G-2 Section, 10th Military District Commended
22 February 1943
Three rugged years of concentrated efforts of the Intelligence Section of the Mindanao Guerrillas brought recognition in the form of commendation from the Highest Headquarters of the United States Army in the Pacific in which Major General A. C. WILLOUGHBY, Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, in communication dated 23 Jun 1945, to Colonel WENDELL W. FERTIG, said:
“It is desired to express the appreciation of the G-2 Section of this Headquarters for-most valuable intelligence service rendered by the guerrilla organization under your Command.
“This service and its flow of reports and messages covered the following periods under the agencies indicated:
“From 1942 to June 1943, Ge2 SWPA, through Allied Intelligence Bureau, Philippine Sub-Section;
“From June 1943 to March 1945, through Philippine Regional Section, G-33
“After March 1945, G-2, Eighth Army.
“In the period through 192 and during. the early half of 1943, your Command was particularly helpful in laying plans for the location of radio posts and development of an intelligence net. Since the latter half of 1943, your development of these original plans has been ably carried out.
Air, ground and naval intelligence data have been efficiently correct and therefore of great value in the preparation and successful prosecution of Allied plans in the Philippine area.”
DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED IN EARLY INTELLIGENCE WORK
Funds, absolutely needed in the success of intelligence operations; capable, trained agents required to perform delicate missions and run the gamut of attendant risks; means of transportation and communication, essential in the facility of movement of secret operatives and transmission of information – were all deplorably lacking in the beginning. In fact, in the initial stage of the Mindanao Guerrillas, Col FERTIG, along with other manifold occupations, was his own Intelligence Officer.
The Intelligence Section of the Mindanao Guerrillas evolved from practically nothing. The Intelligence Department is something which, by its obvious importance in any Army organization, deserves foremost consideration and attention. An Army cannot become truly powerful, however heavily stacked with weapons and other vital supplies if it has not within its control an agency with which to obtain accurate knowledge on the plans, strength, location, identification and movements of the enemy.
INTELLIGENCE – FOR SELF-PRESERVATION
No Army, not even a guerrilla band can effectively fight, or even survive if the odds are against it, if it does not have some knowledge of the enemy – his troops, weapons and disposition.
This was especially true in the early days of the Mindanao guerrilla resistance movement where units numbered only a mere handful. They had to know the exact location of the enemy at all time, and if possible obtain some knowledge of his plans, his weapons and other factors which were important then to seif-preservation alone. WILLIAM TATE with his small band in early September 1942 relied on the gossip of his troops and the civilians to learn necessary facts concerning the enemy.
DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE
To warn soldiers of the approach of the enemy, various means were availed of as signals. In Lanao, the use of “agong” or brass gongs was popular. Along the enemy approaches were strategically located “agongs” caught up the announcement and relayed the awesome message to the Headquarters in coastal places, “tambuli” was generally used. “Tambuli” (Tagalog) or “Budyong” (Visayan) are derived from Carabao or Cow horns or big sea shells. They are blown by mouth and echoing sounds that travel a long distance emanate from them.
“Tagongtong” or “bamboo telegraph” was generally am more widely used, due principally to the quick availability of bamboos. They are made by cutting, seasoned bamboo poles to pieces, usually half a meter long. Tied with a rope, they are hung in various places along possible enemy routes. Upon enemy approach, the nearest “Tagongtong” is struck with an iron piece. In this way, no movement of the enemy could be made without the knowledge of the people, especially along the barrios where they passed.
Everyone was enjoined to gather all information of the enemy, including the wildest of rumors, for transmission to headquarters for its evaluation and as basis for whatever action need be taken.
PHILIPPINES’ STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE IN PACIFIC WAR
The Philippines in the theatre of the war operations in the Pacific, occupies a strategic position. The fact is inescapable that the Philippine Islands extending from Batanes to Siasi over a distance of some 900 statute miles, served as an essential link to bridge the gap between Japan and the East Indies, Masaya and even the Indian Ocean.
Control by Japan of the Islands would, in effect make China Sea a private lake of the Nippon Empire. Properly garrisoned and defended, it constitutes a no mean. bulwark to guard the approaches of East Asia against thrusts coming from the Pacific. MACARTHUR himself recognized this fact when on July 1945 he remarked, in summing up the Philippine Campaign that the naval battle off Leyte Gulf was the turning point in the Pacific War.
ENEMY ROUTES COVERED
As much as the Philippines were a barrier to the Japanese in the march for conquest at the initial stage of the Pacific War, so also did it become an obstacle to hurdle in the path of the American Liberation Forces in the return of MACARTHUR – with one great difference, however, and that was: An organized Army of determined guerrillas had long entrenched themselves in the Islands, especially in Mindanao, a veritable fifth column, with carefully coordinated intelligence nets operating without let-up twenty four hours a day, covering ail strategic locations: Overland routes as highway, roads, trails; Waterways, as sea-lanes, rivers, lakes, and vantage points everywhere for observations on aerial enemy activities. They covered surprisingly well the reporting of ship movements, enemy troop dispositions and aerial traffic. Radio sets dotted the whole Mindanao, so that in 1945, there were fifty-eight stations reporting intelligence to Headquarters for relay to higher Army and Navy sources for action.
Because of this intelligence net and radio communication system, the American Forces knew many facts about the Japs that helped the subsequent actions by the Allies in prosecuting the war on Mindanao and other islands of the Philippines.
COAST WATCHER STATIONS – ROAD SPOTTERS
Watcher’s stations, mostly coastal, were assigned the work of reporting immediately ship sightings, including – if possible – direction, tonnage, class, number, possible load, etc. Watcher’s stations were also placed in strategic places along highways to report on troop movements and other information about the enemy on land.
A report by Col FERTIG to Gen MACARTHUR, dated 7 Jul 19, showed in part the role played by the watcher’s station in the scheme of intelligence operations:
“x x x The Commander Seventh Fleet was pleased to give us a “Well Done” for having located a major enemy fleet passing through the islands and out through San Bernardino Straits.
Reports covered a period of thirty-six hours and were remarkably accurate; establishing the presence of nine aircraft, carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyers and the usual fleet train. Our reports allowed. the Navy to calculate strength and speed, and undoubtedly contributed to the successful conclusion of the action, known as the “Battle of the Western Philippines”.
In addition to the spectacular nature of the above reports, our watcher station reports showed a large increase in both number of ships and total tonnage moving through the Islands. For the first time, use of escort vessels appeared to be the rule.
Another effect of the submarine campaign is noted. The Japanese merchant vessels hide each night in a selected anchorage, sailing at dawn. Thus seventy-two hours are required to move a convoy from-Davao to Zamboanga, a distance easily covered in twenty-four hours.”
MINDANAO GUERRILLAS ENJOYED PEOPLE’S BACKING
Intelligence operations were, after the sad debacle met by the USAFFE in early 1942, conducted by various persons, groups of persons or organized bands of guerrillas – for internal security. USAFFE officers and men who had chosen not to submit to the demands for surrender by the Invader, had to have some of intelligence work by themselves, to know the definite intentions of the enemy to escape personal capture.
Early guerrillas, operating independently of each other, had to know somehow the plans, movements and location of the enemy so they could know when and where to strike and at the same time prevent being caught unaware. Even civilians, after learning of Japanese brutalities, found it necessary to know enemy intentions and movements – to avoid contact and escape bearing the brunt of enemy atrocities. In effect, the very fondness for acts of barbarism on the part of the Japanese, forced both the civilians population and the early, loose, scattered guerrilla bands to organize into intelligence groups primarily for security.
When the Mindanao Guerrillas, going under the name Mindanao-Visayan Force was organized little by little into a unified command, it had the people’s backing and support.
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES EXPANDED
The increase in the number of FERTIG’s guerrilla bands necessitated a corresponding intensification and diversification of intelligence activities. And aside from the usual intelligence activities, it was necessary to have some knowledge of the location of hidden arms and ammunition; hidden stuffs of Japanese and pro-Japanese cohorts, Jap spies and sincere collaborators and their actual intentions.
HIDDEN ARMS AND AMMUNITION
After the surrender of 10 May 1942 of the Mindanao USAFFE, a great number of arms and ammunition fell into the hands of civilians by various means. These were badly needed by the ever increasing guerrilla army. To know where they were hidden and who hid them became an important undertaking for intelligence agents. Once known and confiscated, it would mean additional stock for use against the enemy.
HIDDEN JAPANESE PERSONAL EFFECTS, ETC
In certain areas in Mindanao, especially in places where in peacetime, the “Japs had business operations, some of their personal effects were hidden, taken care of by Jap sympathizers, such as trucks, automobiles, radio sets, gasoline, canned goods, cloth, etc. As these were useful to the guerrillas, intelligence agents ferreted them out.
PRIMARY MISSIONS – “INTELLIGENCE”
The radio communication of Gen MAC ARTHUR recognizing the Mindanao Guerrillas of Mindanao and incorporating them into the Tenth Military District on 22 February 1943, emphasized intensification of intelligence coverage, not only of Mindanao but also of Samar-Leyte Area.
This was necessary in view of the fact that the huge American Forces in the Pacific were approaching the Philippine Theatre of operations. No one single factor was to receive any greater effort than intelligence during the entire Mindanao Guerrilla period.
IMPORTANT MATERIALS TO SWPA
On 14 Jul 1943, along with three American officers, escaped POW from the Davao Penal Colony, went four postal bags filled with mail from the Tenth Military District for GHO, SWPA. These bags contained an assortment of reports and intelligence matters. The importance of this mail was summed up in a radio message from Gen MAC ARTHUR to Col FERTIG dated 18 Aug 1943:
“Intelligence Report, Tenth MD for April Won First Class Compliments from G-2, SWPA. Reports, Papers and Personal Knowledge Evacuated with Party have been a Great Value for Plans.”
INTELLIGENCE NET COVERS ENTIRE MINDANAO
The Intelligence Organization of the entire Tenth Military District Command, covered the whole of Mindanao Island as the last of the Guerrilla Bands were finally absorbed into the unified control of Force Headquarters, and the Divisions organized covered the entire island territory.
DISTRICT G-2 SECTION:
In the District Headquarters, as in any Army organization, was created the G-2 Section whose main function was the collection, collation and evaluation of all intelligence information from all available sources to forward with the least possible delay to the Headquarters of Gen MAC ARTHUR then in Australia.
DIVISION G-2 SECTION
In the different Divisions, G-2 Sections were also organized, similar in scope but provided with more field personnel, both Army and Civilian, mostly operatives or agents.
REGIMENTAL 5-2 SECTION
The different regiments that composed a Division each had their own S-2 Intelligence Section with enough personnel, Army and Civilian, to scour for enemy information all over their alloted sectors. The same method of transmission of information availed of by the Division Ge2 Section was used by the Regimentals. Battalions too, had their S-2 Sections charged with the same work.
1,500 INTELLIGENCE AGENTS – FULL TIME JOB
Working in the different battalions, regiments, divisions and the Force G-2 Section were about 1,500 operatives or agents – about twenty-five percent of which were soldiers. This figure represents those operatives actively dedicating their full time to intelligence work. All loyal civilians (the percentage of disloyal ones very negligible), all soldiers and officers were in effect operatives, for in the Philippines, people were naturally curious and to turn that curiosity to advantage became an easy matter not only with the Japanese does the spy system work based on “Everyone can Spy= Everyone must Spy”. Some mercenary elements sided with the Japs, yet the greatest bulk of the population covered the enemy in a network of intelligence. There could hardly be any movement on his part, unless performed in places absolutely inaccessible to foreign approach, that escaped notice and about which information was relayed through various means, reached to Army Unit Headquarters.
THE WORK OF SPECIAL AGENTS
This generally refers however, to the obvious facts like the estimated number of the enemy in certain garrisoned areas or the number of Japs passing through a certain locality. But the more important facts needed by MAC ARTHUR’s Headquarters – enemy intentions; military installations; unit identification; first and last names and ranks of Commanding Officer; enemy material and equipment; locations and description of radio installations and radar; enemy documents; location, capacity and stocks of naval fuel storage; harbor installations, etc – all these needed a special kind of detective work, as well as courage, sacrifices and boundless risks.
HOW THIS INFORMATION IS GATHERED
To obtain accurate data on the enemy, various means were employed by those in charge of subsidiary intelligence nets. The most favorite of which and hardest to detect, is the planting of operatives right in the midst of the Japanese garrisons. Most of those employed in this manner were known to have been uncompromising Pro-Japanese elements, but were at heart for and with the Allied cause. This was a difficult role to assume, with personal complexes and great risks.
One typical instance was the case of VICENTE MENDOZA of Cagayan, Misamis Oriental, who was trusted implicitly by the Japanese but in reality was working for the guerrilla command at Bukidnon and Balingasag. Others, to a lesser degree, aided him in this dangerous work, among them POMPOSA BACCARISAS, a girl close to the Japs. Much valuable information has been furnished the Army by these intrepid agents. The Japanese, however, caught both and extracted the terrible penalty of torture and death.
THREE INTELLIGENCE OPERATIVES INSIDE DAVAO
Among the operatives planted in the midst of the enemy in Davao by Major VIRGILIO S. AGUILAR, Field Military Intelligence Officer for Davao, were SEGUNDO RUIZ, PRIMO BALATAYO and CIPRIANO MERCADO.
1) SEGUNDO RUIZ, a surveyor, was employed by the Zenetaka Gomi (Japanese concern engaged in working on the projects of the Jap Army), to take charge of the levelling of the second runway of the Licanan Airdrome. Being a trusted man of the Japs, he-had access to different military installations. He was working at Licanan for two months prior to 2 Sept 19h – on which day American planes first bombed and strafed Licanan. A considerable number of Japanese lives were lost and a number of planes destroyed on the ground, along with the destruction of military installations. Agents like RUIZ, made possible this effective bombing by furnishing accurate intelligence prior to such bombings.
2) PRIMO BALATAYO, graduate in commerce, was employed by the Japs as Assistant Manager of Maeda Gomi at Bunawan, Davao. He was respected by the Japs and was even allowed a car for his own use. On several occasions, Japanese officers brought him along and showed him different projects, constructed and under construction, by the Japs. Partly, at least, on his information furnished, the Sasa Airfield was heavily bombed on 2 Sept 1943.
Thirty planes were destroyed om the ground. Two hundred and fifty Japs, along with 150 Filipino Pro-Japs, were killed while eating their noon-day meal in the Mess Hall. Military installations were effectively blasted.
3) CIPRIANO MERCADO was employed as Foreman by the Japs in constructing camps in the Akaname Plantation. After all, the camps were constructed’ and occupied by the Japs, MERCADO furnished the Field Military Inte1ligence Officer with complete data on the camps; including sketches showing their exact location, bivouac areas and installations. The same information was transmitted by radio to headquarters concerned. Soon after, sometime in March 195, planes came and bombed and strafed the hidden camps, causing almost total destruction and the loss of many Japanese lives.
All three of these agents, escaped Japanese capture but in the case of CIPRIANO MERCADO, eight members of his immediate family were killed when overtaken by the Japs in Gatungan, two kilometers West of Bunawan, Davao.
BY SUBTERFUGE
Another favorite method employed by operatives was subterfuge. A person, soldier or civilian, in the guise of being a harmless individual, would be sent into a Japanese-held territory using various pretexts: selling chickens and eggs, wine, etc or pretending to visit their relatives or friends who are Jap puppet officials, or in any ways. Their jobs were to carefully observe for later reporting all Japanese installations and activities in areas traveled.
Much information had been gathered by the use of this method.
Women, too, played an important part in the intelligence nets – for they had a particular means of appealing to the vanity of the Japs and getting them to talk.
INTELLIGENCE PRIOR TO AMERICAN LANDINGS
Another example of the efficiency in the inte1ligence work of the Mindanao Guerrillas is the information furnished just prior to the landing of the American Forces at Parang and the subsequent advance on Malabang, Cotabato.
From FERTIG to Commanding General, 8th Army, Information to 10th Corps, dated 13 April 1945:
“Evaluation of the Illana Bay situation; unopposed LANDINGS MAY BE MADE AT any point from Pagadian, Zamboanga, along coast through Malabang to the Cotabato-Lanao Boundary. Nips that were between Malabang and Parang evacuated by baroto to Cotabato on 12 April. Our forces maintaining patrols between Malabang and Parang and will contact our radio station near Parang shortly.
“Latest intelligence information strongly indicate light resistance only at Parang proper although heavy bombings past few days and those to continue should eliminate targets and troops in that city. Nothing but light beach defenses (barbed wire entanglements) reported from Parang to Linek, I believe landings should be accomplished with little preparatory naval gunfire directed at beaches or inland north of Parang.
““Malabang Airfield in condition to take as many planes as you desire. Extremely dry weather in the past few days will cause dust nuisance. For continued use throughout operation, steel mats should be placed at once. The main seven thousand feet runway can be cleared of grass to give eight hundred feet of actual width. Civilian Mayor of Malabang is cleaning town but no civilians allowed to enter except workmen.”
On 17 April 1945, American Forces landed, without opposition.
PROPAGANDA, A NECESSARY ADJUNCT
The enemy, adept at cheap propaganda, found willing listeners at first among the gullible which, though constituting a negligible minority, if not made to understand the true picture of the war situation immediately, might contaminate the others into believing in the eternal “might” of “unconquerable” Japan. Most of them, in Jap garrisoned cities, due to strict censorship, did not even have any inkling of how the war was progressing. To remedy this situation, intelligence operatives not only went to Japs occupied places to gather information on the enemy, but also to apprise the Filipinos inside the real turn of events, by word of mouth or sometimes by printed war news sheets.
In the early days, when the guerrillas had no source from which to draw funds for financial support or to fill up other information needs, the civilians had to be awakened to a sense of patriotism from their lukewarm attitude. Radio news had to be broadcast to the people by speeches or typewritten leaflets and the war situation explained to them in detail.
The “cockpit” became a favorite gathering place and exchange place of information.
DAYS OF DARKNESS
The second half of 1944 sow the most intense mopping-up operations of the Japanese on the island of Mindanao. Thousands of enemy troops, withdrawing from Southwest Pacific fronts, converged in the Philippines. The victorious American troops were fast closing in on the retreating forces. The Philippines offered them a temporary haven from the terrible onslaughts dished out in the Marianas, Pelileu, etc. It was at this time that the Mindanao Guerrillas, ill-fed, ill-clothed, ill-armed and ill, gamely resisted in the face of overwhelming odds, continuously believing with almost blind faith that always “it was darkest before dawn”. Some had to strike temporarily the protection of the jungles – yet always to strike the enemy whenever and wherever opportunity presented itself.
The situation, from the standpoint of the guerrillas, was appalling under the terrific surge of enemy pressure. But they found wider scope and more fields for thorough, intensified intelligence operations. Despite unnerving difficulties encountered in one form or another, intelligence work continued in increased pace and ever-surging tempo.
The answer to the question whether or not the Mindanao Guerrillas were successful in the pursuit of the primary mission – securing of intelligence, is found in the ruins of Surigao and Cagayan cities; in the hundreds of enemy ships resting at the bottom of the surrounding seas; in the charred remains of enemy installations; and in the mangled bodies of dead Japanese.
TRAGEDIES IN INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
Many instances of dire happenings, in the form of tortures and death have occurred to intelligence agents. In their own way, they are as much deserving of recognition as those who fought decisive battles on the battlefields.
EXAMPLE NO. 1: – “Pvt SIMPLICIO LIBRES, “E” Co., 2nd Bn, 113th Infantry, temporarily assigned with Lt DE LOS REYES, 110th Division Special Intelligence Net, Sector No. 2, was captured by the enemy while enroute from Sector No. 3 to Lt DE LOS REYES’ Sector at Nasipit. He was tied and blindfolded when found in Bancasi, Butuan, with five bayonet wounds and cracked skull, on 15 Nov 1944. Later investigations revealed LIFRES was killed by the Japs that passed that area on the 14th of Nov 1944, from Nasipit. He was then bringing a message from the CP of the 113th Infantry Regiment, 110th Div., to Sector No. 2, at Nasipit.”
EXAMPLE NO. 2: – “On 17 Nov 1944, at 1:00 PM, a Jap patrol was able to ambush and capture one of the soldiers of the 113th Infantry Regiment, sent on an intelligence mission, Pvt LACORDA. This was near the Davao road junction, in the vicinity of Butuan. He was later discovered to have been tortured to death, one leg was skinned to the bone from ankle to knee. He was then stabbed to death right through the heart with his own bolo.”
EXAMPLE NO. 3: – “PRIMITIVO TALADUA, Intelligence Agent, G-2 Section, 10th Military District, after having arrived from Manila where he was assigned to gather some intelligence information, was caught by the Japs in Linabo, Plaridel, Misamis Occidental on 13 Feb 1944. Incriminating papers were found by the Japs in his person. He was brought to Calamba, a nearby barrio, his hands tied tight with barbed wire. While being investigated, his nails were pulled out one by one and at the same time, a hot piece of iron was applied to his breast and forehead. After two days of incessant tortures, the Japs finding he would not tell what he knew about the guerrillas, they hacked his body with bayonets until he died”.
EXAMPLE NO. 4: – “On 29 Sep 1944, at 10:00, CANDELARIA DEIMO, a girl civilian operative of the “A” Corps Ge2 Section, 10th MD, was captured by the Japs in Misamis, Misamis Occidental. Her body was battered with blows, after having been brutally abused by the Jap investigators. As she would not teil what she knew of the guerrillas, she was finally bayoneted till killed.”
EXAMPLE NO. 5: – “Hight civilian operatives, led by SABINO SABERON, proceeded to Bayabas, some twenty five kilometers Southwest of Davao City, to obtain accurate data on Jap activities, defenses, dumps and other enemy installations, on 26 Jan 1945.
Suspected by Jap civilians of being Intelligence Agents, the party was attacked in Tuli, before reaching objective, on 29 Jan, killing two of them. The rest who fled were overtaken by the enemy near the junction of the Davao and Siao Rivers the next day. Two more were killed, three fled again to report the tragedy. SABERON, wounded, was brought along by the Japs and on the way, tortured and finally killed.”
INTELLIGENCE EXPENSES – LESS THAN P 500,000
The total intelligence expenses for the Tenth Military District for the entire guerrilla period…Philippine Emergency Money, Old Philippine Treasury Notes, and American Dollars….amounted to less than one half million pesos and dollars!
This amount would hardly buy one seaworthy inter-island steamer. Yet this fund bought Intelligence information which, wholly or in part, led to the sinking of many thousands of tons of Jap shipping….to say nothing of the havoc wrecked by American forces – both ground and air, as a result of factual intelligence reporting.
8,000 RADIO MESSAGES PER MONTH
The various reports immediately following, serve to illustrate just how the intelligence factors were broken down, and accomplished. Radio messages to higher headquarters during 1944, averaged anywhere between 8000 to 10,000 per month..and most of this was concerning intelligence.
There can be nothing but a tremendous satisfaction to all the people of Mindanao…whether soldier or civilian…who had a share, large or small, in contributing their part to this tangible war effort.
History will record the part played by the people of this Island in the progress of the war against the enemy…and the contribution of Intelligence will be included as a valuable and vital factor.
COASTWATCHER STATIONS
In the theater of war operations in the Pacific, the Philippines occupied a strategic position, Gen MAC ARTHUR himself, recognized this fact when on h Jul 1945, he remarked in summing up the Philippine Campaigns that the Naval battle off Leyte was the turning point of the war.
ENEMY SHIPPING MUST BE OBSERVED AND REPORTED.
Realizing the importance of Mindanao, especially in its geographical relation to the Dutch East Indies, New Guinea and other Pacific Islands, the Tenth Military District established coast watcher stations in all strategic spots surrounding the island. As early as 1943, there were 17 coast watcher stations on the island…this was later increased to a total of 31. They covered all the important sea lanes and the radio stations are graphically shown on the map of Radio Stations, including in this History.
EYES OF THE U.S. NAVY
In the beginning these coast watchers served as security outposts for the guerrilla forces, but when the tide of war began to turn in our favor, these stations were multiplied and became the “Eyes” of the U.S. Navy which was fast sweeping Pacific Waters, and ever-nearing the Philippines.
Report of enemy ship movements were reported by “flash” radio messages…in code and in accordance with the Navy system of identification. The actual movement of a convoy of Japanese ships could be “flashed” thru its entire movement along either the west or east coast of the Philippines…for this Headquarters not only served Higher Headquarters with ship spottings for Mindanao…but also acted as the Relay Station for the entire Philippines.
During the month of Jun 1944 a total of 214 ship sightings for the Philippines was flashed to Navy Headquarters over our key station which had direct contact with Navy Intelligence at Perth, Australia.
BEATEN PATHS OBSERVED…JAP SHIPPING INTENSIFIED
Through the particular location of watcher stations it was possible to establish and plot “beaten paths” of enemy shipping, which proved of great assistance to the Navy, particularly submarines which would “catch their prey” in these established shipping lanes.
As the enemy situation became more acute, the Philippines came their haven or refuge, and also as a section of the Pacific for greater fortification. Ship traffic increased considerably in Jun 1944, and even as late as October a total of 405 ships were sighted in Philippine waters…especially the Visayas and Mindanao. Luzon at that time was covered by a separate relay station.
“WELL DONE” FROM THE NAVY
The work that the coast watcher stations contributed to the operations in the Philippines is expressed in a radio message from the Commander, Seventh Fleet, to Commanding Officer, Tenth Military District:
“YOUR FINE WORK HAS BEEN A LARGE CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO SUCCESS OF OUR ARMS IN THE PHILIPPINES.”
***
SCME “FLASH” MESSAGES FROM COAST WATCHER STATIONS 1943:
15 Dec. A CONVOY OF ENEMY SHIPS CONSISTING OF 5 FOX ABLES, 2 FOX TARE ABLE, 1 FOX TARE CHARLIE, 2 FOX TARE DOG, 1 SUGAR BAKER WAS SIGHTED AT 0420 GMT, POSITLON 10 DEGREES 17 MINUTES NORTH AND 124 DEGREES 14 MINUTES EAST, HEADING SCUTYWEST AT MEDIUM SPEED.
1944:
7 Jan. 28 FOX TARE CHARLIES WERE SIGHTED IN SURIGAO STRAITS TO EAST OF ESPERANZA AT 5:25 PM HEADING SOUTHWARD.
15 Jan. 1 FOX TARE DOG, 27 SUGAR CHARLIES AND 6 BIG UNIDENTIFIED VESSELS COMING FROM CEBU WERE SIGHTED AT 0315Z SLOWLY HEADING TO SOUTHEAST. POSITION WAS GIVEN AS 057215.
12 Feb. 20 COASTAL MOTOR VESSELS AND 1 FOX TARE CHARLIE THAT CAME FROM THE DAVAO DIRECTICN WERE LYING OFF SACOL ISLAND AT 1300.
15 Feb. A BIG CCNVOY OF 20 UNIDENTIFIED SHIPS WAS SIGHTED AT 0900 HOW TIME READING SOUTHEAST CELEBES SEA AT REGULAR SPEED.
8 Apr. AT 1115 ONE HEAVY CRUISER APPROACHING TICTUAN ISLAND FRCM ZAMBOANGA TAKING AN EASTERLY DIRECTION. AT 1305 SAME HEAVY CRUISER REPORTED FOLLOWED BY ANOTHER CRUISER OF SAME TYPE FROM ZAMBOANGA GOING WESTWARD TO TICTUAN ISLAND.
8 Apr. AT 0830 ONE SHIP INSIDE LIANGA BAY WITH DESTROYER BEING TOWED. AFTER HALF AN HOUR STOP, IT PROCEEDED NORTH TO SURIGAO, IT WAS FOLLOWED BY ONE PATROL BOMBER.
19 Apr. TWO TRANSPORTS ESCORTED BY ONE DESTROYER SIGHTED AT 1730, 10 MILES OFF LEBAK COAST, COTABATO, GOING NORTH FROM SOUTH AT MEDIUM SPEED.
1 Jun. JAP TASK FORCE IN DAVAO GULF – ONE BIG AIRCRAFT CARRIER, 5 BATTLESHIPS, 6 DESTROYERS, 15 SUBMARINES, 9 TRANSPORTS AND ABOUT 15 SMALLER SHIPS,
7 Jun. 28 FOX TARE CHARLIES WERE SIGHTED IN SURIGAO STRAITS TO EAST OF ESPERANZA AT 5:25 HEADING SOUTH.
19 Jun. TWO COAST GUARD CUTTERS PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED AT STA ANA. CREW OF 25, ARMED WITH TWO CANNONS, THREE AA GUNS AND SERVERAL MGS.
19 Jun. TWO MERCHANT SHIPS ESCORTED BY THREE GUNBOATS ANCHORED AT GLAN, COTABATO.
13 Jul. TWO BIG TRANSPORTS (HEAVILY LOADED) AND 1 GUNBOAT FROM NORTH ENTERED GLAN AND ANCHORED AT WHARF.
18 Jul. 6 SHIPS FROM ZAMBOANGA PROCEEDING EAST WITH 1 DESTROYER LEADING, FOLLOWED BY 1 SUBMARINE CHASER, 2 LARGE MERCHANT SHIPS, 1 DESTROYER AND 1 FREIGHTER*TRANSPORT
1 Aug ONE CRUISER AND ONE MERCHANT VESSEL ENTERED SARANGANT BAY HEADING FAST TOWARDS DADIANGAS.
24 Aug. 24 SHIPS BELIEVED LARGE LAUNCHES, SOME ARMED, SIGHTED ENTERING CAGAYAN, FROM WEST AT 4:00 PM.
19 Sept. 9 UNCLASSIFIED VESSELS, LARGES APPROX 500 TONS, ENTERING CAGAYAN HARBOR FROM WEST. 8 MERCHANT VESSELS REPORTED ARRIVED CAGAYAN PORT FROM NORTHEAST EARLY IN THE MORNING.
Oct. DURING THE MONTH OF OCTOBER 19h A TOTAL OF 05 SHIPS WERE SIGHTED BY COAST WATCHER STATIONS IN THE VISAYAS AND MINDANAO, AND REPORTED THROUGH TENTH MD HEADQUARTERS DIRECTLY TO THE NAVY.
MILITARY INSTALLATIONS
If there is anything which we can call an outstanding achievement of intelligence work on Mindanao, it is the accurate location of enemy military installations, It was in this work that our civilian operatives excelled because they knew the places very well, saw these installations themselves, in fact in some cases they helped in constructing them. Location of guns and their caliber, trenches, foxholes, dugouts supply and ammo depots, barracks and bivouac areas, all these were spotted and plotted in maps just as fast as they were made or even before they were finished. This information was especially valuable to our air forces. What happened? – Before the enemy could use these installations they were either destroyed or neutralized by bombing. What surprised the Japanese most was the accurate bombing of installations which were hardly visible from the air like the tunnels they dug on the sides of mountains and hills. Bewildered, they suspected every Filipino as a “spy” and in the final phase of the Davao Campaign this resulted in the killing of several Filipino civilians including some of our operatives.
ENEMY DEFENSES KNOWN:
Long before the landing of American troops on the island they were already informed of what kind of defenses they would encounter end in what places they would meet them. It is interesting to note that when the American forces marched their way along the Davao South Highway towards the city in May 1945, they found the gun emplacements intact along the coast in the same places as reported by our intelligence net in March 1945.
“20 MARCH 1945 — FIVE COASTAL ARTILLERY GUNS INSTALLED LONG SHORE 1OO METERS FROM SEA BEGINNING EAST OF KM 55 SOUTH HIGHWAY. GUNS ARE 130 METERS APART UNDER MANGROVE TREES.”
***
OTHER TYPICALMESSAGES REPORTING ENEMY MILITARY INSTALLATIONS 1944:
13 Nov. CONCENTRATION OF WAR MATERTAL IN RURAL HIGH SCHOOL AT KIDAPAWAN.
2h; Nov. ENEMY AIR SPOTTER AND RADIO STATION LOCATED ON TOP OF SAAVEDRA HILL, ONE MILE WEST OF TAPUNDO PT, ON SOUTHEAST CORNER OF ISLAND.
1 Dec. FOUR LARGE CANNONS ARE LOCATED ABOUT OO METERS NORTHWEST OF MATINA RESERVOIR. AT POINT 100 METERS WEST OF MATINA RUNWAY AND ONE KM SOUTH OF NATIONAL HIGHWAY ARE FOUR AA GUNS. FOUR MORE ARE LOCATED 300 METERS WEST OF SOUTH END OF MATINA RUNWAY.
6 Dec. GUNS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED EMPLACED AT INTERVALS FROM LAPASAN TO TAGOLOAN. SOME FIELD FORTICIATIONS AND ENTANGLEMENTS ARE LOCATED ON SAME AREA,
23 Dec. CATEEL: JAPS HAVE PLACED ELECTRIFIED WIRE AROUND BARRIO AND
ALONG COAST TO STA FELCMINA. BELIEVE THIS ALARM SYSTEM ONLY.
1945:
10 Mar. GUN EMPLACEMENTS: PIN POINTED IN DAVAO SHEET NR 4732-II: ONE
12-INCH GUN AT 371,562. ONE AT 377-572, AND ANOTHER AT 285-570.
14 Mar. REF DAVAO SHEET NR 4752-II. FOOD DEPOT AT 536-658.2, REVETMENT
3 METERS THICK AND 5U METERS LONG CAMOUFLAGED WITH GRASSY SOD.
LOCATED AT 345.6-320. REF BUNAWAN SHEET NR 4732-I. FOOD DEPOT
IN 3 BLDGS AT 318-687. GAS DRUMS SCATTERED IN PILES AROUND THESE
BLDGS.
20 Mar. TRENCHES, FOXHOLES AND AIR RAID SHELTERS UNDER HIGHSPEED CON-
STRUCTION ALONG TAGUROT ROAD AND BUNAWAN RIVER.
31 Mar. REF SHEET NR 732-II PIN POINTED TARGETS DAVAO AREA: HOUSES ON
BOTH SIDES LAPANDAY RUAD OCCUPIED FRCM 325-663 TO 313-681. BAR
RACKS AND TUNNELS FROM 312.5621.
2 Apr. LARGE TUNNEL WITH 16 OUTLETS LOCATED 25 METERS EAST OF DAVAO
RIVER AND WEST OF KM 15-5 LAPANDAY ROAD. ELECTRIC MACHINERY IN
TUNNEL WORKING DAY AND NIGHT. CONTENTS CANNOT BE GOTTEN DUE TC
STRICT RESTRICTIONS. LOADED CANVAS-COVERED TRUCKS ENTER TO UN-
LOAD.
6 Apr. ENEMY AT TALAKAG ENCAMPED IN MIXTURE OF TENTS AND IMPROVISED SHEL-
TER 150 METERS SOUTHWEST BY WEST OF BRIDGE OVER KABANGLASAN CREEK
NEAR TALAKAG.ON TALAKAG-LINGON TRAIL. ‘THEY ARE IN OPEN TERRITORY.
WILL PROBABLY TAKE SHELTER FROM RAID IN KABANGLASAN CREEK ABOUT
100 METERS SOUTH OF CAMP. FIELD GUN LOCATED NEAR DESTROYED OVEN
80 METERS NORTHWEST OF SAME BRIDGE. OTHER TENTH WEST AND NCRTH OF
GUN. FOXHOLES ON BOTH BANKS OF CREEK NEAR BRIDGE AROUND TALAKAG
PLAZA AND IN TREES HALF KM SOUTH OF FARM 8.
15 Apr. TROOPS ARE BIVOUACKED AT POSITION 194-221. ARTILLERY PIECES
HIDDEN UNDER FRUIT AND BANANA TREES AT NURSERY. RECOMMEND BOMB-
ING AND STRAFING WITHIN RADIUS OF 600 METERS OF POINT INCLUDING
FOREST AREA SOUTH OF NURSERY. ALL THESE PLACES ARE ON KORONADAL
HIGHWAY.
19 Apr. CARMEN FERRY: REF PIKIT SHEET NR 4532-III. CULVERT ON ROAD AT
36.4-64.28 USED AS AIR RAID SHELTER. MOTOR POOL WITH 33 TRUCKS
AT 38.57-65.1. 30 JAPS OCCUPY LONE HOUSE AT 38.8-62.3. GAS
DUMP AT 38.52-64.19.
13 Jun. JAPS IN ABTALEL AREA HAVE CONSTRUCTED TRENCHES. 18 TRUCKS AND
MANY DRUMS OF GASOLINE, SEEN AT MOTOR POOL WHICH IS NOWLOCATED
IN THE WOODED AREA SOUTHWEST OF FOOT OF NUFOL HILL.
15 Jun. AT TAMUGAN AND GIMALANG SECTORS THE ENEMY IS BUSY LAYING MINES
ALONG ROADS AND TRAILS.
ENEMY TROOP DISPOSITION
Most Important Phase of Intelligence:
No one single phase of intelligence, except documents, was more difficult to obtain and evaluate than enemy troop disposition ~ important to our own guerrilla troops who for the most part had to avoid open combat with ‘large forces – and important to higher headquarters which must know enemy troop disposition at all times – in every battle zone of operation.
Evaluation Difficult:
To know of troop movements – whether it be small patrols, or large columns- was not difficult in itself ~- but to have some fairly accurate ideas as to numbers was something again. The Filipinos were decidedly weak in their reporting of anything pertaining to figures – but by process of evaluation, based on this characteristic, one could arrive at same fairly decent estimate.
Troops Shift Frequently
Japanese troops were constantly shifting – even in the heavily garrisoned Davao area. Conditions on Mindanao were not conducive to easy travel so the spotting and reporting of troop movements was made somewhat easier.
Our radio stations were strategically located near the heavily garrisoned enemy locations to facilitate rapid reporting of movements – either overland or by water route. It was particularly important in late 1944 and early 1945 to know the number of troops being shifted to and from Mindanao – either in support of campaigns against the American forces to the north – or the Mindanao as a retreat from such campaigns.
Many Radio Messages
Daily throughout the reporting of Mindanao intelligence, troop movements represented a considerable volume of radio traffic. Just a few representative messages are reproduced below – they cover many sections of the island – and are indicative of the wide range of intelligence coverage.
1944:
11 Jan. MISAMIS ORIENTAL. 1,900 JAPS ARRIVED CAGAYAN FROM ILGILO.
11 Feb. 1,000 JAPS ARRIVED ZAMBOANGA FROM NORTH.
7 Apr. DAVAO. 4 LARGE TRANSPORTS UNLOADED TROOPS AT DAVAO CITY ESTIMATED AT 2,000.
16 May. SURIGAO. ELEMENTS OF JAP 30TH DIV ARRIVED SURIGAO FROM CEBU.
15 Jul. ESTIMATED 2,000 JAPS ARRIVED DAVAO FROM PALAU FOR MONTH OF JUNE AND FIRST TWO WEEKS OF
JULY.
4 Aug. MISAMIS ORIENTAL. TRANSPORTS ARRIVING CAGAYAN BROUGHT 3,000 TROOPS. 1,000 TROOPS
IMMEDIATELY WENT SOUTH THRU THE SAYRE HIGHWAY. INDICATIONS SHOW THEY CAME FROM LUZON
AND VISAYAS: CONSIST OF AIR CORPS GROUND PERSONNEL AND YOUNG INF RECRUITS.
1 Sept. MISAMIS ORIENTAL. FROM 15 to 30 AUGUST ESTIMATED 6,000 TROOPS ARRIVED CAGAYAN FROM VISAYAS
AND LUZON. THREE TROOPS APPEAR TO BE FROM SWPA BUT HAVE RESTED IN THE NORTH.
10 Sept. BUKIDNON. 3,000 TROOPS MOVING SOUTH THRU SAYBE HIGHWAY, HIKING AT NIGHT AND RESTING IN
FOREST DURING DAY.
18 Sept. COTABATO. REPORTS INDICATE THAT APPROX 2,000 TROOPS OF THE HARADA BUTAI COMING FROM
COTABATO DIRECTION ARE DISTRIBUTED TO VARIOUS SECTORS AS DIGOS, MINTAL, BAYABAS, MALAGOS,
AND TUGBOK.
19 Sept. SURIGAO. JAP TROOPS APPROX 3,000 PASSED THRU AGUSAN FROM SURIGAO. SOME TOOK SHIPS IN NASIPIT
FOR GAGAYAN.
11 Oct. AGUSAN. ESTIMATED 2,000 JAPS HIKED FROM NASIPIT TC TAGOLOAN. UNESTIMATED NR LEFT ON 6
BARGES WITH SUPPLIES.
27 Oct. SHIPS WITH ESTIMATED 500 JAPS LEFT CAGAYAN FOR LEYTE. ADDITIONAL 600 JAPS BELIEVED FROM
BUGO-TAGOLOAN AREA LEFT CAGAYAN ON SHIPS FOR SAME DESTINATION.
28 Oct. BUKIDNON. CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF TROOPS IN TRUCKS MOVED FROM SOUTH TO NORTH ALONG THE
SAYRE HIGHWAY. THEY WERE SUBSEQUENTLY SHIFTED TO LEYTE.
17 Nov. MISAMIS ORIENTAL. ESTIMATED 2,200 JAPS LEFT CAGAYAN FOR NORTH BELIEVE LEYTE. ALMOST NIGHTLY
DEPARTURE OBSERVED SINCE NIGHT OF 6 NOV. USUALLY ABOUT 500 EACH NIGHT USING LAUNCHES AND
BARGES
20 Nov. MISAMIS ORIENTAL. 2 SUGAR CHARLIES AND 16 BARGES LOADED WITH TROOPS LEFT CAGAYAN BELIEVE
BOUND FOR LEYTE.
4 Dec. MISAMIS ORIENTAL. STRENGTH IN CAGAYAN AREA INCREASED AT END OF NOV. TROOPS CAME FROM THE
SOUTH. BELIEVE WAITING TRANSPORTATION.
14 Dec. BUKIDNON. MORE THAN 1,000 JAPS FROM BUKIDNON PASSING BUGASAN -EN- ROUTE TO BUTUAN,
COTABATO.
19 Dec. ZAMBOANGA. JAPS HAVE MOVED ALMOST ALL TROOPS FROM TETUAN, TUMAGA AND PRESAMAYOR TO
PASONANCA.
27 DEC. MISAMIS ORIENTAL. GEN MOROZUMI WITH STAFF AND A LARGE NUMBER OF TROOPS LEFT CAGAYAN FOR
SOUTH.
1945:
22 Jan. SURIGAO. APPROX 400 JAPS INCLUDING WOMEN AND CHILDREN LEFT MAGPAYANG, SURIGAO FOR
BUTUAN. TROOPS ARRIVED BUTUAN ON 22 JANUARY.
30 Jan. 200 ENEMY TROOPS SHIFTED SOUTH FROM CAGAYAN AREA AND A SMALL NUMBER ALSO WENT SOUTH
FROM MALUKO-DALWANGAN.
12 Feb. ESTIMATED 1,500 JAPS MOVED FROM LASANG TIBONGCO SECTOR TO PADADA-DIGOS SECTOR, DAVAO.
18 Feb. COTABATO. APPROX 1,000 JAPS ARRIVED PARANG FROM COTABATO CITY AREA. THEY ARE BIVOUACKED
SOUTH OF WATER TOWER, IN BARRACKS AND SCHOOL BUILDING.
21 Apr. COTABATO. OVER 1,000 JAPS OF ARMY, NAVY AND ARTILLERY UNITS MOVING NORTH ON DULAWAN-
KORONADAL HIGHWAY.
20 Mar. COTABATO. OVER 700 JAPS ARRIVED BUTUAN 18 MARCH, FROM SOUTH WITH 4 TRUCKS OF AMMO AND
GASOLINE.
25 Mar. BUKIDNON. ‘TROOPS ALONG SAYRE HIGHWAY ARE MOVING SOUTH. SINCE 15 MAR APPROX 2,500 JAPS
HAVE GONE SOUTH FROM IMPASUGONG AREA.
24 Mar. MISAMIS ORIENTAL. ESTIMATED 00 JAPS WITHOUT ARMS LANDED IN CAGAYAN AREA FROM BARGES.
ENEMY TELLS CIVILIANS THEY ARE FROM ILOILO.
Japanese Documents…High Priority
In a letter to Col FERTIG of 5 May 1944 from Gen WILLOUGHBY, G-2, GHW, SWPA, the primary intelligence requirements were expressed as follows:
“Location of specific enemy units. We can identify them thru documents – we know their strength and organization. The full name and rank of the commander occasionally furnished the clue to the particular tactical unit. Identification of units from a regiment up to a division is extremely important as that data gives us definite indication of the enemy’s combat ability. Enemy documents furnish the clue to the solution of enemy units and their dispositions. Such documents should receive high priority. Diaries, bulletins, orders, etc., of the enemy reveal much more than believed possible.”
This was no easy assignment for not only did the Japanese carry away their dead, almost with fanatical persistence, but we had no interpreters and therefore no way of deciding the importance to higher headquarters of documents when captured. In the earlier days, and even up to the landing in Leyte of 20 Oct 1944, transportation facilities between headquarters was most infrequent…so those documents captured, lost their timeliness due to slowness of delivery.
Through many agents, to all outward appearances, loyal to the Japs but secretly working for our cause – it was possible to obtain the names of Commanding Officers, and occasionally learn the identity of units.
Notwithstanding these drawbacks, a certain amount of captured material made its way to higher headquarters, and in a few instances, loyal Chinese friends were able to give some translations which occasionally proved of value.
Some Documents Found Highly Valuable
Documents captured from two Japanese aviators in Oct 1944 near Butuan, Agusan, and captured items obtained after the Allied air strike at Surigao in Sept, proved to be of exceptional value. The former contained late cryptographic material especially desirable. The latter contained a lot of data on the 1st Japanese Division which at the time had been unlocated but believed to be in the Philippine Islands. These items were delivered to 6th Army on Nov 1944 when their importance was discovered. In this connection the following quotation from letter received from Sixth Army Japanese Translation Section is quoted:
“Receipt is acknowledged of a number of Japanese diaries, documents, maps, equipment and manuals, as delivered to this section by Capt. H. A. Rosenquist, AC of S, Ge2, 10th M.D.
“It is suggested that all such materials be immediately classified as to its source, date obtained, and other information which will be of assistance to this section in its evaluation of such material, All should be separated and labelled accordingly.
“This type of Japanese captured material contributes, greatly to the progress of the war effort. Our special appreciation goes to your forces for these excellent contributions. Keep up the good work.”
****
Some Radio Messages Sent Higher Headquarters
1944:
6 Nov. 20 JAP MANUALS PAYBOOKS AND PERSONAL LETTERS CAPTURED IN SURIGAO. IMMEDIATE ANALYSIS REVEALED VERY VALUABLE ORDER OF BATTLE AND ORGANIZATION INFORMATION OF THE JAP 1ST DIV.
13 Nov. JAP AVIATOR THREW AWAY PACK CONTAINING NAVY CODE BOOK, AVIATION NAVIGATION INSTRUMENT, ENEMY IDENTIFICATION BOOK & AVIATORS REPORT. THESE FORWARDED TO SIXTH ARMY.
1944:
8 Dec. CAPTURED DOCUMENTS REVEALED THAT ENEMY IN MALABANG HAD A STRENGTH OF 500 WITH 2 MORTARS, HEAVY AND 1 LIGHT MG: THEY LOST 46 KIA BUT THEIR MORALE HIGH AND WILL FIGHT TO HE LAST.
18 Dec. CAPTURED DOCUMENTS REVEALED THAT 77H INF REGT STATIONED AT KIBAWE. IT REVEALED THEY HAD 1800 ARMS & APPROX HALF A MILLION AMMO.
1945:
2 Jan. LETTER, WRITTEN BY CO SRD CO,. 32ND BN, 54TH IND BRIGADE TO HIS COMMANDING OFFICER, CAPTURED BY GUERRILLA UNITS STATED THAT THEIR UNIT WAS SHORT ON AMMO AND MEDICINE AND REQUESTS FR EVACUATION.
28 Mar. DOCUMENT CAPTURED FROM L JAP MESSENGER PIGEON IDENTIFIED THE 177TH INF REGT.
9 Apr. DOCUMENT, 1 CARDBOARD BOX FULL, WILL BE PUT ON LCI FOR FORWARDING TO 8TH ARMY. SOME DOCUMENTS OF OFFICIAL NATURE APPEAR TO BE PAYROLLS. SHOULD PROVE VALUABLE.
12 Apr. DOCUMENTS, DIARIES AND DOG TAGS PICKED UP BY AMER PT BOATS AT BALINGASAG.
15 Apr. VARIOUS JAP TRAINING MATERIALS, PHOTOGRAPHS, REFERENCES, BOOKS AND MAPS FORWARDED TO HIGHER HQ. THESE WERE CAPTURED IN MALABANG.
18 Apr. JAPS MAPS OF MATAMPAY AREA (BLUEPRINT) AND NUROUPI TOWNSITE (TOPOGRAPHIC) FIELD MEMORANDA, WAR DIARIES AND OTHER DOCUMENTS CAPTURED BY GUERRILLA AND FORWARDED TO HIGHER HED.
19 Apr. 11 JAP BOOKLETS, 1 PIECE OF THIN WOCD WITH JAP CHARACTERS AND LOOSE PAPERS CAPTURED BY GUERRILLA TROPPS DURING DIPOLOG OPERATIONS FORWARDED TO HIGHER HEADQUARTERS.
Enemy Airfields
The Philippines are strategically located to render convenient airstrikes against allied positions in the Pacific area. They also afford protective screening for their own lines of defenses and operation on areas bordering the China Sea.
Mindanao Air Power Of Enemy Must Be Watched
For offensive reasons as well as purely defensive, it was important to the American forces that close and careful surveillance be given by intelligence agents and this Headquarters to enemy airfields : construction of new fields; improvements of old; locations of revetments, military installations relating to airfield use, and last but equally important a constant report of plane traffic on fields in operation.
Agents Work Right On Fields
The Japanese needed, and needed badly, Filipino laborers, mechanics and others to work on their airfields…many hastily constructed or improved, when they began to realize the fast tempo of the American forces advances, under the shrewd tactics of Gen MACARTHUR. It was therefore possible to place many agents on jobs with the Japs. At Licanan Airfield one such agent was a surveyor. He drew all the airfield plans…and always made a copy of them to smuggle out through another agent, perhaps a loyal truck driver.
Through this means, the intelligence was getting so fine that we even knew how many truckloads of gravel were needed to fill one crater hole, and how many laborers were needed to complete the job. At Matina Airfield, it took 200 laborers one full day to fill one bomb crater!
The following excerpts from a few radio messages serve to illustrate how GHQ, SWPA, and the American Air Force was informed on every phase of airfield activity:
1944:
8 Jul HANGARS AT SASA AND NAVY YARDS CAMOUFLAGED WITH COCONUT AND NIPA. ALL AIRFIELDS PROVIDED WITH AA PROTECTION. GASOLINE STORED AROUND EDGE OF FIELD.
18 Jul MALABANG HAS 80 PLANES SHELTERS LOCATED OUTSIDE OF RUNWAYS NEAR SEA EXTENDING NORTH. BUAYAN HAS 10 RUNWAYS, ANOTHER EAST DIRECTION ARE 12 AA GUNS, 37 MM AND 8 INCH CANNON.
25 Jul JAP SEAPLANE BASE NOW AT MALALAG IN ADDITION TO PADADA.
24 Nov JAP PLANE ASSEMBLY AT BATUTITIK. OVER 90 PLANES ASSEMBLED THERE: HIDDEN AND DISPERSED AS FAR AS 2 KMS FROM FIELD. FIELD LOCATED 2 KMS WEST OF BATUTITIK BARRIO.
10 Dec 27 JAP PLANES HIDDEN IN TUNNELS AT MINDANAO FIELD AT ZAMBOANGA. 7 TORPEDO PLANES, ONE FIGHTER, ONE DIVE BOMBER AND 17 TWIN ENGINE BOMBERS.
23 Oct FIVE ZEKE FIGHTERS PASSED NIGHT AT LUMBIA MISAMIS ORIENTAL FIELD, WENT SOUTH NEXT DAY CAME FROM NORTH. HABITUAL FOR NIP PLANES TO LAND AT DUSK AT LUMBIA AND TAKE OFF EARLY NEXT MORNING.
1945:
9 Feb REMAINING 5 PURSUITS AT LUMBIA NOW LOCATED IN COCO GROVES JUST EAST OF TALAKAG-CAGAYAN ROAD AT KM 8. THIS IS ALONG EAST BOUNDARY LUMBIA FIELD.
10 Feb NO PLANE ASSEMBLY SHOP AT LICAMAN AIRFIELD. PLANES ARRIVE ALREADY IN FLYING CONDITION. SMALL PORTABLE REPAIR SHOP COMPOSED OF 3 LATHES, 6 FEET, 10 FEET AND 12 FEET. 2 SMALL HAND BLOWERS FOR BLACKSMITHING AND IRON WORK. REPAIR DONE AT HANGAR ON RUNWAY WHERE NEEDED.
17 Feb AIRPLANE REPAIR SHOP LOCATED WEST SIDE NR 1 RUNWAY LICANAN AIRFIELD APPROX 90 METERS FROM SOUTH END RUNWAY CITED. 2ND LIKE SHOP SPOTTED APPROX 100 METERS NORTH OF 1ST CITED.
12 Feb FOUR ENEMY PLANES WARMED UP AT LUMBIA TODAY. THEY ARE HIDDEN IN DENSE WOODS 1500 METERS AT 15 DEGREES FROM MUNICIPAL BUILDING LUMBIA.
22 Feb BETWEEN LIBBY FIELD AND NATIONAL ROAD ARE 28 PLANE SHELTERS BUILT OF WOOD AND STONE. 28 PLANES COUNTED BY AGENT ON 12 FEB. GAS BURIED AT ALL FUR CORNERS OR ROAD JUNCTION. GOING FROM LIBBY
FIELD AND CROSSING NATIONAL ROAD.
2 Mar 27 PLANES AT LICANAN AIRFIELD DAVAO AND 82 AT MATINA AIRFIELD.
31 Mar 6 PLANES HIDDEN AT BALUAN, 100 METERS EAST OF CREEK AND 700 METERS FROM SARANGANI BEACH. BALUAN IS JUST NORTH OF BUAYAN. JAPS ARE VERY CAUTIOUS THIS AREA. FILIPINOS RESTRICTED,
Road Spotters
Only two highways on the island of Mindanao offered suitable road surface for mechanized units – the Sayre and National Highways…and even these were by no means ideal for heavy traffic or bulky vehicles. It was an easy matter then to keep a careful check on enemy vehicle traffic; also troop movement on these two highways.
Lookout At Sumilao:
In August 1944 a 24-hour lookout post was established in a strategic position at Sumilao, Bukidnon, which overlooked the Sayre Highway. Traffic to and from Bugo on the Mindanao coast, through Del Monte to points south on Sayre Highway…Malaybalay, Valencia, etc., had to pass this point in the highway.
A radio station was located as near the lookout position as security would permit and radio messages were sent daily…sometimes as “flashes” when the occasion demanded. During the month of Nov 1944 alone a total of 216 Japanese trucks were observed going north; 255 counted going south. A few of the typical daily radio messages are reproduced below:
25 Oct. ‘44 18 TRUCKS WENT NORTH AND 12 WENT SOUTH. CARGO UNIDENTIFIED
25 Oct. ’44 99 TRUCKS WENT SOUTH LOADED WITH TROOPS. 31 TRUCKS WENT NORTH EMPTY.
6 Dec. ‘44 17 TRUCKS WENT SOUTH LOADED WITH TROOPS: 60 TRUCKS WENT
NORTH LOADED WITH UNKNOWN CARGO.
18 Apr. ’45 64 TRUCKS WENT NORTH AND 49 SOUTH.
28 Apr. ’45 ENEMY TRUCK TRAFFIC CONTINUES. FOR PERIOD OF 3 DAYS A TOTAL OF 42 TRUCKS WENT NORTH AND 101 TRUCKS WENT SOUTH. OF THESE 68 MOVED BY DAY AND 75 BY NIGHT. TRUCKS GOING NORTH USUALLY
EMPTY WHILE THOSE GOING SOUTH ALL LOADED WITH TROOPS.
LOOKOUT AT BANCUD (15 Kms. South of Malaybalay): A lookout position in this spot, while covering the same Sayre Highway, gave
the opportunity for a double check and an indication of the activity at Malaybalay proper. Apparently many of the trucks reported from Sumilao post never did go farther than Malaybalay for during the same month of November only 127 trucks were reported as going north; 57 as going south, from the Bancud lookout position.
LOOKOUT ON NATIONAL HIGHWAY DAVAO AREA:
It was much more difficult to maintain lookout positions in the very heavily garrisoned Davao areas However an observer was stationed at Km 20, North of Davao City, along the National Highway. Reports were rendered daily by radio, supplemented by written report covering more details. The following traffic for period of 24 days from 13 Dec 1944 to 5 Jan 1945 as follows:
GOING NORTH:
OFFICERS – 65; TROOPS – 773; JAP CIVILIAN LABORERS – 365; FILIPINO LABORERS – 56; TRUCKLOAD OF PULVERIZED
ROCK – 58; TRUCKLOAD OF BOARD – 71; TRUCKLOAD OF FOODSTUFF – 65; TRUCKLOAD OF GALVANIZED IRON – 7;
TRUCKLOAD OF FUEL – 4; TRUCKLOAD OF SCRAP IRON – 1; TRUCKLOADOF FURNITURE – 2; TRUCKLOAD OF UNIDENTIFIED EQUIPMENT -7; AND A TOTAL OF 415 CARGO TRUCKS AND 49 CARS.
GOING SOUTH:
OFFICERS – 65; TROOPS – 720; JAPANESE CIVILIAN LABORERS 239; FILIPINO LABORERS – 104; TRUCKLOAD OF
PULVERIZED ROCK – 46; TRUCKLOAD OF BOARD – 23; TRUCKLOAD OF GALVANIZED IRON – 2; TRUCKLOAD OF FOODSTUFF – 20; TRUCKLOAD OF SCRAP IRON – 2; TRUCKLOAD OF OIL DRUMS – 5; TRUCKLOAD OF FURNITURE – 2; 25 JAP CIVILIANS AND A TOTAL OF 375 CARGO TRUCKS AND 4l CARS.
Enemy Plane Traffic
In July 1944…about a month prior to the first bombing in the Philippines by American planes…instructions were received emphasizing the need for “flash” reporting of enemy air traffic. An established procedure or reporting was given…and this disseminated by radio to all divisions…all stations. This included not only Mindanao but the Visayas as well, in accordance with orders from GHO, SWPA.
Flashes In Australia…5 Minutes After Plane Sightings
With the net control station of the Tenth Military District on a “24-hour stand-by” and with a separate circuit direct to American Air Force Headquarters, enemy plane traffic could be flashed from original spotter, through intermediate net, then from net control to the Air Force…in an average of 5 minutes, Messages were in code, but in clear text…short but complete…and followed the following procedure:
“20 JULY 44 = YOU WILL REPORT TO FTAW IMMEDIATELY UPON DETECTION INFO CONCERNING AIRCRAFT FLIGHTS IN THE FOLLOWING SEQUENCE:
AIRCRAFT WARNING INDICATOR, YOUR CALL SIGN, MESSAGE LETTER TIME OF OBSERVATION, HOW DETECTED, DISTANCE, DIRECTION, COURSE, NUMBER OF PLANES, TYPE, IDENTITY, ALTITUDE. AIRCRAFT WARNING INDICATOR IS AW REPEATED TWICE TO INDICATE FLIGHT REPORT FOLLOWS.
YOUR NORMAL STATION CALL SIGN. MESSAGE LETTERS START WITH A FOR FIRST REPORT THEN B AND SO THRU ALPHABET TO Z WHEN A IS USED AGAIN. TIME IS REPORT BY 2 NUMBERS INDICATING MINUTES PAST HOUR WHEN FLIGHT DETECTED, HE HOUR IS SHOWN BY THE DATE TIME GROUP OF THE MESSAGE HEADING CONSEQUENTLY HOUR USED IN HEADING MUST BE SAME HOUR AS THAT WHICH FLIGHT DETECTED. METHOD OF DETECTION INDICATED BY IV FOR FLIGHT SEEN AND IA FOR FLIGHT HEARD. DISTANCE IN MILES SHOWN BY 2 NUMBERS OO BEING OVERHEAD AND 99 UNKNOWN. DIRECTION FROM YOUR STATION INDICATED BY SINGLE NUMBER, 7 FOR NORTHEAST, 2 FOR WEST, 7 FOR NORTHWEST, 4 FOR SOUTH, 5 FOR SOUTHWEST, 6 FOR WEST, 3 FOR SOUTHEAST AND 8 FOR NORTH. ZERO MEANS FLIGHT OVERHEAD AND 99 INDICATING TAKING OFF OR LANDING, DISTINCTION BEING MADE BY PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF SUBSEQUENT NORMAL REPORTS. COURSE IN INDICATED BY SINGLE NUMBER AS FOR DIRECTION, ZERO INDICATING FLIGHT CIRCLING. NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT EXPRESSED BY 2 NUMBERS, ZERO ZERO INDICATES NUMBER UNKNOWN.
TYPE AIRCRAFT EXPRESSED BY SINGLE LETTER. P FOR FIGHTER, B IS BOMBER, C FOR TRANSPORT AND X MEANS TYPE UNKNOWN. F FOR FRIENDLY, H FOR HOSTILE AND X FOR UNKNOWN. ALTITUDE IN THOUSANDS OF FEET EXPRESSED BY 2 NUMBERS, 00 MEANS HEIGHT UNKNOWN. FOLLOWING IS A SAMPLE REPORT:
‘AWAW WOO ABLE ZERO THREE ITEM VICTOR ZERO SEVEN THREE FOUR ZERO NINE BAKER HOW ZERO FIVE’
AWAW IS WARNING INDICATOR, WOO IS STATION CALL SIGN, ABLE IS MESSAGE LETTER, ZERO THREE SHOWS THAT FLIGHT DETECTED 3 MINUTES PAST HOUR USED IN MESSAGE HEADING, ITEM VICTOR MEANS FLIGHT SEEN, ZERO SEVEN THAT FLIGHT 7 MILES FROM YOUR STATION, FOUR INDICATES PLANES PROCEEDING SOUTH, ZERO NINE SHOWS PLANES IN FLIGHT, BAKER MEANS TWO ENGINER BOMBER, FIVE INDICATES 5000 FOOT ALTITUDE.”
A Few Of The Radio Flashes
Translated from code to understandable English, there follows a few of the many hundreds of plane flashes sent thru the 10th MD radio net
1943:
19 Dec. 5 ENEMY BOMBERS ESCORTED BY 19 PURSUITS PASSED OVER MISAMIS ORIENTAL. IN THE AFTERNOON 17 FIGHTERS PASSED SAME AREA FLYING FROM NORTH TO SOUTH.
1944:
20 Jan. 50 PURSUITS PASSED OVER SULU SEA GOING NORTH.
23 Mar. FLIGHTS OF 6 TO 9 BOMBERS FROM PATAG AIRFIELD PATROLLING MACAJALAR BAY FOR LAST 3 DAYS.
1 Apr. FLIGHT OF 11 HEAVY BOMBERS, ALL TWIN ENGINED, AND 4 SINGLE MOTORED FIGHTERS, PASSED MALITA HEADING TOWARDS DAVAO.
6 Apr. ONE JAP BOMBER WAS OBSERVED FLYING AT ABOUT 200 FT GOING NORTHEAST OVER CABADBARAN AT 8:00 AM SIGHTED FROM MAGALLANES, AGUSAN.
18 Apr. 11 RED PURSUIT PLANES PASSED CAGAYAN. INSIGNIA: WHITE SKULL AND CROSS BONES BOTH SIDES OF FUSELAGE AND ON WINGS. APPEARED TO BE NARAJIMA PURSUIT. ONE BOMBER ESCORTED BY FIGHTERS PASSED OVER PANGUIL BAY AT 9:30 AM.
11 Jun. 9 PATROL PLANES, SINGLE ENGINED, APPARENTLY WITH FIXED LANDING GEAR OBSERVED PASSING OVER TALAKAG, BUKIDNON, GOING NORTH.
14 Jun. ONE BOMBER ESCORTED BY 6 PURSUITS PASSED EAST TO SOUTHEAST OVER OPOL, MISAMIS ORIENTAL.
22 Jun. 16 PLANES, BOMBERS AND FIGHTERS, PASSED NORTHWEST TO SOUTHEAST
OVER CAMIGUIN ISLAND.
27 Jun. 8 PLANES, ZEKE TYPE, PASSED OVER LAS NIEVES, AGUSAN.
2 Jul. LARGE NUMBERS OF JAP PLANES, BOMBERS AND FIGHTERS PASSED OVER BALINGASAG, ORIENTAL MISAMIS.
14 Jul. 1000 – 1 MEDIUM BOMBER FLEW OVER OPOL TO NORTHWEST. 1430 – 1 MEDIUM BOMBER FLEW OVER OPOL TO WEST.
16 Jul. 1230 – 5 FIGHTERS PASSED OVER CAGAYAN, MISAMIS ORIENTAL TO NORTH.
17 Jul. 1100 – 3 MEDIUM BOMBERS ESCORTED BY 7 PURSUITS ARRIVED DAVAO FROM NORTH.
Bombing Results Reported
FIRST BOMBING – 6 AUGUST 1944: The very first bombing of a target in the Philippines by American planes, occurred 6 August 1944, when two bombs were dropped in Davao area one near Santa Ana wharf, killing three Jap navy men; the other in the water nearby. This how= ever, was no criterion of the bombing and strafing effectiveness to follow – and the months of September and October 19); in particular, saw many American planes in action on Mindanao, insistently pinpointing enemy military installations, ships, airfield, planes, troops and many other targets which this Headquarters had reported by radio to Ge2, GHW, SWPA, over a period of months.
The need for factual reporting on bombing and strafing results was equally as important as sending data on new targets. Ail intelligence agents were instructed to give high priority to this new phase of intelligence reporting. Many hundreds of radio messages on bombing results were received from the many strategically located radio stations on Mindanao. A few, taken at random from our Intelligence Summaries are quoted below; along with an interesting report of the bombing effectiveness in the Hinatuan Bay, East: Coast area on 9 Sept 19h.
1944:
10 Sept: AMERICAN BOMBERS BOMBED AND STRAFED LANDING FIELD AND TRUCKS ALONG NATL HIWAY SURIGAO X RESULTS DASH 9 VESSELS SUNK, INCLUDING 6 TRANSPORTS, 30 MOTORBOATS, 1 LANDING BARGE, 1 QUEEN BOAT X TRANSPORTS LOADED WITH SOLDIERS, KNOWN TO BE ABOUT 1500 WITH BUT FEW SURVIVORS WHO WERE KILLED IN WATER BY LOYAL CIVILIANS IN BAROTOS HITTING THEM OVERHEAD WITH PADDLES X 50 MULES DESTROYED AND 12 SALVAGED X 19 TRUCKS DISABLED ON HIWAY X BOXES OF AMMO, FOODSTUFF, GASOLINE DRUMS AND SOME FIELD GUNS DESTROYED AT WHARF.
14-15 Sept. PILOTS QUARTERS, MOTOR POOL, TWO LARGE WAREHOUSES, TWO SHIPS FUEL TANKS UNDER ACACIA TREES, ALL ZAMBOANGA, DESTROYED BY AMERICAN PLANE BOMBINGS.
24 Sep. SURVIVORS OF MUNKEIN MARU, NOW CONFINED, STATE THAT THEIR SHIP WAS DAMAGED BY PLANES AND SUNK BY SUBMARINES ON 9 SEPT. THEY CLAIMED 400 WERE ON SHIP WITH BUT FEW SURVIVORS.
27 Sep. 3 TRANSPORTS SUNK BETWEEN BONGO ISLAND AND COTABATO CITY. 600 NIPS DEAD AND 200 NIPS SURVIVED X 22 CAPTURED BY OUR TROOPS AT ONE SPOT X.
18 Oct. 11 PLANES DESTROYED SUPPLY DUMPS AT TAMONTAKA, COTABATO AND 1 LAUNCH AND 2 BARGES NEARBY. 2 LAUNCHES BURNED AND MANY JAPS.
2 Dec. 16 TRUCKS AND 2 BOMBERS BURNED, 50 NABY TROOPS KILLED AT MATINA AIRFIELD.
1945:
13 Apr. TWO SUBMARINES SUNK AT PANAKAN WHARF THESE WERE TIED UP AT WHARF EFFECTIVELY CAMOUFLAGED, REPORTED BY OUR AGENTS AND AIR PHOTOS SUBSEQUENTLY PINPOINTED X PERISCOPE WAS CAMOUFLAGED AND HIDDEN BETWEEN GASOLINE DRUMS.
14 May 6 JAP TORPEDO BOATS WERE SUNK OFF PISO PT BEACH THIS SAME AREA STRAFED RESULTING IN DESTRUCTION OF 2 FUEL DUMPS AND 2 AMMO DUMPS. THESE TARGETS WERE CONSTANTLY REPORTED FROM DEC ’44 UNTIL DATE THEY WERE DESTROYED.
NOTE DURING THE MONTHS OF AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER, 19hh, MILITARY TARGETS IN DAVAO CITY ONLY WERE BOMBED YET DUE TO ACCURATE REPORTING OF TARGETS OVER ONE HALF OF CITY IS STILL INTACT, YET ALL MILITARY TARGETS WERE DESTROYED.
“Jap Convoy Annihilated In Hinatuan Bay, Surigao”
“At about 5 o’clock in the morning of 9 Sept 1944, planes were heard from the town on Bislig. From the eyewitness view point, three groups of planes approx. fifty in number were seen over the bay. A few minutes later, explosions were heard and the planes were seen diving by twos. Smoke then rose up from behind the point of Maribojoc. ‘The whole bay of Bislig can be viewed clearly on top of a mountain in sitio Papay. The eyewitness, together with other people went to this favorable position and from there saw big ships, steel vessels with two funnels, some in flames and some covered with thick and black smoke, There were twenty-six of these vessels including two that looked like destroyers and approx. fifty small vessels. The planes continued bombing and strafing for three or four hours which returned the fire. One plane was shot down.
During this attack, the large steel ships remained out in deep water and the smaller vessels which were 200 to 250 ton wooden ships, powered with diesel engines, scattered for shelter behind Macaburom and Mawis Islands. At about 9:00 or 10:00 AM, six US warships were noticed on the horizon, heading towards Hinatuan Bay. A few minutes later, the ships moved to the warships – two big ones and four smaller ones. When they were opposite Marlboro Pt, they opened fire on the Japs vessels, some of which were already burning. All were hit, and subsequently sunk. The warships withdrew and headed south. Only fifty survivors managed to reach Mawis Island. They were picked up by a Jap launch. Not a single Jap ship escaped the bombing and shelling.”
Roads And Trails
Japs Attempt To Keep New Trails Secret:
Among the varied activities undertaken by the enemy in an all-out effort to strengthen their defenses, especially in the Davao area, was the construction of roads and trails to the interior and in the interior sectors.
These were calculated to hasten the movement of troops and equipment in the event of American Landings and subsequent withdrawals. These new trails and roads were so linked together in the Davao area, that they provided an orderly withdrawal of troops and equipment to alternate interior defense positions.
Construction of these trails were naturally meant to be secret…but to construct a road, build a bridge, or erect a building in the Philippines without the knowledge of the native people would be something next to impossible. Trails were made rather narrow, and advantage taken of overhead foliage, to prevent spotting by reconnaissance planes. However, in spite of all precautions, there was not a new Japanese trail that was not subsequently reported by loyal civilians and our agents.
Maps Valuable To American Ground Forces:
Very few accurate maps were available for use by American tactical forces and none of them indicated the trails and roads built since the days of Pearl Harbor. Consequently guerilla maps furnished by the Intelligence Section were of great value…and actually reproduced for distribution to all units concerned.
Such a map is the one of the “DAVAO INTERIOR SECTOR” included with this report. This shows a maze of roads and trails non-existent on any map in the hands of the American forces. Neither did reconnaissance photos bring out all these trails b0u0t this map obviously became important in the Davao Kibawe-Talomo Trail encounters.
In other sectors on Mindanao, the enemy attempted to construct similar trails of withdrawal and secondary positions. The Malungon Trail, connecting Sarangani Bay area with that of Padada or southern Davao is a good example. However, this trail was never used effectively, due to the enemy being cut off from Digos due to rapid advance of American forces.
Following are a few radio messages released to higher Headquarters concerning new trails, roads and important. changes:
1944:
26 Oct. FROM LIBONA, BUKIDNON, NIPS HAVE BACK TRAILS TO SOUTH.
31 Oct. ROAD UNDER CONSTRUCTION NORTHWESTERN DAVAO AREA PASSES THRU GUMALANG, UPPER BIAO, MONGON KULAPU AND UPIAN TO BALATUKAN WHERE IT CONNECTS WITH THE PROVINCIAL ROAD THAT WAS CONSTRUCTED BEFORE THE WAR. PACK ANIMALS ARE USED FOR CARRYING EQUIPMENT FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION PURPOSES.
Oct. NIPS IN CAGAYAN IMPROVING BACK TRAILS THRU LIBONA, MAMPAYAG, DALWANGAN, AS POSSIBLE MEANS OF RETREAT.
Oct. NIPS HAVE ESTABLISHED ESCAPE ROUTE THRU PASONANGA RIVER TOWARDS WEST COAST. THEY ARE ALSO MOVING SUPPLIES TO CAPISAN.
1945:
10 Feb. ALL BRIDGES BETWEEN SANTIAGO AND MAGPAYANG BEING REBUILT.
18 Feb. ENEMY FINISHED ROAD CONNECTING SASA AIRFIELD WITH KM 8 CABANTIAN BUHANGIN ROAD
26 Feb. NEW ROUTES OF WITHDRAWAL ENEMY TROOPS SOUTH DAVAO AREA INFORMED OF WIDENED TRAILS ABOUT 6 METERS WIDE, 1 FROM MATINA SECTOR (KM 2.6) GOING NORTH TO CATALUNAN GRANDE THEN TO MINTAL COMPLETED ABOUT 31 JANUARY. 2ND FROM SIBULAN (KM 30 SOUTH HIGHWAY) PASSING EAST OF INAWAYAN, EAST OF CATIGAN DIRECT TO BAYABAS THEN TO MANUEL PLANTATION (ABOUT KMS WEST OF NAMING).
28 Mar, BRIDGES FROM KM 6h to 66 (AGUSAN-SURIGAO BOUNDARY) UNDER REPAIR.
16 Jun. A NEW 17 KM TRAIL HAS BEEN COMPLETED FROM TULI TO SALAYSAY ALONG NORTH SIDE OF KIBAWE-CALINAN ROAD AND ANOTHER 11 KM TRAIL FROM JUNCTION OF TULI AND SUWAWAN RIVER TO UPIAN MOUNTAINS.
COMPOSITE INTELLIGENCE REPORT
When the Americans landed at Leyte, 20 Oct 1944, they considered sending a force to Surigao, to protect that flank. However, the 6th Army called for a representative of the Tenth Military District, to present facts on that forward and the rear areas as well.
Maj HAROLD A. ROSENQUIST, AC of S, G-2, who had just spent some time in the Surigao area obtaining marine and land mine information before the landing of American forces in Leyte, was dispatched by Col FERTIG to Leyte by PT boat.
A complete report was prepared and submitted to G-2, 6th Army. It is reproduced herewith for it graphically illustrates the intelligence reporting all over the island which made this report possible. On the basis of this report, and the ability of FERTIG’s guerrillas to hold the enemy in check, it was decided not to make a landing in Surigao.
UNITED STATES FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES
Headquarters Tenth Military District
In the Field
7 November 1944
l. Summary Of The Enemy Situation:
a. MINDANAO as a Whole: The Island of MINDANAO is being divided into a forward and a rear area for purposes of discussion, and forward area comprising all territory N of a line running E and W from LIANGA (SURIGAO) to, but not including, CAGAYAN (MISAMIS ORIENTAL), and the rear area comprising the remainder of the Island. As of 30 Oct 1944 enemy strength in MINDANAO was estimated as follows:
AGUSAN 350
BUKIDNON 4,400
COTABATO 16,000
DAVAO 25,000
LANAO 500
MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL 100
MISAMIS ORIENTAL 3,500
SURIGAO 1,800
ZAMBOANGA 5,700
_______
Total 57, 350
be. Enemy Activity in Forward Area: Enemy garrisons as of 30 Oct. were located as follows:
AGUSAN 150
NASIPIT 150
BUTUAN 60
MISAMIS ORIENTAL
TALISAYAN 100
ANAKAN 50
SURIGAO
SURIGAO TOWN 200
MABUHUAY 500
ANAMAR 250
BADAS 100
MADRID 400
TANDAG 100
_____
Total 1,910
Garrisons at NASIPIT, BUTUAN, TANDAG and MADRID are at present confined or being attacked by guerrilla troops of the 119th and ll4th Regt, of the 110th Division. The enemy garrison at ANAKAN was reported as having moved to CAGAYAN by barge. At present those garrisons are on the defensive as a result of the orders from the Headquarters of the Tenth Military District to confine and eliminate them. These guerrillas can contain the enemy by land, but the sea approaches remain open to him; by the use of barges and motor launches the Japs can, therefore, freely move their troops. The enemy garrisons are limited in their function to very short patrols. ‘There are four airfields in the forward area: At SURIGAO, BADAS, MALPOK (near BUTUAN) and ANAKAN (near GINGOOG). These are fighter strips, but they are not in use.
c. Enemy Activity in Rear Area: Since the first of September the Japs have been concentrating on a strong defense of the BUKIDNON VALLEY area, including the SAYRE HIGHWAY leading to DAVAO, COTABATO and CAGAYAN seaports.
Indications were that the Japs moved many troops S (7,000 from SURIGAO during the months of August and September) to establish a highly mobile island reserve straddling the N, S and W approaches to the above named ports. Enemy troops are therefore in a position rapidly to reinforce strategic points as these are threatened except in AGUSAN and SURIGAO. The most recent troop movement was that to the city of KABAKAN (COTABATO) pf approximately 8,000 troops. This movement may account for the sudden drop of 8,000 troops in the strength estimates for BUKIDNON. Besides the movement of 120 truckloads of troops to the N along the SAYRE HIGHWAY, the enemy continues to move troops to the S. According to a PW from the hist Regt, 30th Div, captured at CARAGARA (LEYTE) 31 October, the hist Regt arrived at CAGAYAN 2h October from the S and left CAGAYAN on three unidentified destroyers 26 October, arriving at ORMOC (LEYTE) on 27 October.
In DAVAO PROVINCE the tendency has been to bivouac away from the city, from military installations and other bombing targets; such troops are concentrated in areas to the W of DAVAO CITY near MT APO. No explanation can now be given for the increase in troop strength (an increase of 3,600 during the month of October) in ZAMBOANGA, all concentrated in the vicinity of ZAMBOANGA CITY. Guerrillas occupy or control over three-fourths of this province.
d. Installations, Fortifications, Supplies:
(1) Roads and Trails: When still in control of the AGUSAN and SURIGAO areas, the enemy improved the MAYGATASAN TRAIL, thus providing an outlet from BUTUAN via the AGUSAN RIVER to LIANGA, and at the same time providing an outlet from DAVAO by means-of the National Highway via the AGUSAN RIVER to the MAYGATASAN TRAIL.
(2) Bridges: In the forward area the greater number of the bridges, most covering culverts and small rivers, are either usable or can be replaced. The enemy recently destroyed the bridge between SURIGAO and IPIL (SURIGAO). The large bridge at MAGPAYOS, south of BADAS (AGUSAN), was destroyed by the flood of 20 October. ‘The bridge at SANTIAGO (AGUSAN) is out, one bridge between MADRID and LANUZA. These bridges can be repaired where necessary through the cooperation of the local inhabitants. The small bridges would require little time, the larger much more, for repair, depending upon the available materials.
(3) Fortifications: The usual practice of the enemy is to install barbed wire entanglements, foxholes, and trenches around the garrisoned area. Each garrison has one or more .30 cal MGs covering the main approaches. The recent reports state that there are barbed wire entanglements along the shore from the wharf to the river’s mouth in SURIGAO CITY. There was also an un- confirmed report that land mines are planted on the beach at the mouth of the SURIGAO RIVER. Defensive areas have recently been strengthened from Km 1 to Km 3 (immediately S of the city proper).
(4) Artillery: It has been reported that two 75 mm guns are located within SURIGAO CITY and three at PT BILAA. However, the Japs have recently evacuated PT BILAA and the whereabouts of these guns is not known. A report stated that they had been removed to MADRID but it was not verified.
The Japs make constant and effective use of knee mortars and 8l-mm mortars in keeping guerrilla units at a distance. There are no known AA guns in the forward area.
(5) Armor:
Reports indicate that three tanks are located at BUGO near CAGAYAN.
(6) Underwater Obstacles:
A marine mine field was reported extending from PT BILAA in a northerly direction to a point 100 yards off shore. Boats beyond this point proceeded without escort. Local inhabitants found some floating mines on the E coast shores of SURIGAO. These mines were 1 yard in diameter, with eight acid detonators, were painted black, loaded with citric acid powder, and laid at a depth of from two to three meters. Some mines had red flags to indicate position; they are reported by these inhabitants to break away from their moorings easily.
(7) Supplies:
In SURIGAO PROVINCE only 80% of the Japs are armed, the rest having lost their equipment during large scale bombings of 9 September or being survivors from ships sunk during recent naval battles. In this province the enemy is better equipped with food supplies than in AGUSAN where it had become necessary to rely on local sources, especially on fish from native fishermen.
2. GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES:
During the month of October, following approval of GHQ, SWPA, aggressive action was taken to contain and where possible, to eliminate enemy garrisons. In the forward area at present, as suggested above, the garrisons at NASIPIT and BUTUAN (AGUSAN) are, except for the sea approaches, definitely surrounded. In SURIGAO PROVINCE enemy is being engaged at MADRID, but reinforcements have been received here, and consequently guerrilla activity is limited to harassing attacks only. No large scale offensive action has been taken against the Headquarters garrison at MABUHUAY, principally because of a lack of sufficient mortars and mortar ammunition.
During the first nine months of 1944, a total of 3,916 Japanese were killed by guerrilla forces of the Tenth Military District.
From the time of the original organization of guerrilla units in the Tenth Military District, special emphasis has been placed on the following activities:
a. The establishment of coast watcher systems.
b. The building of intelligence nets for the obtaining of data including facts about troop concentrations and movements, air and water-borne traffic, and airfield installations. Radio communications were installed for the dissemination of such intelligence whenever the equipment was available.
Moreover, the guerrilla units established food projects, and so contributed substantially to the solution of the food problem in a number of areas.
3. ENEMY CAPABILITIES:
The enemy is capable of:
a. Maintaining a static defense of MINDANAO: Although there does not seem to be any logical reason for the Japs to maintain a static defense of MINDANAO, there have been some indications of recent enemy movement to the S. This would seem to indicate that the Japs intend to continue their policy of keeping a mobile inland reserve for the defense of the Island.
b. Defending the N and the NE coasts There have been no indications that the enemy intends to defend the N and the NE coast. Troops have been moved N to CAGAYAN but none has been moved to the E from there. Some enemy troops have been landed along the E coast of SURIGAO PROVINCE at TANDAG and MADRID but these were small in number and some may have been survivors from ships that were sunk.
c. Evacuating troops to BORNEO via ZAMBOANGA: It is possible for the enemy to evacuate his troops to BORNEO via COTABATO and ZAMBOANGA. The constantly fluctuating enemy strength in ZAMBOANGA would suggest that this province has been used as a staging area for troops. Then enemy has been known to stage troops through ZAMBOANGA to COTABATO, and thence to BUKIDNON or DAVAO. Obviously this route could also be used in reverse. During the months of September and October enemy strength in COTABATO PROVINCE increased by approximately 10,000 troops. These probably were scheduled to reinforce the mobile inland reserve in BUKIDNON. It may be that since the American landing on LEYTE they are being held until the enemy can decide which course of action to follow.
d. Moving troops N to CAGAYAN and attempting to reinforce LEYTE: The enemy has already moved the bulk of the List Regt. 30th Div, N to CAGAYAN and by boat to LEYTE. During the last week in October a total of 120 truckloads of Japs were seen moving N to CAGAYAN; these probably were the list Regt and an additional 600 troops that left CAGAYAN by boat for an unknown destination (probably LEYTE). However, there have been no further indications of any attempts to strengthen CAGAYAN or to send troops there from the S.
e. The evacuation of troops by the enemy from CAGAYAN to the WESTERN VISAYAS remains a capability of the enemy, but no reports have been received that would indicate such a maneuver.
/s/ Harold A. Rosenquist
/t/ HAROLD A. ROSENQUIST,
Captain, FA.,
AC of S, G-2
