resumed 15 Mar 1944. On 5 Jul 1944, for the first time the personnel of the mint discovered that printing money, though legally, was not at all heathy. Enemy planes swopped down, bombed and strafed Loreto. The first bomb hit and destroyed the personnel quarters of the mint; the second bomb fell on an empty house in front of the office building; the third fell way out of town and the fourth fell on the river bed just in front of Loreto. There were no casualties, however,

Total amount printed at Loreto up to 25 Oct 1944 was P3,651,445.00.

Total amount printed at Matugas, Liangan, Esperanza and Loreto up to 25 Oct 1944 – P44,342,995.00.

Students taking a closer look at the emergency notes issued by the Free Philippines Government based in Oroquieta, Misamis Occidental in 1942. (RMB)

In Oct 1944, negotiations were made to set up “a branch printing press at Dipolog which was imperative due to increased enemy pressure in the province of Agusan and vicinity. This was also made to have the “A” Corps some accessibility to the mint. The press of ANGEL SOTTO was rented.

The work began in Sent 1944 un to April 1945, Over P7, 000,000.00 were turned out by this mint.

The printing of Philippine Emergency Currency is a Philippine Government undertaking. No army officers and men were employed with the exception of Lt-Col SAM J. WILSON who acted as technical adviser and liaison officer of the Philippine Government and the Tenth Military District.

Inflation Dangers

The subject of finance is interwoven with the economic problems which beset the guerrilla movement. Efforts were exerted to minimize the increasing difficulties of living, by rigid control of adverse economic factors.

Inflation of prices in the free areas. Sky-high prices of commodities of prime necessities was partly controlled by the organization of the Food Supply Administration on 23 Dec 1942 and the Trading Post Administration organized later, both under the control of the Director of Civil Affairs for the province concerned. The primary purpose of the FSA was the distribution of food and commodities to the civilian population at a reasonable and fair price by control of supply and distribution.

The personnel employed was granted limited police powers to enforce compliance with regulations issued by the Administration. A1l officers of the USFIP and the military police were required to assist in the performance of their duty. In order to coordinate the efforts of the FSA and

the USFIP, Capt LEON GATMAYTAN, former Superintendent of Schools for Misamis Occidental, was assigned on detached service with the Tenth Military District, as General Manager.

The FSA was authorized to buy all imports and to control the exports, In no case were exports allowed to get into enemy-occupied areas.

Trading Posts Established

The primary purpose of the TPA was the establishment of trading posts in each municipality to encourage the distribution of food to the consumer at a limited profit. Efforts were exerted to control the prices of the prime necessities of life like rice and corn.

Much later the FSA and TPA were entirely severed from all connections with the USFIP and made an entirely civil government undertaking. Mr. GATMAYTAN continued as its General Manager.

The workings of these organizations were far from perfect and their efficiency not faultless. Yet these entities had supplies and civilian population with food within their limited reach, and had saved the Army hundreds of pesos in the purchase of food which otherwise would have cost much more.

Farm Projects Sponsored

Community farms and Victory Gardens, poultry and hog raising projects, sponsored by the Army and civil officials, were intensified everywhere. In spite of the. presence of plant pests and animal diseases; floods and drought, and on top of it active enemy patrols which seemed to have conspired together during a period of turmoil and distress, the products produced improved the food situation impressively and led to the lowering of prices.

Carabao sleds, carts, sailboats and launches were some of the means utilized in the transportation of foodstuffs from one place to another. In two or three sectors, trucks were used but only for short distances as most of the roads and bridges were unserviceable – either blasted purposely in the early days of the war or destroyed by action of the elements, and never repaired.

Home Industries Encouraged

In all places, the civil government waged a campaign directly supported by the Army for the development of home industries.

Weaving was encouraged. Cloth was manufactured from cotton, ramie and abaca fiber. Finished products were in great demand which, of course, could not be met because of the limited production. Cigarettes, crudely manufactured, substituted for American brands – though a poor substitute, were in big demand. The biggest handicap was the lack of paper.

Salt, soap, coconut oil, and alcohol from tuba were produced in sufficient quantities to supply civilian and army needs. The intensified stimulus for the production of food products included the tending of home gardens, and the employment of unarmed soldiers in Army farm projects. It is consoling to note that even during the dark days, Mindanao had been able to share food with the adjacent areas in the Visayas, like Leyte, Cebu and Bohol.

INFLATION NO CONCERN OF JAPS

The enemy did nothing to check the rise in prices of commodities. The circulation of Japanese emergency notes in unlimited quantities and absolutely worthless, caused the sky-high rise of commodities.

At one time, the price of one cavan of palay was reported to have been no less than P1,000.00 in Cagayan and a little less in other Jap-held towns. The currency of the Japs was never accepted in the free areas. Yet, as the free areas were immediately outside the Jap-held towns, the inflation therein affected the guerrilla-held territory.

No Taxes Collected

Due to intensive enemy activity and the subsequent unstable factors affecting the living conditions of the people, little attempt was exerted by the civil government to collect any taxes, except in some cases in internal revenue tax collection on tobacco and market fees which, of course, is not worth mentioning.

Troop Morale Stimulated

The landing of the American Liberation Forces under Gen MACARTHUR on Leyte on 20 Oct 1944, closed the darkest period in the Philippine History.

Executive Order Noe 22, issued in Nov 1944, by President SERGIO OSMEÑA, published a new schedule of pay and allowances for officers and men of recognized guerrilla organizations. This had tremendous effect on raising the standard of living of the soldiers and officers, those who had spent three years in indescribable hardships, fighting the enemy in jungles end plains, rivers, lakes and seas; leaving family and other loved ones behind. This order raised the morale of all the people.

This, however, was not actually followed. Executive Order of the President dated 10 Mar 1942 was made effective. And so beginning 17 Apr 1945, the day American Forces started the Mindanao Campaign of Liberation, the officers and men have been paid in Philippine Treasury Certificates, commonly known as Victory Notes. The following schedule of salaries was followed:

Officers

Quarters

Rank                            Annual Pay                             Monthly Pay                           Allowance

Major General             P16,000.00                              P1,333.33                                P200.00

Brigadier General         12,000.00                                1,000.00                                200.00

Colonel                           8,000.00                                   666.67                                 200.00

Lieut-Colonel                  7,000.00                                   583.33                                 200.00

Major                              6,000.00                                   500.00                                 160.00

Captain                            4,800.00                                   400.00                                 140.00

1st Lieutenant                 4,000.00                                   333.33                                 100.00

2nd Lieutenant                3,000.00                                   250.00                                   80.00

3rd Lieutenant                 2,400.00                                   200.00                                   60.00

Line and Medical Service Enlisted Men

Master Sergeant                                  P1,032.00                    P86.00                         P16.00

Technical Sergeant                                   840.00                     70.00                           16.00

1st Sergeant                                              810.00                     70.00                           16.00

Staff Sergeant                                           720.00                     60.00                           16.00

Sergeant                                                    612.00                     51.00                           12.00

Corporal                                                    444.00                     37.00                           12.00

Private 1st Class                                       264.00                     22.00                             8.00

Private                                                       216.00                     18.00                             8.00

The following represent the trial balance sheet for the Tenth Military District since its organization on 16 Sept 1942 to 31 May 1945:

a. RECEIPTS

Cash Advances from MECB                                                                                                                P15,315,998.29

Cash Advances from FFO (Capt P. F. CEDDRAN, Actg FFO)                                                              3,710,650.00

Cash Advances from the Provincial Treasurer, Occidental Misamis                                                         923,000.00

Cash Advances from the Province of Lanao                                                                                           1, 300,000.00

Cash Advances from the Province of Zamboanga                                                                                     700,000.00

Miscellaneous                                                                                                                                                  1,455.00

Plus: Transfer of accountability from Actg FFO & MECB                                                                        97,200.00                                                                                                                                                                                                              ______________

TOTAL                                                                                                                                                 P22,048.303.29

b. DISBURSEMENTS:

Cash Loan to American, Swiss and Other Foreign born citizens                                                               P29, 360.00

United States Pensioners                                                                                                                              71,683.15

Cash Advances; Transferred Accounts;

SWPA Personnel; Army & Navy

Personnel; Reverted PC & USAFFE

Officers’ Allowance; Allotments;

Officers’ Additional Allowance;

American Officers’ Additional

Mess Allowance; and Miscellaneous

Accounts Receivable                                                                                                                                      11,387,306.10

Expenditures                                                                                                                                                    10,331,015.62

                                                                                                                                                                      ______________

TOTAL                                                                                                                                                         P 21,819, 364.87

c. CASH ON HAND AS OF 31 MAY 1945                                                                                                         228,938 .42

                                                                                                                                                                       ______________

GRAND TOTAL                                                                                                                      P22,048,303.29-22,048,303.29

d. The expenditures of P10,331,015.62 were distributed as follows:

Hq 10th Military District                                P358,647.47

Force Radio Section                                           36,697.08

105th Division                                                1,212,131.28

10th Division                                                      740,221.92

107th Division                                                   565,044.24

108th Division                                                2,059,694.40

109th Division                                                2,186,740.21

110th Division                                                3,198,074.95

75th Inf, 7th Md                                                  42,868.33

41st Inf, X Corps                                              174,550.60

125th Inf Regt                                                      20,000.00

Provinces                                                           165,941.40

Miscellaneous                                                    168,518.20

                                                                        ___________

TOTAL                                                       P10,929,130.08

FINAL PHASE

Redemption Of Emergency Notes

The printing, issuance and disbursements of the Philippine Emergency Currency Notes were authorized by Commonwealth President MANUEL L. QUEZON, who, in turn, had the full authority to do so, empowered as he had been by the National Assembly of the Philippines, by virtue of the Emergency Powers Act.

The role played by the Philippine Emergency Currency Notes in the life of the guerrillas and that of the civilian population could not be less emphasized. The money circulated as legal tender and on the strength of the assurance of redemption after the termination of the emergency, has helped in no small measure in maintaining the economic stability of the people during the darkest period in their history.

Primarily, however, the basic employment of the Emergency Currency was in the war effort actively engaged in by the Mindanao guerrillas, especially in the gathering of intelligence information for the evaluation and use of Higher Headquarters. This phase, as time has proved, has been well-done and markedly successful.

It speaks well for the people – soldiers and civilians alike, that they accepted without reservation this form of monetary exchange, completely trusting in the rectitude of their own government and that of the United States.

Source: History of the Mindanao Guerrillas by the American Guerrillas of Mindanao (AGOM), Unpublished Manuscript.

The Beginning, Development and Operations of the Mindanao Intelligence Network

G-2 Section, 10th Military District Commended

22 February 1943

Three rugged years of concentrated efforts of the Intelligence Section of the Mindanao Guerrillas brought recognition in the form of commendation from the Highest Headquarters of the United States Army in the Pacific in which Major General A. C. WILLOUGHBY, Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, in communication dated 23 Jun 1945, to Colonel WENDELL W. FERTIG, said:

“It is desired to express the appreciation of the G-2 Section of this Headquarters for-most valuable intelligence service rendered by the guerrilla organization under your Command.

“This service and its flow of reports and messages covered the following periods under the agencies indicated:

“From 1942 to June 1943, Ge2 SWPA, through Allied Intelligence Bureau, Philippine Sub-Section;

“From June 1943 to March 1945, through Philippine Regional Section, G-33

“After March 1945, G-2, Eighth Army.

“In the period through 192 and during. the early half of 1943, your Command was particularly helpful in laying plans for the location of radio posts and development of an intelligence net. Since the latter half of 1943, your development of these original plans has been ably carried out.

Air, ground and naval intelligence data have been efficiently correct and therefore of great value in the preparation and successful prosecution of Allied plans in the Philippine area.”

DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED IN EARLY INTELLIGENCE WORK

Funds, absolutely needed in the success of intelligence operations; capable, trained agents required to perform delicate missions and run the gamut of attendant risks; means of transportation and communication, essential in the facility of movement of secret operatives and transmission of information – were all deplorably lacking in the beginning. In fact, in the initial stage of the Mindanao Guerrillas, Col FERTIG, along with other manifold occupations, was his own Intelligence Officer.

The Intelligence Section of the Mindanao Guerrillas evolved from practically nothing. The Intelligence Department is something which, by its obvious importance in any Army organization, deserves foremost consideration and attention. An Army cannot become truly powerful, however heavily stacked with weapons and other vital supplies if it has not within its control an agency with which to obtain accurate knowledge on the plans, strength, location, identification and movements of the enemy.

INTELLIGENCE – FOR SELF-PRESERVATION

No Army, not even a guerrilla band can effectively fight, or even survive if the odds are against it, if it does not have some knowledge of the enemy – his troops, weapons and disposition.

This was especially true in the early days of the Mindanao guerrilla resistance movement where units numbered only a mere handful. They had to know  the exact location of the enemy at all time, and if possible obtain some knowledge of his plans, his weapons and other factors which were important then to seif-preservation alone. WILLIAM TATE with his small band in early September 1942 relied on the gossip of his troops and the civilians to learn necessary facts concerning the enemy.

DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE

To warn soldiers of the approach of the enemy, various means were availed of as signals. In Lanao, the use of “agong” or brass gongs was popular. Along the enemy approaches were strategically located “agongs” caught up the announcement and relayed the awesome message to the Headquarters in coastal places, “tambuli” was generally used. “Tambuli” (Tagalog) or “Budyong” (Visayan) are derived from Carabao or Cow horns or big sea shells. They are blown by mouth and echoing sounds that travel a long distance emanate from them.

“Tagongtong” or “bamboo telegraph” was generally am more widely used, due principally to the quick availability of bamboos. They are made by cutting, seasoned bamboo poles to pieces, usually half a meter long. Tied with a rope, they are hung in various places along possible enemy routes. Upon enemy approach, the nearest “Tagongtong” is struck with an iron piece. In this way, no movement of the enemy could be made without the knowledge of the people, especially along the barrios where they passed.

Everyone was enjoined to gather all information of the enemy, including the wildest of rumors, for transmission to headquarters for its evaluation and as basis for whatever action need be taken.

PHILIPPINES’ STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE IN PACIFIC WAR

The Philippines in the theatre of the war operations in the Pacific, occupies a strategic position. The fact is inescapable that the Philippine Islands extending from Batanes to Siasi over a distance of some 900 statute miles, served as an essential link to bridge the gap between Japan and the East Indies, Masaya and even the Indian Ocean.

Control by Japan of the Islands would, in effect make China Sea a private lake of the Nippon Empire. Properly garrisoned and defended, it constitutes a no mean. bulwark to guard the approaches of East Asia against thrusts coming from the Pacific. MACARTHUR himself recognized this fact when on July 1945 he remarked, in summing up the Philippine Campaign that the naval battle off Leyte Gulf was the turning point in the Pacific War.

ENEMY ROUTES COVERED

As much as the Philippines were a barrier to the Japanese in the march for conquest at the initial stage of the Pacific War, so also did it become an obstacle to hurdle in the path of the American Liberation Forces in the return of MACARTHUR – with one great difference, however, and that was: An organized Army of determined guerrillas had long entrenched themselves in the Islands, especially in Mindanao, a veritable fifth column, with carefully coordinated intelligence nets operating without let-up twenty four hours a day, covering ail strategic locations: Overland routes as highway, roads, trails; Waterways, as sea-lanes, rivers, lakes, and vantage points everywhere for observations on aerial enemy activities. They covered surprisingly well the reporting of ship movements, enemy troop dispositions and aerial traffic. Radio sets dotted the whole Mindanao, so that in 1945, there were fifty-eight stations reporting intelligence to Headquarters for relay to higher Army and Navy sources for action.

Because of this intelligence net and radio communication system, the American Forces knew many facts about the Japs that helped the subsequent actions by the Allies in prosecuting the war on Mindanao and other islands of the Philippines.

COAST WATCHER STATIONS – ROAD SPOTTERS

Watcher’s stations, mostly coastal, were assigned the work of reporting immediately ship sightings, including – if possible – direction, tonnage, class, number, possible load, etc. Watcher’s stations were also placed in strategic places along highways to report on troop movements and other information about the enemy on land.

A report by Col FERTIG to Gen MACARTHUR, dated 7 Jul 19, showed in part the role played by the watcher’s station in the scheme of intelligence operations:

“x x x The Commander Seventh Fleet was pleased to give us a “Well Done” for having located a major enemy fleet passing through the islands and out through San Bernardino Straits.

Reports covered a period of thirty-six hours and were remarkably accurate; establishing the presence of nine aircraft, carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyers and the usual fleet train. Our reports allowed. the Navy to calculate strength and speed, and undoubtedly contributed to the successful conclusion of the action, known as the “Battle of the Western Philippines”.

In addition to the spectacular nature of the above reports, our watcher station reports showed a large increase in both number of ships and total tonnage moving through the Islands. For the first time, use of escort vessels appeared to be the rule.

Another effect of the submarine campaign is noted. The Japanese merchant vessels hide each night in a selected anchorage, sailing at dawn. Thus seventy-two hours are required to move a convoy from-Davao to Zamboanga, a distance easily covered in twenty-four hours.”

MINDANAO GUERRILLAS ENJOYED PEOPLE’S BACKING

Intelligence operations were, after the sad debacle met by the USAFFE in early 1942, conducted by various persons, groups of persons or organized bands of guerrillas – for internal security. USAFFE officers and men who had chosen not to submit to the demands for surrender by the Invader, had to have some of intelligence work by themselves, to know the definite intentions of the enemy to escape personal capture.

Early guerrillas, operating independently of each other, had to know somehow the plans, movements and location of the enemy so they could know when and where to strike and at the same time prevent being caught unaware. Even civilians, after learning of Japanese brutalities, found it necessary to know enemy intentions and movements – to avoid contact and escape bearing the brunt of enemy atrocities. In effect, the very fondness for acts of barbarism on the part of the Japanese, forced both the civilians population and the early, loose, scattered guerrilla bands to organize into intelligence groups primarily for security.

When the Mindanao Guerrillas, going under the name Mindanao-Visayan Force was organized little by little into a unified command, it had the people’s backing and support.

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES EXPANDED

The increase in the number of FERTIG’s guerrilla bands necessitated a corresponding intensification and diversification of intelligence activities. And aside from the usual intelligence activities, it was necessary to have some knowledge of the location of hidden arms and ammunition; hidden stuffs of Japanese and pro-Japanese cohorts, Jap spies and sincere collaborators and their actual intentions.

HIDDEN ARMS AND AMMUNITION

After the surrender of 10 May 1942 of the Mindanao USAFFE, a great number of arms and ammunition fell into the hands of civilians by various means. These were badly needed by the ever increasing guerrilla army. To know where they were hidden and who hid them became an important undertaking for intelligence agents. Once known and confiscated, it would mean additional stock for use against the enemy.

HIDDEN JAPANESE PERSONAL EFFECTS, ETC

In certain areas in Mindanao, especially in places where in peacetime, the “Japs had business operations, some of their personal effects were hidden, taken care of by Jap sympathizers, such as trucks, automobiles, radio sets, gasoline, canned goods, cloth, etc. As these were useful to the guerrillas, intelligence agents ferreted them out.

PRIMARY MISSIONS – “INTELLIGENCE”

The radio communication of Gen MAC ARTHUR recognizing the Mindanao Guerrillas of Mindanao and incorporating them into the Tenth Military District on 22 February 1943, emphasized intensification of intelligence coverage, not only of Mindanao but also of Samar-Leyte Area.

This was necessary in view of the fact that the huge American Forces in the Pacific were approaching the Philippine Theatre of operations. No one single factor was to receive any greater effort than intelligence during the entire Mindanao Guerrilla period.

IMPORTANT MATERIALS TO SWPA

On 14 Jul 1943, along with three American officers, escaped POW from the Davao Penal Colony, went four postal bags filled with mail from the Tenth Military District for GHO, SWPA. These bags contained an assortment of reports and intelligence matters. The importance of this mail was summed up in a radio message from Gen MAC ARTHUR to Col FERTIG dated 18 Aug 1943:

“Intelligence Report, Tenth MD for April Won First Class Compliments from G-2, SWPA. Reports, Papers and Personal Knowledge Evacuated with Party have been a Great Value for Plans.”

INTELLIGENCE NET COVERS ENTIRE MINDANAO

The Intelligence Organization of the entire Tenth Military District Command, covered the whole of Mindanao Island as the last of the Guerrilla Bands were finally absorbed into the unified control of Force Headquarters, and the Divisions organized covered the entire island territory.

DISTRICT G-2 SECTION:

In the District Headquarters, as in any Army organization, was created the G-2 Section whose main function was the collection, collation and evaluation of all intelligence information from all available sources to forward with the least possible delay to the Headquarters of Gen MAC ARTHUR then in Australia.

DIVISION G-2 SECTION

In the different Divisions, G-2 Sections were also organized, similar in scope but provided with more field personnel, both Army and Civilian, mostly operatives or agents.

REGIMENTAL 5-2 SECTION

The different regiments that composed a Division each had their own S-2 Intelligence Section with enough personnel, Army and Civilian, to scour for enemy information all over their alloted sectors. The same method of transmission of information availed of by the Division Ge2 Section was used by the Regimentals. Battalions too, had their S-2 Sections charged with the same work.

1,500 INTELLIGENCE AGENTS – FULL TIME JOB

Working in the different battalions, regiments, divisions and the Force G-2 Section were about 1,500 operatives or agents – about twenty-five percent of which were soldiers. This figure represents those operatives actively dedicating their full time to intelligence work. All loyal civilians (the percentage of disloyal ones very negligible), all soldiers and officers were in effect operatives, for in the Philippines, people were naturally curious and to turn that curiosity to advantage became an easy matter not only with the Japanese does the spy system work based on “Everyone can Spy= Everyone must Spy”. Some mercenary elements sided with the Japs, yet the greatest bulk of the population covered the enemy in a network of intelligence. There could hardly be any movement on his part, unless performed in places absolutely inaccessible to foreign approach, that escaped notice and about which information was relayed through various means, reached to Army Unit Headquarters.

THE WORK OF SPECIAL AGENTS

This generally refers however, to the obvious facts like the estimated number of the enemy in certain garrisoned areas or the number of Japs passing through a certain locality. But the more important facts needed by MAC ARTHUR’s Headquarters – enemy intentions; military installations; unit identification; first and last names and ranks of Commanding Officer; enemy material and equipment; locations and description of radio installations and radar; enemy documents; location, capacity and stocks of naval fuel storage; harbor installations, etc – all these needed a special kind of detective work, as well as courage, sacrifices and boundless risks.

HOW THIS INFORMATION IS GATHERED

To obtain accurate data on the enemy, various means were employed by those in charge of subsidiary intelligence nets. The most favorite of which and hardest to detect, is the planting of operatives right in the midst of the Japanese garrisons. Most of those employed in this manner were known to have been uncompromising Pro-Japanese elements, but were at heart for and with the Allied cause. This was a difficult role to assume, with personal complexes and great risks.

One typical instance was the case of VICENTE MENDOZA of Cagayan, Misamis Oriental, who was trusted implicitly by the Japanese but in reality was working for the guerrilla command at Bukidnon and Balingasag. Others, to a lesser degree, aided him in this dangerous work, among them POMPOSA BACCARISAS, a girl close to the Japs. Much valuable information has been furnished the Army by these intrepid agents. The Japanese, however, caught both and extracted the terrible penalty of torture and death.

THREE INTELLIGENCE OPERATIVES INSIDE DAVAO

Among the operatives planted in the midst of the enemy in Davao by Major VIRGILIO S. AGUILAR, Field Military Intelligence Officer for Davao, were SEGUNDO RUIZ, PRIMO BALATAYO and CIPRIANO MERCADO.

1) SEGUNDO RUIZ, a surveyor, was employed by the Zenetaka Gomi (Japanese concern engaged in working on the projects of the Jap Army), to take charge of the levelling of the second runway of the Licanan Airdrome. Being a trusted man of the Japs, he-had access to different military installations. He was working at Licanan for two months prior to 2 Sept 19h – on which day American planes first bombed and strafed Licanan. A considerable number of Japanese lives were lost and a number of planes destroyed on the ground, along with the destruction of military installations. Agents like RUIZ, made possible this effective bombing by furnishing accurate intelligence prior to such bombings.

2) PRIMO BALATAYO, graduate in commerce, was employed by the Japs as Assistant Manager of Maeda Gomi at Bunawan, Davao. He was respected by the Japs and was even allowed a car for his own use. On several occasions, Japanese officers brought him along and showed him different projects, constructed and under construction, by the Japs. Partly, at least, on his information furnished, the Sasa Airfield was heavily bombed on 2 Sept 1943.

Thirty planes were destroyed om the ground. Two hundred and fifty Japs, along with 150 Filipino Pro-Japs, were killed while eating their noon-day meal in the Mess Hall. Military installations were effectively blasted.

3) CIPRIANO MERCADO was employed as Foreman by the Japs in constructing camps in the Akaname Plantation. After all, the camps were constructed’ and occupied by the Japs, MERCADO furnished the Field Military Inte1ligence Officer with complete data on the camps; including sketches showing their exact location, bivouac areas and installations. The same information was transmitted by radio to headquarters concerned. Soon after, sometime in March 195, planes came and bombed and strafed the hidden camps, causing almost total destruction and the loss of many Japanese lives.

All three of these agents, escaped Japanese capture but in the case of CIPRIANO MERCADO, eight members of his immediate family were killed when overtaken by the Japs in Gatungan, two kilometers West of Bunawan, Davao.

BY SUBTERFUGE

Another favorite method employed by operatives was subterfuge. A person, soldier or civilian, in the guise of being a harmless individual, would be sent into a Japanese-held territory using various pretexts: selling chickens and eggs, wine, etc or pretending to visit their relatives or friends who are Jap puppet officials, or in any ways. Their jobs were to carefully observe for later reporting all Japanese installations and activities in areas traveled.

Much information had been gathered by the use of this method.

Women, too, played an important part in the intelligence nets – for they had a particular means of appealing to the vanity of the Japs and getting them to talk.

INTELLIGENCE PRIOR TO AMERICAN LANDINGS

Another example of the efficiency in the inte1ligence work of the Mindanao Guerrillas is the information furnished just prior to the landing of the American Forces at Parang and the subsequent advance on Malabang, Cotabato.

From FERTIG to Commanding General, 8th Army, Information to 10th Corps, dated 13 April 1945:

“Evaluation of the Illana Bay situation; unopposed LANDINGS MAY BE MADE AT any point from Pagadian, Zamboanga, along coast through Malabang to the Cotabato-Lanao Boundary. Nips that were between Malabang and Parang evacuated by baroto to Cotabato on 12 April. Our forces maintaining patrols between Malabang and Parang and will contact our radio station near Parang shortly.

“Latest intelligence information strongly indicate light resistance only at Parang proper although heavy bombings past few days and those to continue should eliminate targets and troops in that city. Nothing but light beach defenses (barbed wire entanglements) reported from Parang to Linek, I believe landings should be accomplished with little preparatory naval gunfire directed at beaches or inland north of Parang.

““Malabang Airfield in condition to take as many planes as you desire. Extremely dry weather in the past few days will cause dust nuisance. For continued use throughout operation, steel mats should be placed at once. The main seven thousand feet runway can be cleared of grass to give eight hundred feet of actual width. Civilian Mayor of Malabang is cleaning town but no civilians allowed to enter except workmen.”

On 17 April 1945, American Forces landed, without opposition.

PROPAGANDA, A NECESSARY ADJUNCT

The enemy, adept at cheap propaganda, found willing listeners at first among the gullible which, though constituting a negligible minority, if not made to understand the true picture of the war situation immediately, might contaminate the others into believing in the eternal “might” of “unconquerable” Japan. Most of them, in Jap garrisoned cities, due to strict censorship, did not even have any inkling of how the war was progressing. To remedy this situation, intelligence operatives not only went to Japs occupied places to gather information on the enemy, but also to apprise the Filipinos inside the real turn of events, by word of mouth or sometimes by printed war news sheets.

In the early days, when the guerrillas had no source from which to draw funds for financial support or to fill up other information needs, the civilians had to be awakened to a sense of patriotism from their lukewarm attitude. Radio news had to be broadcast to the people by speeches or typewritten leaflets and the war situation explained to them in detail.

The “cockpit” became a favorite gathering place and exchange place of information.

DAYS OF DARKNESS

The second half of 1944 sow the most intense mopping-up operations of the Japanese on the island of Mindanao. Thousands of enemy troops, withdrawing from Southwest Pacific fronts, converged in the Philippines. The victorious American troops were fast closing in on the retreating forces. The Philippines offered them a temporary haven from the terrible onslaughts dished out in the Marianas, Pelileu, etc. It was at this time that the Mindanao Guerrillas, ill-fed, ill-clothed, ill-armed and ill, gamely resisted in the face of overwhelming odds, continuously believing with almost blind faith that always “it was darkest before dawn”. Some had to strike temporarily the protection of the jungles – yet always to strike the enemy whenever and wherever opportunity presented itself.

The situation, from the standpoint of the guerrillas, was appalling under the terrific surge of enemy pressure. But they found wider scope and more fields for thorough, intensified intelligence operations. Despite unnerving difficulties encountered in one form or another, intelligence work continued in increased pace and ever-surging tempo.

The answer to the question whether or not the Mindanao Guerrillas were successful in the pursuit of the primary mission – securing of intelligence, is found in the ruins of Surigao and Cagayan cities; in the hundreds of enemy ships resting at the bottom of the surrounding seas; in the charred remains of enemy installations; and in the mangled bodies of dead Japanese.

TRAGEDIES IN INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Many instances of dire happenings, in the form of tortures and death have occurred to intelligence agents. In their own way, they are as much deserving of recognition as those who fought decisive battles on the battlefields.

EXAMPLE NO. 1: – “Pvt SIMPLICIO LIBRES, “E” Co., 2nd Bn, 113th Infantry, temporarily assigned with Lt DE LOS REYES, 110th Division Special Intelligence Net, Sector No. 2, was captured by the enemy while enroute from Sector No. 3 to Lt DE LOS REYES’ Sector at Nasipit. He was tied and blindfolded when found in Bancasi, Butuan, with five bayonet wounds and cracked skull, on 15 Nov 1944. Later investigations revealed LIFRES was killed by the Japs that passed that area on the 14th of Nov 1944, from Nasipit. He was then bringing a message from the CP of the 113th Infantry Regiment, 110th Div., to Sector No. 2, at Nasipit.”

EXAMPLE NO. 2: – “On 17 Nov 1944, at 1:00 PM, a Jap patrol was able to ambush and capture one of the soldiers of the 113th Infantry Regiment, sent on an intelligence mission, Pvt LACORDA. This was near the Davao road junction, in the vicinity of Butuan. He was later discovered to have been tortured to death, one leg was skinned to the bone from ankle to knee. He was then stabbed to death right through the heart with his own bolo.”

EXAMPLE NO. 3: – “PRIMITIVO TALADUA, Intelligence Agent, G-2 Section, 10th Military District, after having arrived from Manila where he was assigned to gather some intelligence information, was caught by the Japs in Linabo, Plaridel, Misamis Occidental on 13 Feb 1944. Incriminating papers were found by the Japs in his person. He was brought to Calamba, a nearby barrio, his hands tied tight with barbed wire. While being investigated, his nails were pulled out one by one and at the same time, a hot piece of iron was applied to his breast and forehead. After two days of incessant tortures, the Japs finding he would not tell what he knew about the guerrillas, they hacked his body with bayonets until he died”.

EXAMPLE NO. 4: – “On 29 Sep 1944, at 10:00, CANDELARIA DEIMO, a girl civilian operative of the “A” Corps Ge2 Section, 10th MD, was captured by the Japs in Misamis, Misamis Occidental. Her body was battered with blows, after having been brutally abused by the Jap investigators. As she would not teil what she knew of the guerrillas, she was finally bayoneted till killed.”

EXAMPLE NO. 5: – “Hight civilian operatives, led by SABINO SABERON, proceeded to Bayabas, some twenty five kilometers Southwest of Davao City, to obtain accurate data on Jap activities, defenses, dumps and other enemy installations, on 26 Jan 1945.

Suspected by Jap civilians of being Intelligence Agents, the party was attacked in Tuli, before reaching objective, on 29 Jan, killing two of them. The rest who fled were overtaken by the enemy near the junction of the Davao and Siao Rivers the next day. Two more were killed, three fled again to report the tragedy. SABERON, wounded, was brought along by the Japs and on the way, tortured and finally killed.”

INTELLIGENCE EXPENSES – LESS THAN P 500,000

The total intelligence expenses for the Tenth Military District for the entire guerrilla period…Philippine Emergency Money, Old Philippine Treasury Notes, and American Dollars….amounted to less than one half million pesos and dollars!

This amount would hardly buy one seaworthy inter-island steamer. Yet this fund bought Intelligence information which, wholly or in part, led to the sinking of many thousands of tons of Jap shipping….to say nothing of the havoc wrecked by American forces – both ground and air, as a result of factual intelligence reporting.

8,000 RADIO MESSAGES PER MONTH

The various reports immediately following, serve to illustrate just how the intelligence factors were broken down, and accomplished. Radio messages to higher headquarters during 1944, averaged anywhere between 8000 to 10,000 per month..and most of this was concerning intelligence.

There can be nothing but a tremendous satisfaction to all the people of Mindanao…whether soldier or civilian…who had a share, large or small, in contributing their part to this tangible war effort.

History will record the part played by the people of this Island in the progress of the war against the enemy…and the contribution of Intelligence will be included as a valuable and vital factor.

COASTWATCHER STATIONS

In the theater of war operations in the Pacific, the Philippines occupied a strategic position, Gen MAC ARTHUR himself, recognized this fact when on h Jul 1945, he remarked in summing up the Philippine Campaigns that the Naval battle off Leyte was the turning point of the war.

ENEMY SHIPPING MUST BE OBSERVED AND REPORTED.

Realizing the importance of Mindanao, especially in its geographical relation to the Dutch East Indies, New Guinea and other Pacific Islands, the Tenth Military District established coast watcher stations in all strategic spots surrounding the island. As early as 1943, there were 17 coast watcher stations on the island…this was later increased to a total of 31. They covered all the important sea lanes and the radio stations are graphically shown on the map of Radio Stations, including in this History.

EYES OF THE U.S. NAVY

In the beginning these coast watchers served as security outposts for the guerrilla forces, but when the tide of war began to turn in our favor, these stations were multiplied and became the “Eyes” of the U.S. Navy which was fast sweeping Pacific Waters, and ever-nearing the Philippines.

Report of enemy ship movements were reported by “flash” radio messages…in code and in accordance with the Navy system of identification. The actual movement of a convoy of Japanese ships could be “flashed” thru its entire movement along either the west or east coast of the Philippines…for this Headquarters not only served Higher Headquarters with ship spottings for Mindanao…but also acted as the Relay Station for the entire Philippines.

During the month of Jun 1944 a total of 214 ship sightings for the Philippines was flashed to Navy Headquarters over our key station which had direct contact with Navy Intelligence at Perth, Australia.

BEATEN PATHS OBSERVED…JAP SHIPPING INTENSIFIED

Through the particular location of watcher stations it was possible to establish and plot “beaten paths” of enemy shipping, which proved of great assistance to the Navy, particularly submarines which would “catch their prey” in these established shipping lanes.

As the enemy situation became more acute, the Philippines came their haven or refuge, and also as a section of the Pacific for greater fortification. Ship traffic increased considerably in Jun 1944, and even as late as October a total of 405 ships were sighted in Philippine waters…especially the Visayas and Mindanao. Luzon at that time was covered by a separate relay station.

“WELL DONE” FROM THE NAVY

The work that the coast watcher stations contributed to the operations in the Philippines is expressed in a radio message from the Commander, Seventh Fleet, to Commanding Officer, Tenth Military District:

“YOUR FINE WORK HAS BEEN A LARGE CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO SUCCESS OF OUR ARMS IN THE PHILIPPINES.”

***

SCME “FLASH” MESSAGES FROM COAST WATCHER STATIONS 1943:

15 Dec.            A CONVOY OF ENEMY SHIPS CONSISTING OF 5 FOX ABLES, 2 FOX  TARE ABLE, 1 FOX TARE CHARLIE, 2 FOX TARE DOG, 1 SUGAR BAKER WAS SIGHTED AT 0420 GMT, POSITLON 10 DEGREES 17 MINUTES NORTH AND 124 DEGREES 14 MINUTES EAST, HEADING SCUTYWEST AT MEDIUM SPEED.

1944:

7 Jan.               28 FOX TARE CHARLIES WERE SIGHTED IN SURIGAO STRAITS TO EAST OF ESPERANZA AT 5:25 PM HEADING SOUTHWARD.

15 Jan.             1 FOX TARE DOG, 27 SUGAR CHARLIES AND 6 BIG UNIDENTIFIED VESSELS COMING FROM CEBU WERE SIGHTED AT 0315Z SLOWLY HEADING TO SOUTHEAST. POSITION WAS GIVEN AS 057215.

12 Feb.            20 COASTAL MOTOR VESSELS AND 1 FOX TARE CHARLIE THAT CAME FROM THE DAVAO DIRECTICN WERE LYING OFF SACOL ISLAND AT 1300.

15 Feb.            A BIG CCNVOY OF 20 UNIDENTIFIED SHIPS WAS SIGHTED AT 0900 HOW TIME READING SOUTHEAST CELEBES SEA AT REGULAR SPEED.

8 Apr.              AT 1115 ONE HEAVY CRUISER APPROACHING TICTUAN ISLAND FRCM ZAMBOANGA TAKING AN EASTERLY DIRECTION. AT 1305 SAME HEAVY CRUISER REPORTED FOLLOWED BY ANOTHER CRUISER OF SAME TYPE FROM ZAMBOANGA GOING WESTWARD TO TICTUAN ISLAND.

8 Apr.             AT 0830 ONE SHIP INSIDE LIANGA BAY WITH DESTROYER BEING TOWED. AFTER HALF AN HOUR STOP, IT PROCEEDED NORTH TO SURIGAO, IT WAS FOLLOWED BY ONE PATROL BOMBER.

19 Apr.            TWO TRANSPORTS ESCORTED BY ONE DESTROYER SIGHTED AT 1730, 10 MILES OFF LEBAK COAST, COTABATO, GOING NORTH FROM SOUTH AT MEDIUM SPEED.

1 Jun.               JAP TASK FORCE IN DAVAO GULF – ONE BIG AIRCRAFT CARRIER, 5 BATTLESHIPS, 6 DESTROYERS, 15 SUBMARINES, 9 TRANSPORTS AND ABOUT 15 SMALLER SHIPS,

7 Jun.               28 FOX TARE CHARLIES WERE SIGHTED IN SURIGAO STRAITS TO EAST OF ESPERANZA AT 5:25 HEADING SOUTH.

19 Jun.             TWO COAST GUARD CUTTERS PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED AT STA ANA. CREW OF 25, ARMED WITH TWO CANNONS, THREE AA GUNS AND SERVERAL MGS.

19 Jun.             TWO MERCHANT SHIPS ESCORTED BY THREE GUNBOATS ANCHORED AT GLAN, COTABATO.

13 Jul.             TWO BIG TRANSPORTS (HEAVILY LOADED) AND 1 GUNBOAT FROM NORTH ENTERED GLAN AND ANCHORED AT WHARF.

18 Jul.             6 SHIPS FROM ZAMBOANGA PROCEEDING EAST WITH 1 DESTROYER LEADING, FOLLOWED BY 1 SUBMARINE CHASER, 2 LARGE MERCHANT SHIPS, 1 DESTROYER AND 1 FREIGHTER*TRANSPORT

1 Aug ONE CRUISER AND ONE MERCHANT VESSEL ENTERED SARANGANT BAY HEADING FAST TOWARDS DADIANGAS.

24 Aug.           24 SHIPS BELIEVED LARGE LAUNCHES, SOME ARMED, SIGHTED ENTERING CAGAYAN, FROM WEST AT 4:00 PM.

19 Sept.           9 UNCLASSIFIED VESSELS, LARGES APPROX 500 TONS, ENTERING CAGAYAN HARBOR FROM WEST. 8 MERCHANT VESSELS REPORTED ARRIVED CAGAYAN PORT FROM NORTHEAST EARLY IN THE MORNING.

Oct.                 DURING THE MONTH OF OCTOBER 19h A TOTAL OF 05 SHIPS WERE SIGHTED BY COAST WATCHER STATIONS IN THE VISAYAS AND MINDANAO, AND REPORTED THROUGH TENTH MD HEADQUARTERS DIRECTLY TO THE NAVY.

MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

If there is anything which we can call an outstanding achievement of intelligence work on Mindanao, it is the accurate location of enemy military installations, It was in this work that our civilian operatives excelled because they knew the places very well, saw these installations themselves, in fact in some cases they helped in constructing them. Location of guns and their caliber, trenches, foxholes, dugouts supply and ammo depots, barracks and bivouac areas, all these were spotted and plotted in maps just as fast as they were made or even before they were finished. This information was especially valuable to our air forces. What happened? – Before the enemy could use these installations they were either destroyed or neutralized by bombing. What surprised the Japanese most was the accurate bombing of installations which were hardly visible from the air like the tunnels they dug on the sides of mountains and hills. Bewildered, they suspected every Filipino as a “spy” and in the final phase of the Davao Campaign this resulted in the killing of several Filipino civilians including some of our operatives.

ENEMY DEFENSES KNOWN:

Long before the landing of American troops on the island they were already informed of what kind of defenses they would encounter end in what places they would meet them. It is interesting to note that when the American forces marched their way along the Davao South Highway towards the city in May 1945, they found the gun emplacements intact along the coast in the same places as reported by our intelligence net in March 1945.

“20 MARCH 1945 — FIVE COASTAL ARTILLERY GUNS INSTALLED LONG SHORE 1OO METERS FROM SEA BEGINNING EAST OF KM 55 SOUTH HIGHWAY. GUNS ARE 130 METERS APART UNDER MANGROVE TREES.”

***

OTHER TYPICALMESSAGES REPORTING ENEMY MILITARY INSTALLATIONS 1944:

13 Nov.           CONCENTRATION OF WAR MATERTAL IN RURAL HIGH SCHOOL AT KIDAPAWAN.

2h; Nov.          ENEMY AIR SPOTTER AND RADIO STATION LOCATED ON TOP OF SAAVEDRA HILL, ONE MILE WEST OF TAPUNDO PT, ON SOUTHEAST CORNER OF ISLAND.

1 Dec.             FOUR LARGE CANNONS ARE LOCATED ABOUT OO METERS NORTHWEST OF MATINA RESERVOIR. AT POINT 100 METERS WEST OF MATINA RUNWAY AND ONE KM SOUTH OF NATIONAL HIGHWAY ARE FOUR AA GUNS. FOUR MORE ARE LOCATED 300 METERS WEST OF SOUTH END OF MATINA RUNWAY.

6 Dec.              GUNS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED EMPLACED AT INTERVALS FROM LAPASAN TO TAGOLOAN. SOME FIELD FORTICIATIONS AND ENTANGLEMENTS ARE LOCATED ON SAME AREA,

23 Dec. CATEEL: JAPS HAVE PLACED ELECTRIFIED WIRE AROUND BARRIO AND

ALONG COAST TO STA FELCMINA. BELIEVE THIS ALARM SYSTEM ONLY.

1945:

10 Mar.           GUN EMPLACEMENTS: PIN POINTED IN DAVAO SHEET NR 4732-II: ONE

12-INCH GUN AT 371,562. ONE AT 377-572, AND ANOTHER AT 285-570.

14 Mar.           REF DAVAO SHEET NR 4752-II. FOOD DEPOT AT 536-658.2, REVETMENT

3 METERS THICK AND 5U METERS LONG CAMOUFLAGED WITH GRASSY SOD.

LOCATED AT 345.6-320. REF BUNAWAN SHEET NR 4732-I. FOOD DEPOT

IN 3 BLDGS AT 318-687. GAS DRUMS SCATTERED IN PILES AROUND THESE

BLDGS.

20 Mar.           TRENCHES, FOXHOLES AND AIR RAID SHELTERS UNDER HIGHSPEED CON-

STRUCTION ALONG TAGUROT ROAD AND BUNAWAN RIVER.

31 Mar.           REF SHEET NR 732-II PIN POINTED TARGETS DAVAO AREA: HOUSES ON

BOTH SIDES LAPANDAY RUAD OCCUPIED FRCM 325-663 TO 313-681. BAR

RACKS AND TUNNELS FROM 312.5621.

2 Apr.              LARGE TUNNEL WITH 16 OUTLETS LOCATED 25 METERS EAST OF DAVAO

RIVER AND WEST OF KM 15-5 LAPANDAY ROAD. ELECTRIC MACHINERY IN

TUNNEL WORKING DAY AND NIGHT. CONTENTS CANNOT BE GOTTEN DUE TC

STRICT RESTRICTIONS. LOADED CANVAS-COVERED TRUCKS ENTER TO UN-

LOAD.

6 Apr.              ENEMY AT TALAKAG ENCAMPED IN MIXTURE OF TENTS AND IMPROVISED SHEL-

TER 150 METERS SOUTHWEST BY WEST OF BRIDGE OVER KABANGLASAN CREEK

NEAR TALAKAG.ON TALAKAG-LINGON TRAIL. ‘THEY ARE IN OPEN TERRITORY.

WILL PROBABLY TAKE SHELTER FROM RAID IN KABANGLASAN CREEK ABOUT

100 METERS SOUTH OF CAMP. FIELD GUN LOCATED NEAR DESTROYED OVEN

80 METERS NORTHWEST OF SAME BRIDGE. OTHER TENTH WEST AND NCRTH OF

GUN. FOXHOLES ON BOTH BANKS OF CREEK NEAR BRIDGE AROUND TALAKAG

PLAZA AND IN TREES HALF KM SOUTH OF FARM 8.

15 Apr.            TROOPS ARE BIVOUACKED AT POSITION 194-221. ARTILLERY PIECES

HIDDEN UNDER FRUIT AND BANANA TREES AT NURSERY. RECOMMEND BOMB-

ING AND STRAFING WITHIN RADIUS OF 600 METERS OF POINT INCLUDING

FOREST AREA SOUTH OF NURSERY. ALL THESE PLACES ARE ON KORONADAL

HIGHWAY.

19 Apr.            CARMEN FERRY: REF PIKIT SHEET NR 4532-III. CULVERT ON ROAD AT

36.4-64.28 USED AS AIR RAID SHELTER. MOTOR POOL WITH 33 TRUCKS

AT 38.57-65.1. 30 JAPS OCCUPY LONE HOUSE AT 38.8-62.3. GAS

DUMP AT 38.52-64.19.

13 Jun.             JAPS IN ABTALEL AREA HAVE CONSTRUCTED TRENCHES. 18 TRUCKS AND

MANY DRUMS OF GASOLINE, SEEN AT MOTOR POOL WHICH IS NOWLOCATED

IN THE WOODED AREA SOUTHWEST OF FOOT OF NUFOL HILL.

15 Jun.             AT TAMUGAN AND GIMALANG SECTORS THE ENEMY IS BUSY LAYING MINES

ALONG ROADS AND TRAILS.

ENEMY TROOP DISPOSITION

Most Important Phase of Intelligence:

No one single phase of intelligence, except documents, was more difficult to obtain and evaluate than enemy troop disposition ~ important to our own guerrilla troops who for the most part had to avoid open combat with ‘large forces – and important to higher headquarters which must know enemy troop disposition at all times – in every battle zone of operation.

Evaluation Difficult:

To know of troop movements – whether it be small patrols, or large columns- was not difficult in itself ~- but to have some fairly accurate ideas as to numbers was something again. The Filipinos were decidedly weak in their reporting of anything pertaining to figures – but by process of evaluation, based on this characteristic, one could arrive at same fairly decent estimate.

Troops Shift Frequently

Japanese troops were constantly shifting – even in the heavily garrisoned Davao area. Conditions on Mindanao were not conducive to easy travel so the spotting and reporting of troop movements was made somewhat easier.

Our radio stations were strategically located near the heavily garrisoned enemy locations to facilitate rapid reporting of movements – either overland or by water route. It was particularly important in late 1944 and early 1945 to know the number of troops being shifted to and from Mindanao – either in support of campaigns against the American forces to the north – or the Mindanao as a retreat from such campaigns.

Many Radio Messages

Daily throughout the reporting of Mindanao intelligence, troop movements represented a considerable volume of radio traffic. Just a few representative messages are reproduced below – they cover many sections of the island – and are indicative of the wide range of intelligence coverage.

1944:

11 Jan.             MISAMIS ORIENTAL. 1,900 JAPS ARRIVED CAGAYAN FROM ILGILO.

11 Feb.            1,000 JAPS ARRIVED ZAMBOANGA FROM NORTH.

7 Apr.              DAVAO. 4 LARGE TRANSPORTS UNLOADED TROOPS AT DAVAO CITY ESTIMATED AT 2,000.

16 May.           SURIGAO. ELEMENTS OF JAP 30TH DIV ARRIVED SURIGAO FROM CEBU.

15 Jul.             ESTIMATED 2,000 JAPS ARRIVED DAVAO FROM PALAU FOR MONTH OF JUNE AND FIRST TWO WEEKS OF       

                        JULY.

4 Aug.             MISAMIS ORIENTAL. TRANSPORTS ARRIVING CAGAYAN BROUGHT 3,000 TROOPS. 1,000 TROOPS 

                        IMMEDIATELY WENT SOUTH THRU THE SAYRE HIGHWAY. INDICATIONS SHOW THEY CAME FROM LUZON

                        AND VISAYAS: CONSIST OF AIR CORPS GROUND PERSONNEL AND YOUNG INF RECRUITS.

1 Sept.             MISAMIS ORIENTAL. FROM 15 to 30 AUGUST ESTIMATED 6,000 TROOPS ARRIVED CAGAYAN FROM VISAYAS

                        AND LUZON. THREE TROOPS APPEAR TO BE FROM SWPA BUT HAVE RESTED IN THE NORTH.

10 Sept.           BUKIDNON. 3,000 TROOPS MOVING SOUTH THRU SAYBE HIGHWAY, HIKING AT NIGHT AND RESTING IN

                        FOREST DURING DAY.

18 Sept.           COTABATO. REPORTS INDICATE THAT APPROX 2,000 TROOPS OF THE HARADA BUTAI COMING FROM

                        COTABATO DIRECTION ARE DISTRIBUTED TO VARIOUS SECTORS AS DIGOS, MINTAL, BAYABAS, MALAGOS,

                        AND TUGBOK.

19 Sept.           SURIGAO. JAP TROOPS APPROX 3,000 PASSED THRU AGUSAN FROM SURIGAO. SOME TOOK SHIPS IN NASIPIT

                        FOR GAGAYAN.

11 Oct.             AGUSAN. ESTIMATED 2,000 JAPS HIKED FROM NASIPIT TC TAGOLOAN. UNESTIMATED NR LEFT ON 6

                       BARGES WITH SUPPLIES.

27 Oct.            SHIPS WITH ESTIMATED 500 JAPS LEFT CAGAYAN FOR LEYTE. ADDITIONAL 600 JAPS BELIEVED FROM

                       BUGO-TAGOLOAN AREA LEFT CAGAYAN ON SHIPS FOR SAME DESTINATION.

28 Oct.            BUKIDNON. CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF TROOPS IN TRUCKS MOVED FROM SOUTH TO NORTH ALONG THE

                       SAYRE HIGHWAY. THEY WERE SUBSEQUENTLY SHIFTED TO LEYTE.

17 Nov.           MISAMIS ORIENTAL. ESTIMATED 2,200 JAPS LEFT CAGAYAN FOR NORTH BELIEVE LEYTE. ALMOST NIGHTLY

                        DEPARTURE OBSERVED SINCE NIGHT OF 6 NOV. USUALLY ABOUT 500 EACH NIGHT USING LAUNCHES AND         

                        BARGES

20 Nov.           MISAMIS ORIENTAL. 2 SUGAR CHARLIES AND 16 BARGES LOADED WITH TROOPS LEFT CAGAYAN BELIEVE

                        BOUND FOR LEYTE.

4 Dec.              MISAMIS ORIENTAL. STRENGTH IN CAGAYAN AREA INCREASED AT END OF NOV. TROOPS CAME FROM THE

                        SOUTH. BELIEVE WAITING TRANSPORTATION.

14 Dec.            BUKIDNON. MORE THAN 1,000 JAPS FROM BUKIDNON PASSING BUGASAN -EN- ROUTE TO BUTUAN,

                        COTABATO.

19 Dec.            ZAMBOANGA. JAPS HAVE MOVED ALMOST ALL TROOPS FROM TETUAN, TUMAGA AND PRESAMAYOR TO

                       PASONANCA.

27 DEC.          MISAMIS ORIENTAL. GEN MOROZUMI WITH STAFF AND A LARGE NUMBER OF TROOPS LEFT CAGAYAN FOR

                        SOUTH.

1945:

22 Jan.             SURIGAO. APPROX 400 JAPS INCLUDING WOMEN AND CHILDREN LEFT MAGPAYANG, SURIGAO FOR

                       BUTUAN. TROOPS ARRIVED BUTUAN ON 22 JANUARY.

30 Jan.             200 ENEMY TROOPS SHIFTED SOUTH FROM CAGAYAN AREA AND A SMALL NUMBER ALSO WENT SOUTH

                       FROM MALUKO-DALWANGAN.

12 Feb.            ESTIMATED 1,500 JAPS MOVED FROM LASANG TIBONGCO SECTOR TO PADADA-DIGOS SECTOR, DAVAO.

18 Feb.            COTABATO. APPROX 1,000 JAPS ARRIVED PARANG FROM COTABATO CITY AREA. THEY ARE BIVOUACKED

                        SOUTH OF WATER TOWER, IN BARRACKS AND SCHOOL BUILDING.

21 Apr.            COTABATO. OVER 1,000 JAPS OF ARMY, NAVY AND ARTILLERY UNITS MOVING NORTH ON DULAWAN-

                        KORONADAL HIGHWAY.

20 Mar.            COTABATO. OVER 700 JAPS ARRIVED BUTUAN 18 MARCH, FROM SOUTH WITH 4 TRUCKS OF AMMO AND

                        GASOLINE.

25 Mar.            BUKIDNON. ‘TROOPS ALONG SAYRE HIGHWAY ARE MOVING SOUTH. SINCE 15 MAR APPROX 2,500 JAPS

                        HAVE GONE SOUTH FROM IMPASUGONG AREA.

24 Mar.            MISAMIS ORIENTAL. ESTIMATED 00 JAPS WITHOUT ARMS LANDED IN CAGAYAN AREA FROM BARGES.  

                        ENEMY TELLS CIVILIANS THEY ARE FROM ILOILO.

Japanese Documents…High Priority

In a letter to Col FERTIG of 5 May 1944 from Gen WILLOUGHBY, G-2, GHW, SWPA, the primary intelligence requirements were expressed as follows:

“Location of specific enemy units. We can identify them thru documents – we know their strength and organization. The full name and rank of the commander occasionally furnished the clue to the particular tactical unit. Identification of units from a regiment up to a division is extremely important as that data gives us definite indication of the enemy’s combat ability. Enemy documents furnish the clue to the solution of enemy units and their dispositions. Such documents should receive high priority. Diaries, bulletins, orders, etc., of the enemy reveal much more than believed possible.”

This was no easy assignment for not only did the Japanese carry away their dead, almost with fanatical persistence, but we had no interpreters and therefore no way of deciding the importance to higher headquarters of documents when captured. In the earlier days, and even up to the landing in Leyte of 20 Oct 1944, transportation facilities between headquarters was most infrequent…so those documents captured, lost their timeliness due to slowness of delivery.

Through many agents, to all outward appearances, loyal to the Japs but secretly working for our cause – it was possible to obtain the names of Commanding Officers, and occasionally learn the identity of units.

Notwithstanding these drawbacks, a certain amount of captured material made its way to higher headquarters, and in a few instances, loyal Chinese friends were able to give some translations which occasionally proved of value.

Some Documents Found Highly Valuable

Documents captured from two Japanese aviators in Oct 1944 near Butuan, Agusan, and captured items obtained after the Allied air strike at Surigao in Sept, proved to be of exceptional value. The former contained late cryptographic material especially desirable. The latter contained a lot of data on the 1st Japanese Division which at the time had been unlocated but believed to be in the Philippine Islands. These items were delivered to 6th Army on Nov 1944 when their importance was discovered. In this connection the following quotation from letter received from Sixth Army Japanese Translation Section is quoted:

“Receipt is acknowledged of a number of Japanese diaries, documents, maps, equipment and manuals, as delivered to this section by Capt. H. A. Rosenquist, AC of S, Ge2, 10th M.D.

“It is suggested that all such materials be immediately classified as to its source, date obtained, and other information which will be of assistance to this section in its evaluation of such material, All should be separated and labelled accordingly.

“This type of Japanese captured material contributes, greatly to the progress of the war effort. Our special appreciation goes to your forces for these excellent contributions. Keep up the good work.”

****

Some Radio Messages Sent Higher Headquarters

1944:

6 Nov.             20 JAP MANUALS PAYBOOKS AND PERSONAL LETTERS CAPTURED IN SURIGAO. IMMEDIATE ANALYSIS REVEALED VERY VALUABLE ORDER OF BATTLE AND ORGANIZATION INFORMATION OF THE JAP 1ST DIV.

13 Nov.           JAP AVIATOR THREW AWAY PACK CONTAINING NAVY CODE BOOK, AVIATION NAVIGATION INSTRUMENT, ENEMY IDENTIFICATION BOOK & AVIATORS REPORT. THESE FORWARDED TO SIXTH ARMY.

1944:

8 Dec.              CAPTURED DOCUMENTS REVEALED THAT ENEMY IN MALABANG HAD A STRENGTH OF 500 WITH 2 MORTARS, HEAVY AND 1 LIGHT MG: THEY LOST 46 KIA BUT THEIR MORALE HIGH AND WILL FIGHT TO HE LAST.

18 Dec.            CAPTURED DOCUMENTS REVEALED THAT 77H INF REGT STATIONED AT KIBAWE. IT REVEALED THEY HAD 1800 ARMS & APPROX HALF A MILLION AMMO.

1945:

2 Jan.               LETTER, WRITTEN BY CO SRD CO,. 32ND BN, 54TH IND BRIGADE TO HIS COMMANDING OFFICER, CAPTURED BY GUERRILLA UNITS STATED THAT THEIR UNIT WAS SHORT ON AMMO AND MEDICINE AND REQUESTS FR EVACUATION.

28 Mar.           DOCUMENT CAPTURED FROM L JAP MESSENGER PIGEON IDENTIFIED THE 177TH INF REGT.

9 Apr.              DOCUMENT, 1 CARDBOARD BOX FULL, WILL BE PUT ON LCI FOR FORWARDING TO 8TH ARMY. SOME DOCUMENTS OF OFFICIAL NATURE APPEAR TO BE PAYROLLS. SHOULD PROVE VALUABLE.

12 Apr.            DOCUMENTS, DIARIES AND DOG TAGS PICKED UP BY AMER PT BOATS AT BALINGASAG.

15 Apr.            VARIOUS JAP TRAINING MATERIALS, PHOTOGRAPHS, REFERENCES, BOOKS AND MAPS FORWARDED TO HIGHER HQ. THESE WERE CAPTURED IN MALABANG.

18 Apr.            JAPS MAPS OF MATAMPAY AREA (BLUEPRINT) AND NUROUPI TOWNSITE (TOPOGRAPHIC) FIELD MEMORANDA, WAR DIARIES AND OTHER DOCUMENTS CAPTURED BY GUERRILLA AND FORWARDED TO HIGHER HED.

19 Apr.            11 JAP BOOKLETS, 1 PIECE OF THIN WOCD WITH JAP CHARACTERS AND LOOSE PAPERS CAPTURED BY GUERRILLA TROPPS DURING DIPOLOG OPERATIONS FORWARDED TO HIGHER HEADQUARTERS.

Enemy Airfields

The Philippines are strategically located to render convenient airstrikes against allied positions in the Pacific area. They also afford protective screening for their own lines of defenses and operation on areas bordering the China Sea.

Mindanao Air Power Of Enemy Must Be Watched

For offensive reasons as well as purely defensive, it was important to the American forces that close and careful surveillance be given by intelligence agents and this Headquarters to enemy airfields : construction of new fields; improvements of old; locations of revetments, military installations relating to airfield use, and last but equally important a constant report of plane traffic on fields in operation.

Agents Work Right On Fields

The Japanese needed, and needed badly, Filipino laborers, mechanics and others to work on their airfields…many hastily constructed or improved, when they began to realize the fast tempo of the American forces advances, under the shrewd tactics of Gen MACARTHUR. It was therefore possible to place many agents on jobs with the Japs. At Licanan Airfield one such agent was a surveyor. He drew all the airfield plans…and always made a copy of them to smuggle out through another agent, perhaps a loyal truck driver.

Through this means, the intelligence was getting so fine that we even knew how many truckloads of gravel were needed to fill one crater hole, and how many laborers were needed to complete the job. At Matina Airfield, it took 200 laborers one full day to fill one bomb crater!

The following excerpts from a few radio messages serve to illustrate how GHQ, SWPA, and the American Air Force was informed on every phase of airfield activity:

1944:

8 Jul                HANGARS AT SASA AND NAVY YARDS CAMOUFLAGED WITH COCONUT AND NIPA. ALL AIRFIELDS PROVIDED WITH AA PROTECTION. GASOLINE STORED AROUND EDGE OF FIELD.

18 Jul              MALABANG HAS 80 PLANES SHELTERS LOCATED OUTSIDE OF RUNWAYS NEAR SEA EXTENDING NORTH. BUAYAN HAS 10 RUNWAYS, ANOTHER EAST DIRECTION ARE 12 AA GUNS, 37 MM AND 8 INCH CANNON.

25 Jul              JAP SEAPLANE BASE NOW AT MALALAG IN ADDITION TO PADADA.

24 Nov            JAP PLANE ASSEMBLY AT BATUTITIK. OVER 90 PLANES ASSEMBLED THERE: HIDDEN AND DISPERSED AS FAR AS 2 KMS FROM FIELD. FIELD LOCATED 2 KMS WEST OF BATUTITIK BARRIO.

10 Dec             27 JAP PLANES HIDDEN IN TUNNELS AT MINDANAO FIELD AT ZAMBOANGA. 7 TORPEDO PLANES, ONE FIGHTER, ONE DIVE BOMBER AND 17 TWIN ENGINE BOMBERS.

23 Oct             FIVE ZEKE FIGHTERS PASSED NIGHT AT LUMBIA MISAMIS ORIENTAL FIELD, WENT SOUTH NEXT DAY CAME FROM NORTH. HABITUAL FOR NIP PLANES TO LAND AT DUSK AT LUMBIA AND TAKE OFF EARLY NEXT MORNING.

1945:

9 Feb               REMAINING 5 PURSUITS AT LUMBIA NOW LOCATED IN COCO GROVES JUST EAST OF TALAKAG-CAGAYAN ROAD AT KM 8. THIS IS ALONG EAST BOUNDARY LUMBIA FIELD.

10 Feb             NO PLANE ASSEMBLY SHOP AT LICAMAN AIRFIELD. PLANES ARRIVE ALREADY IN FLYING CONDITION. SMALL PORTABLE REPAIR SHOP COMPOSED OF 3 LATHES, 6 FEET, 10 FEET AND 12 FEET. 2 SMALL HAND BLOWERS FOR BLACKSMITHING AND IRON WORK. REPAIR DONE AT HANGAR ON RUNWAY WHERE NEEDED.

17 Feb             AIRPLANE REPAIR SHOP LOCATED WEST SIDE NR 1 RUNWAY LICANAN AIRFIELD APPROX 90 METERS FROM SOUTH END RUNWAY CITED. 2ND LIKE SHOP SPOTTED APPROX 100 METERS NORTH OF 1ST CITED.

12 Feb             FOUR ENEMY PLANES WARMED UP AT LUMBIA TODAY. THEY ARE HIDDEN IN DENSE WOODS 1500 METERS AT 15 DEGREES FROM MUNICIPAL BUILDING LUMBIA.

22 Feb             BETWEEN LIBBY FIELD AND NATIONAL ROAD ARE 28 PLANE SHELTERS BUILT OF WOOD AND STONE. 28 PLANES COUNTED BY AGENT ON 12 FEB. GAS BURIED AT ALL FUR CORNERS OR ROAD JUNCTION. GOING FROM LIBBY

FIELD AND CROSSING NATIONAL ROAD.

2 Mar              27 PLANES AT LICANAN AIRFIELD DAVAO AND 82 AT MATINA AIRFIELD.

31 Mar            6 PLANES HIDDEN AT BALUAN, 100 METERS EAST OF CREEK AND 700 METERS FROM SARANGANI BEACH. BALUAN IS JUST NORTH OF BUAYAN. JAPS ARE VERY CAUTIOUS THIS AREA. FILIPINOS RESTRICTED,

Road Spotters

Only two highways on the island of Mindanao offered suitable road surface for mechanized units – the Sayre and National Highways…and even these were by no means ideal for heavy traffic or bulky vehicles. It was an easy matter then to keep a careful check on enemy vehicle traffic; also troop movement on these two highways.

Lookout At Sumilao:

In August 1944 a 24-hour lookout post was established in a strategic position at Sumilao, Bukidnon, which overlooked the Sayre Highway. Traffic to and from Bugo on the Mindanao coast, through Del Monte to points south on Sayre Highway…Malaybalay, Valencia, etc., had to pass this point in the highway.

A radio station was located as near the lookout position as security would permit and radio messages were sent daily…sometimes as “flashes” when the occasion demanded. During the month of Nov 1944 alone a total of 216 Japanese trucks were observed going north; 255 counted going south. A few of the typical daily radio messages are reproduced below:

25 Oct. ‘44      18 TRUCKS WENT NORTH AND 12 WENT SOUTH. CARGO UNIDENTIFIED

25 Oct. ’44       99 TRUCKS WENT SOUTH LOADED WITH TROOPS. 31 TRUCKS WENT NORTH EMPTY.

6 Dec. ‘44       17 TRUCKS WENT SOUTH LOADED WITH TROOPS: 60 TRUCKS WENT

NORTH LOADED WITH UNKNOWN CARGO.

18 Apr. ’45      64 TRUCKS WENT NORTH AND 49 SOUTH.

28 Apr. ’45      ENEMY TRUCK TRAFFIC CONTINUES. FOR PERIOD OF 3 DAYS A TOTAL OF 42 TRUCKS WENT NORTH AND 101 TRUCKS WENT SOUTH. OF THESE 68 MOVED BY DAY AND 75 BY NIGHT. TRUCKS GOING NORTH USUALLY

EMPTY WHILE THOSE GOING SOUTH ALL LOADED WITH TROOPS.

LOOKOUT AT BANCUD (15 Kms. South of Malaybalay): A lookout position in this spot, while covering the same Sayre Highway, gave

the opportunity for a double check and an indication of the activity at Malaybalay proper. Apparently many of the trucks reported from Sumilao post never did go farther than Malaybalay for during the same month of November only 127 trucks were reported as going north; 57 as going south, from the Bancud lookout position.

LOOKOUT ON NATIONAL HIGHWAY DAVAO AREA:

It was much more difficult to maintain lookout positions in the very heavily garrisoned Davao areas However an observer was stationed at Km 20, North of Davao City, along the National Highway. Reports were rendered daily by radio, supplemented by written report covering more details. The following traffic for period of 24 days from 13 Dec 1944 to 5 Jan 1945 as follows:

GOING NORTH:

OFFICERS – 65; TROOPS – 773; JAP CIVILIAN LABORERS – 365; FILIPINO LABORERS – 56; TRUCKLOAD OF PULVERIZED

ROCK – 58; TRUCKLOAD OF BOARD – 71; TRUCKLOAD OF FOODSTUFF – 65; TRUCKLOAD OF GALVANIZED IRON – 7;

TRUCKLOAD OF FUEL – 4; TRUCKLOAD OF SCRAP IRON – 1; TRUCKLOADOF FURNITURE – 2; TRUCKLOAD OF UNIDENTIFIED EQUIPMENT -7; AND A TOTAL OF 415 CARGO TRUCKS AND 49 CARS.

GOING SOUTH:

OFFICERS – 65; TROOPS – 720; JAPANESE CIVILIAN LABORERS 239; FILIPINO LABORERS – 104; TRUCKLOAD OF

PULVERIZED ROCK – 46; TRUCKLOAD OF BOARD – 23; TRUCKLOAD OF GALVANIZED IRON – 2; TRUCKLOAD OF FOODSTUFF – 20; TRUCKLOAD OF SCRAP IRON – 2; TRUCKLOAD OF OIL DRUMS – 5; TRUCKLOAD OF FURNITURE – 2; 25 JAP CIVILIANS AND A TOTAL OF 375 CARGO TRUCKS AND 4l CARS.

Enemy Plane Traffic

In July 1944…about a month prior to the first bombing in the Philippines by American planes…instructions were received emphasizing the need for “flash” reporting of enemy air traffic. An established procedure or reporting was given…and this disseminated by radio to all divisions…all stations. This included not only Mindanao but the Visayas as well, in accordance with orders from GHO, SWPA.

Flashes In Australia…5 Minutes After Plane Sightings

With the net control station of the Tenth Military District on a “24-hour stand-by” and with a separate circuit direct to American Air Force Headquarters, enemy plane traffic could be flashed from original spotter, through intermediate net, then from net control to the Air Force…in an average of 5 minutes, Messages were in code, but in clear text…short but complete…and followed the following procedure:

“20 JULY 44 = YOU WILL REPORT TO FTAW IMMEDIATELY UPON DETECTION INFO CONCERNING AIRCRAFT FLIGHTS IN THE FOLLOWING SEQUENCE:

AIRCRAFT WARNING INDICATOR, YOUR CALL SIGN, MESSAGE LETTER TIME OF OBSERVATION, HOW DETECTED, DISTANCE, DIRECTION, COURSE, NUMBER OF PLANES, TYPE, IDENTITY, ALTITUDE. AIRCRAFT WARNING INDICATOR IS AW REPEATED TWICE TO INDICATE FLIGHT REPORT FOLLOWS.

YOUR NORMAL STATION CALL SIGN. MESSAGE LETTERS START WITH A FOR FIRST REPORT THEN B AND SO THRU ALPHABET TO Z WHEN A IS USED AGAIN. TIME IS REPORT BY 2 NUMBERS INDICATING MINUTES PAST HOUR WHEN FLIGHT DETECTED, HE HOUR IS SHOWN BY THE DATE TIME GROUP OF THE MESSAGE HEADING CONSEQUENTLY HOUR USED IN HEADING MUST BE SAME HOUR AS THAT WHICH FLIGHT DETECTED. METHOD OF DETECTION INDICATED BY IV FOR FLIGHT SEEN AND IA FOR FLIGHT HEARD. DISTANCE IN MILES SHOWN BY 2 NUMBERS OO BEING OVERHEAD AND 99 UNKNOWN. DIRECTION FROM YOUR STATION INDICATED BY SINGLE NUMBER, 7 FOR NORTHEAST, 2 FOR WEST, 7 FOR NORTHWEST, 4 FOR SOUTH, 5 FOR SOUTHWEST, 6 FOR WEST, 3 FOR SOUTHEAST AND 8 FOR NORTH. ZERO MEANS FLIGHT OVERHEAD AND 99 INDICATING TAKING OFF OR LANDING, DISTINCTION BEING MADE BY PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF SUBSEQUENT NORMAL REPORTS. COURSE IN INDICATED BY SINGLE NUMBER AS FOR DIRECTION, ZERO INDICATING FLIGHT CIRCLING. NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT EXPRESSED BY 2 NUMBERS, ZERO ZERO INDICATES NUMBER UNKNOWN.

TYPE AIRCRAFT EXPRESSED BY SINGLE LETTER. P FOR FIGHTER, B IS BOMBER, C FOR TRANSPORT AND X MEANS TYPE UNKNOWN. F FOR FRIENDLY, H FOR HOSTILE AND X FOR UNKNOWN. ALTITUDE IN THOUSANDS OF FEET EXPRESSED BY 2 NUMBERS, 00 MEANS HEIGHT UNKNOWN. FOLLOWING IS A SAMPLE REPORT:

‘AWAW WOO ABLE ZERO THREE ITEM VICTOR ZERO SEVEN THREE FOUR ZERO NINE BAKER HOW ZERO FIVE’

AWAW IS WARNING INDICATOR, WOO IS STATION CALL SIGN, ABLE IS MESSAGE LETTER, ZERO THREE SHOWS THAT FLIGHT DETECTED 3 MINUTES PAST HOUR USED IN MESSAGE HEADING, ITEM VICTOR MEANS FLIGHT SEEN, ZERO SEVEN THAT FLIGHT 7 MILES FROM YOUR STATION, FOUR INDICATES PLANES PROCEEDING SOUTH, ZERO NINE SHOWS PLANES IN FLIGHT, BAKER MEANS TWO ENGINER BOMBER, FIVE INDICATES 5000 FOOT ALTITUDE.”

A Few Of The Radio Flashes

Translated from code to understandable English, there follows a few of the many hundreds of plane flashes sent thru the 10th MD radio net

1943:

19 Dec.            5 ENEMY BOMBERS ESCORTED BY 19 PURSUITS PASSED OVER MISAMIS ORIENTAL. IN THE AFTERNOON 17 FIGHTERS PASSED SAME AREA FLYING FROM NORTH TO SOUTH.

1944:

20 Jan.             50 PURSUITS PASSED OVER SULU SEA GOING NORTH.

23 Mar.           FLIGHTS OF 6 TO 9 BOMBERS FROM PATAG AIRFIELD PATROLLING MACAJALAR BAY FOR LAST 3 DAYS.

1 Apr.              FLIGHT OF 11 HEAVY BOMBERS, ALL TWIN ENGINED, AND 4 SINGLE MOTORED FIGHTERS, PASSED MALITA HEADING TOWARDS DAVAO.

6 Apr.             ONE JAP BOMBER WAS OBSERVED FLYING AT ABOUT 200 FT GOING NORTHEAST OVER CABADBARAN AT 8:00 AM SIGHTED FROM MAGALLANES, AGUSAN.

18 Apr.            11 RED PURSUIT PLANES PASSED CAGAYAN. INSIGNIA: WHITE SKULL AND CROSS BONES BOTH SIDES OF FUSELAGE AND ON WINGS. APPEARED TO BE NARAJIMA PURSUIT. ONE BOMBER ESCORTED BY FIGHTERS PASSED OVER PANGUIL BAY AT 9:30 AM.

11 Jun.             9 PATROL PLANES, SINGLE ENGINED, APPARENTLY WITH FIXED LANDING GEAR OBSERVED PASSING OVER TALAKAG, BUKIDNON, GOING NORTH.

14 Jun.             ONE BOMBER ESCORTED BY 6 PURSUITS PASSED EAST TO SOUTHEAST OVER OPOL, MISAMIS ORIENTAL.

22 Jun.             16 PLANES, BOMBERS AND FIGHTERS, PASSED NORTHWEST TO SOUTHEAST

OVER CAMIGUIN ISLAND.

27 Jun.             8 PLANES, ZEKE TYPE, PASSED OVER LAS NIEVES, AGUSAN.

2 Jul.               LARGE NUMBERS OF JAP PLANES, BOMBERS AND FIGHTERS PASSED OVER BALINGASAG, ORIENTAL MISAMIS.

14 Jul.             1000 – 1 MEDIUM BOMBER FLEW OVER OPOL TO NORTHWEST. 1430 – 1 MEDIUM BOMBER FLEW OVER OPOL TO WEST.

16 Jul.             1230 – 5 FIGHTERS PASSED OVER CAGAYAN, MISAMIS ORIENTAL TO NORTH.

17 Jul.             1100 – 3 MEDIUM BOMBERS ESCORTED BY 7 PURSUITS ARRIVED DAVAO FROM NORTH.

Bombing Results Reported

FIRST BOMBING – 6 AUGUST 1944: The very first bombing of a target in the Philippines by American planes, occurred 6 August 1944, when two bombs were dropped in Davao area  one near Santa Ana wharf, killing three Jap navy men; the other in the water nearby. This how= ever, was no criterion of the bombing and strafing effectiveness to follow – and the months of September and October 19); in particular, saw many American planes in action on Mindanao, insistently pinpointing enemy military installations, ships, airfield, planes, troops and many other targets which this Headquarters had reported by radio to Ge2, GHW, SWPA, over a period of months.

The need for factual reporting on bombing and strafing results was equally as important as sending data on new targets. Ail intelligence agents were instructed to give high priority to this new phase of intelligence reporting. Many hundreds of radio messages on bombing results were received from the many strategically located radio stations on Mindanao. A few, taken at random from our Intelligence Summaries are quoted below; along with an interesting report of the bombing effectiveness in the Hinatuan Bay, East: Coast area on 9 Sept 19h.

1944:

10 Sept:           AMERICAN BOMBERS BOMBED AND STRAFED LANDING FIELD AND TRUCKS ALONG NATL HIWAY SURIGAO X RESULTS DASH 9 VESSELS SUNK, INCLUDING 6 TRANSPORTS, 30 MOTORBOATS, 1 LANDING BARGE, 1 QUEEN BOAT X TRANSPORTS LOADED WITH SOLDIERS, KNOWN TO BE ABOUT 1500 WITH BUT FEW SURVIVORS WHO WERE KILLED IN WATER BY LOYAL CIVILIANS IN BAROTOS HITTING THEM OVERHEAD WITH PADDLES X 50 MULES DESTROYED AND 12 SALVAGED X 19 TRUCKS DISABLED ON HIWAY X BOXES OF AMMO, FOODSTUFF, GASOLINE DRUMS AND SOME FIELD GUNS DESTROYED AT WHARF.

14-15 Sept.      PILOTS QUARTERS, MOTOR POOL, TWO LARGE WAREHOUSES, TWO SHIPS FUEL TANKS UNDER ACACIA TREES, ALL ZAMBOANGA, DESTROYED BY AMERICAN PLANE BOMBINGS.

24 Sep.            SURVIVORS OF MUNKEIN MARU, NOW CONFINED, STATE THAT THEIR SHIP WAS DAMAGED BY PLANES AND SUNK BY SUBMARINES ON 9 SEPT. THEY CLAIMED 400 WERE ON SHIP WITH BUT FEW SURVIVORS.

27 Sep.            3 TRANSPORTS SUNK BETWEEN BONGO ISLAND AND COTABATO CITY. 600 NIPS DEAD AND 200 NIPS SURVIVED X 22 CAPTURED BY OUR TROOPS AT ONE SPOT X.

18 Oct.            11 PLANES DESTROYED SUPPLY DUMPS AT TAMONTAKA, COTABATO AND 1 LAUNCH AND 2 BARGES NEARBY. 2 LAUNCHES BURNED AND MANY JAPS.

2 Dec.              16 TRUCKS AND 2 BOMBERS BURNED, 50 NABY TROOPS KILLED AT MATINA AIRFIELD.

1945:

13 Apr.            TWO SUBMARINES SUNK AT PANAKAN WHARF THESE WERE TIED UP AT WHARF EFFECTIVELY CAMOUFLAGED, REPORTED BY OUR AGENTS AND AIR PHOTOS SUBSEQUENTLY PINPOINTED X PERISCOPE WAS CAMOUFLAGED AND HIDDEN BETWEEN GASOLINE DRUMS.

14 May            6 JAP TORPEDO BOATS WERE SUNK OFF PISO PT BEACH THIS SAME AREA STRAFED RESULTING IN DESTRUCTION OF 2 FUEL DUMPS AND 2 AMMO DUMPS. THESE TARGETS WERE CONSTANTLY REPORTED FROM DEC ’44 UNTIL DATE THEY WERE DESTROYED.

NOTE            DURING THE MONTHS OF AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER, 19hh, MILITARY TARGETS IN DAVAO CITY ONLY WERE BOMBED YET DUE TO ACCURATE REPORTING OF TARGETS OVER ONE HALF OF CITY IS STILL INTACT, YET ALL MILITARY TARGETS WERE DESTROYED.

“Jap Convoy Annihilated In Hinatuan Bay, Surigao”

“At about 5 o’clock in the morning of 9 Sept 1944, planes were heard from the town on Bislig. From the eyewitness view point, three groups of planes approx. fifty in number were seen over the bay. A few minutes later, explosions were heard and the planes were seen diving by twos. Smoke then rose up from behind the point of Maribojoc. ‘The whole bay of Bislig can be viewed clearly on top of a mountain in sitio Papay. The eyewitness, together with other people went to this favorable position and from there saw big ships, steel vessels with two funnels, some in flames and some covered with thick and black smoke, There were twenty-six of these vessels including two that looked like destroyers and approx. fifty small vessels. The planes continued bombing and strafing for three or four hours which returned the fire. One plane was shot down.

During this attack, the large steel ships remained out in deep water and the smaller vessels which were 200 to 250 ton wooden ships, powered with diesel engines, scattered for shelter behind Macaburom and Mawis Islands. At about 9:00 or 10:00 AM, six US warships were noticed on the horizon, heading towards Hinatuan Bay. A few minutes later, the ships moved to the warships – two big ones and four smaller ones. When they were opposite Marlboro Pt, they opened fire on the Japs vessels, some of which were already burning. All were hit, and subsequently sunk. The warships withdrew and headed south. Only fifty survivors managed to reach Mawis Island. They were picked up by a Jap launch. Not a single Jap ship escaped the bombing and shelling.”

Roads And Trails

Japs Attempt To Keep New Trails Secret:

Among the varied activities undertaken by the enemy in an all-out effort to strengthen their defenses, especially in the Davao area, was the construction of roads and trails to the interior and in the interior sectors.

These were calculated to hasten the movement of troops and equipment in the event of American Landings and subsequent withdrawals. These new trails and roads were so linked together in the Davao area, that they provided an orderly withdrawal of troops and equipment to alternate interior defense positions.

Construction of these trails were naturally meant to be secret…but to construct a road, build a bridge, or erect a building in the Philippines without the knowledge of the native people would be something next to impossible. Trails were made rather narrow, and advantage taken of overhead foliage, to prevent spotting by reconnaissance planes. However, in spite of all precautions, there was not a new Japanese trail that was not subsequently reported by loyal civilians and our agents.

Maps Valuable To American Ground Forces:

Very few accurate maps were available for use by American tactical forces and none of them indicated the trails and roads built since the days of Pearl Harbor. Consequently guerilla maps furnished by the Intelligence Section were of great value…and actually reproduced for distribution to all units concerned.

Such a map is the one of the “DAVAO INTERIOR SECTOR” included with this report. This shows a maze of roads and trails non-existent on any map in the hands of  the American forces. Neither did reconnaissance photos bring out all these trails b0u0t this map obviously became important in the Davao Kibawe-Talomo Trail encounters.

In other sectors on Mindanao, the enemy attempted to construct similar trails of withdrawal and secondary positions. The Malungon Trail, connecting Sarangani Bay area with that of Padada or southern Davao is a good example. However, this trail was never used effectively, due to the enemy being cut off from Digos due to rapid advance of American forces.

Following are a few radio messages released to higher Headquarters concerning new trails, roads and important. changes:

1944:

26 Oct.            FROM LIBONA, BUKIDNON, NIPS HAVE BACK TRAILS TO SOUTH.

31 Oct.            ROAD UNDER CONSTRUCTION NORTHWESTERN DAVAO AREA PASSES THRU GUMALANG, UPPER BIAO, MONGON KULAPU AND UPIAN TO BALATUKAN WHERE IT CONNECTS WITH THE PROVINCIAL ROAD THAT WAS CONSTRUCTED BEFORE THE WAR. PACK ANIMALS ARE USED FOR CARRYING EQUIPMENT FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION PURPOSES.

Oct.                 NIPS IN CAGAYAN IMPROVING BACK TRAILS THRU LIBONA, MAMPAYAG, DALWANGAN, AS POSSIBLE MEANS OF RETREAT.

Oct.                 NIPS HAVE ESTABLISHED ESCAPE ROUTE THRU PASONANGA RIVER TOWARDS WEST COAST. THEY ARE ALSO MOVING SUPPLIES TO CAPISAN.

1945:

10 Feb.            ALL BRIDGES BETWEEN SANTIAGO AND MAGPAYANG BEING REBUILT.

18 Feb.            ENEMY FINISHED ROAD CONNECTING SASA AIRFIELD WITH KM 8 CABANTIAN BUHANGIN ROAD

26 Feb.            NEW ROUTES OF WITHDRAWAL ENEMY TROOPS SOUTH DAVAO AREA INFORMED OF WIDENED TRAILS ABOUT 6 METERS WIDE, 1 FROM MATINA SECTOR (KM 2.6) GOING NORTH TO CATALUNAN GRANDE THEN TO MINTAL COMPLETED ABOUT 31 JANUARY. 2ND FROM SIBULAN (KM 30 SOUTH HIGHWAY) PASSING EAST OF INAWAYAN, EAST OF CATIGAN DIRECT TO BAYABAS THEN TO MANUEL PLANTATION (ABOUT KMS WEST OF NAMING).

28 Mar, BRIDGES FROM KM 6h to 66 (AGUSAN-SURIGAO BOUNDARY) UNDER REPAIR.

16 Jun. A NEW 17 KM TRAIL HAS BEEN COMPLETED FROM TULI TO SALAYSAY ALONG NORTH SIDE OF KIBAWE-CALINAN ROAD AND ANOTHER 11 KM TRAIL FROM JUNCTION OF TULI AND SUWAWAN RIVER TO UPIAN MOUNTAINS.

COMPOSITE INTELLIGENCE REPORT

When the Americans landed at Leyte, 20 Oct 1944, they considered sending a force to Surigao, to protect that flank. However, the 6th Army called for a representative of the Tenth Military District, to present facts on that forward and the rear areas as well.

Maj HAROLD A. ROSENQUIST, AC of S, G-2, who had just spent some time in the Surigao area obtaining marine and land mine information before the landing of American forces in Leyte, was dispatched by Col FERTIG to Leyte by PT boat.

A complete report was prepared and submitted to G-2, 6th Army. It is reproduced herewith for it graphically illustrates the intelligence reporting all over the island which made this report possible. On the basis of this report, and the ability of FERTIG’s guerrillas to hold the enemy in check, it was decided not to make a landing in Surigao.

UNITED STATES FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES

Headquarters Tenth Military District

In the Field

7 November 1944

l. Summary Of The Enemy Situation:

a. MINDANAO as a Whole: The Island of MINDANAO is being divided into a forward and a rear area for purposes of discussion, and forward area comprising all territory N of a line running E and W from LIANGA (SURIGAO) to, but not including, CAGAYAN (MISAMIS ORIENTAL), and the rear area comprising the remainder of the Island. As of 30 Oct 1944 enemy strength in MINDANAO was estimated as follows:

AGUSAN                                           350

BUKIDNON                                      4,400

COTABATO                                      16,000

DAVAO                                             25,000

LANAO                                              500

MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL                100

MISAMIS ORIENTAL                     3,500

SURIGAO                                          1,800

ZAMBOANGA                                 5,700

                                                            _______

Total                                                    57, 350

be. Enemy Activity in Forward Area: Enemy garrisons as of 30 Oct. were located as follows:

AGUSAN                                           150

NASIPIT                                 150

BUTUAN                               60

MISAMIS ORIENTAL

TALISAYAN                         100

ANAKAN                              50

SURIGAO

SURIGAO TOWN                 200

MABUHUAY                        500

ANAMAR                              250

BADAS                                  100

MADRID                               400

TANDAG                               100

                                                            _____

 Total                                                   1,910

Garrisons at NASIPIT, BUTUAN, TANDAG and MADRID are at present confined or being attacked by guerrilla troops of the 119th and ll4th Regt, of the 110th Division. The enemy garrison at ANAKAN was reported as having moved to CAGAYAN by barge. At present those garrisons are on the defensive as a result of the orders from the Headquarters of the Tenth Military District to confine and eliminate them. These guerrillas can contain the enemy by land, but the sea approaches remain open to him; by the use of barges and motor launches the Japs can, therefore, freely move their troops. The enemy garrisons are limited in their function to very short patrols. ‘There are four airfields in the forward area: At SURIGAO, BADAS, MALPOK (near BUTUAN) and ANAKAN (near GINGOOG). These are fighter strips, but they are not in use.

c. Enemy Activity in Rear Area: Since the first of September the Japs have been concentrating on a strong defense of the BUKIDNON VALLEY area, including the SAYRE HIGHWAY leading to DAVAO, COTABATO and CAGAYAN seaports.

Indications were that the Japs moved many troops S (7,000 from SURIGAO during the months of August and September) to establish a highly mobile island reserve straddling the N, S and W approaches to the above named ports. Enemy troops are therefore in a position rapidly to reinforce strategic points as these are threatened except in AGUSAN and SURIGAO. The most recent troop movement was that to the city of KABAKAN (COTABATO) pf approximately 8,000 troops. This movement may account for the sudden drop of 8,000 troops in the strength estimates for BUKIDNON. Besides the movement of 120 truckloads of troops to the N along the SAYRE HIGHWAY, the enemy continues to move troops to the S. According to a PW from the hist Regt, 30th Div, captured at CARAGARA (LEYTE) 31 October, the hist Regt arrived at CAGAYAN 2h October from the S and left CAGAYAN on three unidentified destroyers 26 October, arriving at ORMOC (LEYTE) on 27 October.

In DAVAO PROVINCE the tendency has been to bivouac away from the city, from military installations and other bombing targets; such troops are concentrated in areas to the W of DAVAO CITY near MT APO. No explanation can now be given for the increase in troop strength (an increase of 3,600 during the month of October) in ZAMBOANGA, all concentrated in the vicinity of ZAMBOANGA CITY. Guerrillas occupy or control over three-fourths of this province.

d. Installations, Fortifications, Supplies:

(1) Roads and Trails: When still in control of the AGUSAN and SURIGAO areas, the enemy improved the MAYGATASAN TRAIL, thus providing an outlet from BUTUAN via the AGUSAN RIVER to LIANGA, and at the same time providing an outlet from DAVAO by means-of the National Highway via the AGUSAN RIVER to the MAYGATASAN TRAIL.

(2) Bridges: In the forward area the greater number of the bridges, most covering culverts and small rivers, are either usable or can be replaced. The enemy recently destroyed the bridge between SURIGAO and IPIL (SURIGAO). The large bridge at MAGPAYOS, south of BADAS (AGUSAN), was destroyed by the flood of 20 October. ‘The bridge at SANTIAGO (AGUSAN) is out, one bridge between MADRID and LANUZA. These bridges can be repaired where necessary through the cooperation of the local inhabitants. The small bridges would require little time, the larger much more, for repair, depending upon the available materials.

(3) Fortifications: The usual practice of the enemy is to install barbed wire entanglements, foxholes, and trenches around the garrisoned area. Each garrison has one or more .30 cal MGs covering the main approaches. The recent reports state that there are barbed wire entanglements along the shore from the wharf to the river’s mouth in SURIGAO CITY. There was also an un- confirmed report that land mines are planted on the beach at the mouth of the SURIGAO RIVER. Defensive areas have recently been strengthened from Km 1 to Km 3 (immediately S of the city proper).

(4) Artillery: It has been reported that two 75 mm guns are located within SURIGAO CITY and three at PT BILAA. However, the Japs have recently evacuated PT BILAA and the whereabouts of these guns is not known. A report stated that they had been removed to MADRID but it was not verified.

The Japs make constant and effective use of knee mortars and 8l-mm mortars in keeping guerrilla units at a distance. There are no known AA guns in the forward area.

(5) Armor:

Reports indicate that three tanks are located at BUGO near CAGAYAN.

(6) Underwater Obstacles:

A marine mine field was reported extending from PT BILAA in a northerly direction to a point 100 yards off shore. Boats beyond this point proceeded without escort. Local inhabitants found some floating mines on the E coast shores of SURIGAO. These mines were 1 yard in diameter, with eight acid detonators, were painted black, loaded with citric acid powder, and laid at a depth of from two to three meters. Some mines had red flags to indicate position; they are reported by these inhabitants to break away from their moorings easily.

(7) Supplies:

In SURIGAO PROVINCE only 80% of the Japs are armed, the rest having lost their equipment during large scale bombings of 9 September or being survivors from ships sunk during recent naval battles. In this province the enemy is better equipped with food supplies than in AGUSAN where it had become necessary to rely on local sources, especially on fish from native fishermen.

2. GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES:

During the month of October, following approval of GHQ, SWPA, aggressive action was taken to contain and where possible, to eliminate enemy garrisons. In the forward area at present, as suggested above, the garrisons at NASIPIT and BUTUAN (AGUSAN) are, except for the sea approaches, definitely surrounded. In SURIGAO PROVINCE enemy is being engaged at MADRID, but reinforcements have been received here, and consequently guerrilla activity is limited to harassing attacks only. No large scale offensive action has been taken against the Headquarters garrison at MABUHUAY, principally because of a lack of sufficient mortars and mortar ammunition.

During the first nine months of 1944, a total of 3,916 Japanese were killed by guerrilla forces of the Tenth Military District.

From the time of the original organization of guerrilla units in the Tenth Military District, special emphasis has been placed on the following activities:

a. The establishment of coast watcher systems.

b. The building of intelligence nets for the obtaining of data including facts about troop concentrations and movements, air and water-borne traffic, and airfield installations. Radio communications were installed for the dissemination of such intelligence whenever the equipment was available.

Moreover, the guerrilla units established food projects, and so contributed substantially to the solution of the food problem in a number of areas.

3. ENEMY CAPABILITIES:

The enemy is capable of:

a. Maintaining a static defense of MINDANAO: Although there does not seem to be any logical reason for the Japs to maintain a static defense of MINDANAO, there have been some indications of recent enemy movement to the S. This would seem to indicate that the Japs intend to continue their policy of keeping a mobile inland reserve for the defense of the Island.

b. Defending the N and the NE coasts There have been no indications that the enemy intends to defend the N and the NE coast. Troops have been moved N to CAGAYAN but none has been moved to the E from there. Some enemy troops have been landed along the E coast of SURIGAO PROVINCE at TANDAG and MADRID but these were small in number and some may have been survivors from ships that were sunk.

c. Evacuating troops to BORNEO via ZAMBOANGA: It is possible for the enemy to evacuate his troops to BORNEO via COTABATO and ZAMBOANGA. The constantly fluctuating enemy strength in ZAMBOANGA would suggest that this province has been used as a staging area for troops. Then enemy has been known to stage troops through ZAMBOANGA to COTABATO, and thence to BUKIDNON or DAVAO. Obviously this route could also be used in reverse. During the months of September and October enemy strength in COTABATO PROVINCE increased by approximately 10,000 troops. These probably were scheduled to reinforce the mobile inland reserve in BUKIDNON. It may be that since the American landing on LEYTE they are being held until the enemy can decide which course of action to follow.

d. Moving troops N to CAGAYAN and attempting to reinforce LEYTE: The enemy has already moved the bulk of the List Regt. 30th Div, N to CAGAYAN and by boat to LEYTE. During the last week in October a total of 120 truckloads of Japs were seen moving N to CAGAYAN; these probably were the list Regt and an additional 600 troops that left CAGAYAN by boat for an unknown destination (probably LEYTE). However, there have been no further indications of any attempts to strengthen CAGAYAN or to send troops there from the S.

e. The evacuation of troops by the enemy from CAGAYAN to the WESTERN VISAYAS remains a capability of the enemy, but no reports have been received that would indicate such a maneuver.

/s/ Harold A. Rosenquist

/t/ HAROLD A. ROSENQUIST,

Captain, FA.,

AC of S, G-2

Invasion*Occupation*Liberation : World War II tales from the Xavier Ateneo Heritage Preservation Zone

Xavier University – Ateneo de Cagayan (Xavier Ateneo) and the National Historical Commission of the Philippines (NHCP) are establishing a Historical Preservation Zone within the Downtown campus with eight school buildings with “exceptional and historical significance” that the NHCP will honor with a historical marker in 2033 when the university marks it centennial.

XU was established by the Jesuits in 1933 and is the first Ateneo school in the country to be granted “university status” (in 1958), making it also the first ever university in Mindanao.

As we celebrate the 80th Anniversary of the Liberation of Cagayan de Oro (then known as Cagayan de Misamis) on May 12, 2025, let’s look back at the history of three of these eight buildings which played a significant role in Cagayan’s history during the Second World War.

The construction of the (now called) Xavier, Campion, and Lucas Hall took place from 1935 to 1938. Each of these buildings plays a crucial role in the university’s operations and reflects the Jesuit values of education, service, and community.

Named in honor of Fr John Lucas, SJ, a Jesuit missionary who was instrumental in the early development of the university, Lucas Hall is one of the oldest buildings which originally contained all the classrooms and offices in the 1940s and the 1950s. The Lucas Hall was a small science building. However, since 1967, Lucas Hall has been used mainly for administration offices.

Named after St Edmund Campion, an English Jesuit martyr, Campion Hall is significant for its role in housing various academic and administrative functions. The hall is used for lectures, seminars, and other educational activities. Its naming pays homage to the Jesuit tradition of education and sacrifice.

Not the least, Xavier Hall typically serves as a central administrative building and is a key location for various university events and gatherings. It is named after St Francis Xavier, one of the co-founders of the Jesuit order and a significant figure in the Catholic missionary movement.

The campus was used as the Northern Mindanao headquarters of the Japanese troops after they entered Cagayan de Oro on May 9, 1942. Lucas Hall, Campion Hall, and Xavier Hall trace their origins before World War II, and following are some vignettes of the people and events which made them significant during the Japanese Invasion and Occupation, and the Liberation by Filipino Guerrillas on May 12, 1945.

Invasion (May 3-9, 1942)

Rev. Fr. James Edward Haggerty, SJ was the Rector of Ateneo de Cagayan in Cagayan de Oro when World War II broke out. He joined the Mindanao Guerillas and later became a key figure in the vast guerrilla movement in Mindanao which earned him the nom de guerre “Guerilla Padre”. He personally met with key figures of the conflict including Gen. Douglas MacArthur at Del Monte, and key leaders of the Mindanao Resistance, which eventually became the largest  and best organized in the Philippines during World War II.

The Ateneo de Cagayan closed on December 9, 1941, and on May 1, 1942 Fr Haggarty “deposited all that could be saved (library, laboratory equipment, school records) from the school in the old mission center of Sumilao. (The library, consisting of some 15,00 volumes was transported to Sumilao by Lt. Jose Villanueva, an Ateneo student, and his men). Unfortunately, on October 21, 1944, “the house in Sumilao, where the library had been stored, collapsed due to heavy rains and the collection was destroyed.”

Occupation (May 10, 1942-September 8, 1944)

1st Lt BLAS C. VELEZ wearing his US Army Bronze Star Medal and Philippine Medal of Merit (photo of a painting by Nene Uy)

After the USAFFE Mindanao Force surrendered to the Japanese Imperial Army on May 10, 1942, Dr. Blas C. Velez MD was held as a prisoner-of-war at Camp Casisang, Malaybalay, Bukidnon, and later at the Japanese Imperial Army Headquarters in Ateneo de Cagayan, during which he was recruited as an Intelligence Agent by the 109th Infantry Division to which he furnished valuable information about the enemy’s movements, strength and disposition of troops, their supplies and defenses.

Beyond the Call of Duty

It takes a man with a generous portion of courage to deliberately surrender to the enemy to gain access to intelligence information from his headquarters, but that’s what Velez did when asked by his colleagues in the 109th Division.

“Soon after the surrender of the USAFFE Forces to the Japanese Imperial Army, Dr. Blas C. Velez was under our instructions, directed to surrender at the Japanese Imperial Army Headquarters at the Ateneo de Cagayan, where he became a prisoner of war from August 5, 1942 to September 8, 1944,” attested Maj. Angeles L. Limena in a post-war sworn affidavit.

Capt. Primitivo P. Quiem, the former assistant chief of staff (G-2) of the 109th Division, who was given the task of getting military information and organizing an intelligence network covering the 109th Division area of operations, and in particular, the Japanese Garrison at Cagayan, Misamis Oriental, attested in a post war affidavit he chose Dr. Velez as a member of the intelligence network inside Cagayan “because of his military training, his quality of observation, sharp memory and his reserved demeanor and fortitude in withstanding possible torture should he be caught spying by the enemy.”

“Dr. Blas Velez was able to give out vital information regarding the strength of the Japanese, the Japanese units that were under the command of the Ateneo Garrison; supply situation; patrol activities; types of weapons available; supply dumps; disposition of Japanese troops; morale and others,” Quiem attested.

Although scheduled for execution by the Japanese Kempeitai, he escaped from the Japanese Garrison at Ateneo de Cagayan on Sept. 9, 1944 during the USAAF bombing of Cagayan and volunteered at the Headquarters of the 109th Infantry Division under Col. James Grinstead (AUS) and assigned as Medical Officer of the 111th Regiment, on October 24, 1944, and later promoted to Regimental Surgeon.

Not all spies were so lucky. Before the war Cpl.  Jesus “Jake” Ilogon was a part of the Hydraulics basketball team along with teammates Cox Banquerigo, Romeo Velez, and Ben Rosales who were neighbors at the Parque (Gaston Park.)  Banquerigo was relaying valuable information to the guerrillas, but was betrayed by Rosaleswho was a member of Japanese sponsored Bureau of Constabulary (BC) and imprisoned at the  Ateneo de Cagayan, where he was tortured and beheaded. He was only 16 years old.

Liberation (May 9-12, 1945)

The first recorded bombings of Cagayan by the returning US forces occurred on September 9-10, 1944. In his memoir Guerrilla Padre in Mindanao, Fr Haggerty describes his eyewitness accounts of the day’s events in a chapter titled “The Planes are Ours” (page 218-222)

“It began just as I was finishing Mass-this wonderful day. A roar of planes-many planes-swept over us just before the end of Mass. I turned around and told the congregation to take cover. I unvested and stepped down into a little creek which formed a tunnel. Strangely, I felt no fear this time, although from the number of planes and the nearness of the bombings I though the Japs were beginning a really systematic clean-up of guerrillas.

 To my amazement my boys dashed breathlessly happy down the hill to our gully.

“Our planes! Our planes!” they shouted. “The Jap airfields are both on fire! The planes dived at the wharf of Cagayan! The town is on fire! Ships are exploding in the bay!” 

He further describes seeing great black columns of smoke at the Lumbia Airfield then explosions at the Patag Airfield to the delight of everyone watching the spectacle.

The carrier based raiders returned two more times, and fourteen hours after the first attack, the sky above Cagayan is aglow and a  heavy black pall hangs over the area for  miles.

The American Guerrillas of Mindanao (AGOM) in its unpublished manuscript “History of the Mindanao Guerrillas” (a copy of which was provided to us by the late AGOM President Virginia Hansen Holmes), reported witnessing the flights of American planes coming over Col. Fertig’s new headquarters on the Agusan River Valley.

“On 9 Sept 1944, a large formation of planes flew directly over the encampment. Some arguments arose as to whether they were American or Jap planes. Some claimed having caught glimpses of stars on the wings. Others were pessimistic having been schooled for three years in seeing always a red ball on the planes.”

“But a couple of hours later, messages began pouring in from stations all over Mindanao. Friendly planes! One station reported the actual  bombing practically play by play, of the town of Cagayan, capital of Misamis Oriental. From then on, American planes were continuously flying in large groups over the camp.”

From October 16, 1944 to May 10, 1944 Cagayan and its immediate areas were again attacked by no less than sixteen bombing missions by various elements of the Far East Air Force, SouthWest Pacific Area (FEAF, SoWesPac)

On October 21, 1944, seven B-24 Liberators from the US Army Air Forces’ 22nd  and 43rd Bomb Groups  destroyed the Ateneo de Cagayan, the Macabalan Wharf (Cagayan pier), St. Augustine Church and the Bishop’s House and Convent. Fr. Haggerty’s account of this air raid wasn’t as cherry and ebullient as his first one.

“The next day, October 21st, we saw for the first time flights of Liberators. Explosion after explosion came up the wind to us. As we trotted down the road to home other flights were circling overhead. Those Liberators wrecked the town of Cagayan and its wharves. When the day was over the old transit showed our college in ruins, the century-old cathedral gone, and the lovely house of the Bishop a heap of concrete.

I wrote simply in my diary: “One group of seven Liberators destroyed in fifteen minutes our material labor of fifteen years.  What is now left to show we gave her the best years of our life, unless we look into the souls of our people.”

A mission report filed by elements of the 22nd Bomb Group to which the B-24s belonged said “On October 21st, the government school at Cagayan [sic], doing double duty on the north coast of Mindanao, was destroyed by a wing strike.”  

The following day, October 22nd, another bombing run was conducted by 12 B-24 Liberators of the 43rd Bomb Group on Cagayan.

The mission report succinctly reported how “Due to extensive mechanical problems, only 12 of 18 planes sent by the 43rd made it to Cagayan, but they recorded an excellent bombing run, with seven administrative buildings destroyed in the attack. Among the target buildings was one with a red cross on the roof, which did not deter the bombing crews. One 64th Squadron airman recalled it blew up “like an oil explosion.” 

Filipino Guerrillas Liberate Cagayan

In the History of Mindanao Guerrillas compiled by 10th Military District, Capt. Andres D. Bacal, a Kagay-anon from Carmen, and later alumnus of Ateneo de Cagayan, was cited in the battle report for his prominent role in the liberation of Cagayan.

Andres Daba Bacal was born in Cagayan, Misamis Oriental on 17 October 1917. He joined the guerrillas on 1 November 1942 and is registered with the roster of troops of “A” Co., 1st Battalion, 109th Infantry Regiment as of 30 Nov 1942, and was promoted to Captain, Infantry, effective 16 June 1944 by Lt. Col. Robert V.  Bowler, “A” Corps commanding officer on 16 June 1944.

He served as battalion commander of the 1st Battalion, 109th Infantry Regiment, 109th Division from 10 November 1942 until the liberation. He led  this unit in capturing Patag Airfield on May 9, 1945 and led the advance towards the west side of Cagayan road on 11May 1945 from highway to Patag.

On 12 May, Bacal again led the 1st Battalion in crossing the Cagayan River at the vicinity of the steel bridge (present day Ysalina Bridge at Carmen) which was earlier destroyed by retreating USAFEE forces in 1942. Simultaneously, and the 2nd Battalion also crossed the river at Julao-Julao (present day Consolacion, present day Maharlika Bridge), 3rd Battalion at the Japanese wooden bridge (linking Yacapin street to Lirio Street in Carmen).

By 9:30 AM the whole town was occupied by guerrilla forces and Bacal’s 1st Battalion with the Combat Co attached secured the area from Ateneo de Cagayan to Macasandig to the east bank of Cagayan River from possible Jap counterattacks. Mopping up operations were ordered and after the search, then Cagayan was declared clear from enemy occupants.

Bacal married Portia Abonitalla Chaves on 27 November 1943 in Tignapoloan in the midst of the Second World War, with whom he had five children. He retired from active duty on 17 October 1945, graduated with an AB degree in 1951, and later studied law also at Ateneo de Cagayan but did not pass the  bar exam. He worked for the government afterwards in Manila until May 24, 1965 when he passed away at the relatively young age of 47.

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ECCP exec sees vast tourism potential in PH island destinations

CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, PHILIPPINES – The ongoing upgrades of some of the Philippines key international and trunkline airports are an encouraging development which the country can capitalize on to score a quantum leap in its foreign tourists arrivals.

“The European Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines (ECCP) is closely following the ongoing upgrades of the major gateways, particularly the privatization of various airports in the Philippines,” said Florian Gottein, ECCP Executive Director, on the sidelines of the  ECCP Business Mixer Night held 28 April 2025 (Monday) at a new hotel.

ECCP Executive Director Florian Gottein.

With the theme: Expanding Networks, Creating Brighter Opportunities, the event brought together members of the ECCP Northern Mindanao Chapter for  an evening of meaningful conversations, networking, and business opportunities.

“ASEAN is a very interesting destination not only for investments. but also for tourists,” Gottein noted. “Linking world famous ASEAN island destinations like Bali, Phuket and Sarawak with islands in the Philippines, makes it more affordable and convenient for travelers to stay within the region, instead of going direct from Europe to international gateways like Metro Manila and Metro Cebu.”

The three ASEAN destinations combined for approximately 20 million foreign tourist arrivals in 2024, compared to a paltry 980,996 for Cebu, Bohol and Northern Mindanao over the same period, a mere 5 percent of the three famous ASEAN destinations.

If airlines and tour operators consider including these three emerging VisMin destinations in their tour packages, even a 10% share of their current tourism traffic would already bring in 2 million foreign tourists, or approximately double what they attained in 2024.

CAAP, DOTr, ABOITIZ INFRACAPITAL LEAD LAGUINDINGAN AIRPORT CEREMONIAL AWARD. Aboitiz InfraCapital (AIC) has formally received the notice of award to upgrade, operate, and maintain the Laguindingan Airport in Misamis Oriental. Leading the ceremonial handover last October 11, 2024, at Laguindingan Airport were (from left) Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines Deputy Director-General Danjun G. Lucas, Department of Transportation (DOTr) Undersecretary Roberto C.O. Lim, DOTr Secretary Jaime J. Bautista, AIC President & CEO Cosette V. Canilao, and AIC Vice President-Head for Airports Business Rafael Aboitiz. 

Aboitiz InfraCapital has signed concessionary agreements for the management and expansion of key airports in the Visayas and Mindanao including the Metro Cebu International Airport (MCIA), Laguindingan International Airport in Misamis Oriental, and the Bohol-Panglao International Airport in Bohol.

Gottein remarked that direct air links between these emerging island destinations with those already well-established holds great potential and makes it easier and more convenient for foreign travelers to explore new places at a fraction of the cost of traveling directly from their own countries.

“Of course, the ultimate decision to develop tourist traffic rests with the airlines who will base their decisions on actual passenger traffic growth and trends,” he added.

As of December 17, 2024, the entire Philippines accounted for nearly 5.65 million international visitors, of which 5,175,599 (91.66%) were  foreign tourists, and 470,752 (8.34%) were overseas Filipinos, according to figures from the Department of Tourism (DOT).

However, Gottein cautions that the tourism potential of emerging  island destinations in the Visayas and Mindanao are still constrained by the travel advisories issued now and then by various foreign embassies based in Manila.

Participants to ECCP CDO’s Business Mixer N Night with ECCP Exec Dir Florian Gottein & ECCP CDO Chair Ralph Paguio.

“The Mindanao-wide State of Calamity was only lifted last year. Working further to lift or reduce the adverse travel advisories which will be the basis for further developments will go a long way towards optimizing the tourism potential of these islands,” he added.

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A Shared Journey to raise the Kagay-anon Literary Scene

CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, PHILIPPINES – I recently attended a one day forum urging Kagay-anon writers to have more of their stories published with Kagay-anon publishers to increase awareness about the literary scene in Cagayan de Oro, and couldn’t help but reminiscence about the last four decades I’ve spent spreading the good news about this city I fell in love with.

“We want to revisit the publishing legacy of Cagayan de Oro—through platforms like the Kinaadman Journal, XU Press, the Carayan Journal, and its publishing future like Papel-Papel,” said Abigail “Abby” C James, Director for Creative Development of Nagkahiusang Magsusulat sa Cagayan de Oro (NAGMAC).

 “We want to talk about what’s possible now for writers and researchers who want to get their work out there. We want to listen to those who’ve done it and learn from their experiences. And we want to get our hands messy in the creative process—especially through zine-making, which is such a fun, accessible way to tell stories and share them with others,” she added.

NAGMAC facilitated a one-day seminar-workshop “Writing and Publishing from the City of Gold” on April 26 with the support of the City Government of Cagayan de Oro and special participation from XU Press and Papel-Papel Publishing, in celebration of  National Literature Month with 12 participants from a varied cross-section of the city’s residents.

The 12 workshop participants with organizers from NAGMAC, CDO City Museum and Resouurce Speakers.

Let me raise a toast to this noble undertaking, which resonates with what I’ve been doing these last four decades, spreading the gospel about our dear City of Golden Friendship.

I started on this journey in 1985, forty years to the date when I was the Project Officer of the Cagayan de Oro Chamber of Commerce & Industry Foundation, Inc. (Oro Chamber) for its Philippine-German Chamber Cooperation Project (PGCCP). With official development assistance from Handwerkskammer, Kassel (Kassel Chamber of Small Crafts & Trades) and the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ, now the GIZ) we sought to uplift the capabilities of our micro and small enterprises with shared service facilities, a credit guarantee program, expert consultants, among others.

A decade later I was the planning officer for the Cagayan de Oro-Iligan Corridor (CIC) Special Development Project and the business of raising awareness of CDO and Iligan became deadly serious as we sought to push flagship projects like the Laguindingan Airport, Panguil Bay Bridge, and Mindanao Container Terminal (MCT) expansion.

During this time, I was already deep into the advocacy of promoting the two cities as a regional correspondent of national papers, most notably with BusinessWorld. I am happy to recall I also spearheaded a 16-page insert into the then AsiaMoney Magazine where decision makers around Asia and the world got their first peek at the Cagayan-Iligan Corridor.

Not the least, I became a part of the Philippines largest broadcast network as regional desk for the Sarimanok News Network (SNN, now known as ANC) where I was assigned to produce a 15-minute daily news segment on Northern Mindanao that was broadcast to overseas Filipinos in countries around the world through The Filipino Channel (TFC).

Even in semi-retirement, I unceasingly seek to bring the good news from Cagayan de Oro and Northern Mindanao to as many people as possible through local newspapers like Mindanao Daily News, BusinessWeek, and Metro Cagayan de Oro Times, and online through Rappler and my news blog Metro Cagayan de Misamis.

Thus, I am most appreciative and relate NAGMAC’s seminar-workshop to raise awareness within and outside Cagayan de Oro and will do my utmost to help them in their crusade, because as a true blue Atenean, I believe in importance of the Arts and the Humanities as a central pillar of education to develop well rounded individuals with a strong moral and intellectual foundation.

The Jesuit tradition embraced a humanistic approach, emphasizing the education of the whole person, seeking to enrich and empower individuals through a liberal education which extends beyond grammar and rhetoric, encompassing the study of literature, history, philosophy, and ethics, fostering critical thinking and intellectual curiosity. 

But we digress, back to our locally published authors and their efforts to shine more light on the Kagay-anon literary scene. Ms. James shares a recent experience she had in Roxas City in Capiz, Western Visayas, for the KRITIKA workshop on Art and Cultural Criticism where she met many different writers and critics, mostly from Luzon.

Locally Published Authors NH Legaspi, Abbie James & Adeva Jane Esparago-Kalidas field questions from the participants during the Q&A Forum.

She was perturbed that most of the participants had little to zilch knowledge about the creative scene in Cagayan de Oro or heard about  NAGMAC. A friend shared how CDO was also overlooked in articles about literary groups in Mindanao during their Literary History class.

“These recent things gave me a lot of perspective about our roles as cultural workers in this city. It disturbed me more if fellow Kagay-anons don’t have an idea. Do Kagay-anons know our history? Our writers, our publishers? Do Kagay-anons feel empowered to tell our own stories? I think it’s time to focus on these things because the more ideas and works that are made and curated here, the more they will proliferate. And who better to give platforms than homegrown institutions and organizations? So yes, the title matters: it’s Writing and Publishing in the City of Gold. Because it’s happening here. It’s alive here. It’s growing here!”

A sampling of books by locally published authors.

“We are writing and publishing in Cagayan de Oro. Because when we know who we are, where we come from, and why we’re doing this, the recognition from outsiders is only secondary. And that’s what this day is all about. At its heart, this forum is about Kagay-anons—especially students and educators—to know that writing and publishing isn’t some far-off dream. It’s already happening. It’s already here. And it’s something you can be part of.”

“We hope that today reminds you of something important: that literature doesn’t just come from far-away publishing houses or the center. It comes from here—from our communities, our schools, our conversations, and our own lived experiences.”

NH Legaspi shows some expample of Zines during the PM workshop.

“We also urge you to write. Tell your own stories. Whether it’s through poetry, fiction, essays, or zines—your voice matters, and there is space for it in our growing literary community.”

Ms. James invited everyone interested to join NAGMAC on May 3 for the launch of NH Legaspi’s collection of short stories. “It’s a celebration of all things CDO, and we would love to see you there. Also upcoming is the CDO Young Writers Studio, NAGMAC’s workshop for beginner writers. For those who would like to get their works critiqued and improve your craft, we hope you apply.”

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The History of the Mindanao Guerrillas Intelligence Network

22 February 1943

G-2 Section, 10th Military District

Three rugged years of concentrated efforts of the Intelligence Section of the Mindanao Guerrillas brought recognition in the form of commendation from the Highest Headquarters of the United States Army in the Pacific in which Major General A. C. WILLOUGHBY, Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, in communication dated 23 Jun 1945, to Colonel WENDELL W. FERTIG, said:

“It is desired to express the appreciation of the G-2 Section of this Headquarters for-most valuable intelligence service rendered by the guerrilla organization under your Command.

This service and its flow of reports and messages covered the following periods under the agencies indicated:

From 1942 to June 1943, Ge2 SWPA, through Allied Intelligence Bureau, Philippine Sub-Section;

From June 1943 to March 1945, through Philippine Regional Section, G-33

After March 1945, G-2, Eighth Army.

In the period through 192 and during. the early half of 1943, your Command was particularly helpful in laying plans for the location of radio posts and development of an intelligence net. Since the latter half of 1943, your development of these original plans has been ably carried out.

Air, ground and naval intelligence data have been efficiently correct and therefore of great value in the preparation and successful prosecution of Allied plans in the Philippine area.”

Difficulties Encountered in Early Intelligence Work

Funds, absolutely needed in the success of intelligence operations; capable, trained agents required to perform delicate missions and run the gamut of attendant risks; means of transportation and communication, essential in the facility of movement of secret operatives and transmission of information – were all deplorably lacking in the beginning. In fact, in the initial stage of the Mindanao Guerrillas, Col FERTIG, along with other manifold occupations, was his own Intelligence Officer.

The Intelligence Section of the Mindanao Guerrillas evolved from practically nothing. The Intelligence Department is something which, by its obvious importance in any Army organization, deserves foremost consideration and attention. An Army cannot become truly powerful, however heavily stacked with weapons and other vital supplies if it has not within its control an agency with which to obtain accurate knowledge on the plans, strength, location, identification and movements of the enemy.

Intelligence – For Self-Preservation

No Army, not even a guerrilla band can effectively fight, or even survive if the odds are against it, if it does not have some knowledge of the enemy – his troops, weapons and disposition.

This was especially true in the early days of the Mindanao guerrilla resistance movement where units numbered only a mere handful. They had to know  the exact location of the enemy at all time, and if possible, obtain some knowledge of his plans, his weapons and other factors which were important then to seif-preservation alone. WILLIAM TATE with his small band in early September 1942 relied on the gossip of his troops and the civilians to learn necessary facts concerning the enemy.

Development of Intelligence

To warn soldiers of the approach of the enemy, various means were availed of as signals. In Lanao, the use of “agong” or brass gongs was popular. Along the enemy approaches were strategically located “agongs” caught up the announcement and relayed the awesome message to the Headquarters in coastal places, “tambuli” was generally used. “Tambuli” (Tagalog) or “Budyong” (Visayan) are derived from Carabao or Cow horns or big sea shells. They are blown by mouth and echoing sounds that travel a long distance emanate from them.

“Tagongtong” or “bamboo telegraph” was generally am more widely used, due principally to the quick availability of bamboos. They are made by cutting, seasoned bamboo poles to pieces, usually half a meter long. Tied with a rope, they are hung in various places along possible enemy routes. Upon enemy approach, the nearest “Tagongtong” is struck with an iron piece. In this way, no movement of the enemy could be made without the knowledge of the people, especially along the barrios where they passed.

Everyone was enjoined to gather all information of the enemy, including the wildest of rumors, for transmission to headquarters for its evaluation and as basis for whatever action need be taken.

Philippines’ Strategic Importance In Pacific War

The Philippines in the theatre of the war operations in the Pacific, occupies a strategic position. The fact is inescapable that the Philippine Islands extending from Batanes to Siasi over a distance of some 900 statute miles, served as an essential link to bridge the gap between Japan and the East Indies, Malaya and even the Indian Ocean.

Control by Japan of the Islands would, in effect make China Sea a private lake of the Nippon Empire. Properly garrisoned and defended, it constitutes a no mean. bulwark to guard the approaches of East Asia against thrusts coming from the Pacific. MACARTHUR himself recognized this fact when on July 1945 he remarked, in summing up the Philippine Campaign that the naval battle off Leyte Gulf was the turning point in the Pacific War.

Enemy Routes Covered

As much as the Philippines were a barrier to the Japanese in the march for conquest at the initial stage of the Pacific War, so also did it become an obstacle to hurdle in the path of the American Liberation Forces in the return of MACARTHUR – with one great difference, however, and that was: An organized Army of determined guerrillas had long entrenched themselves in the Islands, especially in Mindanao, a veritable fifth column, with carefully coordinated intelligence nets operating without let-up twenty four hours a day, covering ail strategic locations; Overland routes as highway, roads, trails; Waterways, as sea-lanes, rivers, lakes, and vantage points everywhere for observations on aerial enemy activities. They covered surprisingly well the reporting of ship movements, enemy troop dispositions and aerial traffic. Radio sets dotted the whole Mindanao, so that in 1945, there were fifty-eight stations reporting intelligence to Headquarters for relay to higher Army and Navy sources for action.

Because of this intelligence net and radio communication system, the American Forces knew many facts about the Japs that helped the subsequent actions by the Allies in prosecuting the war on Mindanao and other islands of the Philippines.

Coast Watcher Stations – Road Spotters

Watcher’s stations, mostly coastal, were assigned the work of reporting immediately ship sightings, including – if possible – direction, tonnage, class, number, possible load, etc. Watcher’s stations were also placed in strategic places along highways to report on troop movements and other information about the enemy on land.

A report by Col FERTIG to Gen MACARTHUR, dated 7 Jul 19, showed in part the role played by the watcher’s station in the scheme of intelligence operations:

“x x x The Commander Seventh Fleet was pleased to give us a “Well Done” for having located a major enemy fleet passing through the islands and out through San Bernardino Straits.

Reports covered a period of thirty-six hours and were remarkably accurate; establishing the presence of nine aircraft, carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyers and the usual fleet train. Our reports allowed the Navy to calculate strength and speed, and undoubtedly contributed to the successful conclusion of the action, known as the “Battle of the Western Philippines”.

In addition to the spectacular nature of the above reports, our watcher station reports showed a large increase in both number of ships and total tonnage moving through the Islands. For the first time, use of escort vessels appeared to be the rule.

Another effect of the submarine campaign is noted. The Japanese merchant vessels hide each night in a selected anchorage, sailing at dawn. Thus seventy-two hours are required to move a convoy from-Davao to Zamboanga, a distance easily covered in twenty-four hours.

Mindanao Guerrillas Enjoyed People’s Backing

Intelligence operations were, after the sad debacle met by the USAFFE in early 1942, conducted by various persons, groups of persons or organized bands of guerrillas – for internal security. USAFFE officers and men who had chosen not to submit to the demands for surrender by the Invader, had to have some of intelligence work by themselves, to know the definite intentions of the enemy to escape personal capture.

Early guerrillas, operating independently of each other, had to know somehow the plans, movements and location of the enemy so they could know when and where to strike and at the same time prevent being caught unaware. Even civilians, after learning of Japanese brutalities, found it necessary to know enemy intentions and movements – to avoid contact and escape bearing the brunt of enemy atrocities. In effect, the very fondness for acts of barbarism on the part of the Japanese, forced both the civilians population and the early, loose, scattered guerrilla bands to organize into intelligence groups primarily for security.

When the Mindanao Guerrillas, going under the name Mindanao-Visayan Force was organized little by little into a unified command, it had the people’s backing and support.

Intelligence Activities Expanded

The increase in the number of FERTIG’s guerrilla bands necessitated a corresponding intensification and diversification of intelligence activities. And aside from the usual intelligence activities, it was necessary to have some knowledge of the location of hidden arms and ammunition; hidden stuffs of Japanese and pro-Japanese cohorts, Jap spies and sincere collaborators and their actual intentions.

Hidden Arms and Ammunition

After the surrender of 10 May 1942 of the Mindanao USAFFE, a great number of arms and ammunition fell into the hands of civilians by various means. These were badly needed by the ever increasing guerrilla army. To know where they were hidden and who hid them became an important undertaking for intelligence agents. Once known and confiscated, it would mean additional stock for use against the enemy.

Hidden Japanese Personal Effects, Etc.

In certain areas in Mindanao, especially in places where in peacetime, the Japs had business operations, some of their personal effects were hidden, taken care of by Jap sympathizers, such as trucks, automobiles, radio sets, gasoline, canned goods, cloth, etc. As these were useful to the guerrillas, intelligence agents ferreted them out.

Primary Missions – “Intelligence”

The radio communication of Gen MAC ARTHUR recognizing the Mindanao Guerrillas of Mindanao and incorporating them into the Tenth Military District on 22 February 1943, emphasized intensification of intelligence coverage, not only of Mindanao but also of Samar-Leyte Area. This was necessary in view of the fact that the huge American Forces in the Pacific were approaching the Philippine Theatre of operations. No one single factor was to receive any greater effort than intelligence during the entire Mindanao Guerrilla period.

Important Materials to SWPA

On 14 Jul 1943, along with three American officers, escaped POW from the Davao Penal Colony, went four postal bags filled with mail from the Tenth Military District for GHO, SWPA. These bags contained an assortment of reports and intelligence matters. The importance of this mail was summed up in a radio message from Gen MAC ARTHUR to Col FERTIG dated 18 Aug 1943:

“Intelligence Report, Tenth MD for April Won First Class Compliments from G-2, SWPA. Reports, Papers and Personal Knowledge Evacuated with Party have been a Great Value for Plans.”

Intelligence Net Covers Entire Mindanao

The Intelligence Organization of the entire Tenth Military District Command, covered the whole of Mindanao Island as the last of the Guerrilla Bands were finally absorbed into the unified control of Force Headquarters, and the Divisions organized covered the entire island territory.

District G-2 Section

In the District Headquarters, as in any Army organization, was created the G-2 Section whose main function was the collection, collation and evaluation of all intelligence information from all available sources to forward with the least possible delay to the Headquarters of Gen MAC ARTHUR then in Australia.

Division G-2 Section

In the different Divisions, G-2 Sections were also organized, similar in scope but provided with more field personnel, both Army and Civilian, mostly operatives or agents.

Regimental S-2 Section

The different regiments that composed a Division each had their own S-2 Intelligence Section with enough personnel, Army and Civilian, to scour for enemy information all over their allotted sectors. The same method of transmission of information availed of by the Division Ge2 Section was used by the Regimentals. Battalions too, had their S-2 Sections charged with the same work.

1,500 Intelligence Agents – Full Time Job

Working in the different battalions, regiments, divisions and the Force G-2 Section were about 1,500 operatives or agents – about twenty-five percent of who were soldiers. This figure represents those operatives actively dedicating their full time to intelligence work. All loyal civilians (the percentage of disloyal ones very negligible), all soldiers and officers were in effect operatives, for in the Philippines, people were naturally curious and to turn that curiosity to advantage became an easy matter not only with the Japanese does the spy system work based on “Everyone can Spy= Everyone must Spy”. Some mercenary elements sided with the Japs, yet the greatest bulk of the population covered the enemy in a network of intelligence. There could hardly be any movement on his part, unless performed in places absolutely inaccessible to foreign approach, that escaped notice and about which information was relayed through various means, reached to Army Unit Headquarters.

The Work of Special Agents

This generally refers however, to the obvious facts like the estimated number of the enemy in certain garrisoned areas or the number of Japs passing through a certain locality. But the more important facts needed by MAC ARTHUR’s Headquarters – enemy intentions; military installations; unit identification; first and last names and ranks of Commanding Officer; enemy material and equipment; locations and description of radio installations and radar; enemy documents; location, capacity and stocks of naval fuel storage; harbor installations, etc – all these needed a special kind of detective work, as well as courage, sacrifices and boundless risks.

How this Information is Gathered

To obtain accurate data on the enemy, various means were employed by those in charge of subsidiary intelligence nets. The most favorite of which and hardest to detect, is the planting of operatives right in the midst of the Japanese garrisons. Most of those employed in this manner were known to have been uncompromising Pro-Japanese elements, but were at heart for and with the Allied cause. This was a difficult role to assume, with personal complexes and great risks.

One typical instance was the case of VICENTE MENDOZA of Cagayan, Misamis Oriental, who was trusted implicitly by the Japanese but in reality was working for the guerrilla command at Bukidnon and Balingasag. Others, to a lesser degree, aided him in this dangerous work, among them POMPOSA BACCARISAS, a girl close to the Japs. Much valuable information has been furnished the Army by these intrepid agents. The Japanese, however, caught both and extracted the terrible penalty of torture and death.

Three Intelligence Operatives Inside Davao

Among the operatives planted in the midst of the enemy in Davao by Major VIRGILIO S. AGUILAR, Field Military Intelligence Officer for Davao, were SEGUNDO RUIZ, PRIMO BALATAYO and CIPRIANO MERCADO.

1) SEGUNDO RUIZ, a surveyor, was employed by the Zenetaka Gomi (Japanese concern engaged in working on the projects of the Jap Army), to take charge of the levelling of the second runway of the Licanan Airdrome. Being a trusted man of the Japs, he-had access to different military installations. He was working at Licanan for two months prior to 2 Sept 19h – on which day American planes first bombed and strafed Licanan. A considerable number of Japanese lives were lost and a number of planes destroyed on the ground, along with the destruction of military installations. Agents like RUIZ, made possible this effective bombing by furnishing accurate intelligence prior to such bombings.

2) PRIMO BALATAYO, graduate in commerce, was employed by the Japs as Assistant Manager of Maeda Gomi at Bunawan, Davao. He was respected by the Japs and was even allowed a car for his own use. On several occasions, Japanese officers brought him along and showed him different projects, constructed and under construction, by the Japs. Partly, at least, on his information furnished, the Sasa Airfield was heavily bombed on 2 Sept 1943.

Thirty planes were destroyed om the ground. Two hundred and fifty Japs, along with 150 Filipino Pro-Japs, were killed while eating their noon-day meal in the Mess Hall. Military installations were effectively blasted.

3) CIPRIANO MERCADO was employed as Foreman by the Japs in constructing camps in the Akaname Plantation. After all, the camps were constructed and occupied by the Japs, MERCADO furnished the Field Military Inte1ligence Officer with complete data on the camps; including sketches showing their exact location, bivouac areas and installations. The same information was transmitted by radio to headquarters concerned. Soon after, sometime in March 195, planes came and bombed and strafed the hidden camps, causing almost total destruction and the loss of many Japanese lives.

All three of these agents, escaped Japanese capture but in the case of CIPRIANO MERCADO, eight members of his immediate family were killed when overtaken by the Japs in Gatungan, two kilometers West of Bunawan, Davao.

By Subterfuge

Another favorite method employed by operatives was subterfuge. A person, soldier or civilian, in the guise of being a harmless individual, would be sent into a Japanese-held territory using various pretexts: selling chickens and eggs, wine, etc or pretending to visit their relatives or friends who are Jap puppet officials, or in any ways. Their jobs were to carefully observe for later reporting all Japanese installations and activities in areas traveled.

Much information had been gathered by the use of this method.

Women, too, played an important part in the intelligence nets – for they had a particular means of appealing to the vanity of the Japs and getting them to talk.

Intelligence Prior to American Landings

Another example of the efficiency in the inte1ligence work of the Mindanao Guerrillas is the information furnished just prior to the landing of the American Forces at Parang and the subsequent advance on Malabang, Cotabato.

From FERTIG to Commanding General, 8th Army, Information to 10th Corps, dated 13 April 1945:

“Evaluation of the Illana Bay situation; unopposed LANDINGS MAY BE MADE AT any point from Pagadian, Zamboanga, along coast through Malabang to the Cotabato-Lanao Boundary. Nips that were between Malabang and Parang evacuated by baroto to Cotabato on 12 April. Our forces maintaining patrols between Malabang and Parang and will contact our radio station near Parang shortly.

Latest intelligence information strongly indicate light resistance only at Parang proper although heavy bombings past few days and those to continue should eliminate targets and troops in that city. Nothing but light beach defenses (barbed wire entanglements) reported from Parang to Linek, I believe landings should be accomplished with little preparatory naval gunfire directed at beaches or inland north of Parang.

Malabang Airfield in condition to take as many planes as you desire. Extremely dry weather in the past few days will cause dust nuisance. For continued use throughout operation, steel mats should be placed at once. The main seven thousand feet runway can be cleared of grass to give eight hundred feet of actual width. Civilian Mayor of Malabang is cleaning town but no civilians allowed to enter except workmen.”

On 17 April 1945, American Forces landed, without opposition.

Propaganda, A Necessary Adjunct

The enemy, adept at cheap propaganda, found willing listeners at first among the gullible which, though constituting a negligible minority, if not made to understand the true picture of the war situation immediately, might contaminate the others into believing in the eternal “might” of “unconquerable” Japan. Most of them, in Jap garrisoned cities, due to strict censorship, did not even have any inkling of how the war was progressing. To remedy this situation, intelligence operatives not only went to Japs occupied places to gather information on the enemy, but also to apprise the Filipinos inside the real turn of events, by word of mouth or sometimes by printed war news sheets.

In the early days, when the guerrillas had no source from which to draw funds for financial support or to fill up other information needs, the civilians had to be awakened to a sense of patriotism from their lukewarm attitude. Radio news had to be broadcast to the people by speeches or typewritten leaflets and the war situation explained to them in detail.

The “cockpit” became a favorite gathering place and exchange place of information.

Days Of Darkness

The second half of 1944 sow the most intense mopping-up operations of the Japanese on the island of Mindanao. Thousands of enemy troops, withdrawing from Southwest Pacific fronts, converged in the Philippines. The victorious American troops were fast closing in on the retreating forces. The Philippines offered them a temporary haven from the terrible onslaughts dished out in the Marianas, Peleliu, etc. It was at this time that the Mindanao Guerrillas, ill-fed, ill-clothed, ill-armed and ill, gamely resisted in the face of overwhelming odds, continuously believing with almost blind faith that always “it was darkest before dawn”. Some had to strike temporarily the protection of the jungles – yet always to strike the enemy whenever and wherever opportunity presented itself.

The situation, from the standpoint of the guerrillas, was appalling under the terrific surge of enemy pressure. But they found wider scope and more fields for thorough, intensified intelligence operations. Despite unnerving difficulties encountered in one form or another, intelligence work continued in increased pace and ever-surging tempo.

The answer to the question whether or not the Mindanao Guerrillas were successful in the pursuit of the primary mission – securing of intelligence, is found in the ruins of Surigao and Cagayan cities; in the hundreds of enemy ships resting at the bottom of the surrounding seas; in the charred remains of enemy installations; and in the mangled bodies of dead Japanese.

Tragedies in Intelligence Operations

Many instances of dire happenings, in the form of tortures and death have occurred to intelligence agents. In their own way, they are as much deserving of recognition as those who fought decisive battles on the battlefields.

EXAMPLE NO. 1: – “Pvt SIMPLICIO LIBRES, “E” Co., 2nd Bn, 113th Infantry, temporarily assigned with Lt DE LOS REYES, 110th Division Special Intelligence Net, Sector No. 2, was captured by the enemy while enroute from Sector No. 3 to Lt DE LOS REYES’ Sector at Nasipit. He was tied and blindfolded when found in Bancasi, Butuan, with five bayonet wounds and cracked skull, on 15 Nov 1944. Later investigations revealed LIFRES was killed by the Japs that passed that area on the 14th of Nov 1944, from Nasipit. He was then bringing a message from the CP of the 113th Infantry Regiment, 110th Div., to Sector No. 2, at Nasipit.”

EXAMPLE NO. 2: – “On 17 Nov 1944, at 1:00 PM, a Jap patrol was able to ambush and capture one of the soldiers of the 113th Infantry Regiment, sent on an intelligence mission, Pvt LACORDA. This was near the Davao road junction, in the vicinity of Butuan. He was later discovered to have been tortured to death, one leg was skinned to the bone from ankle to knee. He was then stabbed to death right through the heart with his own bolo.”

EXAMPLE NO. 3: – “PRIMITIVO TALADUA, Intelligence Agent, G-2 Section, 10th Military District, after having arrived from Manila where he was assigned to gather some intelligence information, was caught by the Japs in Linabo, Plaridel, Misamis Occidental on 13 Feb 1944. Incriminating papers were found by the Japs in his person. He was brought to Calamba, a nearby barrio, his hands tied tight with barbed wire. While being investigated, his nails were pulled out one by one and at the same time, a hot piece of iron was applied to his breast and forehead. After two days of incessant tortures, the Japs finding he would not tell what he knew about the guerrillas, they hacked his body with bayonets until he died”.

EXAMPLE NO. 4: – “On 29 Sep 1944, at 10:00, CANDELARIA DEIMO, a girl civilian operative of the “A” Corps Ge2 Section, 10th MD, was captured by the Japs in Misamis, Misamis Occidental. Her body was battered with blows, after having been brutally abused by the Jap investigators. As she would not tell what she knew of the guerrillas, she was finally bayoneted till killed.”

EXAMPLE NO. 5: – “Hight civilian operatives, led by SABINO SABERON, proceeded to Bayabas, some twenty five kilometers Southwest of Davao City, to obtain accurate data on Jap activities, defenses, dumps and other enemy installations, on 26 Jan 1945.

Suspected by Jap civilians of being Intelligence Agents, the party was attacked in Tuli, before reaching objective, on 29 Jan, killing two of them. The rest who fled were overtaken by the enemy near the junction of the Davao and Siao Rivers the next day. Two more were killed, three fled again to report the tragedy. SABERON, wounded, was brought along by the Japs and on the way, tortured and finally killed.”

Intelligence Expenses – Less Than P 500,000

The total intelligence expenses for the Tenth Military District for the entire guerrilla period…Philippine Emergency Money, Old Philippine Treasury Notes, and American Dollars….amounted to less than one half million pesos and dollars!

This amount would hardly buy one seaworthy inter-island steamer. Yet this fund bought Intelligence information which, wholly or in part, led to the sinking of many thousands of tons of Jap shipping….to say nothing of the havoc wrecked by American forces – both ground and air, as a result of factual intelligence reporting.

8,000 Radio Messages Per Month

The various reports immediately following, serve to illustrate just how the intelligence factors were broken down, and accomplished. Radio messages to higher headquarters during 1944, averaged anywhere between 8000 to 10,000 per month and most of this was concerning intelligence.

There can be nothing but a tremendous satisfaction to all the people of Mindanao…whether soldier or civilian…who had a share, large or small, in contributing their part to this tangible war effort.

History will record the part played by the people of this Island in the progress of the war against the enemy…and the contribution of Intelligence will be included as a valuable and vital factor.

Coastwatcher Stations

In the theater of war operations in the Pacific, the Philippines occupied a strategic position, Gen MAC ARTHUR himself, recognized this fact when on h Jul 1945, he remarked in summing up the Philippine Campaigns that the Naval battle off Leyte was the turning point of the war.

Enemy Shipping Must be Observed and Reported

Realizing the importance of Mindanao, especially in its geographical relation to the Dutch East Indies, New Guinea and other Pacific Islands, the Tenth Military District established coast watcher stations in all strategic spots surrounding the island. As early as 1943, there were 17 coast watcher stations on the island…this was later increased to a total of 31. They covered all the important sea lanes and the radio stations are graphically shown on the map of Radio Stations, including in this History.

Eyes Of The U.S. Navy

In the beginning these coast watchers served as security outposts for the guerrilla forces, but when the tide of war began to turn in our favor, these stations were multiplied and became the “Eyes” of the U.S. Navy which was fast sweeping Pacific Waters, and ever-nearing the Philippines.

Report of enemy ship movements were reported by “flash” radio messages…in code and in accordance with the Navy system of identification. The actual movement of a convoy of Japanese ships could be “flashed” thru its entire movement along either the west or east coast of the Philippines…for this Headquarters not only served Higher Headquarters with ship spotting for Mindanao…but also acted as the Relay Station for the entire Philippines.

During the month of Jun 1944 a total of 214 ship sightings for the Philippines was flashed to Navy Headquarters over our key station which had direct contact with Navy Intelligence at Perth, Australia.

Beaten Paths Observed, Jap Shipping Intensified

Through the particular location of watcher stations it was possible to establish and plot “beaten paths” of enemy shipping, which proved of great assistance to the Navy, particularly submarines which would “catch their prey” in these established shipping lanes.

As the enemy situation became more acute, the Philippines came their haven or refuge, and also as a section of the Pacific for greater fortification. Ship traffic increased considerably in Jun 1944, and even as late as October a total of 405 ships were sighted in Philippine waters, especially the Visayas and Mindanao. Luzon at that time was covered by a separate relay station.

“Well Done” from The US Navy

The work that the coast watcher stations contributed to the operations in the Philippines is expressed in a radio message from the Commander, Seventh Fleet, to Commanding Officer, Tenth Military District:

“YOUR FINE WORK HAS BEEN A LARGE CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO SUCCESS OF OUR ARMS IN THE PHILIPPINES.”

***

Some “Flash” Messages From Coast Watcher Stations 1943:

15 Dec.            A CONVOY OF ENEMY SHIPS CONSISTING OF 5 FOX ABLES, 2 FOX  TARE ABLE, 1 FOX TARE CHARLIE, 2 FOX TARE DOG, 1 SUGAR BAKER WAS SIGHTED AT 0420 GMT, POSITION 10 DEGREES 17 MINUTES NORTH AND 124 DEGREES 14 MINUTES EAST, HEADING SOUTYWEST AT MEDIUM SPEED.

1944:

7 Jan.               28 FOX TARE CHARLIES WERE SIGHTED IN SURIGAO STRAITS TO EAST OF ESPERANZA AT 5:25 PM HEADING SOUTHWARD.

15 Jan.             1 FOX TARE DOG, 27 SUGAR CHARLIES AND 6 BIG UNIDENTIFIED VESSELS COMING FROM CEBU WERE SIGHTED AT 0315Z SLOWLY HEADING TO SOUTHEAST. POSITION WAS GIVEN AS 057215.

12 Feb.            20 COASTAL MOTOR VESSELS AND 1 FOX TARE CHARLIE THAT CAME FROM THE DAVAO DIRECTICN WERE LYING OFF SACOL ISLAND AT 1300.

15 Feb.            A BIG CCNVOY OF 20 UNIDENTIFIED SHIPS WAS SIGHTED AT 0900 HOW TIME READING SOUTHEAST CELEBES SEA AT REGULAR SPEED.

8 Apr.              AT 1115 ONE HEAVY CRUISER APPROACHING TICTUAN ISLAND FRCM ZAMBOANGA TAKING AN EASTERLY DIRECTION. AT 1305 SAME HEAVY CRUISER REPORTED FOLLOWED BY ANOTHER CRUISER OF SAME TYPE FROM ZAMBOANGA GOING WESTWARD TO TICTUAN ISLAND.

8 Apr.              AT 0830 ONE SHIP INSIDE LIANGA BAY WITH DESTROYER BEING TOWED. AFTER HALF AN HOUR STOP, IT PROCEEDED NORTH TO SURIGAO, IT WAS FOLLOWED BY ONE PATROL BOMBER.

19 Apr.            TWO TRANSPORTS ESCORTED BY ONE DESTROYER SIGHTED AT 1730, 10 MILES OFF LEBAK COAST, COTABATO, GOING NORTH FROM SOUTH AT MEDIUM SPEED.

1 Jun.               JAP TASK FORCE IN DAVAO GULF – ONE BIG AIRCRAFT CARRIER, 5 BATTLESHIPS, 6 DESTROYERS, 15 SUBMARINES, 9 TRANSPORTS AND ABOUT 15 SMALLER SHIPS,

7 Jun.               28 FOX TARE CHARLIES WERE SIGHTED IN SURIGAO STRAITS TO EAST OF ESPERANZA AT 5:25 HEADING SOUTH.

19 Jun.             TWO COAST GUARD CUTTERS PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED AT STA ANA. CREW OF 25, ARMED WITH TWO CANNONS, THREE AA GUNS AND SERVERAL MGS.

19 Jun.             TWO MERCHANT SHIPS ESCORTED BY THREE GUNBOATS ANCHORED AT GLAN, COTABATO.

13 Jul.             TWO BIG TRANSPORTS (HEAVILY LOADED) AND 1 GUNBOAT FROM NORTH ENTERED GLAN AND ANCHORED AT WHARF.

18 Jul.             6 SHIPS FROM ZAMBOANGA PROCEEDING EAST WITH 1 DESTROYER LEADING, FOLLOWED BY 1 SUBMARINE CHASER, 2 LARGE MERCHANT SHIPS, 1 DESTROYER AND 1 FREIGHTER*TRANSPORT

1 Aug ONE CRUISER AND ONE MERCHANT VESSEL ENTERED SARANGANT BAY HEADING FAST TOWARDS DADIANGAS.

24 Aug.           24 SHIPS BELIEVED LARGE LAUNCHES, SOME ARMED, SIGHTED ENTERING CAGAYAN, FROM WEST AT 4:00 PM.

19 Sept.           9 UNCLASSIFIED VESSELS, LARGES APPROX 500 TONS, ENTERING CAGAYAN HARBOR FROM WEST. 8 MERCHANT VESSELS REPORTED ARRIVED CAGAYAN PORT FROM NORTHEAST EARLY IN THE MORNING.

Oct.                 DURING THE MONTH OF OCTOBER 19h A TOTAL OF 05 SHIPS WERE SIGHTED BY COAST WATCHER STATIONS IN THE VISAYAS AND MINDANAO, AND REPORTED THROUGH TENTH MD HEADQUARTERS DIRECTLY TO THE NAVY.

Military Installations

If there is anything which we can call an outstanding achievement of intelligence work on Mindanao, it is the accurate location of enemy military installations, It was in this work that our civilian operatives excelled because they knew the places very well, saw these installations themselves, in fact in some cases they helped in constructing them.

Location of guns and their caliber, trenches, foxholes, dugouts supply and ammo depots, barracks and bivouac areas, all these were spotted and plotted in maps just as fast as they were made or even before they were finished. This information was especially valuable to our air forces.

What happened? – Before the enemy could use these installations they were either destroyed or neutralized by bombing. What surprised the Japanese most was the accurate bombing of installations which were hardly visible from the air like the tunnels they dug on the sides of mountains and hills. Bewildered, they suspected every Filipino as a “spy” and in the final phase of the Davao Campaign this resulted in the killing of several Filipino civilians including some of our operatives.

Enemy Defenses Known

Long before the landing of American troops on the island they were already informed of what kind of defenses they would encounter end in what places they would meet them. It is interesting to note that when the American forces marched their way along the Davao South Highway towards the city in May 1945, they found the gun emplacements intact along the coast in the same places as reported by our intelligence net in March 1945.

“20 MARCH 1945 — FIVE COASTAL ARTILLERY GUNS INSTALLED LONG SHORE 1OO METERS FROM SEA BEGINNING EAST OF KM 55 SOUTH HIGHWAY. GUNS ARE 130 METERS APART UNDER MANGROVE TREES.”

***

Other Typical messages Reporting Enemy Military Installations 1944:

13 Nov.           CONCENTRATION OF WAR MATERIAL IN RURAL HIGH SCHOOL AT KIDAPAWAN.

2h; Nov.          ENEMY AIR SPOTTER AND RADIO STATION LOCATED ON TOP OF SAAVEDRA HILL, ONE MILE WEST OF TAPUNDO PT, ON SOUTHEAST CORNER OF ISLAND.

1 Dec.             FOUR LARGE CANNONS ARE LOCATED ABOUT OO METERS NORTHWEST OF MATINA RESERVOIR. AT POINT 100 METERS WEST OF MATINA RUNWAY AND ONE KM SOUTH OF NATIONAL HIGHWAY ARE FOUR AA GUNS. FOUR MORE ARE LOCATED 300 METERS WEST OF SOUTH END OF MATINA RUNWAY.

6 Dec.              GUNS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED EMPLACED AT INTERVALS FROM LAPASAN TO TAGOLOAN. SOME FIELD FORTICIATIONS AND ENTANGLEMENTS ARE LOCATED ON SAME AREA.

23 Dec. CATEEL: JAPS HAVE PLACED ELECTRIFIED WIRE AROUND BARRIO AND ALONG COAST TO STA FELCMINA. BELIEVE THIS ALARM SYSTEM ONLY.

1945:

10 Mar.           GUN EMPLACEMENTS: PIN POINTED IN DAVAO SHEET NR 4732-II: ONE 12-INCH GUN AT 371,562. ONE AT 377-572, AND ANOTHER AT 285-570.

14 Mar.           REF DAVAO SHEET NR 4752-II. FOOD DEPOT AT 536-658.2, REVETMENT 3 METERS THICK AND 5 METERS LONG CAMOUFLAGED WITH GRASSY SOD. LOCATED AT 345.6-320. REF BUNAWAN SHEET NR 4732-I. FOOD DEPOT IN 3 BLDGS AT 318-687. GAS DRUMS SCATTERED IN PILES AROUND THESE BLDGS.

20 Mar.           TRENCHES, FOXHOLES AND AIR RAID SHELTERS UNDER HIGHSPEED CONSTRUCTION ALONG TAGUROT ROAD AND BUNAWAN RIVER.

31 Mar.           REF SHEET NR 732-II PIN POINTED TARGETS DAVAO AREA: HOUSES ON BOTH SIDES LAPANDAY RUAD OCCUPIED FRCM 325-663 TO 313-681. BARRACKS AND TUNNELS FROM 312.5621.

2 Apr.              LARGE TUNNEL WITH 16 OUTLETS LOCATED 25 METERS EAST OF DAVAO RIVER AND WEST OF KM 15-5 LAPANDAY ROAD. ELECTRIC MACHINERY IN TUNNEL WORKING DAY AND NIGHT. CONTENTS CANNOT BE GOTTEN DUE TO STRICT RESTRICTIONS. LOADED CANVAS-COVERED TRUCKS ENTER TO UNLOAD.

6 Apr.              ENEMY AT TALAKAG ENCAMPED IN MIXTURE OF TENTS AND IMPROVISED SHELTER 150 METERS SOUTHWEST BY WEST OF BRIDGE OVER KABANGLASAN CREEK NEAR TALAKAGON-TALAKAG-LINGION TRAIL. ‘THEY ARE IN OPEN TERRITORY.WILL PROBABLY TAKE SHELTER FROM RAID IN KABANGLASAN CREEK ABOUT 100 METERS SOUTH OF CAMP. FIELD GUN LOCATED NEAR DESTROYED OVEN 80 METERS NORTHWEST OF SAME BRIDGE. OTHER TENTH WEST AND NORTH OF GUN. FOXHOLES ON BOTH BANKS OF CREEK NEAR BRIDGE AROUND TALAKAG PLAZA AND IN TREES HALF KM SOUTH OF FARM 8.

15 Apr.            TROOPS ARE BIVOUACKED AT POSITION 194-221. ARTILLERY PIECES HIDDEN UNDER FRUIT AND BANANA TREES AT NURSERY. RECOMMEND BOMBING AND STRAFING WITHIN RADIUS OF 600 METERS OF POINT INCLUDING FOREST AREA SOUTH OF NURSERY. ALL THESE PLACES ARE ON KORONADAL HIGHWAY.

19 Apr.            CARMEN FERRY: REF PIKIT SHEET NR 4532-III. CULVERT ON ROAD AT 36.4-64.28 USED AS AIR RAID SHELTER. MOTOR POOL WITH 33 TRUCKS AT 38.57-65.1. 30 JAPS OCCUPY LONE HOUSE AT 38.8-62.3. GAS DUMP AT 38.52-64.19.

13 Jun.             JAPS IN ABTALEL AREA HAVE CONSTRUCTED TRENCHES. 18 TRUCKS AND MANY DRUMS OF GASOLINE, SEEN AT MOTOR POOL WHICH IS NOW LOCATED IN THE WOODED AREA SOUTHWEST OF FOOT OF NUFOL HILL.

15 Jun.             AT TAMUGAN AND GIMALANG SECTORS THE ENEMY IS BUSY LAYING MINES ALONG ROADS AND TRAILS.

Enemy Troop Disposition Most Important Phase of Intelligence

No one single phase of intelligence, except documents, was more difficult to obtain and evaluate than enemy troop dispositions – important to our own guerrilla troops who for the most part had to avoid open combat with ‘large forces’ – and important to higher headquarters which must know enemy troop disposition at all times – in every battle zone of operation.

Evaluation Difficult

To know of troop movements – whether it be small patrols, or large columns – was not difficult in itself – but to have some fairly accurate ideas as to numbers was something again. The Filipinos were decidedly weak in their reporting of anything pertaining to figures – but by process of evaluation, based on this characteristic, one could not arrive at same fairly decent estimate.

Troops Shift Frequently

Japanese troops were constantly shifting – even in the heavily garrisoned Davao area. Conditions on Mindanao were not conducive to easy travel so the spotting and reporting of troop movements was made somewhat easier.

Our radio stations were strategically located near the heavily garrisoned enemy locations to facilitate rapid reporting of movements – either overland or by water route. It was particularly important in late 1944 and early 1945 to know the number of troops being shifted to and from Mindanao – either in support of campaigns against the American forces to the north – or the Mindanao as a retreat from such campaigns.

Many Radio Messages

Daily throughout the reporting of Mindanao intelligence, troop movements represented a considerable volume of radio traffic. Just a few representative messages are reproduced below – they cover many sections of the island and are indicative of the wide range of intelligence coverage.

1944:

11 Jan.             MISAMIS ORIENTAL. 1,900 JAPS ARRIVED CAGAYAN FROM ILOILO.

11 Feb.            1,000 JAPS ARRIVED ZAMBOANGA FROM NORTH.

7 Apr.              DAVAO. 4 LARGE TRANSPORTS UNLOADED TROOPS AT DAVAO CITY     ESTIMATED AT 2000.

16 May.           SURIGAO. ELEMENTS OF JAP 30TH DIV ARRIVED SURIGAO FROM CEBU.

15 Jul.             ESTIMATED 2,000 JAPS ARRIVED DAVAO FROM PALAU FOR MONTH OF JUNE AND FIRST TWO WEEKS OF JULY.

4 Aug.             MISAMIS ORIENTAL. TRANSPORTS ARRIVING CAGAYAN BROUGHT 3,000 TROOPS. 1,000 TROOPS IMMEDIATELY WENT SOUTH THRU THE SAYRE HIGHWAY.

1944:

INDICATIONS SHOW THEY CAME FROM LUZON AND VISAYAS: CONSIST OF AIR CORPS GROUND PERSONNEL AND YOUNG INF RECRUITS.

1 Sept.             MISAMIS ORIENTAL. FROM 15 to 30 AUGUST ESTIMATED 6,000 TROOPS ARRIVED CAGAYAN FROM VISAYAS AND LUZON. THREE TROOPS APPEAR TO BE FROM SWPA BUT HAVE RESTED IN THE NORTH.

10 Sept.           BUKIDNON. 3,000 TROOPS MOVING SOUTH THRU SAYBE HIGHWAY, HIKING AT NIGHT AND RESTING IN FOREST DURING DAY.

18 Sept.           COTABATO. REPORTS INDICATE THAT APPROX 2,000 TROOPS OF THE HARADA BUTAI COMING FROM COTABATO DIRECTION ARE DISTRIBUTED TO VARIOUS SECTORS AS DIGOS, MINTAL, BAYABAS, MALAGOS, AND TUGBOK.

19 Sept.           SURIGAO. JAP TROOPS APPROX 3,000 PASSED THRU AGUSAN FROM SURIGAO. SOME TOOK SHIPS IN NASIPIT FOR GAGAYAN.

11 Oct.             AGUSAN. ESTIMATED 2,000 JAPS HIKED FROM NASIPIT TO TAGOLOAN. UNESTIMATED NR LEFT ON 6 BARGES WITH SUPPLIES.

27 Oct.            SHIPS WITH ESTIMATED 500 JAPS LEFT CAGAYAN FOR LEYTE. ADDITIONAL 600 JAPS BELIEVED FROM BUGO-TAGOLOAN AREA LEFT CAGAYAN ON SHIPS FOR SAME DESTINATION.

28 Oct.            BUKIDNON. CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF TROOPS IN TRUCKS MOVED FROM SOUTH TO NORTH ALONG THE SAYRE HIGHWAY. THEY WERE SUBSEQUENTLY SHIFTED TO LEYTE.

17 Nov.           MISAMIS ORIENTAL. ESTIMATED 2,2000 JAPS LEFT CAGAYAN FOR NORTH BELIEVE LEYTE. ALMOST NIGHTLY DEPARTURE OBSERVED SINCE NIGHT OF 6 NOV. USUALLY ABOUT 500 EACH NIGHT USING LAUNCHES AND BARGES

20 Nov.           MISAMIS ORIENTAL. 2 SUGAR CHARLIES AND 16 BARGES LOADED WITH TROOPS LEFT CAGAYAN BELIEVE BOUND FOR LEYTE.

4 Dec.              MISAMIS ORIENTAL. STRENGTH IN CAGAYAN AREA INCREASED AT END OF NOV. TROOPS CAME FROM THE SOUTH. BELIEVE WAITING TRANSPORTATION.

14 Dec.            BUKIDNON. MORE THAN 1,000 JAPS FROM BUKIDNON PASSING BUGASAN -EN-ROUTE TO BUTUAN, COTABATO.

19 Dec.            ZAMBOANGA. JAPS HAVE MOVED ALMOST ALL TROOPS FROM TETUAN, TUMAGA AND PRESAMAYOR TO PASONANCA.

27 DEC.          MISAMIS ORIENTAL. GEN MOROZUMI WITH STAFF AND A LARGE NUMBER OF TROOPS LEFT CAGAYAN FOR SOUTH.

1945:

22 Jan.             SURIGAO. APPROX 400 JAPS INCLUDING WOMEN AND CHILDREN LEFT MAGPAYANG, SURIGAO FOR BUTUAN. TROOPS ARRIVED BUTUAN ON 22 JANUARY.

30 Jan.             200 ENEMY TROOPS SHIFTED SOUTH FROM CAGAYAN AREA AND A SMALL NUMBER ALSO WENT SOUTH FROM MALUKO-DALWANGAN.

12 Feb.            ESTIMATED 1,500 JAPS MOVED FROM LASANG TIBONGCO SECTOR TO PADADA-DIGOS SECTOR, DAVAO.

18 Feb.            COTABATO. APPROX 1,000 JAPS ARRIVED PARANG FROM COTABATO CITY AREA. THEY ARE BIVOUACKED SOUTH OF WATER TOWER, IN BARRACKS AND SCHOOL BUILDING.

21 Apr.            COTABATO. OVER 1000 JAPS OF ARMY, NAVY AND ARTILLERY UNITS MOVING NORTH ON DULAWAN-KORONADAL HIGHWAY.

20 Mar.            COTABATO. OVER 700 JAPS ARRIVED BULUAN 18 MARCH, FROM SOUTH WITH 4 TRUCKS OF AMMO AND GASOLINE.

25 Mar.            BUKIDNON. ‘TROOPS ALONG SAYRE HIGHWAY ARE MOVING SOUTH. SINCE 15 MAR APPROX 2,500 JAPS HAVE GONE SOUTH FROM IMPASUGONG AREA.

24 Mar.            MISAMIS ORIENTAL. ESTIMATED 00 JAPS WITHOUT ARMS LANDED IN CAGAYAN AREA FROM BARGES. ENEMY TELLS CIVILIANS THEY ARE FROM

ILOILO.

Japanese Documents : High Priority

In a letter to Col FERTIG of 5 May 1944 from Gen WILLOUGHBY, G-2, GHW, SWPA, the primary intelligence requirements were expressed as follows:

“Location of specific enemy units. We can identify them thru documents – we know their strength and organization. The full name and rank of the commander occasionally furnished the clue to the particular tactical unit. Identification of units from a regiment up to a division is extremely important as that data gives us definite indication of the enemy’s combat ability. Enemy documents furnish the clue to the solution of enemy units and their dispositions. Such documents should receive high priority. Diaries, bulletins, orders, etc., of the enemy reveal much more than believed possible.”

This was no easy assignment for not only did the Japanese carry away their dead, almost with fanatical persistence, but we had no interpreters and therefore no way of deciding the importance to higher headquarters of documents when captured. In the earlier days, and even up to the landing in Leyte of 2O Oct 1944, transportation facilities between headquarters was most infrequent, so those documents captured, lost their timeliness due to slowness of delivery.

Through many agents, to all outward appearances, loyal to the Japs but secretly working for our cause – it was possible to obtain the names of Commanding Officers, and occasionally learn the identity of units.

Notwithstanding these drawbacks, a certain amount of captured material made its way to higher headquarters, and in a few instances, loyal Chinese friends were able to give some translations which occasionally proved of value.

Some Documents Found Highly Valuable

Documents captured from two Japanese aviators in Oct 1944 near Butuan, Agusan, and captured items obtained after the Allied air strike at Surigao in Sept, proved to be of exceptional value. The former contained late cryptographic material especially desirable. The latter contained a lot of data on the 1st Japanese Division which at the time had been unlocated but believed to be in the Philippine Islands. These items were delivered to 6th Army on Nov 1944 when their importance was discovered. In this connection the following quotation from letter received from Sixth Army Japanese Translation Section is quoted:

“Receipt is acknowledged of a number of Japanese diaries, documents, maps, equipment and manuals, as delivered to this section by Capt. H. A. Rosenquist, AC of S, Ge2, 10th M.D.

It is suggested that all such materials be immediately classified as to its source, date obtained, and other information which will be of assistance to this section in its evaluation of such material. All should be separated and labelled accordingly.

This type of Japanese captured material contributes greatly to the progress of the war effort. Our special appreciation goes to your forces for these excellent contributions. Keep up the good work.”

****

Some Radio Messages Sent Higher Headquarters

1944:

6 Nov.             20 JAP MANUALS PAYBOOKS AND PERSONAL LETTERS CAPTURED IN SURIGAO. IMMEDIATE ANALYSIS REVEALED VERY VALUABLE ORDER OF BATTLE AND ORGANIZATION INFORMATION OF THE JAP 1ST DIV.

13 Nov.           JAP AVIATOR THREW AWAY PACK CONTAINING NAVY CODE BOOK, AVIATION NAVIGATION INSTRUMENT, ENEMY IDENTIFICATION BOOK & AVIATORS REPORT. THESE FORWARDED TO SIXTH ARMY.

1944:

8 Dec.              CAPTURED DOCUMENTS REVEALED THAT ENEMY IN MALABANG HAD A STRENGTH OF 500 WITH 2 MORTARS, HEAVY AND 1 LIGHT MG: THEY LOST 46 KIA BUT THEIR MORALE HIGH AND WILL FIGHT TO HE LAST.

18 Dec.            CAPTURED DOCUMENTS REVEALED THAT 77H INF REGT STATIONED AT KIBAWE. IT REVEALED THEY HAD 1,800 ARMS & APPROX HALF A MILLION AMMO.

1945:

2 Jan.               LETTER, WRITTEN BY CO SRD CO,. 32ND BN, 54TH IND BRIGADE TO HIS COMMANDING OFFICER, CAPTURED BY GUERRILLA UNITS STATED THAT THEIR UNIT WAS SHORT ON AMMO AND MEDICINE AND REQUESTS FR EVACUATION.

28 Mar.           DOCUMENT CAPTURED FROM L JAP MESSENGER PIGEON IDENTIFIED THE 177TH INF REGT.

9 Apr.              DOCUMENT, 1 CARDBOARD BOX FULL, WILL BE PUT ON LCI FOR FORWARDING TO 8TH ARMY. SOME DOCUMENTS OF OFFICIAL NATURE APPEAR TO BE PAYROLLS. SHOULD PROVE VALUABLE.

12 Apr.            DOCUMENTS, DIARIES AND DOG TAGS PICKED UP BY AMER PT BOATS AT BALINGASAG.

15 Apr.            VARIOUS JAP TRAINING MATERIALS, PHOTOGRAPHS, REFERENCES, BOOKS AND MAPS FORWARDED TO HIGHER HQ. THESE WERE CAPTURED IN MALABANG.

18 Apr.            JAPS MAPS OF MATAMPAY AREA (BLUEPRINT) AND NUROUPI TOWNSITE (TOPOGRAPHIC) FIELD MEMORANDA, WAR DIARIES AND OTHER DOCUMENTS CAPTURED BY GUERRILLA AND FORWARDED TO HIGHER HED.

19 Apr.            11 JAP BOOKLETS, 1 PIECE OF THIN WOOD WITH JAP CHARACTERS AND LOOSE PAPERS CAPTURED BY GUERRILLA TROPPS DURING DIPOLOG OPERATIONS FORWARDED TO HIGHER HEADQUARTERS.

Enemy Airfields

The Philippines are strategically located to render convenient airstrikes against allied positions in the Pacific area. They also afford protective screening for their own lines of defenses and operation on areas bordering the China Sea.

Mindanao Air Power of Enemy Must Be Watched

For offensive reasons as well as purely defensive, it was important to the American forces that close and careful surveillance be given by intelligence agents and this Headquarters to enemy airfields construction of new fields; improvements of old; locations of revetments, military installations relating to airfield use, and last but equally important a constant report of plane traffic on fields in operation.

Agents Work Right on Fields

The Japanese needed, and needed badly, Filipino laborers, mechanics and others to work on their airfields, many hastily constructed or improved, when they began to realize the fast tempo of the American forces advances, under the shrewd tactics of Gen MACARTHUR. It was therefore possible to place many agents on jobs with the Japs. At Licanan Airfield one such agent was a surveyor. He drew all the airfield plans and always made a copy of them to smuggle out through another agent, perhaps a loyal truck driver.

Through this means, the intelligence was getting so fine that we even knew how many truckloads of gravel were needed to fill one crater hole, and how many laborers were needed to complete the job. At Matina Airfield, it took 200 laborers one full day to fill one bomb crater!

The following excerpts from a few radio messages serve to illustrate how GHQ, SWPA and the American Air Force was informed on every phase of airfield activity:

1944:

8 Jul                HANGARS AT SASA AND NAVY YARDS CAMOUFLAGED WITH COCONUT AND NIPA. ALL AIRFIELDS PROVIDED WITH AA PROTECTION. GASOLINE STORED AROUND EDGE OF FIELD.

18 Jul              MALABANG HAS 80 PLANES SHELTERS LOCATED OUTSIDE OF RUNWAYS NEAR SEA EXTENDING NORTH. BUAYAN HAS 10 RUNWAYS, ANOTHER EAST DIRECTION ARE 12 AA GUNS, 37 MM AND 8 INCH CANNON.

25 Jul              JAP SEAPLANE BASE NOW AT MALALAG IN ADDITION TO PADADA.

24 Nov            JAP PLANE ASSEMBLY AT BATUTITIK. OVER 90 PLANES ASSEMBLED THERE: HIDDEN AND DISPERSED AS FAR AS 2 KMS FROM FIELD. FIELD LOCATED 2 KMS WEST OF BATUTITIK BARRIO.

10 Dec             27 JAP PLANES HIDDEN IN TUNNELS AT MINDANAO FIELD AT ZAMBOANGA. 7 TORPEDO PLANES, ONE FIGHTER, ONE DIVE BOMBER AND 17 TWIN ENGINE BOMBERS.

23 Oct             FIVE ZEKE FIGHTERS PASSED NIGHT AT LUMBIA MISAMIS ORIENTAL FIELD, WENT SOUTH NEXT DAY CAME FROM NORTH. HABITUAL FOR NIP PLANES TO LAND AT DUSK AT LUMBIA AND TAKE OFF EARLY NEXT MORNING.

1945:

9 Feb               REMAINING 5 PURSUITS AT LUMBIA NOW LOCATED IN COCO GROVES JUST EAST OF TALAKAG-CAGAYAN ROAD AT KM 8. THIS IS ALONG EAST BOUNDARY LUMBIA FIELD.

10 Feb             NO PLANE ASSEMBLY SHOP AT LICANAN AIRFIELD. PLANES ARRIVE ALREADY IN FLYING CONDITION. SMALL PORTABLE REPAIR SHOP COMPOSED OF 3 LATHES, 6 FEET, 10 FEET AND 12 FEET. 2 SMALL HAND BLOWERS FOR BLACKSMITHING AND IRON WORK. REPAIR DONE AT HANGAR ON RUNWAY WHERE NEEDED.

17 Feb             AIRPLANE REPAIR SHOP LOCATED WEST SIDE NR 1 RUNWAY LICANAN AIRFIELD APPROX 90 METERS FROM SOUTH END RUNWAY CITED. 2ND LIKE SHOP SPOTTED APPROX 100 METERS NORTH OF 1ST CITED.

12 Feb             FOUR ENEMY PLANES WARMED UP AT LUMBIA TODAY. THEY ARE HIDDEN IN DENSE WOODS 1,500 METERS AT 15 DEGREES FROM MUNICIPAL BUILDING LUMBIA.

22 Feb             BETWEEN LIBBY FIELD AND NATIONAL ROAD ARE 28 PLANE SHELTERS BUILT OF WOOD AND STONE. 28 PLANES COUNTED BY AGENT ON 12 FEB. GAS BURIED AT ALL FUR CORNERS OR ROAD JUNCTION. GOING FROM LIBBY FIELD AND CROSSING NATIONAL ROAD.

2 Mar              27 PLANES AT LICANAN AIRFIELD DAVAO AND 82 AT MATINA AIRFIELD.

31 Mar            6 PLANES HIDDEN AT BALUAN, 100 METERS EAST OF CREEK AND 700 METERS FROM SARANGANI BEACH. BALUAN IS JUST NORTH OF BUAYAN. JAPS ARE VERY CAUTIOUS THIS AREA. FILIPINOS RESTRICTED,

Road Spotters

Only two highways on the island of Mindanao offered suitable road surface for mechanized units – the Sayre and National Highways, and even these were by no means ideal for heavy traffic or bulky vehicles. It was an easy matter then to keep a careful check on enemy vehicle traffic; also troop movement on these two highways.

Lookout At Sumilao

In August 1944 a 24-hour lookout post was established in a strategic position at Sumilao, Bukidnon, which overlooked the Sayre Highway. Traffic to and from Bugo on the Mindanao coast, through Del Monte to points south on Sayre Highway, Malaybalay, Valencia, etc., had to pass this point in the highway.

A radio station was located as near the lookout position as security would permit and radio messages were sent daily, sometimes as “flashes” when the occasion demanded. During the month of Nov 1944 alone a total of 216 Japanese trucks were observed going north; 255 counted going south. A few of the typical daily radio messages are reproduced below:

25 Oct. ‘44      18 TRUCKS WENT NORTH AND 12 WENT SOUTH. CARGO UNIDENTIFIED

25 Oct. ’44       99 TRUCKS WENT SOUTH LOADED WITH TROOPS. 31 TRUCKS WENT NORTH EMPTY.

6 Dec. ‘44       17 TRUCKS WENT SOUTH LOADED WITH TROOPS: 60 TRUCKS WENT NORTH LOADED WITH UNKNOWN CARGO.

18 Apr. ’45      64 TRUCKS WENT NORTH AND 49 SOUTH.

28 Apr. ’45      ENEMY TRUCK TRAFFIC CONTINUES. FOR PERIOD OF 3 DAYS A TOTAL OF 42 TRUCKS WENT NORTH AND 101 TRUCKS WENT SOUTH. OF THESE

68 MOVED BY DAY AND 75 BY NIGHT. TRUCKS GOING NORTH USUALLY EMPTY WHILE THOSE GOING SOUTH ALL LOADED WITH TROOPS.

LOOKOUT AT BANCUD (15 Kms. South of Malaybalay):

A lookout position in this spot, while covering the same Sayre Highway, gave the opportunity for a double check and an indication of the activity at Malaybalay proper. Apparently many of the trucks reported from Sumilao post never did go farther than Malaybalay for during the same month of November only 127 trucks were reported as going north; 57 as going south, from the Bancud lookout position.

Lookout On National Highway Davao Area

It was much more difficult to maintain lookout positions in the very heavily garrisoned Davao areas However an observer was stationed at Km 20, North of Davao City, along the National Highway. Reports were rendered daily by radio, supplemented by written report covering more details. The following traffic for period of 24 days from 13 Dec 1944 to 5 Jan 1945 as follows:

GOING NORTH:

OFFICERS – 65; TROOPS – 773; JAP CIVILIAN LABORERS – 365; FILIPINO LABORERS – 56; TRUCKLOAD OF PULVERIZED ROCK – 58; TRUCKLOAD OF BOARD – 71; TRUCKLOAD OF FOODSTUFF – 65; TRUCKLOAD OF GALVANIZED IRON – 7; TRUCKLOAD OF FUEL – 4; TRUCKLOAD OF SCRAP IRON – 1; TRUCKLOADOF FURNITURE – 2; TRUCKLOADOF UNIDENTIFIED EQUIPMENT -7; AND A TOTAL OF 415 CARGO TRUCKS AND 49 CARS.

GOING SOUTH:

OFFICERS – 65; TROOPS – 720; JAPANESE CIVILIAN LABORERS 239; FILIPINO LABORERS – 104; TRUCKLOAD OF PULVERIZED ROCK – 46; TRUCKLOAD OF BOARD – 23; TRUCKLOAD OF GALVANIZED IRON – 2; TRUCKLOAD OF FOODSTUFF -20; TRUCKLOAD OF SCRAP IRON – 2; TRUCKLOAD OF OIL DRUMS – 5; TRUCKLOAD OF FURNITURE – 2; 25 JAP CIVILIANS AND A TOTAL OF 375 CARGO TRUCKS AND 4l CARS.

Enemy Plane Traffic

In July 1944…about a month prior to the first bombing in the Philippines by American planes…instructions were received emphasizing the need for “flash” reporting of enemy air traffic. An established procedure or reporting was given…and this disseminated by radio to all divisions…all stations. This included not only Mindanao but the Visayas as well, in accordance with orders from GHO, SWPA.

FLASHES IN AUSTRALIA…5 MINUTES AFTER PLANE SIGHTINGS

With the net control station of the Tenth Military District on a “24-hour stand-by” and with a separate circuit direct to American Air Force Headquarters, enemy plane traffic could be flashed from original spotter, through intermediate net, then from net control to the Air Force…in an average of 5 minutes, Messages were in code, but in clear text…short but complete…and followed the following procedure:

“20 JULY 44 = YOU WILL REPORT TO FTAW IMMEDIATELY UPON DETECTION INFO CONCERNING AIRCRAFT FLIGHTS IN THE FOLLOWING SEQUENCE:

AIRCRAFT WARNING INDICATOR, YOUR CALL SIGN, MESSAGE LETTER TIME OF OBSERVATION, HOW DETECTED, DISTANCE, DIRECTION, COURSE, NUMBER OF PLANES, TYPE, IDENTITY, ALTITUDE. AIRCRAFT WARNING INDICATOR IS AW REPEATED TWICE TO INDICATE FLIGHT REPORT FOLLOWS.

YOUR NORMAL STATION CALL SIGN. MESSAGE LETTERS START WITH A FOR FIRST REPORT THEN B AND SO THRU ALPHABET TO Z WHEN A IS USED AGAIN. TIME IS REPORT BY 2 NUMBERS INDICATING MINUTES PAST HOUR WHEN FLIGHT DETECTED, HE HOUR IS SHOWN BY THE DATE TIME GROUP OF THE MESSAGE HEADING CONSEQUENTLY HOUR USED IN HEADING MUST BE SAME HOUR AS THAT WHICH FLIGHT DETECTED. METHOD OF DETECTION INDICATED BY IV FOR FLIGHT SEEN AND IA FOR FLIGHT HEARD. DISTANCE IN MILES SHOWN BY 2 NUMBERS OO BEING OVERHEAD AND 99 UNKNOWN. DIRECTION FROM YOUR STATION INDICATED BY SINGLE NUMBER, 7 FOR NORTHEAST, 2 FOR WEST, 7 FOR NORTHWEST, 4 FOR SOUTH, 5 FOR SOUTHWEST, 6 FOR WEST, 3 FOR SOUTHEAST AND 8 FOR NORTH. ZERO MEANS FLIGHT OVERHEAD AND 99 INDICATING TAKING OFF OR LANDING, DISTINCTION BEING MADE BY PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF SUBSEQUENT NORMAL REPORTS. COURSE IN INDICATED BY SINGLE NUMBER AS FOR DIRECTION, ZERO INDICATING FLIGHT CIRCLING. NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT EXPRESSED BY 2 NUMBERS, ZERO ZERO INDICATES NUMBER UNKNOWN.

TYPE AIRCRAFT EXPRESSED BY SINGLE LETTER. P FOR FIGHTER, B IS BOMBER, C FOR TRANSPORT AND X MEANS TYPE UNKNOWN. F FOR FRIENDLY, H FOR HOSTILE AND X FOR UNKNOWN. ALTITUDE IN THOUSANDS OF FEET EXPRESSED BY 2 NUMBERS, 00 MEANS HEIGHT UNKNOWN. FOLLOWING IS A SAMPLE REPORT:

‘AWAW WOO ABLE ZERO THREE ITEM VICTOR ZERO SEVEN THREE FOUR ZERO NINE BAKER HOW ZERO FIVE’

AWAW IS WARNING INDICATOR, WOO IS STATION CALL SIGN, ABLE IS MESSAGE LETTER, ZERO THREE SHOWS THAT FLIGHT DETECTED 3 MINUTES PAST HOUR USED IN MESSAGE HEADING, ITEM VICTOR MEANS FLIGHT SEEN, ZERO SEVEN THAT FLIGHT 7 MILES FROM YOUR STATION, FOUR INDICATES PLANES PROCEEDING SOUTH, ZERO NINE SHOWS PLANES IN FLIGHT, BAKER MEANS TWO ENGINER BOMBER, FIVE INDICATES 5000 FOOT ALTITUDE.”

A Few Of The Radio Flashes

Translated from code to understandable English, there follows a few of the many hundreds of plane flashes sent thru the 10th MD radio net:

1943:

19 Dec.            5 ENEMY BOMBERS ESCORTED BY 19 PURSUITS PASSED OVER MISAMIS ORIENTAL. IN THE AFTERNOON 17 FIGHTERS PASSED SAME AREA FLYING FROM NORTH TO SOUTH.

1944:

20 Jan.             50 PURSUITS PASSED OVER SULU SEA GOING NORTH.

23 Mar.           FLIGHTS OF 6 TO 9 BOMBERS FROM PATAG AIRFIELD PATROLLING MACAJALAR BAY FOR LAST 3 DAYS.

1944:

1 Apr.              FLIGHT OF 11 HEAVY BOMBERS, ALL TWIN ENGINED, AND 4 SINGLE MOTORED FIGHTERS, PASSED MALITA HEADING TOWARDS DAVAO.

6 Apr.             ONE JAP BOMBER WAS OBSERVED FLYING AT ABOUT 200 FT GOING NORTHEAST OVER CABADBARAN AT 8:00 AM SIGHTED FROM MAGALLANES, AGUSAN.

18 Apr.            11 RED PURSUIT PLANES PASSED CAGAYAN. INSIGNIA: WHITE SKULL AND CROSS BONES BOTH SIDES OF FUSELAGE AND ON WINGS. APPEARED TO BE NAKAJIMA PURSUIT. ONE BOMBER ESCORTED BY FIGHTERS PASSED OVER PANGUIL BAY AT 9:30 AM.

11 Jun.             9 PATROL PLANES, SINGLE ENGINED, APPARENTLY WITH FIXED LANDING GEAR OBSERVED PASSING OVER TALAKAG, BUDIDNON, GOING NORTH.

14 Jun.             ONE BOMBER ESCORTED BY 6 PURSUITS PASSED EAST TO SOUTHEAST OVER OPOL, MISAMIS ORIENTAL.

22 Jun.             16 PLANES, BOMBERS AND FIGHTERS, PASSED NORTHWEST TO SOUTHEAST OVER CAMIGUIN ISLAND.

27 Jun.             8 PLANES, ZEKE TYPE, PASSED OVER LAS NIEVES, AGUSAN.

.2 Jul.              LARGE NUMBERS OF JAP PLANES, BOMBERS AND FIGHTERS PASSED OVER BALINGASAG, ORIENTAL MISAMIS.

14 Jul.             1000 – 1 MEDIUM BOMBER FLEW OVER OPOL TO NORTHWEST. 1430 – 1 MEDIUM BOMBER FLEW OVER OPOL TO WEST.

16 Jul.             1230 – 5 FIGHTERS PASSED OVER CAGAYAN, MISAMIS ORIENTAL TO NORTH.

17 Jul.             1100 – 3 MEDIUM BOMBERS ESCORTED BY 7 PURSUITS ARRIVED DAVAO FROM NORTH.

Bombing Results Reported

FIRST BOMBING – 6 AUGUST 1944: The very first bombing of a target in the Philippines by American planes, occurred 6 August 1944, when two bombs were dropped in Davao area = one near Santa Ana wharf, killing three Jap navy men; the other in the water nearby. This however, was no criterion of the bombing and strafing effectiveness to follow – and the months of September and October 19); in particular, saw many American planes in action on Mindanao, insistently pinpointing enemy military installations, ships, airfield, planes, troops and many other targets which this Headquarters had reported by radio to Ge2, GHW, SWPA, over a period of months.

The need for factual reporting on bombing and strafing results was equally as important as sending data on new targets. Ail intelligence agents were instructed to give high priority to this new phase of intelligence reporting.

Many hundreds of radio messages on bombing results were received from the many strategically located radio stations on Mindanao. A few, taken at random from our Intelligence Summaries are quoted below; along with an interesting report of the bombing effectiveness in the Hinatuan Bay, East:

Coast area on 9 Sept 19h.

1944:

10 Sept:           AMERICAN BOMBERS BOMBED AND STRAFED LANDING FIELD AND TRUCKS ALONG NATL HIWAY SURIGAO X RESULTS DASH 9 VESSELS SUNK, INCLUDING 6 TRANSPORTS, 30 MOTORBOATS, 1 LANDING BARGE, 1 QUEEN BOAT X TRANSPORTS LOADED WITH SOLDIERS, KNOWN TO BE ABOUT 1,500 WITH BUT FEW SURVIVORS WHO WERE KILLED IN WATER BY LOYAL CIVILIANS IN BAROTOS HITTING THEM OVERHEAD WITH PADDLES X 50 MULES DESTROYED AND 12 SALVAGED X 19 TRUCKS DISABLED ON HIWAY X BOXES OF AMMO, FOODSTUFF, GASOLINE DRUMS AND SOME FIELD GUNS DESTROYED AT WHARF.

14-15 Sept.      PILOTS QUARTERS, MOTOR POOL, TWO LARGE WAREHOUSES, TWO SHIPS FUEL TANKS UNDER ACACIA TREES, ALL ZAMBOANGA, DESTROYED BY AMERICAN PLANE BOMBINGS.

1944:

24 Sep.            SURVIVORS OF MUNKEIN MARU, NOW CONFINED, STATE THAT THEIR SHIP WAS DAMAGED BY PLANES AND SUNK BY SUBMARINES ON 9 SEPT. THEY CLAIMED 400 WERE ON SHIP WITH BUT FEW SURVIVORS.

27 Sep.            3 TRANSPORTS SUNK BETWEEN BONGO ISLAND AND COTABATO CITY. 600 NIPS DEAD AND 200 NIPS SURVIVED X 22 CAPTURED BY OUR TROOPS AT ONE SPOT X.

18 Oct.            11 PLANES DESTROYED SUPPLY DUMPS AT TAMONTAKA, COTABATO AND 1 LAUNCH AND 2 BARGES NEARBY. 2 LAUNCHES BURNED AND MANY JAPS.

2 Dec.              16 TRUCKS AND 2 BOMBERS BURNED, 50 NABY TROOPS KILLED AT MATINA AIRFIELD.

1945:

13 Apr.            TWO SUBMARINES SUNK AT PANAKAN WHARF THESE WERE TIED UP AT WHARF EFFECTIVELY CAMOUFLAGED, REPORTED BY OUR AGENTS AND AIR PHOTOS SUBSEQUENTLY PINPOINTED X PERISCOPE WAS CAMOUFLAGED AND HIDDEN BETWEEN GASOLINE DRUMS.

14 May            6 JAP TORPEDO BOATS WERE SUNK OFF PISO PT BEACH THIS SAME AREA STRAFED RESULTING IN DESTRUCTION OF 2 FUEL DUMPS AND 2 AMMO DUMPS. THESE TARGETS WERE CONSTANTLY REPORTED FROM DEC ’44 UNTIL DATE THEY WERE DESTROYED.

NOTE            DURING THE MONTHS OF AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER, 19hh, MILITARY TARGETS IN DAVAO CITY ONLY WERE BOMBED YET DUE TO ACCURATE REPORTING OF TARGETS OVER ONE HALF OF CITY IS STILL INTACT, YET ALL MILITARY TARGETS WERE DESTROYED.

“Jap Convoy Annihilated In Hinatuan Bay, Surigao”

“At about 5 o’clock in the morning of 9 Sept 1944, planes were heard from the town on Bislig. From the eyewitness view point, three groups of planes approx. fifty in number were seen over the bay. A few minutes later, explosions were heard and the planes were seen diving by twos. Smoke then rose up from behind the point of Maribojoc. ‘The whole bay of Bislig can be viewed clearly on top of a mountain in sitio Papay. The eyewitness, together with other people went to this favorable position and from there saw big ships, steel vessels with two funnels, some in flames and some covered with thick and black smoke.

There were twenty-six of these vessels including two that looked like destroyers and approx. fifty small vessels. The planes continued bombing and strafing for three or four hours which returned the fire. One plane was shot down.

During this attack, the large steel ships remained out in deep water and the smaller vessels which were 200 to 250 ton wooden ships, powered with diesel engines, scattered for shelter behind Macaburom and Mawis Islands. At about 9:00 or 10:00 AM, six US warships were noticed on the horizon, heading towards Hinatuan Bay. A few minutes later, the ships moved to the warships – two big ones and four smaller ones. When they were opposite Maribojoc Pt, they opened fire on the Japs vessels, some of which were already burning. All were hit, and subsequently sunk. The warships withdrew and headed south. Only fifty survivors managed to reach Mawis Island. They were picked up by a Jap launch. Not a single Jap ship escaped the bombing and shelling.”

ROADS AND TRAILS

Japs Attempt To Keep New Trails Secret:

Among the varied activities undertaken by the enemy in an all-out effort to strengthen their defenses, especially in the Davao area, was the construction of roads and trails to the interior and in the interior sectors.

These were calculated to hasten the movement of troops and equipment in the event of American Landings and subsequent withdrawals. These new trails and roads were so linked together in the Davao area, that they provided an orderly withdrawal of troops and equipment to alternate interior defense positions.

Construction of these trails were naturally meant to be secret…but to construct a road, build a bridge, or erect a building in the Philippines without the knowledge of the native people would be something next to impossible.

Trails were made rather narrow, and advantage taken of overhead foliage, to prevent spotting by reconnaissance planes. However, in spite of all precautions, there was not a new Japanese trail that was not subsequently reported by loyal civilians and our agents.

Maps Valuable To American Ground Forces:

Very few accurate maps were available for use by American tactical forces and none of them indicated the trails and roads built since the days of Pearl Harbor. Consequently guerilla maps furnished by the Intelligence Section were of great value…and actually reproduced for distribution to all units concerned.

Such a map is the one of the “DAVAO INTERIOR SECTOR” included with this report. This shows a maze of roads and trails non-existent on any map in the hands of the American forces. Neither did reconnaissance photos bring out all these trails…but this map obviously became important in the Davao…Kibawe-Talomo Trail encounters.

In other sectors on Mindanao, the enemy attempted to construct similar trails of withdrawal and secondary positions. The Malungon Trail, connecting Sarangani Bay area with that of Padada or southern Davao is a good example. However, this trail was never used effectively, due to the enemy being cut off from Digos due to rapid advance of American forces.

Following are a few radio messages released to higher Headquarters concerning new trails, roads and important. changes:

1944:

26 Oct.            FROM LIBONA, BUKIDNON, NIPS HAVE BACK TRAILS TO SOUTH.

31 Oct.            ROAD UNDER CONSTRUCTION NORTHWESTERN DAVAO AREA PASSES THRU GUMALANG, UPPER BIAO, MONGON KULAPU AND UPIAN TO BALATUKAN WHERE IT CONNECTS WITH THE PROVINCIAL ROAD THAT WAS CONSTRUCTED BEFORE THE WAR. PACK ANIMALS ARE USED FOR CARRYING EQUIPMENT FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION PURPOSES.

Oct.                 NIPS IN CAGAYAN IMPROVING BACK TRAILS THRU LIBONA, MAMPAYAG, DALWANGAN, AS POSSIBLE MEANS OF RETREAT.

Oct.                 NIPS HAVE ESTABLISHED ESCAPE ROUTE THRU PASONANGA RIVER TOWARDS WEST COAST. THEY ARE ALSO MOVING SUPPLIES TO CAPISAN.

1945:

10 Feb.            ALL BRIDGES BETWEEN SANTIAGO AND MAGPAYANG BEING REBUILT.

18 Feb.            ENEMY FINISHED ROAD CONNECTING SASA AIRFIELD WITH KM 8 CABANTIAN BUHANGIN ROAD

26 Feb.            NEW ROUTES OF WITHDRAWAL ENEMY TROOPS SOUTH DAVAO AREA INFORMED OF WIDENED TRAILS ABOUT 6 METERS WIDE, 1 FROM MATINA SECTOR (KM 2.6) GOING NORTH TO CATALUNAN GRANDE THEN TO MINTAL COMPLETED ABOUT 31 JANUARY. 2ND FROM SIBULAN (KM 30 SOUTH HIGHWAY) PASSING EAST OF INAWAYAN, EAST OF CATIGAN DIRECT TO BAYABAS THEN TO MANUEL PLANTATION (ABOUT KMS WEST OF NAMING).

28 Mar.  BRIDGES FROM KM 6h to 66 (AGUSAN-SURIGAO BOUNDARY) UNDER REPAIR.

16 Jun. A NEW 17 KM TRAIL HAS BEEN COMPLETED FROM TULI TO SALAYSAY ALONG NORTH SIDE OF KIBAWE-CALINAN ROAD AND ANOTHER 11 KM TRAIL FROM JUNCTION OF TULI AND SUWAWAN RIVER TO UPIAN MOUNTAINS.

COMPOSITE INTELLIGENCE REPORT

When the Americans landed at Leyte, 20 Oct 1944, they considered sending a force to Surigao, to protect that flank. However, the 6th Army called for a representative of the Tenth Military District, to present facts on that forward and the rear areas as well.

Maj HAROLD A. ROSENQUIST, AC of S, G-2, who had just spent some time in the Surigao area obtaining marine and land mine information before the landing of American forces in Leyte, was dispatched by Col FERTIG to Leyte by PT boat.

A complete report was prepared and submitted to G-2, 6th Army. It is reproduced herewith for it graphically illustrates the intelligence reporting all over the island which made this report possible. On the basis of this report, and the ability of FERTIG’s guerrillas to hold the enemy in check, it was decided not to make a landing in Surigao.

UNITED STATES FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES

Headquarters Tenth Military District

In the Field

7 November 1944

l. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION:

a. MINDANAO as a Whole: The Island of MINDANAO is being divided into a forward and a rear area for purposes of discussion, and forward area comprising all territory N of a line running E and W from LIANGA (SURIGAO) to, but not including, CAGAYAN (MISAMIS ORIENTAL), and the rear area comprising the remainder of the Island. As of 30 Oct 1944 enemy strength in MINDANAO was estimated as follows:

AGUSAN                                           350

BUKIDNON                                      4,400

COTABATO                                      16,000

DAVAO                                             25,000

LANAO                                              500

MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL                100

MISAMIS ORIENTAL                     3,500

SURIGAO                                          1,800

ZAMBOANGA                                 5,700

                                                            _______

Total                                                    57, 350

b. Enemy Activity in Forward Area: Enemy garrisons as of 30 Oct. were located as follows:

AGUSAN                                           150

NASIPIT                                 150

BUTUAN                               60

MISAMIS ORIENTAL

TALISAYAN                         100

ANAKAN                              50

SURIGAO

SURIGAO TOWN                 200

MABUHUAY                        500

ANAMAR                              250

BADAS                                  100

MADRID                               400

TANDAG                               100

                                                            _____

 Total                                                   1,910

Garrisons at NASIPIT, BUTUAN, TANDAG and MADRID are at. present confined or being attacked by guerrilla troops of the 119th and ll4th Regt, of the 110th Division. The enemy garrison at ANAKAN was reported as having moved to CAGAYAN by barge. At present those garrisons are on the defensive as a result of the orders from the Headquarters of the Tenth Military District to confine and eliminate them. These guerrillas can contain the enemy by land, but the sea approaches remain open to him; by the use of barges and motor launches the Japs can, therefore, freely move their troops. The enemy garrisons are limited in their function to very short patrols. ‘There are four airfields in the forward area: At SURIGAO, BADAS, MALPOK (near BUTUAN) and ANAKAN (near GINGOOG). These are fighter strips, but they are not in use.

c. Enemy Activity in Rear Area: Since the first of September the Japs have been concentrating on a strong defense of the BUKIDNON VALLEY area, including the SAYRE HIGHWAY leading to DAVAO, COTABATO and CAGAYAN seaports.

Indications were that the Japs moved many troops S (7,000 from SURIGAO during the months of August and September) to establish a highly mobile island reserve straddling the N, S and W approaches to the above named ports. Enemy troops are therefore in a position rapidly to reinforce strategic points as these are threatened except in AGUSAN and SURIGAO. The most recent troop movement was that to the city of KABAKAN (COTABATO) pf approximately 8,000 troops. This movement may account for the sudden drop of 8,000 troops in the strength estimates for BUKIDNON. Besides the movement of 120 truckloads of troops to the N along the SAYRE HIGHWAY, the enemy continues to move troops to the S. According to a PW from the hist Regt, 30th Div., captured at CARAGARA (LEYTE) 31 October, the hist Regt arrived at CAGAYAN 2h October from the S and left CAGAYAN on three unidentified destroyers 26 October, arriving at ORMOC (LEYTE) on 27 October. In DAVAO PROVINCE the tendency has been to bivouac away from the city, from military installations and other bombing targets; such troops are concentrated in areas to the W of DAVAO CITY near MT APO. No explanation can now be given for the increase in troop strength (an increase of 3,600 during the month of October) in ZAMBOANGA, all concentrated in the vicinity of ZAMBOANGA CITY. Guerrillas occupy or control over three-fourths of this province.

d. Installations, Fortifications, Supplies:

(1) Roads and Trails: When still in control of the AGUSAN and SURIGAO areas, the enemy improved the MAYGATASAN TRAIL, thus providing an outlet from BUTUAN via the AGUSAN RIVER to LIANGA, and at the same time providing an outlet from DAVAO by means-of the National Highway via the AGUSAN RIVER to the MAYGATASAN TRAIL.

(2) Bridges: In the forward area the greater number of the bridges, most covering culverts and small rivers, are either usable or can be replaced.

The enemy recently destroyed the bridge between SURIGAO and IPIL (SURIGAO). The large bridge at MAGPAYOS, south of BADAS (AGUSAN), was destroyed by the flood of 20 October. ‘The bridge at SANTIAGO (AGUSAN) is out, one bridge between MADRID and LANUZA. These bridges can be repaired where necessary through the cooperation of the local inhabitants. The small bridges would require little time, the larger much more, for repair, depending upon the available materials.

(3) Fortifications: The usual practice of the enemy is to install barbed wire entanglements, foxholes, and trenches around the garrisoned area. Each garrison has one or more .30 cal MGs covering the main approaches. The recent reports state that there are barbed wire entanglements along the shore from the wharf to the river’s mouth in SURIGAO CITY. There was also an unconfirmed report that land mines are planted on the beach at the mouth of the SURIGAO RIVER. Defensive areas have recently been strengthened from Km 1 to Km 3 (immediately S of the city proper).

(4) Artillery: It has been reported that two 75 mm guns are located within SURIGAO CITY and three at PT BILAA. However, the Japs have recently evacuated PT BILAA and the whereabouts of these guns is not known.

A report stated that they had been removed to MADRID but it was not verified.

The Japs make constant and effective use of knee mortars and 8l-mm mortars in keeping guerrilla units at a distance. There are no known AA guns in the forward area

(5) Armor: Reports indicate that three tanks are located at BUGO near CAGAYAN.

(6) Underwater Obstacles: A marine mine field was reported extending from PT BILAA in a northerly direction to a point 100 yards off shore.

Boats beyond this point proceeded without escort. Local inhabitants found some floating mines on the E coast shores of SURIGAO. These mines were 1 yard in diameter, with eight acid detonators, were painted black, loaded with citric acid powder, and laid at a depth of from two to three years. Some mines had red flags to indicate position; they are reported by these inhabitants to break away from their moorings easily.

(7) Supplies: In SURIGAO PROVINCE only 80% of the Japs are armed, the rest having Lost their equipment during large scale bombings of 9 September or being survivors from ships sunk during recent naval battles. In this province the enemy is better equipped with food supplies than in AGUSAN where it had become necessary to rely on local sources, especially on fish from native fishermen.

2. GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES: During the month of October, following approval of GHQ, SWPA, aggressive action was taken to contain and where possible, to eliminate enemy garrisons. In the forward area at present, as suggested above, the garrisons at NASIPIT and BUTUAN AGUSAN) are, except for the sea approaches, definitely surrounded. In SURIGAO PROVINCE enemy is being engaged at MADRID, but reinforcements have been received here, and consequently guerrilla activity is limited to harassing attacks only. No large scale offensive action has been taken against the Headquarters garrison at MABUHAY, principally because of a lack of sufficient mortars and mortar ammunition.

During the first nine months of 1944, a total of 3,916 Japanese were killed by guerrilla forces of the Tenth Military District.

From the time of the original organization of guerrilla units in the Tenth Military District, special emphasis has been placed on the following activities:

a. The establishment of coast watcher systems.

b. The building of intelligence nets for the obtaining of data including facts about troop concentrations and movements, air and water-borne traffic, and airfield installations. Radio communications were installed for the dissemination of such intelligence whenever the equipment was available.

Moreover, the guerrilla units established food projects, and so contributed substantially to the solution of the food problem in a number of areas.

3. ENEMY CAPABILITIES: The enemy is capable of:

a. Maintaining a static defense of MINDANAO: Although there does not seem to be any Logical reason for the Japs to maintain a static defense of MINDANAO, there have been some indications of recent enemy movement to the S. This would seem to indicate that the Japs intend to continue their policy of keeping a mobile inland reserve for the defense of the Island.

b. Defending the N and the NE coasts There have been no indications that the enemy intends to defend the N and the NE coast. Troops have been moved N to CAGAYAN but none has been moved to the E from there. Some enemy troops have been landed along the E coast of SURIGAO PROVINCE at TANDAG and MADRID but these were small in number and some may have been survivors from ships that were sunk.

c. Evacuating troops to BORNEO via ZAMBOANGA: It is possible for the enemy to evacuate his troops to BORNEO via COTABATO and ZAMBOANGA. The constantly fluctuating enemy strength in ZAMBOANGA would suggest that this province has been used as a staging area for troops. Then enemy has been known to stage troops through ZAMBOANGA to COTABATO, and thence to BUKIDNON or DAVAO. Obviously this route could also be used in reverse. During the months of September and October enemy strength in COTABATO PROVINCE increased by approximately 10,000 troops. These probably were scheduled to reinforce the mobile inland reserve in BUKIDNON. It may be that since the American landing on LEYTE they are being held until the enemy can decide which course of action to follow.

d. Moving troops N to CAGAYAN and attempting to reinforce LEYTE: The enemy has already moved the bulk of the 1st Regt. 30th Div., N to CAGAYAN and by boat to LEYTE. During the last week in October a total of 120 truckloads of Japs were seen moving N to CAGAYAN; these probably were the 1st Regt and an additional 600 troops that left CAGAYAN by boat for an unknown destination (probably LEYTE). However, there have been no further indications of any attempts to strengthen CAGAYAN or to send troops there from the S.

e. The evacuation of troops by the enemy from CAGAYAN to the WESTERN VISAYAS remains a capability of the enemy, but no reports have been received that would indicate such a maneuver.

/s/ Harold A. Rosenquist

/t/ HAROLD A. ROSENQUIST,

Captain, FA.,

AC of S, G-2

Historic Jasaan Church finally gets a historical marker

Previously Recognized as a National Cultural Treasure by the National Museum

JASAAN, MISAMIS ORIENTAL-The historic Immaculate Conception Parish Church of this elder municipality of Misamis Oriental finally got a historical marker from the National Historical Commission of the Philippines recognizing its historical significance.

The NHCP Historical Marker (photo courtesy of Arellano J. Galdo III)

On April 23, 2025, the NHCP marker was unveiled and turned over by NHCP Chair Regalado Trota Jose, Jr.,  to Most. Rev. Jose A. Cabantan, DD., Archbishop of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Cagayan de Oro.

Aside from the signing of the Memorandum of Agreement for the historical marker, the occasion also marked the unveiling of the church’s newly restored Retro-Tabula (Retablo).

The Restored Retablo (photo courtesy of Arellano J. Galdo III)

Retablo (Latin for Retro-Tabula meaning “behind the Altar”) is equivalent to reredos or the retable in French, a vertical multi-tiered structure behind the altar with an elaborate frame enclosing revered objects, which may include religious paintings, sculptures, or both.

The Jasaan Parish Restoration & Development Committee with NHCP Chair Regalado Trota Jose, Jr., Cagayan de Oro Archbishop Jose Cabantan, Jasaan Municipal Mayor Redentor Jardin, and other dignitaries. (photo courtesy of Vinny N. Veleso)

The event was witnessed by Mr. Alvin R. Alcid, NHCP Deputy Executive Director for Programs and Projects; Rev. Fr. Demli Redeemer C. Valmores, SSJV, Parish Priest of the Immaculate Conception Parish Church; and Mayor Redentor S. Jardin of the Municipality of Jasaan.

According to Vinny N. Veloso, secretary and founding member of the Jasaan Parish Restoration & Development Committee (JPRDCI) which led the restoration of the retablo, it was established by and composed of Jasaan Parishioners, dedicated to the restoration and development of the religious, spiritual and cultural heritage of the Jasaan Parish Church and its environs for the benefit of the residents of the parish today and in the future, and for the old and the new generations to reconnect with their spiritual and religious heritage and culture.

Currently, the JPRDCI officials include Chair Lorraine V Gagno; Vice chair Joey J Cabañas; Treasurer Efleda J Geralde; Auditor Bella P Pagapular; PRO Lucila S Valledor; Cultural and Heritage & Education- Segundo H Sabijon.

“The Committee is focused on the restoration of the Immaculate Conception Parish Church and related buildings and on the establishment of other projects like a parish museum to safeguard and showcase the historical and cultural artifacts of the parish,” Veloso said.

History of Jasaan Church

Immaculate Conception Parish Church, better known as the Jasaan Church, is a Baroque Roman Catholic Church  located in Poblacion, Upper Jasaan, Misamis Oriental, Philippines.  It falls within the jurisdiction of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Cagayan de Oro. It was declared a National Cultural Treasure by the National Museum due to its artistic design and cultural values.

The Immaculate Conception Parish Church of Jasaan, Misamis Oriental (photo courtesy of Arellano J. Galdo III)

In 1830, the mission of Jasaan was established separately from Cagayan de Oro,  where its authority and evangelization reached as far as the towns of Sumilao, Libona, and Malitbog in the province of Bukidnon. 

Inspired by the San Ignacio Church in Intramuros, Manila, the Jesuit brothers Francisco Rivera and Juan Cuesta are credited with the construction of the original church.

The center of civilization of the new parish and its first church was at “Daanglungsod,” which is now Aplaya, Jasaan. The first church was built out of lime from 1723 to 1830 under the supervision of Fr. Ramos Cabas, parish priest of Sitio Kabitiaugan, Barrio AplayaThe ruins of the first church and a ‘cotta’ (fortified watchtower) is visible on the low hill near the highway.

In 1859, Jasaan became the base for evangelical activities among the Manobos in Bukidnon.  From Jasaan, missionaries fanned out to areas in Bukidnon now known as Malitbog, Siloo, Linabo, and Sumilao.  In 1887, Jesuit Father Juan Herras, began the construction of the present Immaculate Conception Church. Father Gregorio Parache, S.J., was the parish priest of Jasaan at that time.

The original facade of the church has been modified after a series of renovations. The original altar of the church has been moved backward to allow a larger area for the faithful inside the church building. The original sacristy has been moved to the side.

The church is registered as a National Cultural Treasure by the National Commission for Culture and the Arts  (NCCA) after the National Museum declared the Immaculate Conception Parish Church a National Cultural Treasure on July 31, 2001 due to its cultural and historical value. The NCCA serves as the umbrella organization for the National Museum, coordinating with it and other cultural agencies to implement cultural policies and programs.

The church has two bell towers  with four bells in total. The oldest of the four bells is dated 1807 while the largest is cast “Nuestra Señora de la Inmaculada Concepcion de Jasaan Año 1854”, while the others have these inscriptions around its outer rim: “Para El Pueblo de Jasaan 1860”.

The NHCP is the national government agency mandated to promote Philippine history through its museums, research, and publications, and to preserve historical heritage through conservation and the marking of historic sites and structures.

The Jasaan Church also has a church museum in an annex building which houses its extensive collection of artifacts dating back to its beginning during the 1800s.

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Mindanao Guerrillas Radio Communication Net

When Col WENDELL W. FERTIG assumed command of the Mindanao Guerrillas on 18 September 1942, he was confronted with the problem of setting up and perfecting a good radio communication system, both for internal and external contact. Efficient administration of the units under his command and the transmission of vital information to higher headquarters especially relating to enemy troop disposition, ship movement and plane traffic, demanded the establishment of radio net. A move in this direction was immediately started.

By 30 Sept 1942, four Filipino radio men, ALFREDO BONTUYAN, GLICERIO LIM, GERARDO and ELENO ALMENDRAS, reported to Col FERTIG. They were commissioned Third Lieutenants in the United States Army Forces in the Philippines, and subsequently established themselves in Lala, Lanao.

FLORENTINO OPENDO, former Bureau of Aeronautics Radio Operator, living at that time in Dipolog, Zamboanga and reported having a radio transmitter buried near nis home, was called – after an improvised radio set failed to function.

After OPENDO’s radio transmitter was fixed and ready for use, all the radio men transferred to Bonifacio, Misamis Occidental where the set was established. At this time, three American radio men, ROBERT V. BALL, 5th Air Base Sq., USAC, WILLIAM F. KONKO, MTB Sq 3, USN, and WILLIAM JOHNSON of the MIB So, were commissioned Second lieutenants. Another American, GEORGE HALL, USAC, having reported to Col FERTIG, was assigned to the Force Radio Section which at that time had just been activated.

Lt ROBERT F. BALL, was designated CO of the Force Radio Section (FRS).

America Suspicious of our Call Sign

In the early days of January 1943, BALL, KONKO, JOHNSCN, HALL, OPENDO and ELENO ALMENDRAS, by turns sat at the key day and night, without let-up, calling CQ, general call for any station, in the hope that some Allied station would hear them. For over a month, efforts spent in this direction proved futile. No contact was made.

Later, however, it became known that all the calls were heard by monitoring stations in Washington, but the call sign used, KZOM, having been utilized by the former Air Corps stationed at Del Monte, Mindanao, suspicion was entertained that calling station from the Philippines was a decoy. This was confirmed by Capt CHARLES SMITH who, with Capts ALBERT Y. SMITH and JOHN A. HAMNER, had gone to Australia in a sailboat on 5 Dec 1942. Capt CHARLES M. SMITH came back to Mindanao in the first submarine that landed on 5 Mar 1943.

Visiting General MacArthur in his office in Brisbane at 6:05pm on Friday 30 July 1943 were
L to R:- Major William E. Dyess (Air Corps), Commander Melvyn H. McCoy (USN), General
Douglas  MacArthur and Major S.M. Mellnik (Coast Artillery Corps). These three men had recently escaped
a Japanese POW camp on Davao
 and returned to Australia by submarine with Commander “Chick” Parsons.
Present but not in the photograph were Colonel Whitney, Commander Parsons and Captain Charles Smith.
(Ozatwar.com)

Sometime in the second week of Jan 1943, ROX M. BELL, formerly Physics professor at the Silliman University, Dumaguete, came with a small home-made radio transmitter which right then was utilized by Col FERTIG’s headquarters in Misamis, Misamis Occidental, in contacting the big transmitter at Bonifacio which later was functioning smoothly after ROY M. BELL had done some repairs on it.

First Contact With Outside

On 6 Feb 1943, contact was made with the station of Lt-Col MACARIO PERALTA in Panay. PERALTA also had a guerrilla organization in Panay.

On 18 Feb 1943, contact was made with station KFS, San Francisco. Code words were arranged with the War Department through this station and contact was established with station KAZ, Gen MacArthur’s net control station in Australia.

On 23 Feb 1943, the first message was received from Gen MacArthur, designating Mindanao as the Tenth Military District and assigning Col FERTIG Commanding Officer. For use with KAZ, the call sign WYZB was employed.

A guerrilla unit in Pagadian, Zamboanga, under Maj NICOLAS P. LASOLA had built a small radio and contact was quickly established between FERTIG’s station WAM and LASOLA’s WPX. At this time, the call sign ZAP, previously used, was dropped and substituted with WAM for the inter-island net and WYZB for contacts with SWPA.

Through radio contact, Maj LASOLA and his unit came under the Tenth Military District command.

Couriers coming from Malaybalay, Bukidnon brought the information that SALIPADA K. PENDATUN, another guerrilla leader, was operating in Bukidnon. He was reported to have a radio, built by some Americans who were in his unit. Contact with PENDATUN was then established.

At this time, WAM at Bonifacio was designated as Net Control Station for the Tenth Military District with WPX, Pagadian, Zamboanga; WSK, station of ROY M. BELL, Negros; and WBA, PERALTA’s station on Panay as branches.

Sub Brings Needed Supplies

The submarine that landed at Pagadian on 5 Mar 1943, brought Lt-Commander “CHICK” PARSONS and five brand-new radio sets along with other vitally needed supplies. Commander PARSONS brought with him instructions from Gen MacArthur. The importance of gathering intelligence information on and about the enemy and its quick transmission to SWPA was especially stressed.

Accordingly, on 10 Mar 1943, Capt CHARLES M. SMITH with Lts JOHNSON and BALL went to Davao and established a radio station as close to the city as possible. Then they employed intelligence operatives to gather information inside the city, especially on harbor installations and ship movements. This information was sent to WAM and immediately relayed to GHQ, Australia.

JOHNSON was left in Davao while BALL and SMITH returned to District Headquarters sometime in May 1943. On his return, BALL began to plan for the installation of more Coast Watcher Stations, under instructions of Col FERTIG, which were subsequently to cover every harbor and shipping lane in the Philippine waters.

Another Radio Contact With America

Major Cecil Walter.

In Feb 1943, two Americans, LLOYD WATERS, USAC and GLYN MITCHELL, USAC, worked under Maj CECIL WALTER in Anakan, Misamis Oriental, in putting into operation a 250-watt transmitting set which WALTER previous to the war had been using to contact Manila and the States. After some weeks of constant labor, contact between WALTER and the War Department through KFS, San Francisco, California, was established.

In May 1943, Commander PARSONS visited WALTER at Anakan, bringing with him instructions and codes from Col FERTIG. Soon thereafter, contact between WALTER’s MRS and WAM, was established. WALTER and Col FERTIG were old friends both having worked for the same company prior to the war.

Another submarine landing was made at Pagadian in May 1943, bringing back Capt JOHN HAMNER with more radio equipment and other supplies. A week later, HAMNER with JAMES CAIN, Sgt. USAC, who had recently joined the FRS, went to Tawi-Tawi and there established a watcher station to take careful watch and report of enemy movements in the Southern shipping lanes.

Lt LINCOLN H. DA PRON, 1th Bombardment Sq., USAC, arrived at FERTIG’s headquarters on 21 May 1943 from Col ROBERT V. BOWLER, then commanding the 109th Division, operating in the Cagayan-Bukidnon area. DA PRON returned to Misamis Oriental on 26 May with radio equipment and installed a radio set at Alubijid, a few kilometers from Cagayan, having an excellent view of the Cagayan harbor. This station was in addition to BOWLER’s main Headquarters Station TAC. On 5 Jun 1943 DA PRON using call sign TAB, made the first contact with WAM. Lt JCHN WOOD, 101st Ordnance, and @LAYTON MANNERS, 19th Bombardment Group, took over operation of the station when DA PRON left early in July 1943 to join the FRS.

The Force Radio Section was gradually expanding. HENRY ROOKE, MTB Sq 3, USN, THOMAS MITSOS and HAROLD MARTIN, both previously with the 19th Bombardment Group, were commissioned Second Lieutenants and assigned to the FRS as code men.

Japs Force Withdrawal

On 26 Jun 1943, the Japanese landed a huge convoy of troops at Misamis, Misamis Occidental. One cruiser, 2 destroyers, 15 aircraft and several transports participated in the landing. The odds were too much for the guerrilla troops. They were forced to withdraw inland after putting up some resistance which proved futile. Previously, Col FERTIG foreseeing such eventuality, had engines and equipment installed in the interior.

The radio was moved to that location. At times during the enemy operations, the radio was operating within 300 yards of Jap patrols, but never missed contact with any of the net stations. Gen MacArthur, in a communication a few weeks later, highly commended the radio personnel for exemplary bravery under fire.

The presence of the enemy in the area, aggravated the food procurement difficulty. So by the end of July 1943, Col FERTIG’s headquarters transferred to Liangan, Lanao – using bancas in crossing Panguil Bay, and under the very noses of the enemy in the middle of the night – leaving Lt KONKO behind to take over the control of the net while the move was being made.

Lt KONKO’s station ERT, with the exception of traffic to SWPA, handled the entire net while the move-out was in progress. Traffic was relayed to WALTER’s MRS at Anakan which in turn relayed all the traffic direct to KAZ. All incoming messages from KAZ were routed in the same manner.

WAM was installed in the first few days of Aug 1943, three kilometers inland from Liangan.

Francis J. Napolillo, Jr. (courtesy of Frank Andruss)

On 12 Sept 1943, another submarine landing took place at Liangan, just a few miles across from the Japanese garrison at Misamis. Seven tons of much-needed cargo were unloaded. The first American repatriates from the Philippines to the United States were shipped out on this trip. One of them was Lt FRANCIS J. NAPILLILO, Jr. who had been working with the FRS and the former Chief Petty Officer of PT-35 which escorted Gen. Douglas MacArthur on his famous Breakout from Corregidor to Cagayan on March 11-13, 1942.

Establish Contact With US Navy

One of the most important pieces of equipment unloaded by this submarine was a large Navy transmitter. This transmitter was immediately set up at the inland radio station by Lts DA PRON and ALMA B. MILLS. On 28 Sept 1943, direct contact with the Naval net control station in Australia was made. This contact enabled the FRS to send flashes on Japanese shipping direct to the Naval Intelligence and made possible also the sending of traffic direct to KAZ without relaying any more through MRS.

In the early part of Oct, BALL then recently promoted Captain, was sent by Col FERTIG to Agusan Valley to look for a more suitable location of the Force Headquarters. The barrio of Esperanza, thirty five kilometers from the coast up the Agusan River, was picked for the new site. Engines were immediately installed and houses repaired in expectation of the move-out from Lanao. Col FERTIG accompanied by Lt LOWELL HOLDER, two weeks previously assigned with the FRS, followed Capt BALL on 15 Oct 1943.

USS Narwhal (SS-167) was the busiest Spyron sub with nine missions to her credit. (USN Phot0)

Two more submarine landings took place in Nasipit and Cabadbaran, Agusan Province on 15 Nov and 2 Dec 1943 respectively. Approximately ninety eight tons of supplies were unloaded during those two weeks. Many radio sets were among the cargo. This enabled the FRS to establish an extensive coast watcher net all over Mindanao.

Lts MARTIN, MITSCS and DA PRON arrived Esperanza on 4 Dec 1943 from Lanao.

With these three men and many more which Capt BALL assigned from the 110th Division, the Net Control Station was speedily set up and ready to resume control. A new call sign was assigned by BALL for use at the new location. This call sign WAT, was both for the inter-island and SWPA. Another call sign ZAV was used with the Navy. Three sets were put into operation; one for the Mindanao island net, another for SWPA and still another for the Navy.

The men assigned were Lts WILLARD MONEY, WILLIAM LASAM, LAZARO HIDALGO, VINCENTE LASAN, TOMAS LOPEZ, SIXTO FERRER and ISIDRO PALACIO, MITCHELL and WALTERS had formerly been operating WALTER’s MRS at Anakan which was moved to Butuan when they were assigned to the FRS.

WAM, during the move, continued to be operated in Lanao as Net Control Station, under the care of Lts KONKO, CHIMELEWSKI, MILLS, ALMENDRAS, OPENDO, LE COUVRE, GARLAND and FARRENS. When enough equipment was set up at Esperanza, WAM was left complete as standby station. The WAM personnel remained in Lanao with the exception of Lts KONKO, MILLS, LE COUVRE and GARLAND who were called to Esperanza where they arrived on 22 Dec 1943.

Radio Stations Expand

Lt Col Ernest E McClish, CO, 110th Division, 10th Military District, USFIP

With various strategic sites picked out for watcher net coverage, Lt WILLARD MONEY was sent out to put the sets into operation. Leaving Esperanza on 23 Dee 1943, he installed the first set at Mambajao, Camiguin, and left it under the management of Lt RICHARD THOMMES, a former USAC soldier previously assigned in Camiguin by Lt-Col ERNEST E. McCLISH, the CO of the 110th Division, with headquarters at Butuan.

MONEY proceeded to LIANGAN where he dropped off some new equipment for WAM. Then a Coast Watcher Net was installed by MONEY in the province of Cotabato that extended along the whole of the provincial coastline. With the increase of the number of stations in Western side of Mindanao, WAM was designated Net Control Station for Western Mindanao. All stations in the Western side directed their traffic to WAM. All traffic was then sent to WAT thru a different circuit.

Other stations were then established: MBA with Lt FERRER, guarded the sea

lanes that extended into the Mindanao sea from the Surigao straits, SEVILLA at Balete, Surigao; MBN with Lt OWEN P. WILSON at Caraga, Davao; MBQ with Lt GILL at Lianga, Surigao and MBR at Nueva Campo, Surigao. The last three American officers were newly assigned to the FRS.

Approximately thirty stations then about completely covered the coastline of the entire island. Besides these stations on Mindanao, the FRS was in contact with eight stations in the Visayan islands. Ship movements were flashed to WAT from these stations and were in turn relayed direct to Navy Headquarters in Australia. In some cases, messages of this type were receipted for by the Navy within one hour of ship sighting by the watcher station.

Organize Radio Net in Samar

With the final installations of the net completed, Capt BALL was relieved by Maj JAMES L. EVANS who had arrived with Maj CHARLES SMITH, when the latter came back to Mindanao, BALL and SMITH went to Samar to organize the guerrillas and set up a radio net there. At this time, the FRS was augmented by more personnel. Lts ARTHUR HAGE, FREDERICK TAYLOR, JAMES SCHOEN, BERNARDO ADOLFO, GAUDIO PANGAN, GREGORIO SAN GILL, GREGORIO OLIVER and MELQUIADES CAROZ. The FRS personnel now consisted about twenty operators and sixteen code men with more than this number distributed in the watcher stations.

On 22 Dec 1943, the Japanese invaded the province of Lanao, forcing the radio station there to go off the air. The radio personnel managed to reach Misamis Occidental where they set up a sub-Net Control in the mountains behind the town of Misamis, after making their way through the jungles. Using the call sign CET, they again took over the control of all stations on the western half of the island.

In the later part of Jan 1944, WAT was moved further up the Agusan River to Talacogon. Reports from the watcher stations and all other intelligence information on the enemy situation were being flashed in such a volume that twenty four hour operation daily became imperative. Two stations were assigned to gather all the incoming messages from the net. Another net was utilized to flash reports to the Navy. Still another set was used to send out all the intelligence reports to GHQ, SWPA.

Radio Traffic Greatly Increased

More stations were then established. These were as near as possible to the places garrisoned by the Japs in order to flash information on the number of planes and airfield the enemy had in operation; troop movements; heavy gun emplacements, truck convoys, troop concentrations, etc. This data was of utmost importance and along with ship sightings and plane movements, given priority. To confuse the enemy monitoring stations, the call signs of the net stations were frequently changed.

On 2 Mar 1944 Lt-Commander M. M* WHEELER of the United States Naval Intelligence arrived on Mindanao by submarine. With him were Lt SATURNINO SILVA and four enlisted men of the 1st Filipino Division from the States. The four enlisted men were subsequently assigned to the FRS as operators and Lt SILVA as Ordnance Officer, Tenth Military District. Commander WHEELER was to make many trips along the coast of the island to gather important naval intelligence.

Japs Bomb Headquarters Incessantly

On 15 Mar 1944, huge Japanese contingents invaded Butuan, headquarters of the 110th Division – at the same time enemy dive bombers bombed the Agusan River Valley, bombing every barrio along the river banks in an endeavor to knock out radio installations and destroy guerrilla headquarters. These bombings and strafings continued for days. Over a two-day period, Talacogon was savagely bombed and strafed. No less than twenty bombs exploded right in the barrio. Radio houses, though not badly damaged, were riddled with bullets. One transmitter was hit but was immediately replaced. The continuous search, intense and persistent, conducted by Jap planes and ground troops to locate radio installations proved useless. No damage was inflicted in these enemy operations on the radio net. However, it was decided that in case of a shutdown by the Net Control Station at Talacogon, another should take its place at a moment’s notice. So Lts WATER and RUSSEL SMITH were sent to build a camp at Waloe, on a tributary of the Agusan River, installing engines and setting up the necessary equipment.

On 5 May 1944, at 11:35 AM, six Jap Betty bombers swept over Talacogon, bombing and strafing at a low altitude. After the enemy action, only one cow was found killed. All installations were intact.

Evacuation Prudent  to Waloe

Immediate evacuation was ordered that day. It was thought that the next aerial attacks might not be so erratic. That afternoon half of the number of operators and code men went up the river to Waloe, arriving there at 8:00 PM and immediately began operating the radio equipment established by WATERS and SMITH. The remaining radio personnel in Talacogon dismantled all installations and moved to Waloe that night. By dawn of 6 May 1944, the barrio had been completely evacuated. A major move had again been made by the FRS without missing a single contact.

In the morning of 6 May 194, the six Bettys came back and levelled Talacogon to the ground. Not a single building was left standing. This evidently led the Japs to believe that all installations force Headquarters were wiped out.

A few days later, Commander WHEELER arrived at Waloe from one of his trips to the coast. He was then designated CO, FRS, relieving Maj EVANS who was ordered by Col FERTIG to make a complete survey of the health situations of the various units stationed in Agusan, Surigao and Davao.

New Code System Introduced

Commander WHEELER introduced a new code system which was put into use with all stations of the Tenth Military District. This in time proved most valuable. An aircraft warning system was then organized with all stations, using a special type of code. This was to facilitate speedy transmittal of plane traffic so that each station could send in a short message, not exceeding ten groups, all data regarding the type, speed, direction, altitude, and position of a plane sighted.

Such facts could be reported to the NCS and in turn relayed to a Fighter Command Station almost before the planes were out of sight of the spotter. This system proved invaluable when American fighters and bombers began working over the islands in Sept 1944. Plane sightings with this code system were being reported from watcher station to Net Control to Australia on the average of five and one half minutes after sighting!

In the new location, food problem became more acute. The Agusan River Valley was flooded during most of the year, making the planting of staple crops terribly hard. The produce of the natives was barely enough for their own needs. To procure dried fish and salt required a twenty-day round trip to and from the coast. Officers and men used to scour the surrounding country for food available. The Headquarters personnel, however, took it on the chin and smiled it off.

May 27-28, another American submarine was scheduled to land near Lianga, Surigao, but did not establish contact with shore party and supplies were unloaded in Tukuran, Zamboanga on 1 Jun 1944. Three Americans were un loaded on that trip; Maj HAROLD A. ROSENQUIST, Sgts MC GRATH, and GEORGE FINNEGAN. The two enlisted men were weather men sent to report weather conditions to the Air Forces. Maj ROSENQUIST had the mission, among others, of contacting the American Prisoners at Davao Penal Colony. But the Japs had already moved the prisoners from the Colony when ROSENQUIST arrived in Davao on 6 Aug 1944. Maj ROSENQUIST was then unable to perform this part of his mission.

These three Americans had to hike all the way through from Pagadian to Waloe, arriving there on 25 July 1944. Maj ROSENQUIST was assigned Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2, for the Tenth Military District having come direct from G-2 Section, CHQ,  SWPA.

During this period, it became evident that the Japanese were intent in tracking down the headquarters, with all possible means and persistence. They were reported converging in on Talacogon. It was not hard for them to get at Waloe in three flanks.

Shipping flashes were coming in thick and fast and the security of the radio was vital to Army and Naval Intelligence. Going off the air, happen what might, would be a calamity at this time. The flow of valuable intelligence traffic must continue.

At this time, the Sub-NCS in Western Mindanao was functioning efficiently under Lt JOIN SIMMONS, USNR, who landed by submarine on 5 Jun 1944. The call sign used was now SL9 and most of the other station call signs were also changed.

SL9 Prepared For Emergency Take-Over

With the enemy closing in, Col FERTIG decided that SL9 should be prepared to take over the net control of the entire Tenth Military District, in the event the Waloe radio headquarters was forced to go off the air. Lt-Commander SAM J. WILSON, with a complete list of codes, key phrases and station records, left Waloe in July 19) for SL9 to deliver the instructions and codes he carried. With SL9 prepared to take over at a moment’s notice, 9LL, formerly WAT, could go off the air with the knowledge that the huge intelligence network of the radio stations would remain in operation.

Radio Traffic Must Continue

On 3 August 1944, Col FERTIG decided to leave Waloe and move to the interior. With the flow of intelligence reaching a peak volume and coming from strategic stations all over the island – ship movements, plane traffic, enemy troop movements and ever so much other data of essential value to the war effort, it was more important to keep radio contact than any one single factor.

Taking two diesel motors, radio equipment and a small supply of food, the first party left Waloe on the morning of 5 Avg 1944. This group consisted of Col FERTIG, Lts DA PRON, GARLAND, WATERS and HIDALGO and a number of soldiers. This group was to prepare the camp, set up motors, install other equipment and take over the net as soon as possible. After a ten-hour baroto trip, the party arrived at the prearranged site after dark, but there was no camp existing. An unfinished bamboo hut was all that stood in the midst of the virgin jungle far up the Umayon River. Plans had previously been made by Col FERTIG for the building of a camp at this site. But the laborers to whom the work was entrusted were uncivilized pagan natives about the only available denizens thereabouts and wholly unreliable.

Early the next morning, everyone set to work fast but methodically, getting radios set up and on the air. A small battery set was set up to keep contact with the headquarters at Waloe. Messages were received to the effect that the Japs were swiftly closing in on Waloe. Other messages stated that more Japs were heading for Waloe from the South. Urgency of setting up the radio patently apparent, speed on the work was accelerated.

On 10 Aug 1944, three sets were ready for operation. Near midnight of the same day, Commander WHEELER ordered the radios at Waloe off the air and the remaining Headquarters personnel started up river to join the first group.

The sets in this jungle camp were on the air that night. Again the change-over was completed without missing a single contact. During the next two days, the three sets were operated by only one operator on each net. And when: on the morning of 12 Aug 1944, the rest of the Headquarters personnel arrived, it was a great relief to Col FERTIG and all the men.

There were only two huts hacked out of the jungle. Everyone then set to work establishing a camp. When the men were not on duty at the radio station, they were out in the jungle with bolos, Gradually large clearings were made and a camp of sorts was built.

Food and Floods Real Problem

The radios were now working perfectly. However, other problems, keenly felt, began to force themselves on the group. The rainy season had begun, swelling the river twenty or more feet. The whole camp was deep in mud and water. Food in the area was impossible to get. No natives lived there and wild foods were not in sight. Everything had to be brought up the river by barotos – a twelve hour trip from Waloe. The biggest maneuverable baroto could  only haul a small amount of cargo – and there were forty men at the camp!

Waloe was bare of foodstuffs. To make matters worse, all the trails to the food areas were closed by the Japs swarming in all directions. About one hundred soldiers were busy day and night, procuring whatever could be found; corn, wild camotes, coconuts and even sago, an extract from the pulp of a certain palm tree.

As food was becoming increasingly difficult to obtain and slow process of starvation closing in on the camp, radio traffic was coming in faster and heavier. Jap shipping was out in huge force and ship flashes seemed to the group more important than food. Each might mean one Jap ship less and this was the goal towards which efforts in the past few years were directed.

Fatigued by too much work, hunger gnawing at the vitals and living conditions bitter1y unbearable, any group would have become irritable and the slightest provocation would have started a fight. But the morale of the group continued to be high for Col FERTIG proved a real and understanding leader during this trying period. There were three days when a small ear of roasted corn served the meal of one person each. Yet during those three days, at least eight enemy ships were reported sunk due to the flashes from the radio sets of that camp. That helped!

Friendly Planes Sighted

On 9 Sept 1944, a large formation of planes flew directly over the encampment. Some arguments arose as to whether they were American or Jap planes. Some claimed having caught glimpses of stars on the wings. Others were pessimistic having been schooled for three years in seeing always a red bail on the planes. But a couple of hours later, messages began pouring in from stations all over Mindanao. Friendly planes! One station reported the actual bombing practically play by play, of the town of Cagayan, capitol of Misamis Oriental. \

From then on, American planes were continually flying in large groups over the camp. This increased the work two-fold. As must have to happen, some of these planes were getting shot down. After reports on such incidents poured in, instructions by radio were flashed immediately to all stations to instigate rescue parties in search of survivors. In some instances, search parties were on the job one hour after a plane had been seen to go down.

Later in the month, the two diesels began to give trouble. Going at twenty four hour a day pace, they were just about to give out. Col FERTIG immediately ordered parties to locate other motors. One was found in an old useless river launch in the barrio of La Paz, about two days baroto trip down the river. The Japs having vacated by then the Agusan River area, Col FERTIG decided to move the Headquarters to la Paz.

Move To La Paz

On 1 Nov 1944, Lt DA PRON took one small radio set and went down river to set up radio installations in this barrio. On 4 Nov La Paz was ready with motors, power line, antennas and houses for the equipment. Leaving the river camp for La Paz on November, half of the personnel reached the new location on the 6th. Radios were installed without loss of time and the net control was taken over by the net set-up the next morning. Another move without loss of contact.

One station was working messages with the upriver location at the time of the turn-over. While this station was waiting for a receipt on a message just sent, a signal was given by the La Paz set-up to take over. The station continued sending traffic without ever knowing that a change-over had been made. A few days later, the rest of the personnel arrived at La Paz and the operation was again back to normal.

Americans Leave For Repatriation

12 Jan 1945 brought changes to the FRS, Five American officers who had been with the outfit since its activation left for Leyte to proceed to the States for a well-deserved rest. Capt MARTIN, Lts MITSOS, WATERS, HACE and LE COUVRE had all been away from home and overseas for over five years and were very anxious to be back to the homeland. Capt GARLAND was made Code Officer for the district. Capt MILLS was sent to Baculin, Davao to replace Lt WILSON who had been ordered to Leyte for hospitalization. Lt JOHN F. WOOD who had been operating a watcher station near Cagayan over a year and a half, was transferred to SL9, Western Mindanao, as Chief Radio Operator.

Radio Traffic Increased 164 Percent

Beginning with the American landings in Leyte, 20 Oct 1944, continual shifting of enemy troops was accentuated. Barges, bancas, ships, trucks and planes were being used by the Japanese in the transport of troops, aside from the usual method of hiking or using carabaos, horses and carts. So new areas heretofore without radio stations had to be covered. Good coverage of all seaports and highways was imperative, necessitating more and more mobile stations to be sent to the field.

Seven airfields have been built by the Tenth Military District, under the direction and supervision of Col FERTIG. These fields were scattered over the island and in operational use. There were other airstrips just as serviceable as the bigger airfields in other strategic locations. Planes bringing in supplies were landing on them. Planes in need of gas or repair or because the weather was bad or in any other case where they were in distress, were using these fields. The war was taking the fast tempo of augmented action and the FRS was in the thick of it. So sets were installed on each field for instant coverage of all traffic. In Nov 1944 radio traffic to the outside higher echelon had increased by 164% over that sent out in June 1944!

Fertig Goes to Leyte

In Feb 1945, Col FERTIG flew to Leyte to discuss future plans for the District. Among them was the move of the FRS to a better location at Camp Keithley, Lanao Province. Lt FREDERICK TAYLOR previously assigned to the 110th Division, was called to La Paz to take over the control of the net.

During the move out, it was decided that station SL9 would act as the NCS. 9LL would be the NCS for the stations on the eastern side of the island. They would relay all their messages to SL9 as that station had been previously doing with its traffic. After an assortment of equipment, enough was left for 9LL to continue efficient operation. The rest of the equipment was packed and moved to the east coast for transfer over a water route.

Personnel and equipment were to be picked up at Barobo, Surigao on 16 Mar 945. As the trip from La Paz to Barobo required a good three days, the first echelon left headquarters on the 10th. All equipment had to be carried on the back and so the move was no easy matter. The sets and generators were not altogether light. Then upon reaching Barobo all would have to be taken to a small island about a mile offshore. The waters at Barobo were too shallow so the island had to be utilized in that lap of the move out.

At 8:00 AM, 16 Mar 1945, the boats were sighted. Most of the men had not seen US ships in three years. The sight was very welcome. At 2:00 PM, all men and cargo had been loaded and the ships were under way. The convoy passed through Surigao Straits and into the Mindanao Sea and arrived at the port of Iligan, Lanao on the morning of the 18th.

New Headquarters at Camp Keithley

The location for the new headquarters was Camp Keithley, a former PC camp, about thirty six kilometers inland. All equipment and part of the personnel were immediately sent by trucks to the camp. By the 22nd, the entire set-up was installed, although much of the equipment suffered some damages on the way. Using a new call sign, LW2, the NCS was taken over from the SL9 on the morning of the 23rd of March 1945. Five separate circuits were installed – one to work all the traffic from Eastern Mindanao (9LL), one for Western Mindanao (SL9) and one for Cotabato (NCS) under Capt MONEY, (3PP6); one for the 8th Army and the USAFFE Headquarters and one for the Navy. For the first time there was enough space, housing and wire to facilitate the installation with remote control for transmitters. In the new set-up the entire section was considerably improved in layout and efficiency.

Col. Wendell W. Fertig (center) and his general staff at Camp Keithley, Dansalan City.

On 17 Apr 1945, the first American troops landed at Parang, Cotabato. The Tenth Military District was immediately attached to the Tenth Corps whose troops made the landing. Communication was established immediately between LW2 and YD44, Tenth Corps NCS.

24th Infantryh Division amtracs landing in Parang, Cotabato, Mindanao (World War Photo)

A new phase of the Force Radio Section began with this invasion. Guerrilla troops were used with American troops to round up and cut off all Jap troops that tried to evade the advancing American element. Small portable radios were sent to all sectors, to accompany each advancing unit. From Davao to Agusan, Bukidnon, Cotabato and Zamboanga operators with these small sets hiked with the fighting troops and relayed back to headquarters the latest information on Jap movements. By these sets, Jap hideouts were located and our ground troops hounded them, ferreted them out and zooming, diving planes bombed and strafed them.

“Mission Accomplished”

With the Island of Mindanao now declared officially liberated, the Tenth Military District Force Radio Communications Net, BROUGHT into being with the PRIME PURPOSE OF RELAYING INTELLIGENCE DATA TO HIGHER HEADQUARTERS, HAD ACCOMPLISHED ITS MAIN ASSIGNMENT.

The tangible results of this flow of traffic – enemy ship sinkings, destructions of military installations by American planes and the annihilation of enemy troops – have more than justified the sacrifices, hardships and the many problems attendant to keeping constant radio contact without interruption with higher Army and Navy Headquarters.

Nothing has been said in this report concerning the other jobs handled through the Radio Communication Net but the problems concerning administration control and the tactical disposition of 33,000 Mindanao Guerrilla troops have added the burden to the Radio Communication Net.

The map preceding this section graphically illustrates the many strategically located radio stations which comprised the Tenth Military District Radio Communications Net or Force Radio Section as it was more commonly known.

Source: History of the Mindanao Guerrillas by the American Guerrillas of Mindanao (Unpublished Manuscript)

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TESDA, PDO eye expanded partnership to boost emerging metro

Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines – The burgeoning Northern Mindanao region may soon get a timely boost as it metamorphoses into the Philippines fourth metropolitan area.

Barely five months after signing an agreement to join forces in building up a globally competitive workforce in the Metro Cagayan de Misamis growth area, the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority(TESDA) and Pueblo de Oro Development Corporation (PDO), are in talks to have the government agency construct its Region 10 office, Misamis Oriental Provincial Office, and  Cagayan de Oro Training Center in the Pueblo de Oro Township in Uptown Cagayan de Oro.

In a meeting hosted by the Cagayan de Oro Chamber of Commerce and Industry Foundation, Inc., (Oro Chamber), PDO General Manager & Vice President for Mindanao Engr. Chrysler B. Acebu, who is also concurrently the  Vice President for Manufacturing and Industry of Oro Chamber, stressed  the strategic importance of its partnership with TESDA, especially with regard to PDO’s Masterson Mile North, a five-tower luxury condominium complex; the 31-hectare Southridge Silicon Valley-inspired mixed-use development, and a World Trade Center.

TESDA Sec. Jose Francisco “Kiko” Benitez addresses the joint meeing of TESDA, PDO and Oro Chamber. (RMB)

“We would really need TESDA to help us upgrade the skills of our workforce since PDO is known for its high-end products, therefore we need workers who are able to keep up in terms of delivering quality work that align with the premium standards we envision for these upcoming projects,” Acebu noted.

Industry 4.0, (also known as the Fourth Industrial Revolution or 4IR) is the current phase of the industrial revolution characterized by digital transformation and a shift towards automation and data exchange in the manufacturing and business processes. 

ICCP manages six industrial parks around the Philippines where the skillsets of the workers of its locators have to be competitive at a global level to be able to adequately address the needs of their markets and clients.

Pueblo de Oro Development Corporation (PDO), through its corporate social responsibility arm ICCP Group Foundation, Inc. (IGFI), and the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) signed a Memorandum of Agreement on November 29, 2024, which aims to address the growing demand for skilled workers particularly in the construction sector, promote sustainable livelihoods, and advance the region’s economic growth. Left to Right – Ronnie Tapnio, IGFI; Chrysler-Acebu, PDO; Rafael Abrogar II, TESDA-X; and, Marigold Cherie Garrido. TESDA MisOr.

TESDA Sec Kiko Benitez with Oro Chamber President Al Brito. (RMB)

“To network with TESDA and other stakeholders is part and parcel of our  journey and we are looking forward that the initiative of Pueblo de Oro will come into reality,” said Oro Chamber President Almarco C. Brito.

“It’s time to build our own regional building that will become the face of TechVoc to improve things, the way we do things, the way we deliver our services to our clients,” responded TESDA-10 Regional Director Rafael “Rafi” Y. Abrogar II. “Our partnership is a testament to the development of Cagayan de Oro, Misamis Oriental and Region X, and we are honored to be your partners (PDO and Oro Chamber).”

Abrogar revealed that TESDA Regional Offices are now empowered to delve into curriculum development in partnership with industry and the academe, especially for hard-to-fill skills, trainings, or qualifications which still lack competency standards, and apply these directly to address the specific needs of particular industries and companies.

TESDA Director General Secretary Jose Francisco “Kiko” B. Benitez for his part stressed the advantage of having the TESDA regional and provincial offices in close proximity to the Oro Chamber office, considering the member firms of the chamber is the primary market for its graduates and services.

“This jibes perfectly with TESDA’s BEST (Better Employability through Skills Training) priority program which focuses on demand and data driven TVET that’s agile and responsive to the demands of industry,” Sec. Benitez stressed. “This involves modernizing programs, integrating digital skills, and fostering partnerships with industries, to ensure graduates are future proofed for the evolving workforce, and ever ready to meet the demands of local and global economies. 

Joined by TESDA Deputy Directors General for TESDA Deputy Director Generals Vidal Villanueva III (Operations) and Felizardo Colambo (Special Concerns), Secretary Benitez kicked off his official visit to Region 10 with a meeting at Pueblo de Oro to discuss the proposed donation of a lot intended for the establishment of a new TESDA Regional Office Building in the city’s uptown area, signifying a new chapter in service accessibility and infrastructure development for the region. Click on this link for a first look at TESDA’s concept for the planned edifice.

“Inherent to TESDA’s mandate is to provide relevant, accessible, high quality techvoc, hence the need to have a demand driven skills training through a strengthened partnership with industry as indicated in our priority program for Demand Drive and Data Driven TVET,” said  TESDA Misamis Oriental Provincial Dir. Marigold Cherie R. Garrido. “The partnership with PDO will also lead towards realizing TESDA’s priority program 5.0 on Employment Outcomes.”

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